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Summary of Opinion — Quashing of Proceedings (C.C. No. 868 of 1956)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application to quash criminal proceedings under section 409, Indian Penal Code, against Md. Abdul Sattar, the managing partner of Sri Dhannalakshmi Rice and Oil Mill Contractors Company, Vijayawada. The firm was a partnership formed by agreement between 16 persons in December 1954 for a period of two years. The partners held unequal shares; the accused held a 1/24th share and contributed his share of capital. By a special resolution dated 9 December 1954 he was appointed managing partner with a monthly remuneration of Rs. 100. His duties included purchasing and selling paddy, working the mill, maintaining accounts and day-to-day management. A cash credit account in the State Bank of India, Vijayawada, was opened in the partnership's name and two partners, including P.W.1, were authorised to operate it.

The prosecution alleged that the accused failed to enter the full amount of certain cheques issued by P.W.1: a cheque of Rs. 11,000 dated 24 December 1955 (alleged misappropriation of Rs. 1,000) and a cheque of Rs. 20,000 dated 2 January 1956 (alleged misappropriation of Rs. 5,000). Proceedings began on a police report and a charge under section 409 IPC was framed. The accused pleaded not guilty and applied to this Court to quash the proceedings on the ground that the criminal prosecution was illegal because he was a partner of the firm.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to entertain the petition despite the delay and the fact that the point was not raised earlier in the lower court.
  2. Whether a partner — here the managing partner — can be prosecuted for criminal breach of trust (and specifically under section 409 IPC) in respect of partnership property held and dealt with in the ordinary course of partnership business.
  3. Whether, on the facts alleged and the evidence adduced, the accused's omissions in accounting (failure to enter full cheque amounts) amount to dishonest misappropriation attracting sections 405/406/409 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Accused) — Md. Abdul Sattar

  • The criminal proceedings are illegal and ought to be quashed because he was a partner of the firm and the property in question constituted partnership property.
  • Implicit in his application is reliance on partnership law principles to show that there was no entrustment of property by one partner to another such as would attract criminal breach of trust provisions.

Prosecution / Respondent

  • Raised a preliminary objection that the application for quashing should have been made at the earliest opportunity; argued that because the petitioner did not raise the jurisdictional point in the lower court and waited until two witnesses had been examined, the petition should be dismissed in limine.
  • The prosecution's factual case is that the accused misappropriated portions of cheques issued by P.W.1 by not entering full amounts in the cash book and diverting the shortfall to his own use (specific allegations concerning Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 5,000 respectively).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhuban Mohan v. Surendra Mohan, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 69 (Full Bench) Held that a charge of criminal breach of trust against a partner by a copartner in relation to property belonging to both cannot be lawfully framed unless there is a special agreement creating entrustment or exclusive dominion in favour of one partner. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to conclude that, absent any special agreement conferring exclusive dominion over partnership property on one partner, a partner cannot be prosecuted under sections 405/406/409 IPC in respect of ordinary partnership property; this case was treated as determinative of the legal principle applied to the facts.
In re Lall Chand Roy (Division Bench of Calcutta High Court) (as referred to in the opinion) Division Bench held that a partner cannot be prosecuted for criminal breach of trust (in contexts reviewed). The Court cited this decision as supporting the view that partners, in the ordinary incidents of partnership, are not subject to prosecution for criminal breach of trust for dealings in partnership property.
The Queen v. Okhoy Coomar, 1874 13 Beng. L.R. 307 (Full Bench) Expressed the view that the words of section 405 IPC are wide enough to include a partner and that if it is proved a partner was entrusted with partnership property and dishonestly misappropriated it, the section could apply. The Court distinguished this earlier Full Bench decision, noting it did not indicate the circumstances under which a partner could be said to be entrusted; the Court treated that decision as capable of being confined to cases involving special agreements that create entrustment to a particular partner.
Piddocke v. Burt, L.R. 1894 1 Ch. 343 The dictum that a partner receiving money belonging to the partnership on account of himself and his copartners does not do so in a fiduciary capacity; this represents the true position of a partner under the law of partnership. The Court relied on this English authority to support the proposition that, under ordinary partnership rules, a partner is not in a fiduciary position vis-à-vis his copartners that would attract criminal breach of trust provisions absent special agreement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages: first addressing the preliminary objection regarding delay and then considering the substantive legal question whether the criminal proceedings could be maintained.

On the preliminary objection, the Court held that delay by itself is immaterial where there is a strong case for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. The Court recognised its general reluctance to interfere with ongoing trials before lower courts but stated that it is the Court's duty to exercise inherent powers where the prosecution case, as stated in the charge-sheet or by evidence, clearly leads to the conclusion that there is no case against the accused and further prosecution would amount to harassment.

On the substantive issue the Court analysed the legal relationship created by the Partnership Act and the ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in section 405 IPC. The Court noted:

  • Partnership property is owned by the partners as a whole and, in the absence of any special agreement, all partners have an interest in the whole of the partnership property (citing Section 15 of the Partnership Act); rights in partnership property are not mutually exclusive and no specific item of property belongs to any partner to the exclusion of others while the partnership subsists.
  • A partner is an agent of the firm (Section 18 Partnership Act) but his capacity as a partner is not derogated by his agency role; management is a right and duty of every partner (Section 9) and section 13 permits fixation of remuneration without altering partner status.
  • The essential elements of criminal breach of trust are entrustment or dominion over the property and dishonest misappropriation; entrustment must be by one as against another.

Applying these principles, the Court reasoned that ordinary incidents of partnership mean there is no "entrustment" of partnership property by one partner against another within the meaning of section 405 IPC. The Court emphasised that entrustment contemplated by section 405 presupposes that the property is not the recipient's own or held in his own right; because partnership property is as much the property of one partner as of his copartners, ordinary partnership dealings cannot attract the operation of sections 406 or 409 IPC unless there exists a special agreement creating exclusive dominion over particular property.

The Court reviewed relevant authorities (including Bhuban Mohan v. Surendra Mohan and Queen v. Okhoy Coomar) and concluded that the weight of authority, particularly the Full Bench decision in Bhuban Mohan, supports the proposition that criminal breach of trust charges against a partner in respect of partnership property are not maintainable in the absence of a special agreement creating entrustment or exclusive dominion.

The Court further examined the facts and the evidence adduced. It noted that a prosecution witness responsible for the accounts stated the firm kept duplicate books, that not all transactions were recorded in the cash book, that unauthorised expenditures were recorded in a private account (kept with P.W.1), and that clerks wrote accounts at P.W.1's dictation. Given this evidence, the Court held that the mere omission to enter full cheque amounts in the cash book did not necessarily have criminal significance, and that the allegation of misappropriation was open to doubt.

On the combined basis of law (no entrustment in ordinary partnership absent special agreement) and fact (accounting practices and witness statements undermining the allegation of dishonest misappropriation), the Court found no reason for the criminal proceedings to continue.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 868 of 1956.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the prosecution against Md. Abdul Sattar in respect of the alleged misappropriation (the specific cheques and amounts set out in the charge) was terminated by quashing the proceedings. The Court's decision rests on established principles of partnership law and the cited authorities; the opinion does not purport to lay down a broader novel precedent beyond applying those authorities and the Partnership Act to these facts. In particular, the Court concluded that, absent a special agreement creating exclusive entrustment or dominion of particular partnership property in favour of a partner, a partner cannot be lawfully charged with criminal breach of trust in respect of ordinary partnership property.


Order signature as recorded in the opinion: Ch. R.

Proceedings quashed.

    Mohammad Abdul Sattar v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, By Station House Officer, Vijayawada .

    1. This is an application to quash criminal proceedings for an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, against Md. Abdul Sattar, Managing Partner of Sri Dhannalakshmi Rice and Oil Mill Contractors Company, Vijayawada. This company is a partnership concern. The partnership was created by an agreement between 16 persons in December, 1954, for a period of two years for the purpose of working the said company at Vijayawada. The shares of all the partners are not equal. The accused has 1/24th share therein. Like others he brought into the concern his own share of capital. He being more experienced in the bussiness was, by a special resolution, dated 9th December, 1954, appointed managing partner. A remuneration of Rs. 100 per month was fixed for him by the said resolution to which he too was a party. He was to look after the purchases and sales of paddy, the working of the mill and correct maintenance of accounts and day-to-day business of the firm. A cash credit account was opened in the State Bank of India, Vijayawada, in the name of the partnership firm. Two of the partners including P.W 1 were authorised to operate that account.

    2. The case against the accused is that he failed to enter in the cash book the full amount of the cheque of Rs. 11,000/- issued by P.W 1 on 24th December, 1955 and misappropriated Rs. 1,000/- out of it; and that he similarly, on 2nd January, 1956, instead of entering the entire amount of Rs. 20,000/- for which the cheque was issued by P.W 1 credited only Rs. 15,000/- and misappropriated the remaining Rs. 5,000/-. The proceedings were started on the Police report and a charge was framed under section 409, Indian Penal Code, against the accused. He pleaded not guilty. Thereafter he has come to this Court with a request for quashing the proceedings in C.C No. 868 of 1956 on the ground that this criminal proceeding against him is illegal, he being a partner of the firm.

    3. Before I go into the merits I have to dispose of a preliminary objection. It is argued that an application for quashing the proceedings ought to be made at the earliest opportunity and that since the petitioner has not raised the point of jurisdiction in the Court below and has waited till two witnesses, after the charge, were examined, his petition ought to be dismissed in limine. I do not think that this petition can be dismissed on such a technical ground. The delay alone is immaterial if there is a strong case for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure 1 Code. Ordinarily this Court will be reluctant to interfere, before the completion of the trial, with the proceedings pending before the lower Court, but where the prosecution case itself, as stated in the charge-sheet or on the basis of evidence adduced, clearly leads to the conclusion that there is no case against the accused and that further prolongation of the prosecution would amount to harassment, certainly it will be the duty of this Court to interfere by exercising its inherent powers.

    4. So, then, the next question is, whether the criminal proceedings are ill-founded on the facts alleged. There is no doubt that the assets in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed are partnership assets evidently belonging to the partners as a whole and not the exclusive property of any of the partners, that the accused is a partner in the firm having interest both in the assets and the profits that may be ascertained and further that he is clothed with power to make purchases and sales and deal with the partnership property as a managing partner. He is charged with an offence section 409, Indian Penal Code, probably as an agent and not under section 406, Indian Penal Code which is a general section. The law of partnership is but a branch of the law of agency and section 18 of the Partnership Act provides that subject to the other provisions of the Act a partner is an agent of the firm. But this capacity does not derogate from his capacity as a partner; nor by virtue of his management is he divested of his capacity as a partner. As a matter of fact according to the provisions of section 9, all partners are bound to carry on business and to render true accounts and full information of all things affecting the firm to any partner. Thus the management of the business is the right and duty of every partner. Ordinarily no partner is entitled to receive remuneration for managing the business but Section 13 of the Partnership Act permits fixation of some remuneration by agreement. It is on this account that the remuneration has been fixed under a resolution for the accused. But the fixation of such remuneration does not alter he status as a partner. So then it has to be considered whether as a partner he can be prosecuted for an offence of criminal breach of trust. That offence is defined in section 405, Indian Penal Code which is in the following words:

    “Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust or wilfully suffers any other person so to do commits ‘criminal breach of trust’.”

    5. It is clear that a person to be guilty of criminal breach of trust should be (a) entrusted with property (b) or with any dominion over the property (c) that he should dishonestly misappropriate or convent it his own use (d) in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged and (e) or of any legal contract express or implied. Thus the main ingredients are entrustment or dominion over the property and dishonest misappropriation. No doubt the expression ‘whoever’ in section 405 in wide enough to cover all persons but the offence can by made out only if its ingredients are fulfilled.

    6. The point is, whether a partner having regard to the nature and incident of partnership can be deemed to be entrusted with the property as against the other partner or partners. Section 15 of the Partnership Act provides that subject to the contract between the parties the property of the firm shall be held and used by the partners exclusively for the purpose of the partnership business. In other words, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, all the partners hold, use and have interest in the whole of the partnership property. They have community of interest and hence their rights in the property are not mutually exclusive. So long as partnership subsists this property cannot be deemed to be separate property of any partner. No partner therefore can claim exclusive interest in the property nor till the dissolution of partnership and the accounts any specific item of property can belong to any partner to the exclusion of others. Such being the incidents of ordinary partnership no entrustment of property within the meaning of section 405, Indian Penal Code, is possible. Entrustment contemplated by this section is of the property which is not his and which he does not hold in his right. The entrustment or dominion of the property must be by one as against the other. Since the partnership property is as much the property of one partner as it is of his co-partner or co-partners it cannot attract the operation of an offence of section 406, Indian Penal Code. Of course, the case would be different if there be a contract as contemplated by Section 15 between the partners that a particular property would be the separate property of the partner. The law on this point has been laid down in Bhuban Mohan v. Surendra Mohan . A.I.R 1951 Cal. 69 F.B. wherein all the previous cases are reviewed. That was a decision of five Judges to whom the matter was referred on account of conflict of authorities on the subject. In In re. Lall Chand Roy2, it was held by a Division Bench of that Court that a partner cannot be prosecuted for criminal breach of trust. But in The Queen v. Okhoy Coomar . 1874 13 Beng. L.R 307., which was a judgment of the Full Bench a different view was taken. It was expressed therein that the words in section 405, Indian Penal Code were wide enough to include the case of a partner. It was further observed if it be proved that in fact a partner was entrusted with partnership property or dominion over it and has dishonestly misappropriated it or converted it to his own use there is no rule that the case of the petitioner should be excepted from the operation of the section. This decision did not give any indication as to the circumstances under which a partner can be said to be entrusted with partnership property or with dominion over it. The dictum in Piddocke v. Burt . L.R 1894 1 Ch. 343. that a partner receiving money belonging to the partnership on account of himself and his co-partner does not do so in a fiduciary capacity, represents the true position of a partner under the Law of Partnership. The Indian Partnership Act of 1932 is based on the English Act of 1890 and the codified law both in India and England is not exhaustive on the Law of Partnership. However the law as it was in England as referred to above would not permit the criminal prosecution of a partner for stealing, embezzling or misappropriating the property of the firm. This legal difficulty and disability was removed to an extent by 31 and 32 Vict., Chapter 116, now replaced by section 40(4) Larceny Act. No such legislation has been enacted in India. The position in India in the same as is was in England before such legislation. The sections relating to criminal breach of trust do not admit of an interpretation that there can be entrustment of property belonging to one's own self. The words “property of himself and or any other person” used in section 424, Indian Penal Code do not find place in sections relating to criminal breach of trust. This omission is intentional and brings out the mind of the Legislature. Such being the case the observations in Queen v. Okhoy Coomar, led to some practical difficulties in applying the law to the case of partners. The views of various High Courts and some of the Judges of the same Court did differ. The question was referred to the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court to resolve the conflict. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Bhuban Mohan v. Surendra Mohan, after fully considering the judgment of the Full Bench observed that a charge of criminal breach of trust against a partner by a copartner in relation to property belonging to both cannot be lawfully framed. They expressed that the Full Bench case of Queen v. Okhoy Comar, may be regarded as rightly decided if it is confined to cases whereunder a special agreement entered into between the parties entrustment of the property or dominion over it was given to any particular partner. But if it lays down any general rule applicable to prosecution of all partners for offences under section 406, Indian Penal Code in respect of property received or held by such partner on behalf of the partnership in the ordinary course of partnership dealings, that cannot be regarded as correctly decided. It may be remembered that the case of Bhuban Mohan v. Surendra Mohan related to the partnership property, which on account of communal disturbances at the time was with the consent of the partners removed to one of the partner's house for safety purposes but later on the partner concerned misappropriated and denied all knowledge about the property. In such circumstances it was held by the Full Bench that the said partner could not be charged with criminal breach of trust. The proceedings before the learned Magistrate were on that ground ordered to be quashed. The judgment proceeded on the principle that there was no entrusment of the partnership property or dominion over it by one partner against the other under the ordinary partnership unless there was special agreement. Harries, C.J, observed that there can be no fiduciary relationship with regard to the partnership property and a partner cannot therefore be guilty of fraudulent breach of trust in view of the ordinary incidents of partnership; of course, the case may be different if there is any special agreement. Mukherji, J., observed:

    “It is only when (such) ordinary character and nature of the partnership property ore varied by special contract of partnership so as to create entrustment of any specific property in favour one partner as against the others or so as to give exclusive dominion of such property to one partner as against the other that there can be any scope of application of section 405, Penal Code”.

    7. According to Banerji, J., “unless there is an agreement between the parties that a particular property will be the separate property of a partner there cannot be any entrustment of it to the other partner or partners.” It follows that unless there is a special agreement which admits of operation of section 405, Indian Penal Code, a partner cannot be prosecuted for the criminal breach of trust in respect of partnership property. Evidently there is not such special agreement in the instant case. The partner held the property on behalf of himself and his co-partners. There is no occasion therefore to attract the provisions of section 406 or 409 Indian Penal Code. That apart, even on facts alleged, misappropriation itself is open to doubt. One of the witnesses examined who was entrusted with the maintenance of the account books has clearly stated that the firm maintained duplicate books, that all the transactions were not brought to the cash book that unauthorised expenditure was written in a private account without being entered in the public account and that the private accounts are with P.W 1. He further deposed that A-1 and the other clerk wrote accounts to the dictation of P.W 1. In view of this statement, the mere fact that the cash book did not contain the entries of the full amount drawn from the Bank does not assume any criminal significance. In these circumstances, I see no reason why criminal proceedings should continue. Thus both on law and on facts this application should be allowed. I therefore allow this petition and quash the proceedings in C.C No. 868 of 1956.

    Ch. R.

    8. Proceedings quashed.

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    Comments

    Mohammad Abdul Sattar v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, By Station House Officer, Vijayawada .
    (Sep 11, 1957)