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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench reference arose from a second appeal in a dispute concerning title and possession of a family house. The litigation began when Sagi Lakshmi Kumara Raju (the plaintiff) sued for partition of the house into seven equal shares and for allotment of one such share to him. Seven defendants were impleaded; the 1st defendant was the plaintiff's paternal uncle and defendants 2–7 were members of the plaintiff's branch of the family.

The plaintiff and defendants 2–7 claimed that the property formed part of an ancestral share in possession until March 1949 when the 1st defendant forcibly occupied it. Defendants 2 (the father) and others later executed an agreement of sale dated 5-12-1949 (Ex. B-1) in favour of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant claimed the agreement was valid, binding on the family, and invoked section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (the doctrine of part performance) and adverse possession as defences.

The trial court found in favour of the 1st defendant on adverse possession, on the sale being for the family's benefit, and on applicability of section 53A; the suit was dismissed. On first appeal the Additional District Judge held the suit to be in time and that adverse possession was not perfected, but ruled against the 1st defendant on section 53A by applying the Division Bench decision in Satyanarayanmurthi v. Subrahmanyam. The 1st defendant then appealed to this Court (Second Appeal No. 687 of 1960). A question of law about the proper construction of section 53A and the correctness of Satyanarayanmurthi was referred to a Full Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. The Full Bench question expressly referred: Whether the decision in Satyanarayanmurthi v. Subrahmanyam (1959-(1)-An. W.R 405) requires re-consideration in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao (AIR 1948 P.C. 95)?
  2. Trial and first appellate issues (as framed below and relevant to the overall dispute):
    1. Whether the 1st defendant acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession?
    2. Whether the agreement of sale dated 5-12-1949 (Ex. B-1) is valid and binding on the plaintiff and defendants 3 to 7?
    3. Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to resist the suit under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff and defendants 2–7 asserted that the property was part of their ancestral share and that the 1st defendant forcibly occupied it in March 1949.
  • They contended that the agreement of sale (Ex. B-1) executed by the 2nd defendant was not binding on the plaintiff and defendants 3–7 (i.e., those who had not signed the agreement), on grounds that it was not for legal necessity or family benefit as to bind them.
  • The plaintiff's position, adopted on first appeal, was that Satyanarayanmurthi's interpretation of section 53A precluded application of the section against a person who had not signed the agreement or expressly authorised a signatory; thus the plaintiff (not a contracting party) could recover possession.

1st Defendant's Arguments

  • The 1st defendant claimed title by adverse possession and contended he had been in possession for the statutory period.
  • He argued Ex. B-1 was a valid agreement of sale executed by the 2nd defendant as manager (karta) of the joint family and that it was binding on all members of the joint family, including the plaintiff.
  • Relying on section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the 1st defendant maintained that, having been let into possession and performed his part, he could invoke the doctrine of part performance as a defence to the suit.
  • Before the first-instance single Judge and on the second appeal, counsel for the 1st defendant challenged the correctness of Satyanarayanmurthi and relied on contrary authority including a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Labhchand v. Sharifabi.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satyanarayanmurthi v. Subrahmanyam (1959-(1)-An. W.R. 405) Held that section 53A applies only where the contract is signed by the party himself or expressly on his behalf; the disability under S.53A attaches to the contracting party and cannot be applied against a member of a joint Hindu family who has not agreed or signed. The Full Bench examined this Division Bench decision and ultimately held that its narrow construction was erroneous because it ignored the Privy Council's reasoning in Subrahmanyam's case and improperly refused to apply relevant personal law (Hindu law) in identifying the contracting/transferor.
Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao (AIR 1948 P.C. 95) (Privy Council) Interpreted S.53A in the context of a guardian (mother) contracting on behalf of a minor: the guardian's act is an act done on behalf of the minor; where the guardian had power to bind the ward and the contract was within that power and for the ward's benefit, the ward is the person who "contracts to transfer" for purposes of S.53A. The Full Bench relied on this Privy Council authority as decisive: it held that personal law (here Hindu law principles on guardianship and family management) is relevant to determining who is the contracting party and thus whether S.53A can operate; Subrahmanyam's ratio was adopted to conclude the Division Bench in Satyanarayanmurthi was wrong to exclude Hindu law from construction of S.53A.
Ratiayya v. G. Chandrayya Interpreted S.53A narrowly; treated the absence of express wording like "deemed to have been signed on his behalf" as decisive that signing must be by the contracting party or by someone expressly authorised. The Full Bench noted that Satyanarayanmurthi adopted Ratiayya's narrow view; the Full Bench rejected that narrow approach as inconsistent with Subrahmanyam and with principles of personal law applicable to Hindus.
Labhchand v. Sharifabi (AIR 1961 Bom 215) Division Bench of the Bombay High Court disagreed with Satyanarayanmurthi's restrictive interpretation of S.53A, applying principles consistent with Subrahmanyam. The Full Bench cited this decision as one of several High Court rulings that followed Subrahmanyam's approach; it was relied upon by the 1st defendant's counsel to challenge Satyanarayanmurthi and the Full Bench regarded it as supporting their conclusion that Satyanarayanmurthi should be reconsidered.
Govindaraju v. Vinayak (Division Bench, Madras High Court) Applied the Privy Council's reasoning in Subrahmanyam to hold S.53A applicable where family manager's act bound family members. The Full Bench referenced this decision as another authoritative High Court ruling that aligned with Subrahmanyam and supported the view that Satyanarayanmurthi was incorrectly decided.
Hunoomanpersaud Pandey v. Mt Babooee Munraj Kunweres (6 M.I.A. 393) / referenced as Hanumanpersaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Authority on acts of a guardian or manager being regarded as acts done on behalf of another (illustrating that guardian/manager's acts bind the ward/family in appropriate circumstances). The Full Bench relied on the principle from this authority (quoted by the Privy Council) to support the conclusion that a guardian's/manager's contract can be treated as the act of the person bound by it for purposes of S.53A.
Mohori Bibi v. Dhurmadas Ghose Authority for the proposition that a minor cannot contract (relied upon in the Privy Council discussion regarding competence to contract and S.11 of the Contract Act). The Full Bench cited the Privy Council's use of this authority to explain that while a minor cannot personally contract, a guardian may validly contract on the minor's behalf where competent under personal law; that principle assisted in identifying the "transferor" for S.53A purposes.
Chinnayya v. Ramarmurthi (unreported decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.) An unreported decision accepted in Satyanarayanmurthi but later overruled by a Madras Division Bench following Subrahmanyam's ratio. The Full Bench noted that the Madras Division Bench overruled the unreported decision which had been quoted with approval in Satyanarayanmurthi, thereby undermining an authority relied upon by Satyanarayanmurthi.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the reasoning appearing in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the central statutory provision: The court began from the text of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and focused on the phrase "by writing signed by him or on his behalf" appearing in the opening clause of the section.
  2. Statement of the statutory purpose: The Bench accepted the established view (including that of the Privy Council) that S.53A is a statutory adoption of the English equitable doctrine of part performance, intended to relax strict formalities of registration by allowing a transferee who has performed and been put in possession to use part performance as a defence (a "shield, not a sword").
  3. Examination of Satyanarayanmurthi: The court reviewed the Division Bench decision in Satyanarayanmurthi which had interpreted S.53A as applying only where the party himself signed the contract or someone expressly authorised signed "on his behalf", and had held that Hindu law notions (e.g., manager's authority) were irrelevant to construing S.53A.
  4. Identification of the omission: The Full Bench observed that the Satyanarayanmurthi judgment did not refer to the Privy Council's decision in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao and thus had not considered an authoritative pronouncement directly addressing the analogous factual and legal issues.
  5. Reliance on Subrahmanyam (Privy Council): The court adopted the Privy Council's approach that personal law governing the parties (Hindu law principles regarding guardianship or management of family property) is material to determining who is the contracting party or transferor for S.53A. In Subrahmanyam the Privy Council held that when a guardian (mother) contracts within her competence and for the ward's benefit, the ward is nevertheless the "transferor" for S.53A because the guardian's act is an act done on behalf of the minor.
  6. Conclusion that personal law must inform construction: The Bench held that one cannot determine who "contracts to transfer" without applying relevant personal law. Where, under Hindu law, the Karta or manager of a joint family has power to bind the family (and the transaction is for the family's benefit), his signing will amount to signing on behalf of the other members.
  7. Rejection of a narrow textual-only approach: While acknowledging that S.53A lacks explicit words such as "deemed to have been signed on his behalf", the court rejected the notion that the absence of such words prevents operation of principles of personal law. The Bench concluded that the statutory phrase "signed by him or on his behalf" includes signing on behalf of others where, under their personal law, the signatory had authority to bind them.
  8. Application to the facts (hypothetical assumption for the reference): The Bench expressly assumed for purposes of answering the reference that the contract entered into by the father (as Karta) was binding upon his minor sons (i.e., was for legal necessity or family benefit). On that assumption and applying Subrahmanyam's reasoning, the Bench held that the sons (including the plaintiff) constituted part of the contracting/transferor party, so S.53A would bar the plaintiff's claim and the transferee (1st defendant) could rely on part performance as a defence.
  9. Consideration of supporting High Court authorities: The Bench noted that several High Courts (Bombay and Madras Division Benches cited) had followed Subrahmanyam and had applied Hindu law principles to S.53A; these decisions reinforced the conclusion that Satyanarayanmurthi was wrongly decided.
  10. Procedural consequence: Because the Full Bench assumed the contract was binding on the sons only for purposes of the legal question and did not decide the factual question, it directed that the matter be remitted so that the first appellate court should make a finding on whether the contract was in fact binding on the plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Yes — the decision in Satyanarayanmurthi v. Subrahmanyam requires re-consideration; the Full Bench held that Satyanarayanmurthi was erroneous to the extent it excluded relevant personal law (Hindu law) in construing section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, and that where the Karta/guardian validly contracts so as to bind others, the words "signed by him or on his behalf" include signing on behalf of those persons.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Full Bench adopted the Privy Council's approach in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao and held that personal law (here Hindu law governing managers and guardians) is relevant to determine who the "transferor" is under S.53A.
  • Where the Karta of a joint Hindu family enters into a contract of sale which is binding upon other family members under Hindu law (e.g., being for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family), the Karta's signing is treated as signing on behalf of his co-owners for the purposes of S.53A; consequently S.53A can operate to bar claims by those co-owners and the transferee may rely on part performance as a defence.
  • On the specific procedural posture of the underlying litigation, the Full Bench did not decide the factual question whether the 2nd defendant's contract was actually binding on the plaintiff; it instructed that a finding on that point be called for from the first appellate court. The second appeal will proceed accordingly (to be heard by a Division Bench or single Judge as appropriate).
  • The Bench noted that several High Courts had already reached the view consistent with Subrahmanyam, and it considered the narrow reading in Satyanarayanmurthi likely to produce inequitable results (for example, encouraging double-dealing by managers), a result contrary to the equitable aim of S.53A.
  • The opinion answered the reference: "Reference answered." The practical effect is (a) to displace Satyanarayanmurthi's restrictive construction insofar as it refused to apply personal law principles in construing S.53A, and (b) to require further factual determination below about whether the contract bound the plaintiff before S.53A can be applied to bar his claim.

    Raja Sagi Padmanabharaju v. Sagi Lakshmi Kumara Raju And Others

    Basi Reddy, J.:— The question that has been referred to the Full Bench is:—

    “Whether the decision in Satyanazaynamurthi v. Subrahmanyam (1959-(1)-An. W.R 405) requires re-consideration, in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao, AIR 1948 P.C 95?”.

    2. For the sake of convenience, we will hereafter refer to the former as Satyanarayanmurthi's case and the latter as Subrahmanyam's case. Satyanarayanamurthi's case was decided by a Divisional Bench of this Court, composed of Chandra Reddy, C.J and Mohammed Ahmed Ansari. J.

    3. The answer to the question turns upon the true construction of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and in particular, of the expression “by writing signed…… on his behalf”, occurring in the opening clause of the section. That section is in the following terms:

    “53A. Part Performance- Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,

    and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,

    and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

    then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, or has not been registered where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provded by the terms of the contract:

    Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof”.

    4. This section has been described by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as “a partial importation into India of the English equitable doctrine of part performance”. The principle on which the doctrine rests is that “if a man have made a bargain with another, and allowed that other to act upon it, he may have created an equity against himself which he cannot resist by setting up the want of a formality in, the evidence of the contract out of which the equity in part arose; and that a person who has performed his part of the contract and obtained possession of the property, should be in a position to protect his possession against the person who has tranferred the property or anyone who claims through him. This doctrine has been enacted in section 53A. of the Act subject to two conditions, namely, that the contract must be in writing end the right is available only as a defence: it is a shield and not a sword. The effect of the section is to relax the strict provisions of the Registration and Transfer of Property Acts in order to allow the defence of part performance to be established. Now, our, answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is; Yes: both on principle and on authority, the decision in Satyanaryanamuthi's case does require reconsideration”. Before we give our reasons, it is necessary to state briefly how and why this refernce came to be made.

    5. One Sagi Lakshmi Kumara Raju instituted a suit (O.S No. 267 of 1956) in the District Munsif's Court, Visakhapatnam, for partition of a house shown in the plaint schedule into seven equal shares and for allotment of one such share to him. Seven persons were impleaded as defendants to the suit. Of these, the 2nd defendant in the father and defendants 3 to 7 are the brothers of the plaintiff, while the 1st defendant is his paternal uncle, that is to say, the brother of the 2nd defendant. In the suit, the plaintiff and defendents 2 to 7 sailed together. Their case was that in the year 1948 defendants land 2 and their eldest brother by name Sagi Chandrasekhara Sanyasi Raju partitioned their ancestral properties. In that partition, the family house was divided into three shares and the plaint schedule property fell to the share of the 2nd defendant, From that time on wards it was in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 7 till March, 1949 when the 1st defendant forcibly occupied it. There upon the 2nd defendant filed a criminal case against the 1st defendant be fore the Taluk Magistrate, Bhimunipatnam; but, during the pendency of the said criminal case, pressure and undue influence were brought to bear upon the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant and others and on 5-12-1949 the 2 defendant was made to execute Ex. B-1, an agreement for the sale of the suit property in favour of the 1st defendant for a low price, The said agreement of sale however, was not for any legal necessity or for the benefit of the family, and as such it was not binding either on the plaintiff or on defendants 3 to 7. The 1st defendant was in unlawful possession of the suit house.

    6. On the other hand, the stand taken by the 1st defendant was that the ancestral properties including the family house were divided between the three brothers in the year 1933, that from that time the family house was being enjoyed in three distinct shares; that the eldest brother built a house in Kurapalli and removed himself to that place even in 1933, that the 2nd defendant also wanted to build a house for himself at Kurupalli and so he purchased a site and started a construction there in 1933 itself, that as the 2nd defendant had no children by then and the family house was in a dilapidated condition, he agreed to sell his portion of the house to the 1st defendant for Rs. 800/- and received an advance of 50/- that since then the 1st defendant has been in possession of that portion of the house, that the 2nd defendant was living with his eldest brother till March, 1941, when he removed himself with his family to the new house at Kurapalli. that subsequently on account of misunderstandings between him and the 2nd defendant, the latter filed a criminal complaint against him and others, that the matter was ultimately compromised on the advice of elders, that it was then settled that in furtherance of the agreement in 1933, the 2nd defendant should execute the necessary conveyance of the suit property in his favour for an enhanced price of Rs. 2,000/-, that, out of that, Rs. 300/- inclusive of Rs. 50/- already paid, was paid by him to the 2nd defendant, that a promissory note was executed for the balance of Rs. 1700/- and the amount was subsequently realised by the 2nd defendant by filing a suit. It was the further case of the 1st defendant that the 2nd defendant had executed the agreement of sale by Ex. B-1 as the manager of his branch of the family and of his own free will and it was not true that any undue influence or coercion had been used. It was also not true that the agreement of sale was not for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family. He further contended that as the 2nd defendant had executed the agreement of sale Ex. B-1 on behalf of the joint family and put him in possession of the suit property, he is entitled to resist the suit relying on the doctrine of part performance under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The further contention of the 1st defendant was that as he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for over the statutory period to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 7, he had acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. He also contended that the suit was not in time.

    7. Several issues were framed by the trial Court, out of which the material ones were the following:—

    (a) “Whether the 1st defendant has acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession?”

    (b) “Whether the agreement of sale dated 5-12-49, Ex. B-1, is valid and binding on the plaintiff and on defendants 3 to 7?”

    (c) “Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to resist the suit under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act?”.

    8. On a consideration of the entire evidence, oral and documentary, the trial Court recorded the following findings on the aforesaid issues:

    (a) On the question of adverse possession, the learned District Munsif found that the 1st defendant had been in exclusive possession of the suit property even prior to 1942 and definitely from the year 1942. As the suit was filed on 31-7-65, the 1st defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession,

    (b) On the issue whether the sale of the suit property by the 2nd defendant was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family, the District Munsif found that in all the circumstances of the case the sale was for the benefit of the family and as such it was valid and binding on the plaintiff and en defendants 3 to 7.

    (c) As to whether the 1st defendant could rely on the doctrine of part performance as enbodied in section 53A of the Act the District Munsif found that inasmuch as the 2nd defendant had executed the agreement of sale on behalf of his branch of the family as family manager and the sale was for the benefit of the family, and the 2nd defendant had put the 1st defendant in possession of the property and the latter had performed his part of the contract, he (the 1st defendant) could rely on the doctrine of part performance by way of defence to the action brought by the plaintiff. Upon those findings, the District Munsif dismissed the suit.

    9. On appeal by the plaintiff the Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, who heard the appeal A.S No. 101 of 1953 framed only the following two points for determination.

    1. “Whether the suit was filed in time and whether the 1st defendant perfected his title to the suit property by adverse possession?”

    2. “Whether the 1st defendant can invoke the provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act?”.

    10. On the first point, the learned Judge held that the plaintif's suit was in time and that the 1st defendant bad not perfected his title in the suit property as against the plaintiff and defendants 3 to 7.

    11. As regards the second point, this is bow the learned Additional District Judge dealt with it in paragraph 8 of his judgment.

    “Ex. B-1 dated 5-12-49 the unregistered agreement of sale was executed in favour of the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendant alone. Neither the plaintiff nor defendants 3 to 7 are parties to the same in the decision Satyanarayanamurthi v. Subrahmanyam (1959 (1) An. W.R 405), it is held by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, that Sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act precludes a transferor from asserting his title in respect of the property transferred by him and the doctrine laid down is based on the rule of estoppel, and hence the disability attached to a contracting party and not to any other person, that it cannot be applied against a member of a joint Hindu family who has not agreed to transfer the property by writing signed by him or on his behalf; that in order to attract Sec. 53A, it is essential that the contract must be signed by him or expressly on his behalf: and that the section cannot come into play where the writing is deemed to have been signed on his behalf. Following the above decision, I bold that the 1st defendant cannot invoke the provisions of Sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act by way of defence against the plaintiff who was not a contracting party. I find the point accordingly against the 1st defendant”.

    12. In that view, the learned Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.

    13. Against the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the 1st defendant preferred a second appeal to this Court-Second Appeal No. 687 of 1960. It came up for hearing in the first instance before Manohar Pershad J., as he then was. Before the learned Judge it was contended on behalf of the 1st defendant that as the lower appellate Court had ruled out the applicability of section 53A of the Act without giving any finding on the crucial point whether the agreement of sale entered into by the 2nd defendant as the karta of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his sons was binding, on the sons, a finding should be called for on that point. That request was, however, opposed by the Counsel for the plaintiff on the ground that inasmuchas in Satyanarayana murthi's case a Division Bench of this court had held that the provisions of section 53A of the Act were applicable only to one who is a party to the agreement in the sense that he has himself signed the agreement or has expressly authorised some one to sign on his behalf, it was unnecessary to call for a finding as to the binding nature of the transaction, as, admittedly in that case the plaintiff had not signed the agreement himself not had he expressly authorised his father, the 2nd defendant, to sign on his behalf. The learned Advocate appearing for the 1st defendant then canvassed before the learned Judge the correctness of the Bench decision, and in support of his contention relied on a Division Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court in Labhchand v. Sharifabi . AIR 1961 Bom 215, which had disagreed with the view taken by the Division Bench of this court with regard to section 53A of the Act; Thereupon the learned Judge directed the second appeal to be posted before a Division Bench in view of the importance of the question involved.

    14. When the matter came up, before a Division Bench consisting of Satyanarayana Raju, (as he then was) and Venkatesam, J., they referred for determination by a Full Bench the question whether the decision in Satyanarayana murthi's case requires reconsideration in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam's case That is how this matter has come before us

    15. Even at the outset, we should like to make it absolutely clearly that in answering the question referred to us, we are assuming that in the present case the contract entered into by the father as the karta of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his minor sons, is binding upon the sons as being for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. We are proceeding on that assumption because in Subrahmanyam's case, in the light of which we have to consider the correctness of the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in Satyanarayanamurthi case, the Judicial Committee proceeded to consider the question of law as to the true construction of section 53A of the Act on the footing that in that case the contract entered into by the mother as guardian of the minor, was binding on the minor.

    16. We now turn to Satyanarayana Murthi's case to see whether section 53A of the Act has been correctly construed thereby the Division Bench. The material facts in that case were the following. The three plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 were the sons of the 1st defendant and all off them constituted a joint Hindu family on 2-11-1934 an agreement of sale in respect of certain lands-belonging to the family was executed in favour of defendants 4 and 5 by defendants 1 to 3 and plaintiffs 2 and 3, the latter two being minors by, their father and guarian, the 1st defendant. The document was not signed by the 1st plaintiff. In part performance of the contract, defendants 4 and 5 were put in possession of the lands. Some time thereafter, plaintiffs 1 to 3 institute a suit for partition of the property which had been transferred to defendants 4 and 5 into six equal shares and for possession of their shares after declaring that the agreement of sale dated 2-11-1964 in favour of defendants 4 and 5 did not bind the plaintiffs. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the view that) section 53A of the Act debarred the plaintiffs from asserting any title to the property in question. On appeal, the District Judge decreed the suit as regards the share of the 1st plaintiff, while affirming the judgment of the trial court with regard to plaintiffs 2 and 3 as in his view section 53A was no impediment in the way of the 1st plaintiff filing a suit for partition and for recovery of his share of the property as he was not a party to the contract of sale. Against that judgment, a second appeal was preferred by defendants 4 and 5 which was heard by a Bench consisting of Chandra Reddy, C.J, and Mohammed Ahmed Ansari J., on behalf of the appellants it was urged that Section 53A of the Act was a bar even to the 1st plaintiff's suing for recovery of the property since he was a member of the joint family on whose behalf the 1st-defendant as manager had entered into the agreement of sale. Chandra Reddy, C.J, speaking for the Bench, readily recognized the legal position that the manager of a joint Hindu family is competent to make a binding contract on behalf of the family and in so doing it is not essential that he should describe himself as the manager, provided that he was the manager at the material time and it could be implied from the contents of the document and the surrounding circumstances that he had acted in that capacity and in such a case he would be deemed to have signed the document on behalf of the family. The learned Chief Justice was, however of the view that there was no scope for importing notions of Hindu law whilst interpreting the provisions of section 53A of the Act. After quoting the section, the learned, Chief Justice, stated the legal position thus:

    “It is seen that the equitable doctrine of part performance embodied in section 53A is applicable only where a person having contracted to transfer property by writing signed by him or on his behalf and put the vendee in possession thereof, wants to recover the property, taking advantage of want of formality in the evidence. In other words, this section precludes a transferor from asserting his title in respect of property transferred by him when the conditions contemplated by the section are fulfilled. It is based on the rule of estoppel, and hence the disability attaches to a contracting party and not to any other person. This is available only to a defendant to protect his possession and it does not create any legal title in him, to put it differently, it can be used only as a shield and not as a weapon of attack. That being so, it could not be applied against a member of a joint Hindu family who has not agreed to transfer the property by writing signed by him or on his behalf. It is true that an agreement of sale made by the manager of the family would bind all the persons provided it is for the benefit of the family and would affect the interests of each of them, as, under Hindu law, the manager is vested with authority to represent the family and to do all acts on its behalf, so long as they are not detrimental to its interests. But those considerations are irrelevant in construing section 53A which bars a person who has contracted to sell property by writing “signed by him or on his behalf”.

    Thus, in order to attract section 53A, it is essential that the contract must be signed by him or expressly on his behalf. That section cannot come into play where the writing is deemed to have been signed on his behalf. That coven only two cases, namely where the plaintiff has actually signed or where some one who has been specifically authorised has signed on his behalf. If the language was “signed by him or on his behalf or deemed to have been signed by him”, it would have been permissible to import such notions into the section. As it is the signature must be by the contracting party or by some one on his behalf”.

    17. On that reasoning, the learned Chief Justice repelled the contention advanced or behalf of the transferees that in the circumstances of the case, they were entitled to call in aid section 53A of the Act even as against the 1st plaintiff.

    18. It seems to us rather remarkable that in reaching the above conclusion, the learned Chief Justice made no reference whatever to the authoritative pronouncement of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam's case, wherein Their Lordships had occasion to consider the true scope and meaning of section 53-A of the Act with reference to a contract of sale entered into by the mother of a Hindu minor as his guardian and acting on his behalf. Apparently that decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges.

    19. We may also point out that while it is true that the section does not contain words like “demed to have been signed on his behalf”, it is equally clear that it does not contain words like “expressly or specifically authorised to sign on his behalf”. All that the section contemplate is that the document should be signed by the contracting party himself, or by some one on his behalf.

    20. Now, in giving a some what narrow connotation to the words “signed …….on his behalf” occurring in section 53A of the Act, the learned judge approved and adopted the view in Ratiayya v. G. Chandrayya. In that case, that learned Judge had regarded as decisive the absence of words like “or deemed to have been signed on his behalf”, in section 53A and held that in order to attract the provisions of the section, the contract should have been signed by the plaintiff himself or by some one on his behalf, and on the language of the section there was no scope for inferring that the father as the manager of a Hindu joint family must be deemed to have entered into the contract on behalf of himself and his sons, and as such the contract must be deemed to have been signed by him not only for himself but also on behalf of his sons.

    21. Satyanarayana Rao, J. in his turn had followed the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ. in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao, In that case, a mother of a Hindu minor had, on behalf of the minor, entered into a contract for sale of immoveable property belonging to the minor, and in pursuance of the contract, the vendee was put in possession of the property, but the transfer was not duly completed by the execution and registration of the deed as provided for in the agreement. Taking advantage of that circumstance, the minor sued by his mother as next friend, claiming possession of the property contracted to be told. It was found as a fact that the plaintiff's father had left considerable debts which could not have been discharged from the income of the family properties and that it was necessary and beneficial to sell some of them for discharging those debts. Under the circumstances the question arose whether section 53A of the Act was applicable to the transaction in question so as to bar the plain tiff's cairn. Patanjali Sastri J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench held that the minor plaintiff on whose behalf the contract had been executed by the guardian was not the contracting party nor was he the transferor and hence section 53A. was not applicable. It was pointed out by the learned judge that the bar imposed by the statute is personal to the contracting party and does not extend to persons who have not signed the contract or on whose behalf the contract has not been signed. The learned Judge's reasoning was as follows (at p. 339):

    “As we have already pointed out, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the properties in question unless the transferee's possession is protected under S. 53A. It seems to us that the section is not so framed as to afford protection against claims of persons who are not parties to the contract of transfer ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

    Where guardian contracts to transfer immovable property belonging to his minor ward, can it be said that the minor is the “transferor” within the meaning of the section? The term clearly refers back to the opening words of the section and must, we think, be taken to signify the person who “contracts to transfer”. It must be remembered that the doctrine of part performance rests on the ground of fraud which is personal and has been held to apply only to the party who, having entered into the the contract and permitted the obligee to act on the faith of it as if it were legally perfect, seeks to resile from it on the ground of its imperfect execution …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

    We are accordingly of opinion that S. 53A does not operate to bar the plaintiff's claim to recover the properties in question, as he does not claim under the transferor, and cannot be affected with the fraud, or estopped by the conduct of his guardian”.

    22. This judgment was taken in appeal to the Privy Council and was reversed by the Judicial Committee in Subrahmanyam's case referred to supra. In considering the scope and effect of section 53A of the Act in relation to the facts of that case. Their Lordships laid great stress on the rights and obligations flowing from the personal law governing the parties. This is how Their Lordships dealt with the question (at P. 96):

    “Their Lordships entertain no doubt that it was within the powers of the mother as guardian to enter into the contract of sale of 29-11-1935 on behalf of the respondent for the purpose of discharging his father's debts, and that, if the sale had been completed by the execution and registration of a deed of sale, the respondent would have been bound under Hindu law. As the sale was not so completed, it is conceded by Counsel for the appellant that the present appeal must fail unless the appellants are entitled to the protection afforded by S. 53A, Transfer of Property Act. They are entitled to that protection if, but only if the respondent comes within the words “the transferor or only person claiming under him”. If he does, the section bars him from obtaining the relief claimed by him in the present suit and the appeal must succeed. If he does not, the order for possession made in his favour was right and the appeal must be dismissed.

    23. Their Lordships think it is clear that the words “the transferor” refer back to the person who “contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf”. Counsel for the respondent rely, upon S. 11, Contract Act, which is as follows:—

    “Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject”.

    24. They submit that having regard to that section and to the decision of Their Lordships' Board in Mohori Bibi v. Dhurmadas Ghose a minor cannot be a person who contracts. It is clear, that if the mother and guardian had taken no part at all in the transaction, the respondent could not have entered into a valid contract to sell the land in suit to the appellants, but it is equally clear that such a contract could and did come into existence in the present case, and the question for decision is-was the person who contracted, within the meaning of S. 53A, the respondent or his mother?

    25. The position of a guardian under the Hindu law was considered by Their Lordships' Board in Hunoomanpersaud Pandey v. Mt Babooee Munraj Kunweres . 6 M.I.A 393. and the following passage is to be found at P. 412:

    “They consider that the acts of the Ranee cannot be reasonably viewed otherwise than as acts done on behalf of another, whatever description she gave to herself, or others gave to her”.

    Thus the act of the mother and guardian in entering into the contract of sale in the present case was an act done on behalf of the minor”

    26. Their Lordships then pointed out that in that case the contract was one which it was within the competence of the guardian to enter into on behalf of the minor so as to bind by it and further it was for the benefit of the minor. They then proceeded to observe as follows:

    “It would appear, therefore, that the contract in the present case was binding upon the respondent from the time when it was executed. If the sale had been completed by a trasfer, the transfer would have been a transfer of property of which the respondent and not his mother, was the owner. If an action had been brought for specific performance of the contract, it would have been brought by or against the respondent and not by or against his mother.

    27. Having regard to all the circumstance, Their Lordships are of opinion that the respondent is the person who most aptly answers the description of “the transferor” in the sense in which these words are used in S. 53A. It follows that he is debarred by the section from obtaining the relief claimed by him in the present action, which was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge”.

    28. On the authority or this ruling of the Privy council, it will be readily seen that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Satyanarayanaumurthi's case that in considering whether the provision 53A are applicable to a given case, rules of Hindu law are irrelevant and should not be imported even, where the parties are Hindus, is plainly untenable. If we may say so with respect, since the entire reasoning in Satyanarayanamurthi's case proceeded on that fallacy, the decision in that case must be held to be erroneous, In truth, in deciding who the real contracting party is and who the real transferor is, one has necessarily to apply the personal law governing the parties. This is manifest from the reasoning adopted by the Judicial Committee in Subrahmanyam's case. It is hardly necessary to point out that the power of the manager of a joint Hindu family to alienate joint family property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir as explained by the Judicial Committee in Hanumanpersaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Kunweree.

    29. In our opinion the true view is that where the Karta of a joint Hindu family enters into a contract of sale and signs it himself without specifying that he was signing on behalf of the other members of the family also, and the contract is binding on the other members under the principles of Hindu law, then the Karta would have signed the contract on behalf of the other members also.

    30. In a case like the present, where the parties are Hindus and are governed by Hindu law: where the contract of sale was entered into by the father as manager of the joint family consisting of himself and his minor sons; where the sale was hypothesi for the benefit of the family; where the transferee had paid the consideration for the sale and had been let into possession of the property, we are clearly of opinion that the possession of the transferee is protected under section 53A of the Act, and the statutory bar imposed on the transferor com??? into play.

    31. As in Subrahmanyam's case, so here, the person who can be said to have contracted to transfer the property, was not only the father but also all his sons, who constituted the joint family along with him. As in Subrahmanyam's case, so here, the party who most aptly answers the description of “the transferor” in the sense in which that expression is used in section 53A, is not the 2nd defendant alone, but the joint family consisting of the 2nd defendant and his sons the plaintiff and defendants 3 to 7. That being the true legal position, the plaintiff in the instant case would be debarred from recovering possession of the property in question, and the 1st defendant as the transferee who has performed his part of the contract and has taken possession of the property is entitled to rely on the doctrine of part performance as enacted in section 53A of the Act, by way of defence to the action.

    32. It only remains to add that several High Courts in India have taken the same view as the one we have taken as regards the scope and meaning of section 53A of the Act, and in so doing they have applied the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam's case, We need only mention two cases one of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Labhchand v. Sharif abi and the other, of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Govindaraju v. Vinayak. It is also worth mentioning that by the judgment in the second case, an unreported decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J. in Chinnayya v. Ramarmurthi,3 which was quoted with approval by the Division Bench of this court in Satyanarayanamurth's case, was overruled. Further in the course of their Judgment the learned Judges pointed out that a narrow view of section 53A of the Act might lead to undesirable consequences by putting a premium on dishonesty and double-dealing. At p. 314 they made the following pertinent observation:

    The plaintiff cannot plead in the circumstances of this case that section 53A is not applicable, as Swaminatha has not signed the document on behalf of his brothers. On the facts of this case, it was not necessary for Swaminatha to sign the document on behalf of his brothers, because admittedly he is the manager of the undivided joint family and the property agreed to be sold is joint family property. If we hold that in a transaction of similar nature all the brothers should sign the document, the very purpose for which the equitable doctrine of part performance is inserted in the Transfer of Property Act would be defeated.

    33. Otherwise the very manager of the Hindu joint family after obtaining the consent of his brothers to alienate the property, may set up hit own brothers later to claim the property contending that Sec. 53A will not apply to the transaction in question that is not the intention of the legislature”.

    34. We agree with the learned Judges that a statutory provision designed to introduce an equitable doctrine should not be interpreted in such a way as to produce inequitable results.

    35. For the foregoing reasons, we would answer the question referred to the Full Bench in the manner indicated above.

    This second appeal will now go before a Division Bench or a tingle Judge as the case may be. A finding will have to be called for from the first appellate court as to whether the contract of sale entered into by the 2nd defendant is binding upon the plaintiff.

    36. Reference answered.

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