AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sub-section (8).8. Sub-sections (5), (6), (6-A), (7) and (8) refer to sub-section (2)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 139; and the provisions of this Act
  • Income-tax Officer.(6) For the purposes of sub-section (1),
  • Section 37(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
  • sub-section (3) of Section 143, the Income-tax
  • Section 125 or Section 125-A.12. Section 153
  • Section 143(3).14. A reading of Section 144-B,
  • Section 147, the provisions of Section 144-B
  • sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 153.
  • Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act
  • so.7. Sub-section (2) of Section 139
  • sub-section (1), the Income-tax
  • sub-section (3) of Section 143
  • sub-section (6), the Income-tax
  • sub-section (2) of Section 139.
  • provisions of Section 144-B
  • Section 147, the Income-tax
  • Section 153(2)(b).
  • Section 144-B
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sub-section (8).8. Sub-sections (5), (6), (6-A), (7) and (8) refer to sub-section (2)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 139; and the provisions of this Act
  • Income-tax Officer.(6) For the purposes of sub-section (1),
  • Section 37(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
  • sub-section (3) of Section 143, the Income-tax
  • Section 125 or Section 125-A.12. Section 153
  • Section 143(3).14. A reading of Section 144-B,
  • Section 147, the provisions of Section 144-B
  • sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 153.
  • Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act
  • so.7. Sub-section (2) of Section 139
  • sub-section (1), the Income-tax
  • sub-section (3) of Section 143
  • sub-section (6), the Income-tax
  • sub-section (2) of Section 139.
  • provisions of Section 144-B
  • Section 147, the Income-tax
  • Section 153(2)(b).
  • Section 144-B
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference arises under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act on the question whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the assessments for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 as invalid and without jurisdiction.

The assessee is a firm of contractors. The original assessment for the assessment year 1973-74 was completed on 22-12-1973 on a returned income of Rs. 5,37,780/-. The assessment for the year 1974-75 was completed on 5-11-1975 on a returned income of Rs. 3,28,795/-. These assessments were reopened under Section 147 on the basis of information received from the Judicial Commission of Inquiry (headed by Shri Justice Alladi Kuppuswamy) regarding certain tenders accepted by the assessee-company.

A notice under Section 148 was served on the assessee on 26-3-1978; the last date for finalising the assessment was 26-3-1979 under Section 153(2)(b). The Income-tax Officer made a draft assessment under Section 144-B and referred the draft to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who gave directions on 2-8-1979. The assessment was completed on 10-8-1979 following those directions.

The assessee's contention was that Section 144-B should not have been invoked for a reassessment under Section 147 and that the assessment order dated 10-8-1979 was therefore barred by time. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention and, on the Revenue's instance, referred the question to the court for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the assessments for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 as invalid and without jurisdiction?
  2. Reframed by the court: Whether Section 144-B has no application in respect of assessments and re-assessments made under Section 147?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The statutory regime that follows from issuance of a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 139 is attracted to a notice issued under Section 148 by virtue of the language of Section 148 (“so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that subsection”).
  • Whenever a notice is issued under Section 139(2), the procedures under Section 143(3) are engaged; therefore Section 144-B (which is attracted in assessments under Section 143(3)) may be invoked in reassessment proceedings consequent to a Section 148 notice.

Assessee's Arguments

  • Section 147 is independent of Section 143. Because Section 144-B refers specifically to assessments under Section 143(3) and does not mention Section 147, the classes of assessments falling within the ambit of Section 144-B are excluded from the purview of Section 148 and thus should not apply to reassessments under Section 147.
  • Accordingly, the invocation of Section 144-B led to a time-barred assessment (i.e., the assessment dated 10-8-1979 was said to be barred by time).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Partap Singh v. Director of Enforcement, FER Act (1985) 3 SCC 72 Construction of the phrase “so far as may be” — that provisions of another statute may be followed to the extent possible. The court relied on this authority to support the view that the provisions applicable to a notice under Section 139(2) (so far as possible) apply to a notice under Section 148; thus Section 144-B can be followed in reassessment if not inconsistent.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Smt. Usha Agarwal Family Trust (1989) 178 ITR 406 (P&H) The Punjab & Haryana High Court held, on a literal reading of Section 144-B in isolation, that Section 144-B would not apply to proceedings under Section 147 because Section 147 is not mentioned in Section 144-B. The court considered this precedent and expressly declined to follow it, stating inability to agree with the literalist approach adopted by that court.
CIT v. Simson and MC Conechy Limited (1989) 177 ITR 526 (Madras) The Madras view, grounded on the language of Section 153, assumed exclusion of the time taken for Section 144-B proceedings from re-assessment proceedings under Section 153(2). The court rejected the Madras approach, finding it based on an incorrect reading of Section 153 and Section 148; the court did not accept the Madras High Court's reasoning.
Kerala Kaumudi (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax (1990) 181 ITR 30 (Kerala) The Kerala High Court held that once proceedings under Section 147 are initiated by issuing notice under Section 148 read with Section 139(2), assessment proceedings start afresh and continue until a final order is rendered, implying applicability of Section 144-B. The court expressly agreed with the Kerala High Court's view and adopted its reasoning in concluding that Section 144-B applies to reassessments under Section 147.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by closely examining the relevant statutory provisions as they stood: Section 148, sub-section (2) of Section 139, Section 142, Section 143(3), Section 144 (best judgement assessments), the definition of “assessment” (which includes reassessment), Section 144-B (text and legislative purpose), and Section 153 (time-limits and Explanation I concerning completion periods).

Key steps in the court's analysis:

  1. Textual interaction between Section 148 and sub-section (2) of Section 139: Section 148 provides that when a notice for reassessment is issued, “the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under” Section 139(2). The court treated this cross-reference as operative and important to determine which procedures apply to reassessments.
  2. Nature and purpose of Section 144-B: Section 144-B was enacted following recommendations (Wanchoo Committee) aimed at safeguarding assessees by providing a draft assessment procedure and a role for the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner where proposed variations in income exceed a Board-fixed amount (not less than Rs. 25,000). The procedure under Section 144-B was framed as part of the assessment process under Section 143(3).
  3. Resolution of apparent textual omission: Although Section 144-B references Section 143(3) and does not explicitly mention Section 147, the court emphasized that this omission does not automatically exclude Section 144-B from reassessment proceedings. Under Section 148 the phrase “so far as may be” indicates that the procedural provisions applicable to a Section 139(2) notice apply to a Section 148 notice to the extent they are not inconsistent.
  4. Interpretive aid from precedent: The court relied on Partap Singh (FER Act) for the accepted meaning of “so far as may be” — namely that such provisions “may be generally followed to the extent possible.” This supported the inference that Section 144-B should be followed in reassessments unless there is a direct inconsistency.
  5. Consideration of divergent High Court authorities: The court examined the Punjab & Haryana High Court view (Usha Agarwal Family Trust) and the Madras view (Simson and MC Conechy) which had concluded Section 144-B did not apply to Section 147 proceedings. The court found those views unpersuasive because they read Section 144-B in isolation and did not properly account for Section 148's cross-reference, nor the structure of Section 153. By contrast, the Kerala High Court's view (Kerala Kaumudi) — that reassessment proceedings start afresh and Section 144-B is applicable — aligned with the court's interpretation and was expressly approved.
  6. Final application to facts: Applying these conclusions, the court held that Section 144-B was available for application in the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 initiated by the notice under Section 148. Consequently, the assessment completed on 10-8-1979 (after draft assessment procedure and directions) was within time and valid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the referred question in the negative — i.e., it held that Section 144-B does apply to assessments and re-assessments made under Section 147 (subject to the requirement that the provision is not inconsistent with Section 148). The assessment in question (completed on 10-8-1979 following Section 144-B procedure) was within time and valid. The Tribunal's cancellation of the assessments was held to be unsustainable in law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decision is in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee — the reassessments challenged by the assessee stand upheld as valid and within the prescribed time limits.
  • The court rejected the literalist High Court views that would exclude Section 144-B from reassessment proceedings under Section 147 and instead adopted the view that the procedural safeguards of Section 144-B apply to reassessments unless there is a direct inconsistency with Section 148.
  • No order as to costs: the court directed that there be no costs.
  • Broader precedent-setting: The opinion adopts and applies existing authority on statutory interpretation (notably the meaning of “so far as may be”) and aligns with the Kerala High Court view; the opinion does not elaborate on further broader policy consequences beyond its direct effect on the assessments in dispute.

Reference: Question decided under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act; the court relied on the statutory provisions quoted in the opinion and the cited authorities in reaching its conclusion.

    Commissioner Of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh-I v. Supreme Constructions Company

    1. The question referred for our decision under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act is:

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the assessments for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 as invalid and without jurisdiction?”

    2. The assessee is a firm of contractors. The original assessment for the assessment year 1973-74 was completed on 22-12-1973 on a returned income of Rs. 5,37,780/- and the assessment for the year ???974-75 was completed on 5-11-1975 on a returned income of Rs. 3,28,795/-. The assessments were reopened under Section 147 on the basis of information received from the Judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by Shri Justice Alladi Kuppuswamy as regards certain tenders accepted by the assessee-company. Notice under Section 148 was served on the assessee on 26-3-1978 and the last date for finalising to assessment was 26-3-1979 under Section 153(2)(b). However, the Income-tax Officer made a draft assessment under Section 144-B and referred the matter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who gave the directions on 2-8-1979. The assessment was completed on 10-8-1979 following the directions issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The case of the assessee was that Section 144-B should not have been invoked for a re-assessment under Section 147 and, therefore, the assessment order dated 10-8-1979 was barred by time.

    3. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and, at the instance of the Revenue, referred the question stated above for our decision.

    4. As the question framed does not bring out precisely the matter at issue, we reframe the question in the following terms:

    “Whether Section 144-B has no application in respect of assessments and re-assessments made under Section 147?”

    5. It is the contention of Shri S.R Ashok, learned Counsel for the Revenue, that the entire gamut of statutory provisions that come into play in consequence of issue of a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 139 are attracted to a notice under Section 148. Whenever a notice was issued under Section 139(2), there was no bar for the assessing authority to invoke Section 144-B since that would be attracted by virtue of Section 143(3). Controverting this, Shri Bheemsen, the learned Counsel for the assessee, says that inasmuch as Section 147 is independent of Section 143, the classes of assessments that fall within the ambit of Section 144-B are excluded from the purview of Section 148.

    6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced before us it is useful to notice the relevant provisions as obtaining then. Section 148, which confers power to issue notice where income has escaped assessment, is in the following terms:

    “Issue of notice where income has escaped assessment:— (1) Before making the assessment, re-assessment or recomputation under Section 147, the Income-tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 139; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that subsection.

    (2) The Income-tax Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so.”

    7. sub-section (2) of Section 139 reads as under:

    “In the case of any person who, in the Income-tax Officer's opinion, is assessable under this Act, whether on his own total income or on the total income of any other pe???son during the previous year, the Income-tax Officer may, before the end of the relevant assessment year, issue a notice to him and serve the same upon him requiring him to furnish, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, a return of his income or the income of such other person during the previous years, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be presc???ed;

    Provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for furnishing the return, and, notwithstanding that the date is so extended, interest shall be chargeable in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (8).”

    8. Sub-sections (5), (6), (6-A), (7) and (8) refer to sub-section (2) providing for corrections of errors on filing revised returns. Then comes Section 142 which speaks of enquiry before assessment. The power to make assessment is incorporated in Section 143(3):

    “143(3) On the date specified in the notice issued under sub-section (2), or as soon afterwards as may be, after hearing such evidence as the assessee may produce and such other evidence as the Income-tax Officer may require on specified points, and after taking into account all relevant material which he has gathered,—

    (a) in a case where no assessment has been made under sub-section (1), the Income-tax Officer shall, by an order in writing, make assessment of the total income or loss of the assessee, and determine the sum payable by him or refundable to him on the basis of such assessment;”

    9. If an assessee fails to make a return pursuant to receipt of notice under subsection (2) of Section 139, the assessing authority is empowered to make a best judgment assessment under Section 144. This is the normal procedure for making an assessment. We may also mention that the expression “assessment” as defined by clause (8) of Section 2 reads as follows:

    “assessment” includes reassessment;”

    10. The Government of India had appointed a High Power Committee, headed by Justice Wanchoo, former Chief Justice of India, to study the then existing tax pattern and recommend amendments. One of the recommendations made by the Committee relates to ensuring safeguards to assessees by giving opportunity in the form of reassessment notice. The relevant recommendation is as follows:

    “As regards disputed additions in assessments, a point has been made before us that often decisions are taken by the Income-tax Officer behind the assessee's back and the assessee comes to know of additions and disallowances only after the assessment has been made and an order is received by him. In many cases, the dispute could have been avoided if adequate opportunity had been given to the tax payer to explain the position. We are aware that such situations do frequently arise. To ensure that the assessee gets a reasonable opportunity of meeting the objections of the Income-tax Officer before an assessment is finalised, we recommend that there should be a provision in the law requiring the Income-tax Officer to send a draft assessment order to the assessee, to start with, in all cases where the additions or disallowances proposed to be made in assessment order under sub-section (3) of Section 143 exceed in the aggregate Rs. 25,000/-. Where the tax payer objects to the assessment being made on the basis of the draft order, he should intimate his objections within seven days to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who will, after hearing the assessee and the Income-tax Officer, pass the final order of assessment himself. For this purpose, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should have the power to accept, reduce or enhance the income proposed in the draft order. Such a measure will also ensure that major disputes with the tax payers are settled or dealt with by an Officer higher than that of the Income-tax Officer.”

    11. In consequence of the above recommendation, Section 144-B was enacted. It is in the following terms:

    “Reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in certain cases:— (1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in this Act, where, in an assessment to be made under sub-section (3) of Section 143, the Income-tax Officer proposes to make any variation in the income or loss returned which is prejudicial to the assessee and the amount of such variation exceeds the amount fixed by the Board under sub-section (6), the Income-tax Officer shall, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the assessee.

    (2) On receipt of the draft order, the assessee may forward his objections, if any, to such variation to the Income-tax Officer within seven days of the receipt by him of the draft or within such further period not exceeding fifteen days as the Income-tax Officer may allow on an application made to him in this behalf.

    (3) If no objections are received within the period or the extended period aforesaid, or the assessee intimates to the Income-tax Officer the acceptance of the variation, the Income-tax Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order.

    (4) If any objections are received, the Income-tax Officer shall forward the draft order together with the objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner shall, after considering the draft order and the objections and after going through (wherever necessary) the records relating to the draft order, issue, in respect of the matters covered by the objections, such directions as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Income-tax Officer to enable him to complete the assessment:

    Provided that no directions which are prejudicial to the assessee shall be issued under this sub-section before an opportunity is given to the assessee to be heard.

    (5) Every direction issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (4) shall be binding on the Income-tax Officer.

    (6) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Board may, having regard to the proper and efficient management of the work of assessment, by order, fix, from time to time, such amount as it deems fit;

    Provided that different amounts may be fixed for different years:

    Provided further that the amount fixed under this sub-section shall, in no case, be less than twenty five thousand rupees.

    (7) Nothing in this section shall apply to a case where an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises the powers or performs the functions Of an Income-tax Officer in pursuance of an order made under Section 125 or Section 125-A.”

    12. Section 153 provides for time-limit for completion of assessments and reassessments. Item (iv) of explanation I lays down that within 180 days proceedings under Section 144-B shall be completed in cases where the assessee has submitted objections. In other cases, the time-limit prescribed is thirty days.

    13. From a reading of the relevant statutory provisions extracted supra, it appears to be fairly clear that whenever a notice was issued under Section 148 by the assessing officer, the provisions of the Act, so far as may be, would come into play as if the notice issued was a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 139. What needs to be considered in this context is whether Section 144-B is one of the statutory provisions that are attracted in cases where a notice was issued under Section 139(2)? Whenever a notice was issued under Section 139(2), an enquiry is held under Section 142 and an assessment is made under Section 143. In assessments made under Sec. 143, it is specifically laid down by Sec. 144-B that the draft assessment procedure should be followed. It would thus appear that the procedure laid down by Section 144-B is part of the procedure contemplated under Section 143(3).

    14. A reading of Section 144-B, at first sight, may give the impression that assessment or re-assessment proceedings under Section 147 are outside its purview since it mentions only Section 143(3). Such a construction ignores the specific language employed in Section 148 under which the assessing authority gets power to issue notice for re-opening the assessments under Section 147. As already noticed, Section 148 lays down that the provisions of the Act shall, so far as may be, apply to a reassessment made under Section 147. The phrase ‘so far as may be’ implies that if there is anything inconsistent in the statutory provisions that come into play pursuant to a notice under Section 139(2), to the extent of that inconsistency resort cannot be made to any other section of the Act. By necessary implication, we must conclude that Section 144-B not being inconsistent with Section 148, that procedure has to be followed in an assessment or reassessment under Section 147. In Partap Singh v. Director of Enforcement, FER Act 1985 3 SCC 72 the expression “so far as may be” came up for consideration. Section 37(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act obligates the officer issuing a search warrant, to record in writing, the grounds of his belief. Sub-section (2) provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to searches shall, so far as may be, apply to searches under that section, subject to certain modifications. The Supreme Court observed:

    “The expression ‘so far as may be’ has always been construed to mean that those provisions may be generally followed to the extent possible.”

    15. In Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Smt. Usha Agarwal Family Trust. 1989 178 ITR 406 P & H, the question for consideration before the Punjab and Haryana High Court was: Whether in respect of assessments made under Section 147, the provisions of Section 144-B were applicable? The Punjab and Haryana High Court, on a literal interpretation of Section 144-B, in isolation and without referring to Section 148, has held that it would not apply to Section 147 proceedings because Section 147 is not mentioned in Section 144-B. With great respect, we are unable to follow that view. The Madras view, as contained in CIT v. Simson and MC Conechy Limited 1989 177 ITR 526., is based upon the language of Section 153 which provides for separate limitations for assessments and re-assessments. The Madras High Court has assumed that exclusion of the time taken for Section 144-B proceedings as incorporated in clause (iv) of explanation 1 to Section 153 will not apply to re assessment proceedings under Section 153(2). But the opening words of exaplantion 1 of Section 153, “In computing the period of limitation for purposes of this section……”refer to assessments and re-assessments under sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 153. Moreover, under Section 147, assessmentcan be made, for the first time also, in cases where no return was filed and no assessment has been made earlier and information had reached the assessing authority that income assessable to tax has escaped assessment. We, therefore, with great respect, are unable to agree with the Madras view.

    16. A contrary view was taken by the Kerala High Court in Kerala Kaumudi (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax. 1990 181 ITR 30.. After referring to the relevant case-law on this question, the Kerala High Court observed:

    “A survey of the above decisions establishes that there can be only one assessment for each year, that once proceedings under Section 147 of the Act are initiated by issuing a notice under Section 148 read with Section 139(2) of the Act, the assessment proceedings start afresh, and that the proceedings for assessment of that year will be pending and will continue until a final order of assessment is rendered.”

    17. We respectfully agree with the Kerala view. We, therefore, conclude that, without reference to Section 143(3), re-assessment cannot be made under Section 147 and, by virtue of the specific language employed in Section 148, there is no embargo for the assessing authority to invoke the provisions of Section 144-B introduced for the protection of the assessee by providing for a pre-assessment notice. We, therefore, hold that the assessment in question was within time. The view taken by the Tribunal is unsustainable in law. The question referred for our decision is answered in the negative, i.e, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Commissioner Of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh-I v. Supreme Constructions Company
    (Mar 1, 1994)