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Case Number

Special Appeal No. 1 of 1980

Advocates

For the Appellant: M. Suryanarayana Murthy, Y. Rathnakar, Advocates.

Judges

B.P Jeevan Reddy
Upendralal Waghray, JJ.

Acts

section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provision contained in section 5 of that Act
SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.
sub-section (5) of section 253 or section 5 of the Limitation Act.
provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act
SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
SECTION 3 LIMITATION ACT
appeal.5. Sub-section (1) of section 269G
LIMITATION ACT 1963
provisions contained in section 29(2).
section 29(2) of the Limitation Act
INCOME TAX ACT
Criminal Procedure. Section 29(2)
sub-section (5) of section 253.11.
Tenancy Act applying section 5;
sub-section (4) of section 269-1),
sub-section (5) of section 253
INCOME TAX ACT

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant purchased a rice mill by a registered sale deed dated 31 August 1974 for Rs. 46,000. A notice under section 269D(1) of the Income-tax Act commenced acquisition proceedings under section 269C on the ground that the consideration in the instrument was more than 15% below the fair market value and not the true consideration. The appellant filed objections; however, on 6 December 1978 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (the competent authority) passed an order under section 269F(6) acquiring the property. A copy of that order was served on the appellant on 26 December 1978.

The appellant preferred a memorandum of appeal by registered post on 2 February 1979, received by the Appellate Tribunal on 7 February 1979. On 22 March 1979 the appellant applied to the Tribunal to admit the late appeal by extending time under the proviso to section 269G(1) read with section 5 of the Limitation Act and filed an affidavit explaining a 13-day delay. The Tribunal, by order dated 30 April 1979, held that it had no power to condone the delay and rejected the appeal. The appellant brought the present special appeal under section 269H of the Income-tax Act.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has the power to admit an appeal preferred beyond the period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of section 269G of the Income-tax Act (i.e., to condone delay where the appeal is filed after the prescribed period and no application for extension was made before expiry).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant contended that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provision contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act applies; therefore the Tribunal has power to condone delay on sufficient cause (relying on decisions of the Punjab & Haryana and Madhya Pradesh High Courts — Manoj Ahuja and CIT v. Trilokinath).
It was further argued that because the property vests in the Central Government only after possession is taken (sub-section (4) of section 269-1), the affected party should have the right to prefer an appeal so long as the property has not vested in the Government.
Finally, counsel urged that to avoid injustice the court should adopt a construction that permits the Tribunal to condone delay, relying on Supreme Court authorities permitting deviation from literal language to avoid absurd or unjust results (K.P. Varghese, American Home Products, State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union).

Tribunal's Position (as described in the opinion)

The Tribunal held, and the order records, that it had no power to condone the delay in the absence of an application for extension filed before the expiry of the prescribed period under the proviso to section 269G(1), and therefore rejected the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Manoj Ahuja v. IAC of I.T. (Acquisition Range), [1984] 150 ITR 696 (Punjab & Haryana High Court)	Held that sections 4 to 24 (including section 5) of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under the Income-tax Act by virtue of section 29(2).	Noted as an authority relied upon by the appellant; the court rejected this view as contrary to Supreme Court authority that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals.
CIT v. Trilokinath, [1984] 147 ITR 613 (Madhya Pradesh High Court)	Same proposition as above — section 5 of the Limitation Act applies by virtue of section 29(2).	Noted as an authority relied upon by the appellant; the court disagreed with this approach, holding it conflicted with Supreme Court decisions.
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1969) 1 SCC 873 (AIR 1969 SC 1335)	Authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings in courts and not to proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities.	Relied upon as part of a line of Supreme Court authority supporting the conclusion that the Limitation Act does not apply to tribunals.
Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1969) 2 SCC 199 (AIR 1970 SC 209)	Supports the principle that the Limitation Act applies only to courts, not to tribunals.	Used as part of the Supreme Court authorities the bench relied upon to reject the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to the Tribunal.
Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 1 SCC 361 (AIR 1976 SC 177)	Further authority that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies.	Referenced among the consistent Supreme Court decisions establishing that principle and relied upon by the court.
Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 (AIR 1985 SC 1279)	Explains and affirms that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals; that section 29(2) does not, by itself, extend the Limitation Act to tribunals; and that a special statute must expressly make section 5 applicable to confer such power on a non-court appellate authority.	Treated as the decisive Supreme Court authority endorsing the proposition that tribunals do not have section 5 powers unless the special statute expressly provides it; used to reject the appellant's reliance on section 29(2).
K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao, AIR 1978 AP 166 (Division Bench decision of this Court)	Held that an appellate authority under a special statute (not being a court) has no power to condone delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act where the special statute contains no provision making section 5 applicable.	Noted as a decision approved by the Supreme Court (in Sakuru v. Tanaji) and relied upon in the discussion to demonstrate consistency of authority.
IAC (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwalla, [1982] 133 ITR 746 (Patna High Court)	Held that the Tribunal has no power to extend the period prescribed for filing an appeal under section 269G(1).	Observed by the court: the Patna High Court reached the same conclusion as the present court (though by different reasoning); the present court noted the consonance of result.
K.P. Varghese v. ITO, [1981] 131 ITR 597	Authority for the principle that where literal construction produces a manifestly absurd or unjust result, the court may depart from the literal language to avoid such result.	Cited by appellant to urge a purposive construction permitting condonation of delay; the court considered the argument but rejected it as not warranting rewriting the statutory proviso.
American Home Products Corporation v. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 465 (AIR 1986 SC 137)	Another authority on avoiding manifestly absurd consequences by appropriate construction of statute.	Cited by appellant for the same purposive-construction argument; the court rejected its application in this matter.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd., [1986] 62 STC 272	Also cited for the proposition that courts may avoid unjust or absurd results by departing from normal rules of construction in appropriate cases.	Relied upon by the appellant but not accepted by the court as a basis for rewriting the statutory proviso in section 269G(1).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by focusing on the plain text of sub-section (1) of section 269G and its proviso. The proviso permits the Appellate Tribunal to allow an appeal to be presented within a further specified period only if:

an application for extension is made before the expiry of the prescribed period (forty-five or thirty days as applicable), and
the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period.

The court contrasted this special provision with sub-section (5) of section 253 (a provision elsewhere in the Income-tax Act), which explicitly empowers the Appellate Tribunal to admit appeals after the prescribed period if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause — a power similar to section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The court emphasized that Chapter XX-A (which contains section 269G) contains a distinct, deliberately framed mechanism for extension: an application must be made before expiry of the prescribed period. In the present case the appeal was filed 13 days late and no application for extension had been made before the expiry of the prescribed period; accordingly, on the plain wording the appeal was time-barred.

The appellant's principal contention — that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes section 5 of that Act applicable to proceedings under the Income-tax Act, thereby allowing the Tribunal to condone delay — was considered and rejected. The court relied on a line of Supreme Court authority culminating in Sakuru v. Tanaji which holds that the Limitation Act applies only to "courts" and not to quasi-judicial tribunals, unless a special statute expressly makes particular provisions of the Limitation Act applicable. The court read section 29(2) as not having the effect of extending the Limitation Act to tribunals and observed that the statutory language in Chapter XX-A does not incorporate section 5 of the Limitation Act for the Tribunal.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the right to appeal should continue until the property vests in the Central Government under section 269-1(4). It held the prescribed limitation periods in section 269G(1) and its proviso are independent of the question of vesting of title and thus vesting has no bearing on the limitation question before the court.

The court addressed the appellant's plea to depart from literal statutory language to avoid injustice (relying on authorities permitting such construction). It held that no amount of interpretive "twisting" could convert the clear proviso in section 269G(1) into a provision equivalent to section 253(5) or section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court further observed that Parliament, when enacting Chapter XX-A, must be taken to have known of section 253(5) and deliberately chose a different regime; courts must not rewrite that legislative choice.

The court noted that a Patna High Court decision (IAC (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwalla) reached the same result (that the Tribunal has no power to extend the period under section 269G(1)), albeit by different reasoning, and treated that concurrence of result as supportive of the conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The special appeal is dismissed. The court's core ruling is: the Appellate Tribunal does not have power to admit an appeal filed after the period prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 269G where no application for extension was filed before the expiry of that period; accordingly the late appeal is barred.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's special appeal fails and is dismissed (without costs), leaving the Tribunal's order rejecting the late appeal intact.
Scope of the decision: The court applied established Supreme Court authority that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to quasi-judicial tribunals unless a special statute expressly makes particular provisions of the Limitation Act applicable. The decision enforces the literal operation of the statutory proviso in section 269G(1) and confirms that, under Chapter XX-A, Parliament provided a distinct mechanism for extension that does not permit condonation after expiry in the absence of a timely application.
The court expressly refused to rewrite the statute to import powers akin to section 253(5) or section 5 of the Limitation Act into section 269G(1).

The opinion applies established authorities to the facts and does not purport to create a novel principle beyond affirming that the Appellate Tribunal cannot condone delay under section 269G(1) where the procedural precondition of a pre-expiry application is not met.

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B. Subba Rao v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax

B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.:— In this special appeal preferred under section 269H of the Income-tax Act, the only question for consideration is whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has the power to admit an appeal preferred beyond the period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of section 269G of the Act.

2. The appellant purchased a rice mill under a registered sale deed dated August 31, 1974, for a consideration of Rs. 46,000 A notice under section 269D(1) of the Act was served upon the appellant, thereby initiating proceedings under section 269C for acquisition of the said rice mill, on the ground that the apparent consideration, recorded in the instrument of transfer was less than the fair market value by more than 15%. It was alleged that the consideration mentioned in the sale deed is not the true consideration that passed between the parties. The appellant submitted his objections; but, by his order dated December 6, 1978, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Acquisition Range (competent authority), passed an order under section 269F(6) acquiring the said property. The copy of the order was served upon the appellant on December 26, 1978.

3. Against the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, the appellant submitted a memorandum of appeal, through registered post, on February 2, 1979, which was received in the office of the Tribunal on February 7, 1979. On March 22, 1979, the appellant filed an application before the Tribunal to receive and entertain the said appeal by extending time under the proviso to section 269G(1) read with section 5 of the Limitation Act.

4. An affidavit was also filed by the appellant setting out the circumstances in which he could not prefer the appeal within the time prescribed and for the delay of 13 days in preferring the appeal. The Tribunal, however, held, by its order dated April 30, 1979, that it has no power to condone the delay and accordingly rejected the appeal. Thereupon, the appellant preferred the present appeal.

5. Sub-section (1) of section 269G reads as follows:

“An appeal may be preferred to the Appellate Tribunal against the order for the acquisition of any immovable property made by the competent authority under section 269F,—

(a) by the transferor or the transferee or any other person referred to in sub-section (8) of that section, within a period of forty-five days from the date of such order or a period of thirty days from the date of service of a copy of the order on such person under the said sub-section, whichever period expires later;

(b) by any other person interested in such immovable property, within forty-five days from the date of such order:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf before the expiry of the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days, permit, by order, the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein if the applicant satisfies the Appellate Tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days.”

6. A perusal of the proviso would immediately disclose that in the matter of an appeal under this sub-section, the Act has made a departure from section 253, which provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal against the orders passed under various sections of the Act. sub-section (5) of section 253 expressly confers upon the Appellate Tribunal the power to admit an appeal, after the expiry of the prescribed period, if it is satisfied that there was-sufficient cause for not presenting it within the period prescribed. This is a power akin to section 5 of the Limitation Act. But when it came to section 269G, it made a clear departure. According to this provision, an appeal has to be preferred either within forty-five days of the date of order of the competent authority, or within thirty days of the date of service of a copy of the order, whichever is later. The only manner in which the said period can be extended is by the proposed appellant submitting an application before the expiry of the prescribed period for extending the time for filing the appeal, and if the Appellate Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for him for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period, it would extend the time for such period as it may think appropriate. This is a provision totally different from the one contained in sub-section (5) of section 253 or section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this case, admittedly, the appeal preferred by the appellant is 13 days beyond the prescribed period and it is also admitted that no application was filed by the appellant before the expiry of the prescribed period for extending the time nor was any order made thereon extending the time for filing the appeal. The appeal must, therefore, be held to be clearly barred.

7. Mr. Y. Ratnakar, learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provision contained in section 5 of that Act becomes applicable and the Tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal for sufficient cause. He relied upon the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana and Madhya Pradesh High Courts, respectively, in Manoj Ahuja v. IAC of I.T (Acquisition Range), [1984] 150 ITR 696 and CIT v. Trilokinath, [1984] 147 ITR 613. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that inasmuch as neither section 269F nor any other provision in the Act excludes the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to applications and appeals filed under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act, section 5 of the Limitation Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in section 29(2). The Madhya Pradesh High Court also has taken the same view. We are, however, of the opinion that the view taken by these two High Courts is contrary to the various decisions of the Supreme Court in which it has been repeatedly held that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and has no application to quasi-judicial tribunals. This view has consistently been taken by the Supreme Court commencing from its decisions in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR 1969 SC 1335; 36 FJR 177; Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209; 36 FJR 324 and Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1976 SC 177. We do not, however, think it necessary to refer to all the said decisions since it would be sufficient to refer to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 : AIR 1985 SC 1279. The said decision arises from a judgment of this court wherein they have approved a Bench decision of this court in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao, AIR 1978 AP 166. The matter had arisen before the Bench under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The question was whether the appellate authority under the Act has power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Division Bench of this court took the view that it has no such power because the Limitation Act applies only to civil courts, and not to tribunals, and also because there is no provision in that Act making section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings under that Act. It was, however, held that so far as the revision to the High Court provided by the Act is concerned, the High Court being a civil court has power to extend the period under section 5 of the Limitation Act. This decision was expressly approved by the Supreme Court and it made the following observations ((1985) 3 SCC 590 : AIR 1985 SC 1279, 1280, para. 3):

“After hearing both sides, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah's case, AIR 1978 AP 166, is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this court in Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, [1970] 1 SCR 51; (1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR 1969 SC 1335; 36 FJR 177; Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, [1970] 1 SCR 396, (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209; 36 FJR 324 and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, [1976] 2 SCR 845; (1976) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1976 SC 177, that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, apply only to proceedings in ‘courts’ and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under section 90 of the Act not being a court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation, the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings.”

8. The Supreme Court then proceeded to examine whether there is any provision in the Tenancy Act applying section 5; it found that there is none. Accordingly, it held that section 5 does not apply and the appellate authority has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The said decision clearly holds that the Limitation Act applies only to civil courts and not to quasi-judicial tribunals, even though such tribunals may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. Section 29(2) does not have the effect of extending the application of the Limitation Act to tribunals. It only says that where a different period of limitation is prescribed by any special enactment or local law, the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 shall apply unless expressly excluded by such special or local law. This provision applies only to proceedings before a civil court and not before a quasi-judicial tribunal. For the above reasons, it is not possible for us to agree with the aforesaid decisions of the Punjab and Haryana and Madhya Pradesh High Courts.

9. Mr. Ratnakar, learned counsel for the appellant, then contended that inasmuch as the property vests in the Central Government only after the possession of the property acquired is taken (see sub-section (4) of section 269-1), the affected party must be held to have the right to prefer an appeal so long as the property does not so vest in the Central Government. We are unable to appreciate this argument. The period of limitation prescribed by sub-section (1) of section 269G and the proviso contained therein are not dependent upon, nor have they any intrinsic link with the vesting of the property under sub-section (4) of section 269-1. May be that by a mere passing of the order under sub-section (6) of section 269F, the property does not Vest in the Central Government and that it vests in it only after possession is taken, but this aspect, in our opinion, has no relevance on the question at issue herein. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Patna High Court in I AC (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwalla, [1982] 133 ITR 746, wherein it has been held that the Tribunal has no power to extend the period prescribed for filing an appeal under section 269G(1). But, we must say the reasoning behind this conclusion is altogether different from the one given by us hereinbefore. The reasoning of the Patna High Court is that the application of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is excluded by the context, viz., that Chapter XX-A of the Income-tax Act is a self-contained Code. It is not necessary for us to deal with this point of view inasmuch as, according to us, section 29(2) cannot have the effect of applying the Limitation Act to tribunals, and if so, the question of its exclusion by the context would not arise. Suffice it to note that the conclusion arrived at by the Patna High Court accords with our conclusion.

10. Mr. Ratnakar then contended that if the Tribunal is held to have no such power, injustice may result in several cases, and that we should, with a view to avoid such a consequence, be prepared to do violence to the language in the statute and so construe the Act as to deduce such a power. He relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in K.P Varghese v. ITO, [1981] 131 ITR 597 (at page 606); American Home Products Corporation v. Mac Laboratories Private Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 465 : AIR 1986 SC 137 and State Of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd.., [1986] 62 STC 272, wherein it has been held that where by applying the normal rule of construction, a manifestly absurd or unjust result emerges, the court should avoid such a result, if necessary by doing some violence to the language. The idea behind the said rule is to avoid manifestly absurd consequences. We are, however, unable to see any room for applying the said theory herein. By no amount of twisting can we construe the proviso as empowering the Tribunal to entertain an appeal beyond the prescribed period where no application for extension is filed within the prescribed period. We do not think that the said rule of interpretation empowers us to mutilate the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 269G and to rewrite the same in terms of subsection (5) of section 253 or section 5 of the Limitation Act. We cannot forget that section 253(5) and the said proviso occur in the same enactment and that Parliament must be presumed to know of sub-section (5) of section 253 when it introduced Chapter XX-A into the said Act in 1972. The conclusion is inescapable that Parliament wanted to provide a different provision and they made a deliberate and conscious departure from sub-section (5) of section 253.

11. For the above reasons, the special appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.

B. Subba Rao v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax

Judgment Summary — B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Tribunal's Position (as described in the opinion)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

B. Subba Rao v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax

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