Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

L.P.A Nos. 1 and 2 of 1954

Advocates

For the Appellant: V.T. RANGASVAMI IYENGAR, V. VEDANTACHARI, Advocates.

Judges

K. Subba Rao, C.J
Bhimasankaram, J.

Acts

provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.12.
Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure.9.
provisions of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code.
SECTION 30 ANDHRA STATE ACT
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 87 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951
Section 78 of Madras Act II of 1927.5.
Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 C.P.C
provisions of Order 39, Rules 1
appreciated.6. Rule 1:
Rule 2 of Order 39
act7. Rule 2: (1)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These two appeals under the Letters Patent challenge an order of a single Judge of the Madras High Court that declined to grant a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from taking possession of lands in dispute pending disposal of A.S. Nos. 1013 and 1015 of 1953.

The underlying suits (O.S. Nos. 97 and 99 of 1952) were filed in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Eluru, by the present appellant seeking a declaration of his right of occupancy in the suit lands. The appellant is the archaka of three temples in Duvva (Sri Venugopalaswami Varu, Sri Sitharamaswami Varu and Sri Kesavaswami Varu) and claims a right to remain in possession so long as he performs archakathvam service. The respondents (defendants in the original suits) are trustees of the temples and contend the lands belong to the deities and that the plaintiff's entitlement is limited to wages for services.

The Subordinate Court dismissed the suits; the appellant appealed (A.S. Nos. 1013 and 1015). While those appeals were pending, the appellant filed C.M.P. Nos. 10551 and 10552 of 1953 in the Madras High Court seeking temporary injunctions to restrain the respondents from taking steps to recover possession under Section 87 of Madras Act XIX of 1951 pursuant to a certificate obtained under Section 78 of Madras Act II of 1927. The single Judge refused to grant the injunctions, leading to these Letters Patent appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitions for temporary injunctions could be maintained under Order 39, Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.).
Whether the High Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent (and as continued by Section 30 of the Andhra State Act, Act XXX of 1953), has inherent jurisdiction apart from Order 39 to grant interlocutory injunctions in cases not covered by Order 39.
Whether Section 151 (inherent powers) of the C.P.C. can be invoked to grant temporary injunctions in a case where specific procedural provisions (Order 39) exist.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant (through Mr. Vedantachari) conceded that Rule 1 (Order 39) did not apply but contended that the petitions fell within Rule 2 of Order 39 (suits for restraining the defendant from committing an injury of any kind), so as to permit a temporary injunction.
Alternatively, the appellant argued that the High Court possessed inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction in circumstances like the present, even if Order 39 did not apply — relying on inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C., the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court, and Section 30 of the Andhra State Act (Act XXX of 1953) which imports the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court in respect of territories included in Andhra.

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents (represented by the learned Additional Government Pleader) contended the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunctions sought because in the mofussil the power to issue injunctions is limited by the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, which were inapplicable to the present case.
Implicitly, the respondents disputed the appellant's contention that the court's inherent powers or the Letters Patent conferred any additional power to grant interim injunctions outside Order 39 in the appellate context.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Karuppayya v. Ponnusami, I.L.R. 56 Madras 563	Authority holding that the High Court's power to administer law and equity under the Letters Patent is limited to its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, and that inherent power to grant injunctions outside Order 39 was asserted only in Ordinary Original jurisdiction cases.	The court treated Karuppayya as a leading Madras decision supporting the proposition that the High Court, when exercising appellate jurisdiction over mofussil proceedings, cannot exercise an inherent power to grant injunctions beyond Order 39.
Govindarajulu Nayudu v. Imperial Bank of India, Vellore, 1932 35 L.W. 168	Earlier single-judge decision referenced in relation to inherent powers; noted that the judge in that decision had not been referred to the Letters Patent provisions.	The court observed that the earlier decision had not considered the Letters Patent and treated it as not inconsistent with the limit on inherent powers when the Letters Patent are considered.
Subramanian v. Seetarama Aiyar, 1948 2 M.L.J. 188	Held that Subordinate Courts and the High Court sitting as an Appellate Court have no inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction apart from the provisions of Order 39 C.P.C.	The court relied on this decision as supporting the proposition that appellate jurisdiction does not include an inherent power to grant interim injunctions outside Order 39.
Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar, 27 L.W. 418	Referenced in the discussion distinguishing decisions where extraordinary jurisdiction was asserted; used in comparative reasoning with other authorities.	The court recorded that Periakaruppan Chettiar was discussed in prior authorities and that it did not support an inherent appellate jurisdiction to grant injunctions outside Order 39.
Nagabhusbana Reddy v. Reddivari Narasamma, 1950 2 M.L.J. 482	Affirmed the view that in the exercise of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction over mofussil proceedings, the High Court has no inherent power to pass an interim injunction outside Order 39 C.P.C.	The court accepted and followed this decision as reinforcing the limitation on the High Court's power in appellate/mofussil contexts and applied it to dismiss the appeals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, grounded in the text of the opinion:

Scope of Order 39: The court first examined Order 39, Rule 1 and Rule 2 C.P.C. Rule 1 concerns danger of waste, damage or alienation of property or fraudulent removal of property by a defendant; Rule 2 applies to suits for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind.
Applicability of Rule 1 and Rule 2: The appellant conceded Rule 1 did not apply. The court rejected the appellant's contention that Rule 2 applied, explaining that the suits in substance were for a declaratory relief (a declaration of right of occupancy) and not suits seeking to restrain the defendant from committing an injury. The court emphasized that where the relief claimed is declaratory, it is inappropriate to characterize the suit as one for restraining the defendant from committing injury as contemplated by Rule 2.
Inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C.: The court reiterated the settled principle that inherent powers under Section 151 cannot be invoked to override or extend specific procedures that the Code prescribes. Where the Code provides an express procedure or limitation, the court cannot act otherwise under the guise of inherent power.
Letters Patent and the scope of High Court jurisdiction: The court analyzed clauses of the Madras Letters Patent (notably clauses addressing Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction) and Section 30 of the Andhra State Act which imports the Madras High Court's jurisdiction for Andhra. It held that those provisions limit the High Court to exercise those powers only as provided under the Letters Patent and that, in the appellate jurisdiction (which is the capacity in which the court was being asked to act), the High Court's powers are limited to those of the Subordinate Court from which the appeal arises.
Precedential support: The court reviewed Madras High Court authorities (Karuppayya, Govindarajulu, Subramanian, Nagabhusbana Reddy) and found them to support the proposition that, in the appellate/mofussil context, the High Court lacks an inherent jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions outside Order 39. The court therefore declined to accept the appellant's claim of inherent jurisdiction in the present appeals.
Practical observation and recommendation: Although rejecting the appellant's legal grounds, the court noted a practical difficulty — a declaratory decree, if obtained, would not be directly executable to restore possession if the trustees had taken over the lands pending appeal. The court suggested that the provisions of Order 39 might suitably be enlarged to cover cases like the present and asked the Rule Committee of the High Court to consider the suggestion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are dismissed. The court affirmed the single Judge's order declining to grant temporary injunctions and dismissed the appeals with costs.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

The respondents are not restrained by the High Court from taking proceedings to recover possession of the lands pending the disposal of the appeals in A.S. Nos. 1013 and 1015 of 1953.
The appellant remains limited to pursuing his declaratory remedy on appeal; the court observed that if the trustees take possession during the appeals and the appellant ultimately succeeds in obtaining declaratory decrees, those decrees will not be directly executable to regain possession and the appellant may have to initiate fresh proceedings for recovery of possession.

Broader legal implications:

The court explicitly followed Madras High Court authorities holding that, in the appellate exercise over mofussil proceedings, the High Court has no inherent power to grant interim injunctions outside the scope of Order 39 C.P.C.
The court did not purport to create a new precedent expanding inherent jurisdiction; rather, it reiterated existing limitations and recommended consideration of procedural reform (an enlargement of Order 39) by the High Court's Rule Committee to address the gap identified in practice.

Disposition in the opinion: Appeals dismissed with costs.

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Peddinti Gopalacharyulu ( In Both The Appeals) In A.S Nos. 1013 And 1015 Of 1953 (Petitioner In C.M.P Nos. 10551 And 10552 Of 1953) v. Rudra Veeranna And Others S In Both Appeals (S In C.M.P Nos. 10551 & 10552 Of 1953).

1. The Order of Court was pronounced by Bhimasankaram, J.

2. These two appeals under the Letters Patent are against the order of a single Judge of the Madras High Court declining to grant a temporary injunction against the respondents restraining them from taking possession of the lands in dispute pending the disposal of A.S Nos. 1013 and 1015 of 1953.

3. The learned Judge took the view that, in the circumstance of these cases, no injunction could be asked for. Before we go into the question of law, it is desirable to state briefly the facts leading up to the present appeals.

4. A.S Nos. 1013 and 1015 of 1953 are appeals against the common Judgment in O.S Nos. 97 and 99 of 1952 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Eluru. The suits were instituted by the appellant in these appeals for a declaration of his right of occupancy in the lands in dispute in each of the suits. The appellant is the archaka of three temples, Sri Venugopalaswami Varu, Sri Sitharamaswami varu and Sri Kesavaswami varu in the village of Duvva in the West Godavari District. The suit lands admittedly belong to the deities. The appellant claims, however, that he is entitled to remain in possession of the properties as long as he performs archakathvam service and that he cannot during that time be evicted from the lands. The respondents in the appeals, who were defendants in the original suits, are trustees of the temples. Their contention is that both the Melwaram and the Kudivaram belong to the deities and that the plaintiff has no interest in the lands but is entitled only to wages for services tendered. The suits were dismissed by the Sub-Court. A.S Nos. 1013 and 1015 are appeals against that decision. Pending those appeals, the present appellant filed C.M.P Nos. 10551 and 10552 of 1953 in the High Court at Madras seeking in each case, an injunction to restrain the respondents from taking proceedings to recover possession of the lands in dispute under Section 87 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 pursuant to a certificate already obtained by them under Section 78 of Madras Act II of 1927.

5. It is objected on behalf of the respondents by the learned Additional Government Pleader that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue any such injunction. The argument is that the power of the High Court to issue an injunction, like that of any Court, in the mufussil, is limited by the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and that those provisions are inapplicable to a case like the present. It is necessary to extract the relevant portions of these rules in order that the argument may be appreciated.

6. Rule 1:— “Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise:

(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or

(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act………………”

7. Rule 2: (1) “in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.”

8. It has been conceded by Mr. Vedantachari for the appellant that he cannot bring these cases under Rule 1. But he argues that the cases come under Rule 2. Alternatively, he says that this court has inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction in circumstances like the present, even though the case does not come within the scope of Order 39 C.P.C We propose to deal in the first place with his contention that the suits in question are in substance, suits for restraining the defendants from committing injury of any kind. We are unable to accede to this argument. In our opinion, it is impossible to hold that a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff has a right of occupancy in the suit lands and that he cannot be disturbed from his possession as long as he renders archakathvam service can by any stretch of language be considered to be one for restraining the defendants from committing injury of any kind. It is true that the language of Rule 2 of Order 39 is not very artistic. We apprehend that the rule when it speaks of suits for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, speaks of suits for an injunction restraining the defendant from doing any such act. But it is perfectly clear to us that where the relief asked for in a suit is only a declaration, it would be altogether inappropriate to describe the suit as one for restraining the defendant in any manner whatsoever. That being so, we are unhesitatingly of the view that the petitions under appeal are not maintainable under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

9. The question still remains as to whether this Court has inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction in the circumstances. We may premise the discussion by stating that it has been firmly settled that inherent power vested in Courts under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked where the procedure to be adopted in a particular case or class of cases is expressly provided for by the Code. In such matters, the Court cannot act except under the conditions specified by the express provisions. In other words, a Court cannot, under the guise of inherent power, extend the scope of a provision which imposes specific limitations.

10. It is argued, however, that the powers of the High Court are not circumscribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and that, under the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court, the Madras High Court has an inherent power to issue an injunction in cases not covered by Order 39, C.P.C and that under Section 30 of the Andhra State Act (Act XXX of 1953), this court can also exercise that power. The section referred to runs thus:

“The High Court of Andhra shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the State of Andhra, all such original appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the prescribed day, is exercisable in respect of the said territories or any part thereof by the High Court of Madras.”

11. It is true that under this provision this Court has all such original appellate and other jurisdiction as is exercisable by the High Court at Madras under the law in force immediately before the prescribed date. We must, therefore, see whether the power now invoked comes under the original appellate or other jurisdiction conferred on the Madras High Court under its Letters Patent. Clause 19 therein refers to the law or equity to be applied to cases coming before the High Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction is exercisable only as provided for by clause 11 “within such local limits as may from time to time be declared and prescribed by any law made by the Governor-in-Council and until such local limits shall be so declared and prescribed, within the limits of the local jurisdiction of the said High Court of Madras at the date of the publication of these presents, and the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the said High Court shall not extend beyond the limits for the time being declared and prescribed as the local limits of such jurisdiction.” Clearly, the High Court of Andhra has not derived any original jurisdiction of this nature from the Madras High Court apart from the fact that in a case of this kind, there is no question of the exercise of Ordinary Original Jurisdiction. Clause 20 deals with the exercise of Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, which is defined by clause 13 as “power to remove and to try and determine any suit being or falling within the jurisdiction of any Court, whether within or without the Presidency of Madras, subject to its superintendence, when the said High Court shall think proper to do so.” Clause 20 provides that the High Court of Judicature at Madras, in the exercise of its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, shall apply in each case “such law or equity and rule of good conscience which would have been applied to such case by any local court having jurisdiction therein.” It is thus manifest that, even in the exercise of Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, the High Court cannot have powers beyond those of the local Court from whose file the case might have been removed. Clause 21 which deals with the exercise of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction states that the High Court shall apply, in the course of such exercise, to each case coming before it such law or equity and rule of good conscience which the court in which the proceedings in such case were originally instituted ought to have applied to such case. This again limits the jurisdiction of the High Court to that of the Subordinate Court from which an appeal is taken. The foregoing discussion leaves no doubt in our minds, that this court has no inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction apart from the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

12. Reference may be made in this connection to some decisions of the Madras High Court bearing on the point. The leading case on the subject is the decision of a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Karuppayya v. Ponnusami I.L.R 56 Madras 563.. In that case, a decree was passed against the petitioner therein ex-parte. He then applied for the setting aside of that decree and an order was passed that it should be set aside if he gave security for the suit amount and costs within a specified time. As that order was not complied with, the application was eventually dismissed. A civil revision petition was filed against the dismissal and, pending the revision petition, the petitioner filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition seeking an injunction restraining the respondents-plaintiffs from executing the ex-parte decree. Objection war taken that the High Court had no power to grant the injunction unless the case fell under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 C.P.C and that the case not being one such, the petition was not maintainable. The learned Judge discussess clauses 19, 20, and 21 of the Letters Patent and says:—

“It is only under clause 19 of the Letters Patent that a chartered High Court can administer the law and equity that would have been applied by such High Court if the Letters Patent had not been issued, and the cases in which it can apply such law or equity are cases arising in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.”

13. The learned Judge points out that the decisions on which reliance was placed before him in support of the proposition that there was an inherent power were all decisions dealing with cases in which the High Court was acting in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. As regards the decision in Govindarajulu Nayudu v. Imperial Bank of India, Vellore 1932 35 L.W 168. an earlier decision of a single Judge of the same Court, he pointed out that the attention of the learned Judge who decided that case had not been drawn to the provisions of the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the view taken by the learned Judge is in accordance with the language of the Letters Patent and is right.

14. Mr. Vedantachari, however, drew our attention to the decision in Subramanian v. Seetarama Aiyar 1948 2 M.L.J 188.. Even that case says that the Subordinate Courts and the High Court sitting as an Appellate Court against the orders of the Subordinate Courts have no inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction apart from the provisions of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is true that their Lordships say, referring to the decisions in Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar 27 L.W 418. and Govindarajulu Naidu v. Imperial Bank of India, Vellore that, it was clearly laid down therein that the extra-ordinary jurisdiction possessed by the High Court is not possessed by any of the Subordinate Courts. In saying so, their Lordships were simply distinguishing those two cases as not being in point for the purpose of their discussion and not ruling that there was any such extraordinary jurisdiction. In any case, it is clear that the proposition which they accepted is a proposition against the present appellant as what this Court is now called upon to exercise is only appellate jurisdiction.

15. Mr. Seshachalapathy, on the other hand, drew our attention to the decision in Nagabhusbana Reddy v. Reddivari Narasamma 1950 2 M.L.J 482.. This decision affirms the view taken by Bardswell J., in Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami. The Head Note of 1955 this case rung thus:

“In the exercise of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court over moffusil proceedings, the High Court has no inherent power to pass an order of interim injunction outside the scope of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such an order cannot be passed merely because it is in accordance with equity and good conscience, when Order 39 of the Code does not apply to the facts of the case.”

16. We are inclined to accept and follow the above decisions of the Madras High Court. We therefore do not propose to refer to the decisions of the other High Courts some of which, it seems to us, can be explained on the basis of the exercise of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction while most of the others do not contain any discussion of the relevant provisions of the Letters Patent. Before parting with these cases, however, we would like to state that, in our opinion, it would be desirable that the provisions of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code should be enlarged so as to empower the Courts to grant injunctions in cases like the present. If the trustees in these cases should take over possession of the lands in dispute pending the appeals and if ultimately this Court holds that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration asked for, the present appellant will have to launch fresh litigation for recovery of possession of the suit lands, because the declaratory decrees which he may get not being executable would not be of any avail to enable him to get back possession. The Rule Committee of the High Court may deal with this suggestion.

17. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set.

T.A.B

18. Appeals dismissed.

Peddinti Gopalachary... v. Rudra Veeranna And O...