Ramachandra Raju, J.:— The appeal is directed against the decree and Judgment dismissing O.S No. 33/79 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Sangareddy, a suit filed for partition of the properties, belonging to the estate of one late S.M Ghouse, who died on 9-1-1979, due to a fatal accident, while working as a Lineman in the State Electricity Board at Siddipet.
2. The parties are referred to according to their position in the suit. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are respectively the father and mother of late S.M Ghouse. The said Ghouse married one Razia Begum through whom, three daughters plaintiffs 3 to 5 all minors are born to him. On the death of Razia Begum in the year 1972. S.M Ghouse married the 1st defendant as his second wife. Defendant 2 is his son through defendant 1. Defendant 3 is the posthumous daughter of S.M Ghouse by the second marriage. Various amounts, detailed as items 1 to 16 of the plaint schedule, belong to the estate of late. S.M Ghouse either as amounts standing to his credit or which became payable consequent on his death. Item 7 of the plaint Schedule involving an amount of Rs. 16.08 ps. relates to the arrears of salary due to late S.M Ghouse for the period 1-1-1979 to 9-1-1979. Item 9 involving an amount of Rs. 16-37 related to the arrears due, on account of medical aid. It is common ground that, subsequent to the death of late S.M Ghouse, defendant 1 drew these amounts covered by items 7, 9 and 10 involving the total amount of Rs. 57-45 ps.
3. Shortly thereafter, disputes arose between the parties because of the claim for a share made by plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the plaint schedule property. Defendant 1 by notice dated 21-6-1979 denied the rights of the plaintiff and the suit, out of which this appeal had arisen, was filed on 26-7-1979, claiming partition. Defendants 4 to 8 impleaded in the suit are the officers who were, by the date of suit, in custody of the various items, listed out in the plaint schedule.
4. The suit was resisted by defendants 1 to 3 on various grounds. It is firstly submitted that there is a conflict of interest between plaintiff 1 who is representing plaintiffs 3 to 5 as a next friend and plaintiffs 3 to 5 and there is, therefore, no proper representation for plaintiffs 3 to 5 in the suit. It is submitted secondly that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not dependant-parents and they are not, therefore, entitled to claim any share. It is then submitted that the nominees under the life Insurance Corporation policies covered by items 1 and 2 of the schedule are alone entitled to be paid the amounts, to the exclusion of all other legal heirs and that, similarly, the family benefit fund covered by item No. 5 and the gratuity covered by item No. 6 are payable oniy to defendant 1 and the children of S.M Ghouse and that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not entitled to claim any share in those amounts.
5. Defendant 4 Life Insurance Corporation has given particulars, with reference to the individual policies covered by items 1 to 3 and pleaded that the Corporation is prepared to pay the claim amounts to any person as the Court directs, but such payment would arise only when the Corporation decides to admit the claim, after compliance with the requirements of the Corporation to its satisfaction. Defendant-bank 7 is concerned with items 14 and 15. The bank made a counter claim for the repayment by the legal heirs of the loan borrowed by S.M Ghouse on the security of item 15 of the plaint schedule. Defendant 8 who is concerned with item 16 of the plaint schedule denied the claim made by plaintiffs 1 and 2 but otherwise did not dispute the right of plaintiffs 3 to 5 and defendants 1 to 3 receive that amount. Defendants 5 and 6 remained ex parte.
On issue No. 1:—
“Whether the amounts mentioned in the plaint schedule are the matruka and liable for partition.”
the learned Subordinate Judge held that the schedule properties accruing to the estate, after the death of S.M Ghouse, are not matruka properties and, therefore, not liable for partition.
Under issue No. 2:—
“Whether the personal law of plaintiffs 1 and 2 applies to the suit schedule amounts.”
the learned Subordinate Judge found that the personal law is not applicable but the payment should be made in accordance with the nominations made by late S.M Ghouse: On issue No. 3:
“Whether plaintiffs 1 and 2 are dependants on the deceased S.M Ghouse and if so, to what extent they are entitled.”
The learned Subordinate Judge found that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not dependants and, therefore, they are not entitled to claim any share in the suit schedule properties. On issue No. 4:
“What is the balance amount available out of special term deposit after deducting the loan taken by late S.M Ghouse from defendant No. 7 and who is entitled to receive it”
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the said amount is available from defendant 7 who shall however, decide for itself according to law the amount payable in respect of the said special term deposit. He found defendants 4 to 8 to be necessary parties to the suit, but, nonetheless, observed that the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties in as much as all the legal heirs and residuaries are not included in the array of either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiffs have, therefore, preferred this appeal, questioning the correctness of the various findings.
6. During the pendency of this appeal, by an order dated 25-2-1981 made in C.M.P No. 2264/81, defendants 1 to 3 were permitted to withdraw 19/48th share of the amount lying with defendants 4 to 8 and they were prohibited by an interim injunction restraining them from withdrawing the balance 29/48th share of such amounts. By a subsequent order made on 16-4-1981, in the said C.M.P and C.M.P No. 4790/81, defendants 4 to 8 were directed to remit the entire amount, lying with them in the trial court, to the credit of O.S No. 33/79 on its file. The trial Court, after such deposit is made, was directed to pay 19/48th share of that amount to defendants 1 to 3. The balance amount was directed to be kept in deposit until further orders. It would appear that, consequent on this direction, some amounts have been deposited. By an order dated 30-3-1983 made in C.M.P No. 2783/83, the trial Court was directed to invest the balance amount lying to the credit of the suit in a nationalised bank for an initial period of 37 months.
7. The various items of the plaint schedule can be conveniently clubbed and disposed of. Items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule form en-group, as they relate to amounts covered by individual Life Insurance Corporation policies. The written statement filed by defendant 4 discloses that there is no nominee, in respect of item 1, and that defendant 1 is the nominee in respect of item No. 2 and under rules in force, item No. 3 is assigned in favour of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. In the written statement filed by the 1st defendant, she pleaded that, in respect of item No. 1 of the schedule the original nominee was late Razia Begum, the first wife of S.M Ghouse. After the death of the said Razia Begum, S.M Ghouse has not made any other nomination and, therefore, one has to proceed that, in respect of item 1 of the schedule, there is no nomination. The plea put forward by defendants 1 to 3 that payment should be made to defendant 1 in terms of the nomination made in respect of item 2 of the plaint schedule, is no longer tenable, after the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, AIR 1984 SC 340 (Para 12) which laid down:
“A mere nomination made under S. 39, does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.”
In view of this decision, Mr. Azizullah Khan, learned counsel appearing for defedants 1 to 3, did not dispute the right of the plaintiffs to claim a share in those amounts, in accordance with the principles of law of succession, by which the parties are governed.
8. It is however, submitted that the monies, which became payable in terms of the policies, after the death of S.M Ghouse did not form part of his estate, which could devolve on the legal heirs. The insurance is a contract between the insurer and the assured. Under the contract, the assured is entitled to a certain benefit, that is, to the payment of a definite amount. The contract, together with the benefit arising under it, forms part of his assets. The benefit secured by the policy, therefor forms part of the estate of the deceased policy holder. In Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad, AIR 1972 All 167 (FB) observations to a similar effect were made. The learned Subordinate Judge is in clear error in holding that the amount, which became payable after the death of late S.M Ghouse, did not form part of his estate. We, therefore, repel this submission.
9. Mr. Azizullah Khan is not right in placing any reliance on the observations made in B.M Mundkur v. L.I.C of India, AIR 1977 Mad 72 to submit that the nominee under the policy is entitled to receive the amount in her own right. That was a case which considered the effect of S. 44 of the Insurance Act which provided for the right of the nominee to receive the commission payable to a deceased agent. The nomination in terms of S. 44 could also be made in favour of a social or charitable institution. The learned Judge, therefore, held that the proviso contemplates a nomination under which the money itself could be paid to such institution as owner thereof and it could not have been contemplated that such social or charitable institutions were constituted merely as agents to receive the money on behalf of the estate of the deceased with an obligation to pay it over to such estate. In Sarbati Devi's case (AIR 1984 SC 346) (supra) the Supreme Court considered B.M Mundkur's case (supra) as well and observed that no analogy could be drawn between S. 39 and S. 44(2) of the Insurance Act.
10. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 as parents, plaintiffs 3 to 5 and defendant 3 as daughters and defendant 1 as the widow of late S.M Ghouse inherit the estate as sharers. Defendant 2, the only son, inherits as a residuary. There is no dispute that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are each entitled to a 1/6th share, defendant 1 is entitled to a 1/8th share and plaintiffs 3 to 5 and defendant 3 are each entitled to a 13/144th share and defendant 2 is entitled to a 26/144 share in the estate of late S.M Ghouse. The learned Subordinate Judge is in clear error in saying that the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of all the legal heirs and residuaries. All the sharers and the residuary who were entitled to succeed to the estate of late S.M Ghouse, have been impleaded in the suit and there is no need to implead anybody else who, under the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance, had no right at all to succeed to the estate of late S.M Ghouse in any manner.
11. Item 16, which relates to the balance of provident fund to the credit of late. S.M Ghouse focms a separate category. Late S.M Ghouse was a member of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952. He, however, did not give any declaration under para 61 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, nominating any member of his family to receive the provident fund, accumulations standing to his credit in the event of his death. In the absence of any nomination and, when there is no dispute that this amount forms part of the estate of late S.M Ghouse, the succession to this item has to be decided with reference to the material provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme 1952. The following provisions in that scheme become material (only material portions extracted). Para 2(g) defines “family” as menaing in the case of a male member, his wife, his children and his dependent parents. Para 61 of the scheme provides for nomination. In terms of that para each member shall make in his declaration in Form-2, a nomination conferring the right to receive the amount that may stand to his credit in the fund in the event of his death, before the amount standing to his credit has become payable, or where the amount has become payable; before the payment has been made. A member may in his nomination, distribute the amount that may stand to his credit in the fund amongst his nominees, at his own discretion. If a member has a family, at the time of making a nomination, the nomination shall be in favour of one or more persons, belonging to his family. Any nomination made by such member in favour of a person not belonging to his family, shall be invalid. As, in this case, no such nomination has been made, we need not notice the further provisions made in this para. Para 70(ii) of the scheme provides for the disbursement of the provident fund accumulations, in cases where there is no nomination:
“If no nomination subsists the amount shall become payable to the members of his family in equal shares. A member's posthumous child, if born alive, shall be treated in the same way as a surviving child born before the member's death.”
The learned Subordinate Judge, found on an appreciation of the evidence, that plaintiffs 1 and 2 have not established that they are dependent-parents. We have been taken through the evidence. Plaintiff 1 who gave evidence as P.W 1 did not say anything that he or plaintiff 2 was a dependent-parent. We, therefore, confirm the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that plaintiffs 1 and 2 do not answer the description of dependent-parents.
12. The more important question is, whether succession to this asset, stands to be governed by the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance, whether there was a nomination or no nomination. The answer depends on the real intendment of the special provisions made in the Employees Provident Fund Act 1952 or the Employees Provident Funds Scheme, 1952; and the meaning to be given to the word ‘payable’ which occurs in para 70 of the Scheme. Accumulated balances, in the Provident Fund, represent in the majority of cases, the life savings of an employee. If there is a valid nomination, it is payable to the nominee. If there is no nomination, it becomes payable in equal shares, amongst the various members, who fall in the ambit of ‘Family’, as defined in the scheme. Does the nominee in the one case or the member of the family in the other case acquire an exclusive right to appropriate the amount paid to him as an asset belonging to him.? In our view, the word ‘payable’ cannot be interpreted to mean that the payee gets an absolute right over such amounts to the exclusion of the other heirs to the estate of the deceased. To illustrate, ‘A’ nominated his second wife and when he died, he left a provident fund asset of Rs. One lakh and some children by his two wives. Surely A's wife cannot claim to be entitled to the entire amount to the exclusion of A's children. The same principles ought to govern amounts paid to persons in a case of ‘No nomination’ such persons cannot be put on a higher footing than a ‘nominee’. We are of the definite view that, in respect of provident fund amounts, the same principles, as were laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi's case (AIR 1984 SC 346) (supra) should be applied.
13. Prior to the Amendment of 1946, S. 5 of the Provident Funds Act (1925), in its material terms, and dealing with a case of nomination provided “Any nomination which purports to confer upon any person the right to receive the whole or any part of such sum on the death of the subscriber shall be deemed to confer such right absolutely.” There was a conflict of judicial opinion whether the nominee who has the exclusive right to receive payment takes the amount to be enjoyed by him absolutely or only receives the amount, subject to the rights of the legal heirs of the deceased subscriber. By the amendment of 1946, the word ‘absolutely’ occurring hitherto in S. 5 was omitted. After the Amendment of 1946, S. 5 of the Provident Funds Act (1925) was reading in its material terms “where any nomination purports to confer upon any person the right to receive the whole or any part of such sum on the death of the subscriber occurring before the sum has become payable or before the sum, having become payable, has been paid, the said person shall on the death of the subscriber become entitled to the exclusion of all other persons, to receive such sum.” The amendment in our view, sought to put an end to the conflict of judicial opinion and to favour the view that the nominee has, after the amendment only the right to receive the amount which had become payable, without any legislative expression, that such nominee has any right as such to enjoy the money merely on the basis of such nomination.
14. It is however regrettable that, even after the amendment, the conflict in judicial opinion continued to persist. We consider it unnecessary to consider in detail the decisions rendered prior to the 1946 Amendment. M. Mon Singh…(Third ), v. Mothi Bai…(Petitioner), .*, AIR 1936 Mad 477 which was followed in Sitarama Swamy v. Venkatarama Rao, (1944) 1 Mad LJ 198 : (AIR 1944 Mad 370 (1)) and Somayajulu v. Somi Devi, AIR 1950 Mad 210 favoured the view that a nominee acquires an absolute right to enjoy the fund. The contrary view was tersely expressed in Noor Mahomed v. Sardar Khatun, AIR 1949 Sind 38 is “The use of the word “absolutely” has not the effect of conferring on the nominee a title to the exclusive ownership of the deposit”.
15. We now proceed to consider a few decisions rendered, after the Amendment of 1946, which came into force on 18-4-1946. In Narayanan v. Aesha, AIR 1964 Ker 197 the learned Judge held that the rights of a nominee of a Provident Fund are analogous to the rights of a nominee under S. 39 of the Insurance Act.
16. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Malati v. Dharma Rao, AIR 1968 Orissa 8 merely adopted the view expressed by the Madras High Court, in the decisions rendered on the basis of the wording used in S. 5, prior to the Amending Act of 1946. S. 5 of the Act as amended, was no doubt extracted but we find no discussion as to the effect of the amendment on the divergent opinions expressed by different High Courts on the language of S. 5, before and after the amendment. After raising the question “Whether the money received becomes the absolute property of the nominee or continues to remain the property of the deceased so as to be available for distribution amongst his heirs in accordance with the personal law” the learned Judges felt the weight of the opinion is in favour of the former and proceeded further to say that there is nothing in S. 3, 4 or 5 to indicate the contrary that the nominee receives the amount for the benefits of the heirs or dependents.
17. Section 3 of the Act merely provides for protection of compulsory deposits both during the life time of the subscriber or after his death, when the fund vests in the dependent. S. 4 of the Act provides for repayments and S. 5 provides for the rights of nominees. These various provisions have to be read together and with the other provisions of the provident fund Act. The Act makes provision in the interests of certain large classes of employees for a scheme of compulsory and to a limited extent voluntary thrift. Its intention is that such people in case of their retirement have something to live on, in case of death, have something to leave. In the majority of cases, accumulated balances in the provident fund represent the life savings of the employees. Provision for making a nomination is made to fecilitate quick repayment so that the nominee gives a valid acquittance for the amount paid to him as such nominee. S. 5 of the Act therefore provided that the nominee shall become entitled, to the exclusion of all other persons, to receive such sum. The Act had only provided for the exclusive right of the nominee to receive and did not provide that the same shall become the absolute property of the nominee. Prior to the 1946 Amendment, the word “absolutely” occurring in S. 5 contributed to the divergence of opinions. After the 1946 Amendment, the view expressed by the Madras High Court and shared by other High Courts has become obsolete. Malati's case (AIR 1968 Orissa 8) (supra) in our view does not lay down the correct legal position. We dissent from that view.
18. Hardev Kaur v. Jodh Singh, AIR 1969 Punjab 44 accepted the latter view and, in our view, rightly on the question raised in Malati's case (supra). That however related to a case of an invalid nomination made by the deceased subscriber in favour of his father but in whose favour, the deceased subscriber also left a valid will.
19. Ekbote J. (as he then was) in Talupulu v. Narasamma, AIR 1967 Andh Pra 10 subscribed himself to the view expressed in Malati's case (supra) in a case decided ex parte by following Stanley Martin's case AIR 1939 Cal 642 without any discussion. This view was later followed in Lalitha v. Ranganayakamma (1975) 2 APLJ (HC) 168 by another single Judge of this Court. We have carefully analysed the facts in Stanley Martin's case.
20. Stanley Martin, a railway employee, died on 3-12-1938. He left behind a child Ian Martin, a sister Miss Lumsden, a brother Joseph Martin, his mother and Rs. 19,600/- in his provident fund account amongst some other assets which are not material. Concerning the provident fund, Stanley Martin nominated his child represented during her minority by guardian Miss Lumsden, under the will, Stanley Martin bequeathed all his property to his mother and brother and provided only a sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards the education and wants of his child Ian Martin. When Miss Lumsden was trying to withdraw the provident fund as the constituted guardian of the minor nominee, Joseph Martin applied in the testamentary jurisdiction for letters of administration and sought a temporary injunction to restrain Miss Lumsden from withdrawing the provident fund. The learned Judge held that no question regarding title to property can be decided in such an application and that O. 39 R. 1, CPC is inapplicable. Purporting then to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of a chartered High Court, the learned Judge, while granting the temporary injunction, concerning the amount of Rs. 19,600 by saying that the said amount did not form part of the estate of the deceased and it cannot be disposed of by the deceased in his will. It can at once be seen that the case arose, before the amendment of Sec. 5 and the view of the Calcutta High Court, was largely rested on the word ‘absolutely’ appearing in the preamended section. It is not therefore correct to place any reliance on Stanley Martin's case and apply that law to a case, arising after the 1946 Amendment. We accordingly hold that the law is not correctly stated in Talupulu's case (supra).
21. In Lalitha's case (1975 (2) APLJ (HC) 168) (supra), one ‘Pantulu’ died on 29-5-60. His second wife, Ranganayakamma, was the nominee in respect of the provident fund. In repelling the claim made by the other heirs for their share, the learned Judge merely followed Talupulu's case and Stanley Martin's case and some decisions rendered, prior to the Amendment of 1946. We hold that the law is not correctly stated in Lalitha's case either.
22. Jayalaxmi v. Lakshmi Ammal, (1978) 2 Serv LR 736 : (1978 Lab IC 1470) (Mad) dealt with a situation where the adulterous wife of the deceased subscriber was not permitted to get at the provident fund, in respect of which the nominee happened to be the subscriber's sister. The facts are clearly distinguishable. To sum up, our conclusions are:
(1) The nominee of a provident fund has only the exclusive right to receive the fund. His rights are the same as that of a nominee under S. 39 of the Insurance Act.
(2) The provident fund remains the property of the deceased subscriber and is available for distribution amongst his heirs in accordance with their personal law. The Supreme Court decision in Sarbati Devi's case (AIR 1984 SC 346) (supra) governs nominations made, in respect of provident funds as well.
(3) Telupulu's case (AIR 1967 Andh Pra 10) (Supra) and Lalitha's case (1975 (2) APLJ (HC) 168) (supra) do not state the law correctly.
23. Each of plaintiffs 1 and 2 is therefore entitled to a 1/5th share; defendant 1 is entitled to a 1/8th share; defendant 2 is entitled to a 26/144th share and each of plaintiffs 3 to 5 and the 3rd defendant is entitled to a 13/144th share in item 16 of the plaint schedule.
24. There is no dispute that items 7 to 15 of the plaint schedule are assets belonging to the estate of late S.M Ghouse. Item 15 is a special term deposit of Rs. 2,500/- made by late S.M Ghouse in the name of his only son, defendant 2. In the absence of any plea that the money came from a source other than late Ghouse or that Ghouse intended to exclusively benefit D-2 with that amount, the parties will have their rights in that item in accordance with their shares defined while dealing with item 16.
25. Item 4 of the plaint schedule is an amount of Rs. 21,600/- which became payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The distribution of such compensation amount under S. 8 of that act is the exclusive function of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, S. 19(2) of the Act expressly fexcludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to decide any question which under the Act is required to be decided by the Commissioner. We have therefore refrained from expressing in any manner on the rights of parties in this item. We direct the parties to approach the Commissioner for the necessary decision. Under the interim orders made by this court, it is possible that the commissioner may have deposited this amount and the same would have been either paid to defendants 1 to 3 or invested. To facilitate the commissioner to deal with the compensation amount, the trial court is directed to re-transfer to the commissioner the balance amount invested together with any interest which may have accrued on such deposit amount. The Commissioner will make or issue appropriate adjustments or directions regarding any amounts already paid to defendants 1 to 3 under the interim orders of this Court.
26. Item 5 of the plaint schedule is the amount which became payable under the A.P State Employee's Benefit Fund Rules. The rules provide for the payment of the amount to the nominees and in the case of a nomination, the amount shall be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased employee. There is no evidence adduced regarding the existence of any nomination in favour of any member of the family. Even, if under the rules, the amount becomes payable to the 1st defendant, the amount does not belong exclusively to the 1st defendant. It forms part of the estate of late Ghouse in much the same manner as the insurance amounts or the provident fund amount dealt with supra. The plaintiffs 1 to 5 and defendants 1 to 3 will be entitled to share this amount also in accordance with their shares specified already as on inheritance.
27. Item 6 of the plaint schedule represents the amount which became payable as gratuity under the A.P Liberalised Pension Rules. No evidence has been let in to show the existence of any nomination and if so in whose favour. Even otherwise the amount forms part of the estate and is an asset available for distribution amongst the several of late Ghouse. The learned Subordinate Judge is in clear error in dismissing the suit. He failed even to notice that, in the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 3, they were only disputing the right which plaintiffs 1 and 2 were claiming and they never disputed the shares claimed by plaintiffs 3 to 5 in any of the items 4 to 16.
28. This Court issued interim directions on 16-4-81 directing defendants 4 to 8 to deposit the schedule amounts into Court. We have no material before us whether defendants 4 to 8 have complied with such directions or not and if complied to what extent. Item 4 of the plaint schedule stands on a separate footing and this Court has no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the parties with reference to that item. We have indicated the shares in which the plaintiffs 1 to 5 and defendants 1 to 3 are entitled to inherit the amounts, subject matter of items 1 to 3 and 5 to 16 of the plaint schedule. It is possible that some mistakes would have crept in specifying the exact amounts due to the estate under each of the items. There is need to obviate the necessity to seek amendment of the plaint schedule. The decree we propose to pass is therefore directed to take effect on the actual amounts due under each such item without restricting the relief in any manner only to the amounts specified in the schedule. We have also made the necessary provision for the discharge of the loan raised by late Ghouse on the Security of item No. 15. This is a proper case where the parties ought to be and are accordingly directed to bear their respective costs throughout.
29. The judgment and decree of the court below is accordingly set aside. The suit is decreed in terms given below.
1. It is declared that each of plaintiffs 1 and 2 are entitled to a 1/6th share; the 1st defendant is entitled to a 1/8th share; the 2nd defendant is entitled to a 26/144th share and each of plaintiffs 3 to 5 and the 4th defendant is entitled to 13/144th share in the actual amounts due under each of items 1 to 3 and 5 to 16 of the plaint schedule without restricting the relief in any manner to the amounts specified in the schedule.
2. The aforesaid shares be liable to discharge the loan if any outstanding in favour of defendant 7 in the same proportions as defined in clause 1 of the decree.
3. The parties be directed to approach the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation for his decision regarding item 4 of the plaint schedule.
4. The parties or their guardians-ad-litem, as the case may be, sign such forms or receipts as defendants 4 to 8 may require from them.
5. That the parties bear their respective costs throughout.
Order accordingly.