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  • Section 29 of the Evidence Act or section 533
  • SECTION 21 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of S. 164
  • 17, 21, 24 and 26 of the Evidence Act
  • SECTION 26 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of Section 164(3)
  • Section 190(1)(c) of the CPC
  • Section 190(1)(c)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Section 29 of the Evidence Act or section 533
  • SECTION 21 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of S. 164
  • 17, 21, 24 and 26 of the Evidence Act
  • SECTION 26 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of Section 164(3)
  • Section 190(1)(c) of the CPC
  • Section 190(1)(c)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion, delivered by Anantanarayana Ayyar, J., addresses the admissibility of a written statement marked Ex. P.6 and other related evidentiary matters in the trial proceedings. Ex. P.6 is a statement attributed to a person (identified in the opinion as Yendra Narasimhamurthy) in which the declarant describes killing "Kammamettu Manikyam" along with a jewel merchant named Tatayya and gives an account of events surrounding that killing and later interactions. The learned counsel for the accused challenged the admissibility of Ex. P.6, relying upon prior authority (notably AIR 1936 PC 253). The Sessions Judge admitted Ex. P.6 in evidence. The present opinion reviews those evidentiary objections, considers several authorities (Madras High Court and other decisions), and concludes that Ex. P.6 was rightly admitted. The opinion also comments briefly on Ex. P.18 (described as self-exculpatory but containing admissions usable against the accused). The appeal (against the decision under review) was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. P.6 — a statement made to a Magistrate when the declarant was not then an accused, not under arrest and when no investigation was pending — was admissible in evidence despite the statement not having been recorded in the formal manner prescribed by Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  2. Whether the principles and ruling in Nazir Ahmed… (AIR 1936 PC 253) — which excluded a statement recorded by a Magistrate where the magistrate did not follow formalities of Section 164 — were applicable to the facts of the present case.
  3. Whether a statement recorded by a Magistrate in circumstances where it amounts to the first information of the crime can be excluded on account of non-compliance with the formalities of Section 164 of the CrPC, or whether such statements remain admissible under the Evidence Act (notably Section 21 and within the scope of Sections 24–26).

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the accused contended that Ex. P.6 was inadmissible in evidence.
  • He relied on the decision in Nazir Ahmed… (AIR 1936 PC 253) — arguing that where a Magistrate records statements without observing the formalities of Section 164 (and destroys rough notes after preparing a memorandum), such statements are inadmissible; and that the protections or formalities required by Section 164 are essential to admissibility.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's separate, specific arguments on this point beyond the Sessions Judge's admission of Ex. P.6 and the court's review of relevant authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nazir Ahmed… v. Emperor (AIR 1936 PC 253) The Privy Council held that where a Magistrate, acting under para 5 of the Code, records statements without following the procedure of Section 164 (and destroys rough notes after preparing a memorandum that did not contain all matters spoken), the memorandum was inadmissible; the Privy Council emphasized that the Magistrate offered no explanation for not following Section 164. The court distinguished the present facts from Nazir Ahmed: in Nazir Ahmed the accused was under arrest and the Magistrate had not followed Section 164; in the present case the declarant was not an accused, was not under arrest, and no investigation was pending when the Magistrate recorded Ex. P.6. Thus Nazir Ahmed was not treated as directly applicable to exclude Ex. P.6.
Arunachala Reddi v. Emperor (AIR 1932 Mad 500) Recognized that a person who, after committing an offence, went straight to a Magistrate and made a confession which the Magistrate recorded (not necessarily under the formalities of Section 164) could be acted upon; confessions, like other admissions, are relevant under the Evidence Act unless rendered inadmissible by circumstances the Act declares. The court invoked this decision to support the proposition that where a person appears before a Magistrate and gives information before any investigation is pending, such a confession need not be excluded merely because it was not recorded under Section 164; it supports admissibility of Ex. P.6 under the circumstances described.
In re Nainamuthu Kannappan (AIR 1940 Mad 138) Held that an objection to admission on the ground that a statement should have been recorded under Section 164 would be valid if the Magistrate was investigating the case; but where the Magistrate was not investigating and the information constituted the first information of the crime, the Privy Council ruling did not apply. The court relied on this decision to reinforce that statements given to a Magistrate as the first information, when no investigation is pending, need not be excluded for non-compliance with Section 164 formalities; this authority was used to justify admissibility of Ex. P.6.
In re Natesan (AIR 1960 Mad 443) Anantanarayanan J. (in that case) observed that AIR 1936 PC 253 should not be read as meaning no statement to a Magistrate could be admitted unless Section 164 formalities were complied with; Section 21 of the Evidence Act renders such admissions admissible unless excluded by succeeding sections; statements made to a judicial officer before any investigation has commenced or totally outside the scope of investigation are not necessarily excluded. The court cited this decision to support the view that the Privy Council decision is not absolute and to emphasize that admissions to judicial officers can be admitted unless the statutory exclusions apply; used in reasoning to admit Ex. P.6.
W. Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116) The Supreme Court indicated that the true test is whether non-compliance with required formalities was so vital as to cut at the root of jurisdiction or so abhorrent to natural justice as to occasion serious prejudice. The court cited this principle as the correct test for assessing whether non-compliance with formalities (such as Section 164) should lead to exclusion; applied to conclude non-compliance must be judged by whether it vitiates jurisdiction or causes serious prejudice.
Bala Majhi v. The State of Orissa (AIR 1951 Ori 168, Full Bench) The Full Bench held that a confession vitiated by substantial non-compliance with sub-section (3) of Section 164 is not a valid record of confession and cannot be used under Section 26 of the Evidence Act; there is no scope for invoking Section 29 of the Evidence Act or section 533 CrPC to cure such defects. The court noted this decision but observed it did not appear to deal with a confession similar to Ex. P.6 (i.e., recorded when no case was registered and no investigation pending). The decision was therefore distinguished rather than treated as controlling for the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by comparing the factual matrix of the present case with the facts of the cited authorities and by identifying the legal principles each authority stands for:

  1. The court examined the Privy Council decision in Nazir Ahmed (AIR 1936 PC 253). In that case the Magistrate recorded a statement from an accused who was under arrest, did not observe Section 164 formalities, prepared a memorandum from rough notes and destroyed those rough notes; the Privy Council excluded the memorandum because the Magistrate offered no explanation for not following Section 164. The court in the present opinion emphasized those factual distinctions.
  2. The court distinguished the present facts: Yendra Narasimhamurthy (the maker of Ex. P.6) was not an accused when he appeared before the Magistrate, was not under arrest, and there was no investigation pending in any registered case against him when Ex. P.6 was recorded. Because those facts differ materially from Nazir Ahmed, the Privy Council ruling was not treated as determinative.
  3. The court reviewed a line of Madras High Court authorities (Arunachala Reddi; In re Nainamuthu Kannappan; In re Natesan) which had held that where a person voluntarily gives information/confession to a Magistrate before any investigation has commenced and the statement amounts to the first information of the crime, exclusion for non-compliance with Section 164 is not automatic. Those decisions support treating such statements as admissible admissions under the Evidence Act unless other disqualifying circumstances (e.g., Sections 24–26) apply.
  4. The court also invoked the Supreme Court's statement in W. Slaney that the correct test for exclusion is whether non-compliance with required formalities was so vital as to vitiate jurisdiction or so prejudicial as to offend natural justice.
  5. While the Full Bench decision in Bala Majhi was acknowledged (holding that substantial non-compliance with S.164(3) can render a confession unusable under Section 26), the court observed that Bala Majhi did not appear to deal with a confession given in circumstances similar to Ex. P.6 (i.e., where no case was registered and no investigation pending). Thus Bala Majhi was distinguished on facts.
  6. Applying these principles to the present record, the court concluded that Ex. P.6 was rightly admitted by the Sessions Judge: the statement was made when the declarant was not an accused, no investigation was pending, and the weight of the Madras High Court authorities and the governing test from higher authority supported admissibility in such circumstances.
  7. The court additionally observed that Ex. P.18, though self-exculpatory in part, contained features amounting to admissions which could be relied upon against the accused.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Immediate implications:

  • Ex. P.6 was held admissible in evidence by the Sessions Judge and that conclusion was upheld by the court on appeal.
  • Ex. P.18, while self-exculpatory in part, contains admissions which the court indicated may be relied upon against the accused.

Broader implications:
The opinion applies and distinguishes existing authorities rather than purporting to establish a new rule of law. It confirms the approach (derived from Madras High Court decisions and guidance from the Supreme Court) that statements made voluntarily to a Magistrate as the first information of an offence, when no investigation or charge is pending and the maker is not under arrest, are not automatically excluded for non-compliance with Section 164 of the CrPC; non-compliance must be shown to be so vital as to vitiate jurisdiction or cause serious prejudice. The court did not state that it was creating a new precedent; rather it relied on and reconciled prior decisions to justify the admissibility of Ex. P.6.

    Yendra Narasimha Murthy, In Re

    1-22. Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.:—

    23. Item (1): Ex. P. 6 is a most important piece of evidence and it runs as follows:

    “Myself and a jewel merchant Tatayya killed Kammamettu Manikyam of Kotapadu village by twisting her neck near the tank which is by the side of Annapurna Talkies after one reel of first show was over. I kept that girl for some time. I went away after 5 years when it was felt difficult in their house. Till then I stayed in their house. I went to Kamavarapukota. When my photos were there, that girl used to revolt against her husband and son because they used to tear my photos. She sent for me when her son-in-law, husband, and daughter attempted together to kill her. I went from Chintalapudi to Karnam's house at Kotapadu and sent word. Four years back, she told me that they tried to kill her and that she wanted to come away with me and she started. I told her that it was not possible and threatened her I came away. Afterwards she herself came to me to Eluru. I took her to Kamavarapukota and kept her there. I consoled her and when I asked her to go home she did not go. I wrote letters to Recherla Karnani and to the husband of that girl without furnishing my name and address. After 3 months they came and took her. While they were writing letters now and then, I used to go there. Afterwards as he was unable to bear her body she kept this jewel merchant Tatayya. Later on I came to know after some days. I asked her; for that she said that it was true and she kept him. I told her to suffer as she liked from that date, he used to go. If necessary she used to send for me through him. He used to take me since then. He used to gather information about my welfare, and difficulties now and then, and used to tell her. I escaped from her informing her that I was moving with elders from one year. Afterwards, I went away to Aswaraopet. Whenever, the Karnam of that village was asking me to come, on seeing me at Eluru for Photographing, I was not going. When Kotapadu karnam and Gantipati Subbarao pressed me to come I sent word that I would come on a particular day and month and ten days were over. It might be 21st of last month. Afterwards, I went to Kotapadu at 6 O'clock in the evening. While I was going to Karnam's house, through washerman bazar, the son of that girl aged 25 years (P.W 2) and another four persons beat me together in the bazar. Afterwards, they took me to the house of the President. President reprimanded them and sent them away. I agreed that it was my mistake and fault. I sent a report to Vissannapeta police station and wrote a letter to Kotapadu Munsif from Chintalapudi. I was not going since then. It seems Khammammettu Manikyam came to Chintalapudi today noon. While I was going to Eluru from Venkatayapuram for enlargement of photos I came to Chintalapudi at 6 O'clock in the evening. While I was going to bus stand the jewel merchant appeared and stopped me. I stayed away, as he stopped me saying that it was essential. It seems that girl told him that she herself made me to be beaten and he asked her whether she would do the same thing to him also tomorrow. She said that as I had gone abroad, she made it like that, and she said that she was not willing to do like that to him. Again she told him that her son was ready to beat him also. At last it seems he demanded her the money she owed him. Afterwards when he told me that she abused me, I informed him that I could not believe. Afterwards, I met that girl by the side of the Annapurna talkies after the cinema was begun and asked her and knew. She told me that it was a fact to abuse me. I told her that in case I was insulted and beaten in the bazar I would feel it painful. When I told her that I used not to appear to her, she abused me. Afterwards I pushed her while standing. Afterwards, when she came for settlement, she threw me with her leg. She told me that in case I rejected her, she wanted me to think over what would happen to me. Tatayya was also present there. He asked her how many persons are to be insulted? He (accused) may tolerate. But I (Tatayya) cannot tolerate”. So saying he beat her. Afterwards she grew angry and abused both of us. Myself and Tatayya being unable to tolerate the abuses, squeezed her neck and Tatayya tied her neck with my towel and we killed. We left the dead body near that tank and came away being afraid of it. Tatayya went on his own way. I came to bazaar. After I sat for two hours, my conscience did not agree. Thinking that there would be no peace of mind even if I have a lease of life I woke you up and told you at your house. Tatayya would be sleeping either near Dosapativari bungalow or Venkamma's meals hotel”.

    24. The learned counsel for the accused contends that Ex. P. 6 is inadmissible in evidence and relies on Nazir Ahmed…Accused— v. Emperor…., AIR 1936 PC 253 (2). In that case, the relevant facts were as follows.

    25. The First Class Magistrate, under the orders of the District Magistrate, proceeded by car to the scene of dacoity and to places material to the avents connected with it. The accused, who was already under arrest, made a statement before the learned Magistrate. The latter did not observe any formalities but took rough notes of what he was told. After dictating to a typist a memorandum from the rough notes, he destroyed the rough notes. Such memorandum called a note, containing the substance but not all of the matter to which the accused spoke, was put in evidence. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

    “But it was not suggested that the Magistrate, though he was manifestly acting under para 5 of the Code, either purported to follow or in fact followed the procedure of Ss. 164 and 364 ……. The Magistrate offered no explanation of why he acted as he did instead of following procedure required by S. 164……”

    26. Contention was raised before their Lordships that it was admissible by virtue of Sections. 17, 21, 24 and 26 of the Evidence Act just as much as it would be if deposed by a person other than a Magistrate. Their Lordships repelled this contention and held that oral evidence also was inadmissible. The facts of that case are substantially different from the facts of the present case. In this case, Yendra Narasimhamurthy was not an accused when he went to the Magistrate of his own accord and he was not under arrest by the police and no investigation was going on in any crime registered against him at the time when the Magistrate recorded his statement (Exhibit P. 6). On various occasions, the Madras High Court had to deal with cases like the present one where a person appeared before the Magistrate and gave a statement at a time when there was no case already registered against him and no investigation was pending against him. In Arunachala Reddi v. Emperor, AIR 1932 Mad 500, it was observed as follows:

    “The main evidence against him is his own confession (Ex. A), corroborated by the evidence of P.W 4 and by the fact that the clothes he had been wearing were stained with human blood. The first information of the occurrence was given by the appellant himself. After killing his uncle, lie went straight to the nearest Magistrate (P.W 1) and told Trim what he had done. The Magistrate told him to pull himself together and gave him an hour for reflection. At the end of that time, the appellant was still in the same mood and made a complete confession, which the Magistrate recorded in the maimer prescribed by Section 164 of the CPC, which he need not have done as the confession was not taken under that Section……. The Sessions Judge rejected the contention, holding that the Magistrate was entitled under Section 190(1)(c) of the CPC to record and act on the information furnished by the appellant himself ……Assuming that the Magistrate was duly empowered to act under Section 190(1)(c) his view was correct. Apart from that, confessions like other Admissions, are relevant evidence under the Evidence Act, unless they are rendered inadmissible by some circumstances or circumstances which the Act declares to be of an invalidating nature”.

    27. In In re Nainamuthu Kannappan, AIR 1940 Mad 138, it was observed as follows:

    “It is urged upon us by the learned counsel for the appellant that the statement made by the appellant to the joint Magistrate, P.W 9, was, improperly admitted in evidence. Learned counsel argues that this was a statement made under Section 164 of the CPC, and since it was not recorded after observing the formalities prescribed by that section, it should not have been put in evidence. We think that objection would be just if the Magistrate had been investigating the case but he was not investigating the case or any of the facts connected with the case. On the contrary, this information given by the accused was itself the first information of the crime. The ruling cited to us in ILR 17 Lah 629 : AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) does not apply to the facts here……”

    28. In In re Natesan, AIR 1960 Mad 443 the relevant facts were as follows: A Magistrate recorded a statement as dying declaration from a person who was in grave condition at the Hospital. That person survived. He became accused at the trial. In that trial, that statement was excluded from the evidence by the learned Sessions Judge as inadmissible as it was not a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CPC with compliance of formalities required under that section. The accused was convicted under S. 302 I.P.C and sentenced to death. He was also convicted under S. 309 I.P.C The matter came up before the Bench of the Madras Court. Anantanarayanan J., observed as follows: (at p. 445):

    “But, equally, we desire to make it clear that, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), ought not to be construed, in our view, as amounting to some authority that under no circumstances whatever could a statement made by a person amounting to a confession of a crime to a Magistrate be admitted in evidence, unless the provisions of Section 164 of the CPC are complied with. Needless to say the decision itself does not seem to be authority for any such view, nor does it override the clear provisions of Section 21 of the Evidence Act, which render such admissions liable to be admitted in evidence, unless they fall within the mischief of the succeeding sections, such as Ss. 24, 25 and 26.

    29. Consequently, where the statement is made by an accused person to a judicial officer before any investigation has at all commenced, or is totally outside the scope of any such investigation we are not clear that such a statement is liable to be excluded, unless the provisions of Section 164 of the Cr PC had also been complied with. We would further observe that the position that statements recorded under Section 164 of the Cr PC themselves are inadmissible unless the formalities of that section are strictly adhered to would not appear to be the latest and the current view of the law.

    30. For, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out in W. Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (S) AIR 1956 SC 116, that the true test in all such cases is whether the non-compliance was so vital as to cut at the root of the jurisdiction, or so abhorent to natural justice that a serious prejudice has been occasioned”.

    31. Shri Rama Sarma, the learned advocate for the accused, has relied on the decision in Bala Majhi… v. The State Of Orissa…., AIR 1951 Ori 168 (FB). In that case, three questions were referred to Full Bench, of that, question No. 3 was as follows:

    “(3) Does non-compliance with the provisions of Section 164(3) of the Cr PC, by the Magistrate when recording a confessional statement render the same as nullity or inadmissible if there is satisfactory evidence, ‘aliunde’, before the Court that the confessional statement was voluntarily made?”

    32. The Learned Judges of the Full Bench, after referring to the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), held as follows: at p. 176.

    “Such a confession vitiated by substantial non-compliance, as indicated above, with the provisions of sub-section (3) of S. 164 is not a valid record of the confession and cannot, therefore, be made use of under Section 26 of the Evidence Act. There is thus no scope for invoking the aid either of Section 29 of the Evidence Act or section 533 of the Cr PC to cure such defect”.

    33. It does not appear that, in that case, the learned Judges were dealing with a confession similar to Ex. P. 6 which was recorded at a time when there was no case registered against the accused and when there was no investigation pending against him.

    34. In view of the various decisions of the Madras High Court, we find that Ex. P. 6 was rightly held by the learned Sessions Judge to be admissible in evidence.

    35. Item No. 3: Ex. P. 18 is self exculpatory. But various features, which are mentioned there, which are in the nature of admissions, can certainly be relied upon against the accused.

    36-43. [Rest of the judgment is not necessary for the purposes of this report.]

    LI/R.G.D

    44. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Yendra Narasimha Murthy, In Re
    (Feb 23, 1965)