Sriramulu, J.:— A common contention arises in both the above writ petitions filed by the partnership firm Eastern Ore Corporation.

2. For the assessment year 1963-1964, the assesses firm did not file its return as required by Sec. 13 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and Rules. By Notice dated 21-1-1970, the Commercial Tax Officer, required the petitioner to show cause why it should not be ??? on a turnover of Rs. 10,00,000/- at 3% on the purchases of Manganese ore effected by it. For the assessment year 1959-1960 the assesses firm also did not file any return as required by law. After issue of several notices, the assesses firm produced its accounts on 7-1-1964 and the Commercial Tax Officer completed the assessment on 2-12-1964 on purchase turnover of Rs. 15,66,004.28 of Manganese ore. In Writ Petition No. 1960 of 1961 filed in this court, the Petitioner challenged the legality nod validity of that assessment. By its order dated 25-2-1969 this court quashed the assessment and directed the assessing officer to make a fresh assessment according to law after considering all the objections raised by the petitioner on merits, including, limitation. The assessing officer once again issued notice on 14-1-1970 to show cause why the assessee should not be assessed on a turnover of Rs. 15,66,004.28 of purchases of Manganese ore effected by it.

3. The legality and the validity of both the above notices dated 21-1-170 and 14-1-1970 respectively relating to the assessment years 1963-1964 and 1959-1960 are, questioned in these writ petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition directing the respondent, Commercial Tax Officer, to forbear from proceeding further in pursuance of these notices.

4. The learned counsel Sri P. Rama Rao, appearing for the assessee contended that since the assessee did not file the returns for both the assessment years 1963-1964 and 1959-1960, the Commercial Tax Officer could issue notices and complete the assessments under Sec. 14(3) of Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, within a period of four years from the expiry of the assessment years concerned. Notices issued for both the assessment years are beyond four years from the expiry of the assessment years concerned and are, therefore, void and illegal. The Commercial Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make the assessments in pursuance of those notices. Even the original assessment for the assessment year 1959-1960, which was made on 2-12-1934 was beyond the period of four years, from the expiry of the assessment year 1959-1960 and the assessment was, therefore void.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the Government contended that if the turnover assessable to tax had escaped assessment, then Sec. 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act is attracted and the time within which the assessment has to be completed after issue of notice is six years from the expiry of the assessment year concerned. The assessment made on 2-12-1964 for the assessment year 1959-1960 and the notice dated 21-1-1970 issued for the year 1963-1964 assessment year, are within the six years period from the expiry of the respective assessment years and are, therefore, legal and valid.

6. The short question that arises for decision in these two writ petitions is whether the period within which the assessment should be made, after the issue of notice, in case where the assessee had not filed its return in accordance with law is four years as expressed in Sec. 14(3) or six years as expressed in Sec. 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act?

7. This very question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Sayanna v. State . ILR 1971 1 A.P 157. in that case it was contended on behalf of the assessee that a case in which a dealer failed to file a return falls exclusively under Sub Sec. (3) of Sec. 14 of the Act and the assessing authority cannot act under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 14 That contention was rejected by the division Bench. In rejecting that contention, the Division Bench of this court relied upon the decision in The State of Madras v. S. Balu Chettiar . 1956 7 STC 519. and Ghanshyam Das v. Regional Asst. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagapur . 1963 14 STC 976 981..

8. An identical question also fell for decision before another Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1493 and 1494 of 1968. The learned Judges however disposed of those writ petitions on another point, and left open the question whether the period of limitation fixed, for making assessment in a case where the return was not filed was four years or six years as prescribed in Sec. 14(3) or 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act.

9. Relevant portion of Sec. 14 as it stood at the relevant point of time reads as follows:—

Sec. 14(1): If the assessing authority is satisfied that any return submitted under Sec. 13, is correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax payable by the dealer on the basis thereof, but if the return appears to him to be incorrect or incomplete he shall, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and the completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess to the best of his judgment the amount of tax due from the dealer. An assessment under this section shall be made only within a period of four years from the expiry of the years to which the assessment relates.

Sec. 14(2) xxx

Sec. 14(3) If no return is submitted by any dealer liable to tax under this Act before the date prescribed in that behalf, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of the tax due from the dealer on his turnover for that year and may direct the dealer (to pay in addition to the tax so assessed a penalty as specified in sub-sec. (8).

Sec. 14(4) In any of the following events namely, where the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate… … … … … … the assessing authority may after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such inquiry as he may consider necessary by order, setting out the grounds therefor … … … … … … … …

(4-A) An assessment or levy under Sec. (4) shall be made

(a) within a period of six years form the expiry of the year to which the tax… … … … relates if the event that has occasioned such assessment or levy has occurred on account of the failure of the dealer to disclose the turnover or any of the particulars correctly; and

(b) within a period of four years from the expiry of the year aforesaid, if such event has occurred due to any other causes.”

10. On a plain reading of the above section it is evident that sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 14 contemplates making of a best judgment assessment in a case where the return filed by the assessee is incorrect or incomplete, and for making such an assessment, fixes the period of four years, from the expiry of the assessment year concerned within which the assessment should be made.

11. sub-section (3) of Sec. 14 contemplates making of an assessment in a case where the assessee did not file a return. The period fixed for making assessment in such a case has been fixed at four years from the expiry of the assessment year concerned.

12. Having provided two time limits for making assessment in cases where the returns are filed and in cases where returns are not filed, the only field left over for the legislature to cover was to fix time limit for making the assessment in cases where the escapement of whole or part of the turnover from assessment to tax or where there was under-assessment or assessment at a ram lower than the correct rate. The escapement of part of turnover from assessment to tax, under-assessment, or assessment at a rate lower than the correct rate, cannot occur unless an assessment has already been made. The legislature has, therefore, provided sub-sec. (4) and (4-A) of Sec. 14. Under sub-section (4-A)(a) of Sec. 14, the period of six years from the expiry of the assessment year to which the tax relates has been fixed, if such escapement of turnover from tax has occurred on account of the failure of the dealer to disclose the turnover or any of the particulars correctly and four years from the expiry of the year aforesaid, if Such event has occurred due to any other ???

13. It is no doubt true as expressed by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax the expression “escaped assessment” includes that of a turnover which has not been assessed at all. In The State of Madras v. S. Balu Chettiar the Madras High Court held:

“That where an assessee did not file at any time a return of his turnover for a year, whether due to omission or deliberate concealment on his part, Rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939 applies and an assessment has, therefore, to he made within the period of limitation mentioned in that rule”.

14. For a proper appreciation of the decision of the Madras High Court, it is necessary to read Rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939.

Rule 17(1). If for any reason, the whole or any part of the turnover of a business of a dealer or licensee has escaped assessment to tax in any year, or if the licence fee has escaped levy in any year, the assessing authority or the licensing authority as the case may be, subject to the provisions of sub-rule 1(a) may at any time within three years next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee relates, determine to the best of his judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment and assess the tax payable on such turnover or levy of licence fee after issuing a notice to the dealer or licensee and after making such an inquiry as he considers necessary.

Rule 1-A. Where in respect of the turnover referred to in Sub-rule 1, an order has already been passed under Section 11 or 12, the assessing authority shall make a report to the appropriate appellate or revising authority, as the case may be which shall thereupon after giving the dealer concerned reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such orders as it deems fit.

(2) If for any reason either because the turnover finally determined for the preceding year under rule 11(3) of the Madras General Sates Tax (turnover and assessment) Rules is higher than the turnover provisionally determined under Rule 11(4) of the same rules or because of the fresh facts coming to the light, the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer is found to have escaped from the provisional assessment, the assessing authority may revise the provisional assessment after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such inquiry as he considers necessary.”

Provided that the issue of a notice to the dealer, shall not be necessary when the revision of the provisional assessment is due to the determination of a higher turnover for the proceeding year. A perusal of that rule, on the basis of which the Madras High Court rendered its judgment, clearly shows that there was no provision in those rules, which is similar to Sub-Sec. 3 of section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. Hence the decision of Madras High Court relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, does not advance the case of the respondents.

15. If the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, that in a case where the return has not been filed, the assessment has to be made in accordance with sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 14, is considered to be sound and correct, then there was no need for the legislature to specifically enact sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 14 fixing the time limit of four years for making an assessment where no return is filed. In other words if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted and also the correctness of the decision of this court in Sayanna v. State it follows that sub-sec. 3 of Sec. 14 is otiose or redundant. When there are two sub-sections in the same section, both of them must harmoniously be interpreted and no such interpretation can be put upon one sub-section, which would make the other sub-section otiose or redundant.

16. sub-section (3) of Sec. 14 specifically relates to the making of an assessment in a case where no return has been filed; whereas sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 14 is a general section, where time limit has been provided for making an assessment on the ground of escapement of turnover from tax or under assessment or assessment at a rate lower than the correct rate etc.

17. In J.K Cotton Spinning and ??? Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P . AIR 1961 SC 1170. their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that:

“In the interpretation of statutes, the courts must always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect.” When there is a conflict between a specific provision and a general provision, specific provision prevails over the general provision. General provision applies only to such case, which are not covered by the specific provision.”

18. In Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagapur Subba Rao, J. as he then was speaking for the Supreme Court observed that:—

“A construction, which would attribute redundancy to a legislation, shall not be acceptable except for compelling reasons.”

19. In Rajagopalachari v. Corporation of Madras . AIR 1964 SC 1172. the Supreme, Court once again reiterated that:

“A special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope, leaving the general provision to control case where the special provision does not apply”.

20. In Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh . AIR 1966 SC 828. dealing with Sec. 72, which conferred general power on the Government and Sec. 62 which conferred a special power on the Government, under the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithi and Zilla Parishads Act, their lordships of the Supreme Court held that:—

“The principle generalia specialibus non derogant compels one to exclude from the operation of S. 72, the case provided for under Section 62.”

21. The same principle we also find in South India Corporation v. Secretary Board of Revenue . AIR 1964 SC 207. where the law has been stated in the following terms:

“It is settled law that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply.”

22. Thus from the above discussions, it is clear to our mind that Sub-Sec. 3 of the Sec. 14 applies to a case where no return has been filed and sub-sec. 4 of the Section 14 applies to a case where an assessment has been made, but some turnover has escaped assessment etc. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 14 is a special provision and sub-sec. 4 of Sec. 14 deals not only with the escapement of turnover, but also other cases. It is, therefore, a general provision as compared to sub-section (3) of Sec. 14 which is a special provision. If it is held that it is sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 14 that applies to this case, then we may not find any case, which may come under sub-sen (3) of Sec. 14. Then Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 14 becomes redundant. One section of the same statute cannot be interpreted in a manner which makes the other section of the statute redundant. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 14 conflicts with sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 14, because they fix different time limits. If sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 14 is considered to be a general provision and sub-section (3) of section 14 as a special provision, according to the rules of interpretation of statutes then special provision must prevail over the general provision and general provision must be interpreted to apply to cases which do not come within the purview of the special provision.

23. For these reasons, we are of the view that the decision in Sayanna v. State requires consideration.

24. Hence the writ petitions are referred to a larger Bench Papers may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for necessary orders.

25. In pursuance of the above order of reference these Writ petitions came on for final hearing before the Full Bench.

26. P. Rama Rao and E. Satyanarayana, Advocates for the petitioners in W.Ps Nos. 317 and 318/70.

27. Mr. S. Dasaratharama Reddi, Advocate for the petitioner in W.P No. 2914/70.

28. Vth Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents in all the Writ petitions.

29. The Court delivered the following:—

JUDGMENT

(Judgment of the Full Bench delivered by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice).

30. These Writ Petitions have come to us on a reference made by a Bench on 27-7-1971. The learned Judges were of the view that the decision in Sayanna v. State requires reconsideration.

31. The essential facts are that the petitioner for the assessment year 1959-1960 was assessed to certain tax. Questioning the legality of the assessment order, the petitioner filed W.P 1960/1964. The High Court by an order dated 25-2-1969 quashed the assessment order and remitted the case to be decided in the light of the directions given by the High Court. The assessing authority thereafter again assessed the petitioner to tax by an order dated 14-1-1970.

32. For the assessment year 1963-1964 the petitioner was taxed by an order dated 21-1-1970. For that year the petitioner had not submitted any return.

33. These two assessment orders are questioned on the ground that the assessment should have been made within four years from the end of the assessment year according to section 14(3) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. Since they were not so made, the assessment orders were bad in law and have to be struck down.

34. It was, however, a common ground that as the assessment proceedings for both these years were initiated within six years from the end of the assessment years, the orders of assessment would be within time if it is held that section 14(4) of the Act is applicable.

35. In W.P No. 2914 of 1970 penalty proceedings were initiated on 14-1-1969, Previous to that for the assessment year 1963-1964, the petitioner was assessed to tax on a turnover of Rs. 1½ lakhs by an order dated 30-3-1955. On appeal the turnover, however, was reduced to Rs. 50,000/-. The transactions between April to July of relevant year were taken into account to arrive at a taxable turnover.

36. The penalty proceedings culminated in imposition of a penally of Rs. 15,000/-. After a lapse of more than one year, the petitioner now challenged the validity of the order imposing penalty mainly on the ground that the penalty proceedings which ought to have been initiated within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year were actually initiated beyond four years but admittedly within six years. The main contention in this writ petition was also the same i.e whether section 14(3) of the Act applies to the present case or it is only section 14(4) that is applicable.

37. In W.P Nos. 317 and 318 it was contended that since the assessee had not filed the return for both the assessment years, the Commercial Tax Officer could have issued notices and computed the assessment within a period of four years from the expiry of the assessment years concerned. As notice were issued for both the years beyond four years they are void and illegal. The Commercial Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make the assessments in pursuance of those notices. The learned Judges were of the view that while section 14(3) is a special provision and whereas section 14(4) is a general provision, in a case where no return had been filed, it is section 14(3) which provides for such a contingency that is applicable and not section 14(4) which is a general, provision.

38. They felt that sub-section (3) of section 14 applies to a case where no return had been filed, whereas sub-section (4) of section 14 applies to a case where an assessment has been made, but some turnover has escaped assessment. In that view of the position of law, their Lordships were of the view that Sayanna v. State which holds contrary view requires re-consideration.

39. In order to appreciate the said contention it is necessary to read section 14, in so far as it is relevant;

“14(1) If the assessing authority is satisfied that any return submitted under section 13 is correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax payable by the dealer on the basis thereof, but if the return appears to him to be incorrect or incomplete he shall, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer. An assessment under this section shall be made only within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.

2. When making an assessment to the best of judgment under sub-section (1), the assessing authority may also direct the dealer to pay in addition to the tax assessed, a penalty as specified in sub-section (8) on the turnover that was not disclosed by the dealer in his return.

(3) If not return is submitted by any dealer liable to tax under this Act before the date prescribed in that behalf, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which assessment relates, after issuing a notice to the dealer, and after making such inquiry as he considers necessary assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer on his turnover for that year, and may direct the dealer to pay in addition to the tax so assessed, a penalty as specified in sub-section (8).

(4) In any of the following events, namely where the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or assessed at the rate lower than the correct rate or where the licence fee or registration fee his escaped levy or has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate, the assessing authority may, after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, assess the correct amount of tax payable or levy the correct amount of licence fee or registration fee.

(a) Within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which the tax, licence fee or registration fee relates, if any such event has occurred on account of the failure of the dealer to disclose the turnover or any other particulars correctly;

(b) within a period of four years from the expiry of the year aforesaid, if any such event has occurred due to any other causes.

In a case falling under clause (a) the assessing authority may also direct the dealer to pay, in addition to the tax assessed as aforesaid a penalty not exceeding one and half times the amount of that tax.

Explanation: The expression ‘assessing authority’ occurring in this sub-section shall, in relation to licence fee or registration fee, be construed as referring to the licensing or registering authority, as the case may be, under this Act.”

(4-A) An assessment or levy under sub-section (4) shall be made

(a) within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which the tax, licence fee or registration fee relates, if the event that has occasioned such assessment of levy has occurred on account of the failure of the dealer to disclose the turnover or any of the particulars correctly; and

(b) within a period of four years from the expiry of the year aforesaid, if such event has occurred due to any other cause.

xxxxxxxx

(8) The penalty leviable under Sub-section (2), sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) shall not exceed (a) five times the tax, or the fee due, in a case where the assessing authority is satisfied that the failure of the dealer to disclose the whole or part of the turnover or any other particulars correctly or to submit the return before the prescribed date, was willful; and

(b) One half of the tax, or the fee, due in a case where such failure was not wilful.

Provided that where such failure, occurred due to a bonafide mistake on the part of the dealer, no such penalty shall be levied.

Explanation: The expression ‘assessing authority’ occurring in this section shall, in relation to licence fee or registration fee, be construed as referring to the licensing or registering authority, as the case may be under this Act.”

40. A careful reading of section 14 would disclose that sub-section (1) enjoins upon the assessing authority to assess to the best of his judgment the amount of tax due from a dealer where it appears to the Assessing authority that any return submitted under Section 13 is incorrect or incomplete.

41. Sub-section (2) is an incidental provision to sub-section (1) and relates to the imposition of penalty with which wo are not concerned.

42. Sub-section (3) empowers the assessing authority at any time within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates, to assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of the tax due from the dealer on his turnover for the year where no return is submitted by the dealer liable to be taxed within the time prescribed.

43. Between these two provisions i.e, sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) all the possible cases of imposing tax appear to us to be exhausted in so far as the primary power of levy of tax it concerned. A case where incorrect or incomplete turnover is filed is covered by sub-section (1) and a case where no return is filed at all is covered by sub-section (3). It is also pertinent to note that in both the case the assessing authority is empowered to assess to the best of his judgment. It is also relevant to note that the primary authority making such assessment is prescribed and is not the same as we would presently notice in a case coming under sub-section (4).

44. We then turn to sub-section (4) as it then stood. The first thing on a perusal of that sub-section which leaps to the eye is that the power under that sub-section is exercisable in cases which come under one or the other events mentioned in the sub-section. The events mentioned are firstly where the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment of tax or secondly a dealer has been Under assessed or thirdly he has been assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate or fourthly where the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or finally the fee has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate.

45. It is only when any of the aforesaid events happen that the assessing authority after making such inquiry as he considers necessary can assess to correct amount of tax payable or levy the correct amount of licence fee or registration fee.

46. What is to be examined then is whether as argued there is any conflict between sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) and whether sub-section (3) is a special provision applicable in all cases where no return has been filed and would therefore apply in preference to sub-section (4) which is a general provision, which includes the casts where no return is filed.

47. We fail to understand how these two mutually exclusive arguments can be advanced in the same breath. If here is a conflict between these provisions, then they must relate to the same legislative field but provide two inconsistent situations for the legislative problems covered by the two provisions. If, on the other hand, sub-section (4) is considered as general while section (3) is considered as special provision then according to the well accepted principle the special provision covers a specific legislative problem over the general provisions which apart from other legislative problems provides also for a legislative problem impliedly covered by the special provision.

48. In either case, however, both the provisions must relate to a common legislative problem for which different legislative solutions are provided. Is there then a common legislative problem for which provision is made both in sub-section (3) as well as in sub-section (4)?

49. In this connection it is useful to remember that when the Legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it in sub-sections (1) and (3), the presumption is that a subsequent general provision in sub-section (4) separately made for a different subject is not intended to interfere with the special provision made in sub-sections (1) and (3) unless it manifests that intention very clearly. The rule is each provision must be construed in that respect according to its own subject matter and its own terms.

50. A comparative study of the two provisions would leave no one in doubt that there is nothing common between the two provisions. They postulate, two different situations. While sub-section (3) provisions for a situation where a dealer liable to tax has not submitted any return. Only in such a situation that the assessing authority is empowered to assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of the tax due from the dealer on his turnover for the relevant year. That provision has nothing to do with a situation envisaged by sub-section (4) which relates to escapement of a whole or part of the turnover of business of a dealer or the dealer has been under assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate. Sub-section (4) does not provide for the best of judgment assessment in a case where no return is filed. It applies to a case where the turnover has escaped the assessment to tax irrespective of the fact whether such a case for the purposes of primary assessment falls under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3). It provides for escapement of assessment to tax in either of the two cases.

51. It could not be doubted that in a case where no return is submitted by any dealer an assessing authority can assess him nevertheless within four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates on the best of its judgment, under sub-section (3). Never the lass the assessing authority would have power to assess the dealer if it is found that the whole or any part of the turnover of the business had escaped assessment to tax or had been under assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate under sub-section (4) of the Act.

52. It could not similarly be disputed that in a case where it appears to the assessing authority that any return submitted under section 13 is incorrect or incomplete he can assess to the best of his judgment the amount of tax due from the dealer under sub-section (1). Nevertheless the assessing authority finding that the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate can assess the denier to a correct tax under sub-section 4.

53. When this position of law is not doubted or disputed, then in either case it would be incorrect to contend that sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) either, are in conflict with sub-section (4), or that they are special provisions while sub-section (4) is a general provision.

54. As sub-section (4) permits the assessing authority in any of the events mentioned therein the exercise of the power it would include a case where no return is filed or a case where an incorrect or incomplete return is filed. Sub-section (4), it is seen, confers larger and general powers. Although thus for both these situations provisions are made in sub-section (1) or (3) nevertheless a power to reach the escaped turnover and to bring it within the not of taxation is conferred by sub-section (4) it was conceded that in a case where an incomplete or incorrect return was filed and a special power conferred by sub-section (1) to assess such returns on best of judgment is exercised by the assessing authority, even then the power under sub-section (4) can nevertheless be exercised. It could not also be disputed that even though the special power conferred on the assessing authority to assess to the best of the judgment an incomplete or incorrect return is not exercised, even then the power under sub-section (4) can be exercised if it is found that the turnover wholly or partly had escaped the assessment under sub-section (1).

55. Similarly, in a case where the dealer who had not filed the return can be assessed to tax by a special power conferred on the assessing authority under sub-section (3). Inspite of such power and irrespective of the fact whether such power is exercised or not by the assessing authority under sub-section (3), the assessing authority can assess the dealer to a correct tax on his turnover if it appears to the assessing authority that the turnover has escaped the fax wholly or partly.

56. It will thus be seen that although to a superficial eye there may appear some overlapping between sub-sections (1) and (3) on the one hand and sub-section (4) on the other, the legislative situations envisaged by sub-section (4) are entirely different than what are postulated by sub-section (1) or sub-section (3). They do not therefore cover the same legislative field. They cannot therefore be considered as either conflicting or contradictory provisions nor they can be said to be special and general provisions. They are directed to achieve different objectives. While the object of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) is to assess the incomplete or incorrect return or assess the dealers who have failed to file any return to the best of the judgment of the assessing authority, the object of sub-section (4) is get into the net of taxation all the cases where the dealers have escaped the tax irrespective of the reason which led to such escapement. Thus in cases of incomplete or incorrect filing of return and irrespective of the fact whether the power to assess to the best of his judgment is exercised or not by the assessing authority under sub-section (1) power under sub-section (4) is always available for exercise. Likewise, in a case where no return is filed by any dealer irrespective of the fact whether power under sub-section (3) is exercised or not by the assessing authority, the power under sub-section (4) is always available.

57. What must therefore follow is that sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) cover two different legislative problems and are intended to achieve two different end products. That is why we find not only two different periods of limitations are provided for the exercise of powers under sub-sections (1) and (3) on the one hand and sub-section (4) on the other we have already noticed that while sub-sections (1) and (3) confer power on the assessing authority to assess to the best of his judgment in cases coming within the purview of those provisions sub-section (4) does not empower the assessing authority to assess the dealer to the best of his judgment. That is the view taken in the two following cases: State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ravuri Narisimloo and Subramaniam Chettiar & Sons v. Jt. Cmml. Tax Officer. We have also noticed that different authorities are conferred with powers under sub-sections (1) and (3) on the one hand and the authority under sub-section (4) on the other. See Rule 31 of the Rules made under the Act.

58. In these circumstances, it is difficult to agree with the contention that sub-section (4) applies only to cases where an assessment order is made and some turnover has escaped assessment under sub-section (3) and is not applicable to a case where no assessment was made under that sub-section. Sub-section (4) is neither redundant nor otiose. Nor there is any warrant for an argument that sub-section (3) is a special provision whereas sub-section (4) is a general one regarding the same subject matter. We can find no conflict between sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) as we find that they cover two different subject matters.

59. In Sayanna v. State the facts were that the dealer had failed to file the returns. A provisional assessment was made. Thereafter proceedings for the levy of penalty were initiated and the petitioner was directed to pay the penalty. The contention before the Bench was that the penalty proceedings were initiated after a period of four years. Therefore the imposition of penalty was bad. Their Lordships observed:

“The condition precedent for the exercise of this power sub-section (4) of Section (4) is that the turnover should have escaped assessment either wholly or partly, and this must have been noticed and the authority concerned must have issued a notice within six years of the assessment year. Once these two conditions are satisfied, there is no further impediment in the exercise of this power. The turnover may escape assessment either because of the failure of the dealer to file a return who is under an obligation to file a return or because the assessing authority for any reason comes to the conclusion that the turnover was under assessed. Whatever the reason may be, when once the assessing authority finds that the whole or any part of the turnover has escaped assessment, this power can be exercised.”

60. Their Lordships went on to hold:

“The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a case in which a dealer failed to file a return falls exclusively under sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act and the assessing authority cannot act under sub-section (4) of section 14 cannot therefore be accepted.”

61. For the reasons which we have given, we agree with the conclusion arrived at in the abovesaid bench decision. We can find no reason for reaching any other conclusion.

62. Our concluded opinion therefore is that even in a case where no return is filed and no assessment under sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act is made, even then the assessing authority can validly assesses the dealer to a correct tax if it appears to him that the turnover of the dealer wholly or partly has escaped assessment to tax. This power however has to be exercised within six years of the expiry of the relevant assessment year.

63. In this view of ours and since in both the cases under consideration, proceedings of assessment in one case and the proceeding for imposing penalty in the other were initiated within six years of the expiry of the relevant assessment year, the petitioner in one case was rightly assessed to tax and in the other was cox redly required to pay the penalty.

64. In W.P No. 317/70 no other argument was advanced.

65. In the other W.P No. 2914/70 it was, however, sought to be contended that as the assessment under sub-section (3) was confined to the period from April to July 1963 the amended sub-section (4) prescribing 5 times penalty would not apply. During that period of assessment according to the provision then prevailing 1½ times the amount of the tax can alone be levied.

66. We do not find any substance in this contention. It is true that sub-section (4) was inserted by a substitution in the place of the then existing sub-section (4) by Section 15(III) of the Amendment Act, 1963 and took effect from 1-8-1963 by virtue of section 1(2) of the said Amendment Act. What is, however, ignored in advancing this argument is that the case for imposition of penalty can only arise when any one of the events mentioned in sub-section (1) could a tine. Such an event can not detected only when a case falls under clause (a) of sub-section (4), Looked at from that point of view the law which was prevailing at the time when any of the events mentioned in sub-section (4) happens would be applicable and therefore that penalty becomes leviable. On the date of the initiation of the penalty proceedings, may even on the date of the assessment order, the amended sub-section (4) had already come into force. It was that provision therefore which was applicable. The contention that since the assessment was confined to the period April to July 1963 the law regarding penalty prevailing during that period i.e to say penalty one and a half times of the tax should have been levied is devoid of any substance. We therefore experience no difficulty in rejecting the same. It is also relevant to note that the penalty order was passed by the Commercial Tax Officer on 14-1-1969. The petitioner did not prefer any appeal. After a lapse of about one year and 5 months he filed the with petition on 5-6-1970. No reason is shown as to why the appeal was not filed and as to why the order of penalty was allowed to become final. No satisfactory explanation is offered for the enormous delay amounting to latches in filing the writ petition. On these grounds also, we think that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.

67. We accordingly dismiss all the writ petitions with costs Advocate's fee Rs. 250/- in each case.