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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 (for brief the Taxation Act).
  • section 2(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (for brief the Act)
  • section 3 read with section 4 of the Taxation Act
  • rule 213 of the A.P Motor Vehicles Rules
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • section 3(2) of the Taxation Act.4.
  • section 3(1) of the Taxation Act
  • section 12 of the Taxation Act
  • section 3 read with section 4
  • section 6 of the Taxation Act,
  • Sub-section (2) of section 3
  • Sub-rule IV condition (vii)
  • Taxation Act. Section 2(h)
  • journey.5. Section 2(33)
  • section. Section 3(2)
  • Act. Section 3(1)
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 (for brief the Taxation Act).
  • section 2(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (for brief the Act)
  • section 3 read with section 4 of the Taxation Act
  • rule 213 of the A.P Motor Vehicles Rules
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • section 3(2) of the Taxation Act.4.
  • section 3(1) of the Taxation Act
  • section 12 of the Taxation Act
  • section 3 read with section 4
  • section 6 of the Taxation Act,
  • Sub-section (2) of section 3
  • Sub-rule IV condition (vii)
  • Taxation Act. Section 2(h)
  • journey.5. Section 2(33)
  • section. Section 3(2)
  • Act. Section 3(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These matters were referred to a Full Bench because a Division Bench considered prior authority on whether a vehicle registered as a contract carriage could be treated as a stage carriage to attract a higher tax rate had produced inconsistent decisions. The specific factual matrix concerns a contract carriage (registration AAA 1999) which was stopped by a Motor Vehicles Inspector on 25-9-1984 while carrying 49 adult passengers on the Tadipatri–Anantapur route. All passengers boarded at Tadipatri bus-stand and paid individual fares of Rs. 5 each. The trip sheet did not show any express or implied contract for the hire of the vehicle as a whole. On the basis of the check report the Regional Transport Officer (RTO) concluded that the vehicle had been misused as a stage carriage and issued a demand for the difference in tax — Rs. 2,750 for the quarter ending 30-9-1984. The registered owner challenged the demand by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Full Bench heard the matter to decide the legal question whether and when a contract carriage is to be treated as a stage carriage for taxation purposes and whether a valid stage-carriage permit is necessary to levy tax at the stage-carriage rate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When is a "contract carriage" (as defined in section 2(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) to be treated as a "stage carriage" (section 2(29)) so as to attract the higher tax rate notified under section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963?
  2. Is it necessary, for the levy of tax at the stage-carriage rate, that the owner hold a valid permit authorising use of the vehicle as a stage carriage?
  3. What is the proper legal test for distinguishing between use as a contract carriage and use as a stage carriage (i.e., which facts determine classification: the nature of the permit or the actual user)?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The mere fact that individual fares were collected from passengers does not convert a contract carriage into a stage carriage.
  • To treat a contract carriage as a stage carriage for tax purposes it is necessary that the owner hold a valid permit authorising the vehicle to ply as a stage carriage.
  • The petitioners held permits only to ply as contract carriages between two fixed termini; on the facts all passengers travelled only between those termini and no passengers were picked up en route — therefore the vehicle remained a contract carriage despite collection of separate fares (often done for convenience).
  • Because no statutory appeal is provided against an order of levy of tax based on a change of user, the High Court should re-examine the evidence in the interests of justice to correct arbitrary action by checking officers (i.e., petitioner asked the court to reassess facts despite limited appellate provisions).

Respondent / Transport Authorities' Position

  • The Motor Vehicles Inspector concluded that there was no express or implied prior contract to hire the vehicle as a whole and that individual fares were taken; on this factual basis the vehicle was being used as a stage carriage.
  • The Regional Transport Officer treated the vehicle as having been misused as a stage carriage and levied the difference in tax (Rs. 2,750) for the relevant quarter.
  • Administrative action for breach of permit conditions (e.g., under section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act) is a separate remedy and does not preclude levy of tax based on actual user under the Taxation Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
W.P. No. 6127 of 1970 and W.A. No. 131 of 1972 (unreported) The principal requirement for classification as a contract carriage is the existence of a prior contract (express or implied) for the use of the vehicle as a whole for a fixed amount; collection of individual fares for convenience does not defeat such a contract. The Full Bench relied on these decisions to support the proposition that the presence of individual fare collection does not necessarily convert a legitimately contracted vehicle into a stage carriage where a single prior contract for the vehicle as a whole exists.
Y. Venkata Subbamma v. Regional Transport Officer, Krishna, AIR 1971 Andh Pra 414 To qualify as a contract carriage the vehicle must be used as a whole at a fixed or agreed rate under a single contract; the definition excludes two or more contracts by different parties for the same vehicle. The Court cited this authority for the proposition that the contract contemplated by section 2(3) must be one contract and the vehicle's use must be as a whole; this supports the Full Bench's interpretive framework.
Roshan Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 991 Explained the distinction: contract carriage is engaged for the whole journey for hire and has no right to pick up passengers en route; stage carriage runs between points and is boarded by passengers on route who pay for the distance. The Court invoked this Supreme Court decision to elucidate the essential difference between contract and stage carriage and to inform the statutory interpretation used in the present case.
W.P. No. 898 of 1972; W.A. No. 943 of 1973; W.A. No. 17 of 1977 Where there was a specific prior agreement to hire a vehicle as a whole for a fixed sum (example: Babu Rao engaged vehicle for Rs. 400), the vehicle was a contract carriage. The Full Bench observed these authorities confirmed that when a prior agreement is proved the vehicle is a contract carriage; the Court found these cases were not persuasive for the petitioners because those facts showed an actual prior contract.
W.P. No. 3714 of 1982 (Division Bench) This Division Bench had held that the essential condition for plying as a stage carriage was that passengers must have been picked up or set down on route; the court stated collection of separate fares alone was not decisive. The Full Bench expressly disagreed with this limited view, finding it inconsistent with the plain language of the contract-carriage definition and declined to follow that aspect of the decision.
Y. Peda Venkaiah v. The Regional Transport Officer, Nellore, AIR 1977 Andh Pra 227 (Full Bench) Tax under the Taxation Act is levied by reference to the nature of the use of the vehicle (section 3 and section 4); if the class of vehicle changes during the licence period by reason of use, the rate applicable to the new class is attracted without need for a fresh levy provision. The Full Bench relied on and expressly agreed with this earlier Full Bench reasoning that tax follows the actual class of use and does not depend on the permit originally held by the owner.
AIR 1970 SC 992 (cited regarding Article 226 jurisdiction) High Courts exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 will not act as courts of appeal and re-evaluate evidence to upset findings of fact. The Court applied this Supreme Court principle to refuse the petitioners' request that the High Court reappraise and substitute its view for the factual findings of the transport authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded by first closely parsing the statutory definitions in the Motor Vehicles Act (1939) relevant to the classification question:

  • Section 2(3) defines "contract carriage" — a vehicle hired as a whole under an express or implied contract for a fixed or agreed sum (time basis or point-to-point) and used without stopping to pick up or set down passengers not included in the contract; the definition also explicitly includes motor cabs even if passengers pay separately.
  • Section 2(29) defines "stage carriage" — a vehicle carrying more than six persons excluding driver and which carries passengers for hire at separate fares paid by individual passengers either for the whole journey or for stages.

From these definitions the Court drew the following legal propositions and applied them to the facts:

  1. The crucial determinant of classification is the actual user of the vehicle, not merely the permit issued to the owner. A permit authorises use as either a contract carriage or stage carriage, but it is the nature of the user that attracts tax under the Taxation Act.
  2. The dominant/fundamental element of a contract carriage is that a single prior contract (express or implied) exists for the hire of the vehicle as a whole for a fixed sum; the existence of the single contract manifests that a single person or party exercises full control of the vehicle for the trip.
  3. Collection of individual fares for convenience does not, in itself, negate a prior contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole. The statute itself includes motor cabs where passengers may pay separate fares within the contract-carriage definition.
  4. Conversely, where there is no single contract and several passengers separately contract for carriage and pay individual fares — with no leader/party exercising control — the vehicle's use falls within the statutory definition of stage carriage.
  5. The Taxation Act (section 3 read with section 4) permits the State to levy tax by reference to the class of vehicle as used. If the class of use changes during a tax/licence period, the tax rate applicable to the new class becomes attracted without any need for an express further statutory provision permitting a fresh levy; permit status is not determinative for tax levy.
  6. Administrative remedies for breach of permit conditions (e.g., cancellation or suspension under section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act) are distinct from the levy of tax based on actual user; the Act does not prohibit concurrent taxation where permit conditions are breached.
  7. The Court declined to follow the narrow view in the Division Bench decision (W.P. No. 3714 of 1982) which required picking up passengers en route as an essential condition for stage carriage; the Full Bench held that such a requirement is inconsistent with the plain statutory language.
  8. Applying these principles to the facts — the transport authorities found no single prior contract and that individual fares were collected — the Full Bench concluded that the vehicle had been used as a stage carriage, thereby attracting the higher tax rate notified under the Taxation Act.
  9. The Court also noted that it would not reappraise factual findings under Article 226 and act as an appellate tribunal; however, it recommended that section 12 of the Taxation Act be amended to provide an appeal remedy against levies grounded on alleged misuse of vehicles.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ petitions dismissed. The Full Bench held that, on the admitted findings of the transport authorities that there was no single prior contract for hire of the vehicle as a whole and that individual fares were collected, the contract carriage was being used as an unauthorised stage carriage and thus attracted levy of tax as a stage carriage for the relevant period.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The demand made by the Regional Transport Officer (difference of Rs. 2,750 for the quarter ending 30-9-1984) stands on the factual finding that the vehicle was used as a stage carriage; the writ petitions were dismissed and costs were ordered (advocate's fee Rs. 150 in each petition).
  • Legal implication: Tax liability under the Taxation Act depends on the actual user of the vehicle (contract carriage vs stage carriage) rather than the permit held by the owner. If the class of use changes during a licence period, the tax applicable to the new class is attracted without need for a separate statutory provision authorising a fresh levy.
  • Procedural/administrative implication: The Court clarified that action under the Motor Vehicles Act for breach of permit conditions (e.g., cancellation or suspension under section 60) is separate from tax levy proceedings under the Taxation Act; both remedies can co-exist.
  • Remedial recommendation: The Court recommended amendment of section 12 of the Taxation Act to create an appellate remedy against levies based on alleged misuse of vehicles so that aggrieved parties can seek reassessment of evidence before an appellate authority. A copy of the order was to be sent to the Secretary to Government, Transport Department for necessary action.
  • Scope of review by High Court: The Full Bench reaffirmed the settled principle (citing Supreme Court authority) that the High Court will not, in exercise of Article 226, act as a court of appeal and reappraise evidence to overturn findings of fact made by the statutory authorities.

Disposition: Petitions dismissed. Oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused on the stated ground that no substantial question of law of general importance arose.

    V. Govindarajulu And Etc. v. The Regional Transport Officer, Anantapur And Others

    P. Chennakesav Reddi, A.C.J:— These cases raise a vexed question of considerable importance, frequently faced by the transport authorities and owners of public service vehicles and agitated before the Courts. The question is when is a ‘contract carriage’ as defined under section 2(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (for brief ‘the Act’) said to have been used as a ‘stage carriage’ as defined under section 2(29) of the Act in order to attract the levy and demand of the increased rate of tax for a stage carriage as notified under section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 (for brief ‘the Taxation Act’). Is it necessary for the levy of tax as a stage carriage that the owner of the public service vehicle should hold a valid permit to ply it as a stage carriage? When one of the cases, W.P No. 15820 of 1984 came up for hearing before Jeevan Reddy and Sardar Ali Khan, JJ., the learned Judges felt that the course of judicial authority on the question had not been steady but teetered particularly after the Division Bench decision of this Court in W.P No. 3714 of 1982 and it was therefore not only desirable but necessary to have an authoritative pronouncement on this question by a Full Bench of this Court. Accordingly they referred this case and cases involving similar question to the Full Bench. That is how these cases have been posted now before us.

    2. Before we proceed to answer the question, the short and relevant facts provoking the vexed question may usefully be set out: The contract carriage AAA 1999 was found carrying 49 adult passengers in all from Tadipatri to Anantapur. It was stopped and checked by the Motor Vehicles Inspector, Anantapur on 25-9-1984 at 4.00 P.M near Singanamala tank on Anantapur — Tadipatri road. All the passengers boarded the vehicle at Tadipatri bus-stand. They paid an individual fare of Rs. 5/- each. All the passengers did not belong to a single party and each was travelling on his own work. The trip sheet maintained in the bus did not indicate any contract, express or implied, between the passengers and the owner of the contract carriage. Therefore, the Motor Vehicles Inspector came to the conclusion that the vehicle was misused as a stage carriage by collecting individual fares. On the basis of the check report submitted by the Motor Vehicles Inspector, Anantapur, the Regional Transport Officer issued a show-cause notice to the registered owner of the contract carriage AAA 1999 to show cause within seven days from the date of receipt of the said notice as to why the maximum tax of Rs. 11,500/- applicable to a stage carriage should not be collected from him for the quarter ending with 30-9-1984. The registered owner submitted his explanation. He stated in his explanation that the Regional Transport Authority had issued a notice for taking action under section 60 of the Act for the said alleged offence and requested the Regional Transport Officer to await the decision of the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Officer on a consideration of the report of the checking officer found that the contract carriage had been misused as a stage carriage holding that all the passengers that boarded the contract carriage paid individual fare of Rs. 5/-, that there was no express or implied contract between the passengers and the contract carriage owner and that the list of passengers maintained did not tally with the passengers that were actually found travelling in the bus. The registered owner was therefore directed to pay the difference of Rs. 2750/- for the quarter ending 30-9-1984 being the difference in tax payable when the vehicle is used is a contract carriage and the tax payable when the vehicle is used as a stage carriage. Aggrieved against the said decision, the owner of the contract carriage filed the writ petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    3. Broadly stated the question that therefore pre-eminently comes to the fore is when can a contract carriage — a public service vehicle, be classified as a stage carriage to attract the higher rate of tax payable on a stage carriage under the notification issued by the State Government under section 3(2) of the Taxation Act.

    4. In order to answer the question, it is necessary to look at the relevant provisions of the Act and scrutinise the structure of taxation. ‘Contract carriage’ is defined under section 2(3) of the Act as follows:

    “contract carriage means a motor vehicle which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum

    (i) on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance, or

    (ii) from one point to another, and in either case without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract; and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fare.”

    Section 2(15) defines ‘motor cab’ to mean any motor vehicle constructed, adapted or used to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver, for hire or reward. ‘Permit’ is defined under section 2(20) of the. Act to mean the document issued by the Commission or a State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage, or stage carriage, or athorising the owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle. Section 2(24) defines ‘public place’ to mean a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage. Section 2(25) defines ‘public service vehicle’ to mean any motor vehicle, used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage. Lastly we come to the definition of ‘stage carriage’ under section 2(29) which is as follows:

    “‘stage carriage’ means a motor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey.”

    5. Section 2(33) defines ‘transport vehicle’ to mean a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle.

    6. Sections 46 to 48 deal with the procedure for the grant of stage carriage permits and the conditions subject to which a stage carriage permit could be granted by a Regional Transport Authority. Sections 49 to 51 deal with the procedure for the grant of a contract carriage permit and the conditions subject to which a permit can be granted Section 57 prescribes the procedure to be observed in applying for and granting stage carriage or contract carriage permits. Section 59 enumerates the general conditions that are applicable to the holder of any permit Section 60 invests the transport authority which granted the permit with the power to cancel or suspend the permit for violation of any of the conditions enumerated therein.

    7. It would be clear from a combined reading of the definitions of ‘contract carriage’, ‘stage carriage’, ‘permit’, ‘public service vehicle’ and ‘transport vehicle’ that a contract carriage and a stage carriage are public service vehicles used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward. A contract carriage or a stage carriage can be used as a transport vehicle under a permit granted by the State or Regional Transport Authority. The permit is for the use of the transport vehicle as a contract carriage or as a stage carriage. Now the distinction between a contract carriage and a stage carriage is clearly drawn in the definition of ‘contract carriage’ under section 2(3) and ‘stage carriage’ under section 2(29) of the Act. The definition of ‘contract carriage’ is plain and the language not too elastic and wide so as to bring within its sweep, a situation never intended by the Legislature. A transport vehicle is a contract carriage when the vehicle as a whole is hired for a fixed or agreed sum under a contract express or implied by a passenger or passengers from one point to another or on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route, and in either case without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract. On the other hand, in the case of a ‘stage carriage’ a transport vehicle is not hired as a whole and only separate fares are collected from individual passengers either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey and the restrictions relating to a contract carriage use of the vehicle as a whole for a fixed sum and the journey between two points without a right to pick up passengers on route or set down passengers are not there. In this context rule 213 of the A.P Motor Vehicles Rules which lays down additional conditions for the permits becomes relevent. Sub-rule IV condition (vii) makes it obligatory for the owner of a contract carriage to maintain a list of passengers travelling in the vehicle in the form prescribed therein in respect of each trip and such list shall be produced before the checking officer on demand by him. Thus, it is clear that the dominant factor that determines whether a transport vehicle is plied as a contract carriage or as a stage carriage is the actual user of the vehicle and not the permit granted authorising the use.

    8. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended: The mere fact that individual fares were collected from the passengers does not make the vehicle a stage carriage. There must be a valid permit for the use of the vehicle as a stage carriage. The valid permit held by the petitioners in these cases was only for the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage and to ply between two fixed places and all the passengers who travelled in the vehicle were travelling only between those two places and no passenger was picked up on the way and the user of the vehicle was as a contract carriage and not as a stage carriage. It is essential for a contract carriage to be classified as a stage carriage, that the contract carriage should be able to pick up or set down along the line of the route passengers not included in the contract. If no passengers were picked up or set down along the line of the route, the vehicle cannot be classified as a stage carriage. This contention, in our view, ignores the essential part of the definition of ‘contract carriage’, namely, that the contract, express or implied, to use the vehicle must be as a whole for a fixed sum. The essential condition is that a single party or person should be exercising full control for the use of the vehicle. In other words, was there a single contract in respect of the vehicle as a whole? If there is no single contract in respect of the vehicle and if no person or leader of the party could exercise full control of the vehicle and several passengers have separately contracted for the use of the vehicle and pay individual fares, such a transport vehicle cannot fall within the definition of contract carriage. But if there is a prior contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole with the owner, the mere fact that individual fares were collected by the leader of the party from the passengers does not make the vehicle a stage carriage. Though a contract carriage and a stage carriage are public service vehicles as defined under section 2(25) of the Act, it is in the nature of the user that the distinction between the two types of transport vehicles is drawn.

    9. We may now usefully refer to the judicial precedents on the question.

    10. The view expressed by us above is supported by the unreported decisions of this Court in W.P No. 6127 of 1970 and W.A No. 131 of 1972 preferred against the order in W.P No. 6127 of 1970. In these two decisions the learned Judges held that the main requirement to fall within the ambit of the definition of ‘contract carriage’ is whether the prior contract, express or implied, entered into by passenger or passengers was for the use of the vehicle as a whole for a fixed amount. It was also observed by Kuppuswami, J., (as he then was) that

    “It is true that if once a contract is entered into expressly or impliedly to have the use of the vehicle as a whole, from the mere fact that for convenience fares were collected individually from the passengers which is often in vogue, the vehicle will not cease to be a contract carriage.”

    11. The learned Judge further observed that the definition of ‘contract carriage’ to include a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares also strengthens or lends assurance to the conclusion that collection of individual fares is not permitted in a contract carriage. The contract must be for the use of the vehicle as a whole for a fixed amount.

    12. Kondaiah, J., (as he then was) in Y. Venkata Subbamma v. Regional Transport Officer, Krishna AIR 1971 Andh Pra 414 held that in order to bring a transport vehicle within the definition of contract carriage, the use of the vehicle must be as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum under a contract express or implied without stopping to pick passenger not included in the contract. The learned Judge further observed that

    “The contract contemplated under section 2(3) must be only one contract and the use of the vehicle must also be as a whole. It does not admit two or more contracts for the purpose of use of the vehicle as a contract carriage by different parties.”

    13. The Supreme Court in Roshan Lal v. State of U.P, AIR 1965 SC 991 pointed out the distinction between a contract carriage and a stage carriage as defined under section 2(3) and 2(29) thus

    “contract carriage is engaged for the whole of the journey between two points for carriage of a person or persons hiring it, but it has not the right to pick up other passengers eh route. The stage carriage, on the other hand, runs between two points irrespective of any prior contract and it is boarded by passengers on route who pay the fare for the distance they propose to travel.”

    14 Thus, the essential difference between a contract carriage and a stage carriage is that in the former there is a prior contract between the passenger or passengers for the use of the vehicle as a whole for a fixed or agreed sum while in the latter there is absence of such a prior contract and the passengers board the bus on route and pay the fare for the distance they propose to travel.

    15. The unreported decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P No. 898 of 1972 and W.A No. 943 of 1973 preferred against the decision in W.P No. 898 of 1972 and W.A No. 17 of 1977 in which decision in W.A No. 943 of 1973 was followed, are not of much assistance to the learned counsel. In W.P No. 898 of 1972 undoubtedly there was a prior agreement entered into by one Babu Rao to take a party of persons from Vijayawada to Hyderabad and back and the vehicle was engaged as a whole for hire for a fixed amount of Rs. 400/-. Therefore, the learned Judge rightly held that the transport vehicle was used as a contract carriage. In W.A No. 943 of 1973, the decision in W.P No. 898 of 1972 was merely affirmed and in W.A No. 17 of 1977 the decision in W.A No. 943 of 1973 was followed. The learned counsel, however, submits that there was a discordant note struck from the earlier decision in W.P No. 6127 of 1970 and W.A No. 131 of 1972 in W.P No. 3714 of 1982 by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Madhava Reddy, A.C.J, and Punnayya, J. It is true that in that case the learned Judges observed that

    “The essential condition for holding that a motor vehicle was plying as a stage carriage is that it should have picked up passengers or set down passengers on route. So long as all the passengers were picked up at the starting point, in this case at Bangalore and were set down at the last point, i.e, Madras, and were not set down anywhere on route, the contract carriage which was permitted to proceed from Bangalore to Madras with 35 passengers cannot be said to have plied as a stage carriage. Suffice to refer to a judgment of this Court in W.A No. 17 of 1977. Our learned brother Ramachandra Rao, J., speaking for the Bench held: The mere fact that individual fares were collected from the passengers did not lead to the conclusion that the contract carriage was used as a stage carriage.”

    16. With great respect to the learned Judges we find it difficult to agree with the statement of law made that the essential condition for holding that a motor vehicle was plying as a stage carriage is that it should have picked up passengers on route. Such limited operation of the definition of contract carriage is not permissible on the plain language employed in the definition.

    17. Then the question is whether the mere user of a contract carriage as a stage carriage attracts the liability to pay the tax payable on a stage carriage. Is it essential that only when the owner plies a transport vehicle under a permit issued by the competent authority authorising the owner to use it as a stage carriage under section 48 of the Act that tax authorities can levy tax on the footing that the vehicle was a stage carriage.

    18. Let us therefore examine the structure of the Taxation Act. Section 2(h) defines ‘Tax’ ‘to mean tax leviable under the Act’. Section 3(1) empowers the State Government to levy tax on every motor vehicle used or kept for use in a public place in the State by notification from time to time. Sub-section (2) of section 3 provides that the notification issued under sub-section (1) shall specify the class of motor vehicles on which the rates for the periods at which and the date from which the tax shall be levied. Thus, section 3 clearly states that it is the nature of the use of the vehicle that attracts the levy of tax on a motor vehicle. The question of permit being essential for the levy of tax is wholly irrelevant under section 3(1). The only question to be asked is what is the nature of the use of the motor vehicle? Is it used or kept for use as a contract carriage or as a stage carriage and not whether the owner of the vehicle is having a permit for its use as a contract carriage or as a stage carriage. The nature of permit for use of the transport vehicle as a contract carriage or stage carriage by the owner is not the real determinant for the levy and collection of the tax.

    19. It may be noticed from the definition of ‘public service vehicle’ and ‘permit’ that it is for the use of the vehicle as a stage carriage or as a contract carriage that a permit is granted. If a transport vehicle is found to have been used as a stage carriage, tax is levied on the basis of the use of the transport vehicle. A Full Bench of this Court in Y. Peda Venkaiah… v. The Regional Transport Officer, Nellore…., Nellore AIR 1977 Andh Pra 227 had occasion to consider the very same question. Alladi Kuppuswami, J., (as he then was) repelling the contention that once a vehicle was registered as a contract carriage and tax was paid on that footing there is no provision in the Act which enables the authorities to levy tax again on the vehicle as a stage carriage if it is found to have been used as a stage carriage and that the petitioner may be liable for action under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act for contravening the conditions of the permit which enabled him to use the vehicle as a contract carriage observed that

    “This submission in our view proceeds upon a misconception of the true scope of the Act. Section 3 of the Act authorises the Government to levy tax on every vehicle used or kept for use in a public place in the State by means of a notification issued under that section. Section 3(2) provides that the notification shall specify the class of motor vehicle on which the rates for the period at which and the date from which the tax shall be levied. In view of this provision, the Government is authorised to levy different rates of tax on different classes of vehicles and it has accordingly done so. Further, section 4 provides that tax levied shall be paid in advance either quarterly, half-yearly or annually on a licence to be taken out by the owner of the vehicle. If, therefore, at the beginning of the quarter, the vehicle belongs to a particular class referred to in that notification tax is levied on that footing and an entry is made in the certificate of registration to that effect. But it does not follow that if the class of vehicle is changed during the quarter by reason of the use it was put to tax cannot be levied according to the class to which the vehicle then belongs. As soon as the class of the vehicle is changed, the rate of tax which applies to that class according to the notification is automatically attracted. There is no need for the Act to provide specifically that if there is a change in the class of vehicle, the authorities can levy, tax afresh on that vehicle as belonging to that class. The power contained in section 3 read with section 4 is sufficient to enable the Government to levy the tax from time to time when the class of the vehicle is changed.”

    20. We entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Judges.

    21. There remains lastly the contention that for violation of any of the conditions of the permit granted under section 51 or the conditions imposed under section 59, only action can be taken for cancellation or suspension of the permit under section 60 of the Act and no tax can be demanded. As already pointed out, tax is levied on the user of the vehicle and action under section 60 is taken for the breach of any of the conditions of the permit. There is no prohibition in the Act for the levy and collection of tax as authorised under section 3(1) of the Taxation Act in case action is taken for the breach of any of the conditions of the permit. The two actions are quite different — one for the breach of the conditions of the permit and the other for the user of the vehicle.

    22. To sum up our conclusions

    (1) The definition of ‘contract carriage’ under section 2(3) of the Act is plain and the language is not so elastic and wide so as to bring within its sweep a situation never intended by the Legislature.

    (2) The dominant factor under the definition that determines whether a transport vehicle is used as a contract carriage or as a stage carriage is whether the vehicle is hired as a whole for a fixed or agreed sum under a prior contract, express or implied, by a single person or party with the owner of the vehicle.

    (3) If once a single contract is entered into expressly or impliedly for the use of the vehicle as a whole, from the mere fact that the leader of the contracting party or one of the persons in the party collected fares from the passengers, which is very often in vogue, the vehicle cannot be said to have been used as a stage carriage,

    (4) If there was no single contract with the owner in respect of the vehicle and if no person or leader of the party could exercise full control over the vehicle and several passengers had separately contracted for the use of the vehicle and paid individual fares, the transport vehicle used in such manner falls within the definition of ‘stage carriage’ and not ‘contract carriage’,

    (5) Tax is levied on the basis of the use of the transport vehicle and not on the nature of the permit held by the owner in respect of the vehicle and the power contained in section 3 read with section 4 of the Taxation Act is sufficient to enable the State Government to levy the tax from time to time when the nature of the use of the vehicle is changed and the class of the motor vehicle is thereby altered, and

    (6) There is no prohibition in the Act for the levy and collection of tax as authorised under section 3(1) of the Taxation Act in cases where action is taken for the breach of any of the conditions of the permit against the holder of the permit under section 60 of the Act. The two actions are quite different — one for the user of the vehicle and the other for the breach of the conditions of the permit.

    23. Now turning to the facts, it is the clear and categorical finding of the Transport Authorities that there was no single contract with the owner of the contract carriage for the use of the vehicle as a whole and individual fare was collected from each passenger. On such a finding, the only right conclusion, applying the aforesaid principles, that can be reasonably reached is that the contract carriage was unauthorisedly used as a stage carriage and thereby attracted the levy of tax as a stage carriage.

    24. The learned counsel however submitted that an appeal is provided for under section 12 of the Taxation Act against an order of levy of penalty under section 6 of the Taxation Act, that no appeal is provided for against an order of levy of tax on the basis of change in the user or in the classification of the vehicle and that therefore this Court in the interests of justice could and should reexamine the evidence and arrest the of arbitrary and high-handed action of the checking officers. It is now firmly settled that this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution will not act as a Court of Appeal and embark upon any evaluation of the evidence on record and upset a finding of fact. (vide AIR 1970 SC 992). We are, however, positively of the opinion that section 12 should be suitably amended so as to confer a right of appeal on an aggrieved person against levy of tax on the ground of alleged misuse of the motor vehicle so that the appellate authority could reassess the evidence and reverse or modify the levy made by the lower authority. A copy of this order shall be communicated to the Secretary to Government, Transport Department, for necessary action.

    25. In the upshot, the Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150/- in each.

    26. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P Nos. 6979/82 and 11703/83 makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our considered opinion no substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court arises in these cases. The oral request is, therefore, rejected

    Petitions dismissed.

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    V. Govindarajulu And Etc. v. The Regional Transport Officer, Anantapur And Others
    (Aug 6, 1985)