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citation codes
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  • Sub-rule 2 of Rule 60 of the Second Scheduled of Income Tax Act referred hereinabove. For convenience Rule 60 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
  • Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 20 RECOVERY OF DEBTS DUE TO BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT 1993
  • Rules 52 to 63 of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, the Debt Recovery
  • Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short hereinafter referred as the Act),
  • Sub-rule 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules. For convenience Rule 15 of the Rules
  • Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short hereinafter referred as the Rule) Form 16
  • Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 6-A of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 60 of the Second Scheduled of Income Tax Act
  • Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 60 and another provisions Recovery
  • Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-rule 2 of Rule 60 of the Second Scheduled of Income Tax Act referred hereinabove. For convenience Rule 60 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
  • Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 20 RECOVERY OF DEBTS DUE TO BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT 1993
  • Rules 52 to 63 of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, the Debt Recovery
  • Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short hereinafter referred as the Act),
  • Sub-rule 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules. For convenience Rule 15 of the Rules
  • Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short hereinafter referred as the Rule) Form 16
  • Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 6-A of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 60 of the Second Scheduled of Income Tax Act
  • Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 60 and another provisions Recovery
  • Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Devi Prasad Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

M/s. Vishwa Polly Processors Pvt. Ltd. (the Company) was granted a Cash Credit Hypothecation Limit by the State Bank of India, Cantt. Branch, Kanpur. The company defaulted and the Bank issued demand notices which were not complied with, leading to a regular suit (No. 331 of 1997) for recovery of Rs. 29,89,578 plus interest. After the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 came into force, the suit was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), ultimately at Allahabad.

By judgment dated 6 September 2002 the DRT decreed recovery in favour of the Bank for Rs. 29,89,578 and issued Recovery Certificate No. 299 dated 6.9.2002. The DRT ordered attachment of immovable property of the Company; the opinion refers to immovable property described in one place as House No. B-21, Indira Nagar, Lucknow and in other places as House No. B-217, Indira Nagar, Lucknow. Pursuant to valuation and the recovery process, the Recovery Officer fixed a reserve price (noted as Rs. 22.0 lacs), advertisement for sale was published and an auction took place on 30 July 2003.

The petitioner participated in the auction, tendered the highest bid of Rs. 22,50,000/-, deposited 25% immediately and, according to the petitioner, deposited the remaining bid amount (with pounding charges) on 13.8.2003 within the stipulated 15 days. The judgment-debtor filed an application to set aside the sale but, as the opinion records, did not deposit the sums required by the procedure set out in the Second Schedule (Rule 60) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

On 19 August 2003 the Recovery Officer, without issuing notice to the auction purchaser, passed an ex parte order setting aside the auction/sale dated 30 July 2003 on the ground of inadequacy of price. The petitioner challenged that order by filing Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003 before the Presiding Officer, DRT, Allahabad on 9 September 2003. The DRT stayed proceedings before the Recovery Officer by order dated 22.9.2003 pending disposal of the appeal. The judgment-debtor was later impleaded in the appeal on 1.12.2003.

The Bank moved to be permitted to enter into and record a compromise with the judgment-debtor. By order dated 23.2.2004 the Appellate Bench of the DRT, Allahabad permitted the Bank to finalise a compromise with the borrower in accordance with RBI guidelines (this is the impugned order in the writ petition). The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 227 challenging that order and other related actions; this Court entertained the maintainability and merits question and ultimately dismissed the writ petition subject to directions (see Holding).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Appellate Bench) could permit the Bank and the judgment-debtor to finalise a compromise after the DRT had decreed the suit and the Recovery Officer had proceeded to recover the dues.
  2. Whether the Recovery Officer could set aside the auction/sale dated 30.7.2003 without notice to the auction purchaser and without the judgment-debtor depositing the amount required under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 60 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  3. Whether the petitioner could maintain a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the availability of statutory appellate remedy under Section 20 (and appeals under Section 30) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
  4. Whether the purported compromise complied with Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines and whether approvals required by those guidelines had been obtained; and related allegations of mala fide conduct by Bank officials.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • Once the DRT had decreed recovery and the Recovery Officer had proceeded with recovery in accordance with law, it was impermissible for the Bank and judgment-debtor to enter into a compromise (ground (1) in the opinion).
  • The Recovery Officer's ex parte order of 19.8.2003 setting aside the auction was illegal because Rule 60 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act requires the judgment-debtor to deposit the auction amount (with statutory interest) to apply to set aside a sale; since that deposit was not made, the order is not tenable (ground (2)).
  • The DRT's permission to finalise a compromise (23.2.2004) expressly relaxed the earlier interim stay (22.9.2003). The petitioner contends that the Bank did not follow RBI guidelines in entering the compromise and acted under NPA-related motives (ground (3)).
  • A decree of a competent Court like the DRT cannot be modified, annulled or set aside and the decretal amount cannot be enhanced or reduced by a subsequent compromise after finalization of the decree (ground (4)).
  • The compromise had no mandatory approvals required under RBI guidelines and other provisions; the Branch Manager A.K. Agarwal acted mala fide and in collusion with the judgment-debtor—petitioner sought action against the Branch Manager (ground (5)).
  • The compromise was entered into in disregard of the impugned order itself and demonstrates mala fide exercise of power by the Recovery Officer in collusion with Bank authorities and judgment-debtor (ground (6)).
  • The petitioner relied on a coordinate Bench decision (DRC 167 of 2002, Oriental Bank of Commerce) where the Tribunal found that a Recovery Officer has no right to cancel a bid arbitrarily and that non-compliance with Rule 60 prevents cancellation of the bid; the petitioner argued that the DRT should apply the same standards (ground (7)).

Respondents' (Opposite Parties') Arguments

  • Preliminary objection: a statutory appeal lies against the impugned order under Section 20 of the Act; the petitioner has an alternative statutory remedy and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 227 (and Article 226) (para 21).
  • The DRT has the right to permit compromise at any time before enforcement of the decree; the Bank has a right to redeem/compromise while the sale is not yet confirmed, supported by settled law (para 21).
  • No illegality was pointed out in the procedure adopted by the Recovery Officer in auctioning the property in favour of the petitioner; the petitioner lacks locus standi to challenge the impugned compromise (para 23).
  • The respondents relied on numerous authorities to support their contentions that the Bank/judgment-debtor/DRT actions were within legal bounds (para 10 and 21 list cases relied upon by respondents).

Table of Precedents Cited

This table lists precedents cited in the opinion. Where the opinion explicitly records the legal principle or how the precedent was applied, that information is included. Where the opinion merely records citation without specifying the rule or specific application, the table so indicates.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 The opinion cites this case in connection with the High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 and the principles regarding interference when alternative remedies exist. The Court relied on Surya Dev Rai to illustrate the settled proposition that Articles 226/227 must be considered in the light of availability of alternative remedies; used in reasoning on maintainability (paras 13, 25).
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2003) 3 SCC 524 Principle regarding when Article 227/226 writs are appropriate in presence of statutory appellate or revisional remedies (quoted at length in the opinion). The Court reproduced and applied the Sadhana Lodh principle to hold that where statutory appellate/revisional remedies exist the High Court should be cautious in entertaining writs; used in the maintainability analysis (paras 25–28).
Sambhavnath Digambar Jain v. Mohanlal (2003) 9 SCC 219 Authority on revisional jurisdiction and challengeability of orders (Order 6 Rule 17 / Order 8 Rule 6-A context cited). The Court cited Sambhavnath to illustrate that certain interlocutory orders can be challenged by invoking revisional jurisdiction; used as a precedent that the High Court has revisional jurisdiction in appropriate cases (paras 29–32).
Dipak Chandra Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar (2003) 7 SCC 66 Principle that the power of appellate court is wider than the power conferred to High Court or Supreme Court in judicial review context; appeals have a broad scope. The Court cited this judgment to support the conclusion that the appellate authority (under Section 20) has wide powers to decide the controversy and therefore interference by writ jurisdiction was not appropriate (para 38).
Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh v. State of U.P (Division Bench decision cited) The opinion refers to this Division Bench judgment for the principle that once an appeal is filed, the High Court should not normally interfere under writ jurisdiction. Cited in support of the proposition that interference with a proceeding pending before an appellate authority is inappropriate (para 37).
State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibers Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 604 Referenced as authority relevant to the principle that appellate jurisdiction should not normally be interfered with by writ jurisdiction. Cited for the same general principle in the maintainability analysis (para 37).
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai ((1998) 8 SCC 1 / (2003) 2 SCC 107 references) The opinion records the citation but does not specify the precise rule or principle from this case. Cited by the petitioner (or parties) in their lists of authorities; the Court does not record a discrete application of this case in its reasoning.
Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation ((2004) 5 SCC 793) The opinion records the citation but does not specify the precise rule or principle from this case. Cited in the petitioner's compilation of authorities; no specific application detailed in the opinion.
H.S.E.B v. Ramnath ((2004) 7 SCC 166) Not specified in the opinion. Cited in the petitioner's list of cases; the opinion does not identify a specific reliance upon it.
S.J.S Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar ((2004) 3 SCC 553) Not specified in the opinion. Cited in the petitioner's list; the opinion does not describe how it was applied.
ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. ((2003) 6 SCC 675) Not specified in the opinion. Cited among authorities by the petitioner; no discrete application recorded in the Court’s reasoning.
Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal ((2002) 1 SCC 100) Not specified in the opinion. Cited in the petitioner's list of authorities; no specific use recounted in the reasoning.
Matter of Dr. "K" A Judicial Officer ((1997) 5 SCC 76) Not specified in the opinion. Listed among authorities; the opinion does not identify a particular application.
Achutanand Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayan (I (2005) BC 258 (DB) : AIR 2005 Orissa 32) Not specified in the opinion. Cited in the petitioner's compilation of cases; no specific application described.
Allied Chemicals Laboratories v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Cuttack (II (1999) BC 57 (SC)) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by the petitioner; the Court's opinion does not extract a specific rule from it.
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (repeated citation) See above entry. See above entry.
Laxmi Narain v. S.S. Pandiayan ((2000) 7 SCC 241) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents to support their legal position; no discrete use recounted by the Court.
U. Nilan v. Kannayyam through LRs ((2001) 6 SCC 569) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents; the Court does not describe a specific reliance.
Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan (II (2003) BC 695) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents; no particular application is set out.
National Bank Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal (AIR 1996 Cal. 323) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents; the opinion does not articulate a specific application.
Sushil Kumar Jaiswal v. Bank of India ((2000) 3 SCC 190) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents as supporting authority; the Court's reasoning does not analyze this case individually.
Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri v. Bhaskar Balwant Aher ((1975) 1 SCC 858) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents; no distinct application described in the judgment text.
Bathumal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta (AIR 1951 Cal. 202) Not specified in the opinion. Cited by respondents; the opinion does not specify any particular usage.
Various other local and tribunal decisions (e.g., decisions in 2003–2005 cited in the opinion) The opinion lists numerous additional authorities cited by the parties but does not specify the rule/principle for each within the text. The Court records these citations as relied upon by the parties; the opinion does not separately analyze or apply each citation in its reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by addressing the threshold issue of maintainability of the writ petition in view of the statutory appellate remedies available under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Step 1 — Jurisdictional framework: The Court acknowledged that High Courts possess wide powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution but emphasized the settled principle that availability of an alternative statutory remedy (appeal/revision) generally militates against entertaining a writ petition unless exceptional circumstances exist (paras 13–15). The Court relied on authorities (notably Sadhana Lodh and Surya Dev Rai) that delineate the circumstances in which writ relief is appropriate despite alternative remedies.

Step 2 — Availability of statutory appeal and pendency of related appeal(s): The opinion records that a statutory appeal lies under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Act (par. 34–35) and also that the petitioner had already filed an appeal under Section 30 challenging the Recovery Officer's order of 19.8.2003 (para 36). The Court observed that entertaining the writ in respect of matters connected to the order already under appeal would interfere with the appellate process and could prejudice a decision on appeal.

Step 3 — Risk of interfering with appellate jurisdiction: The Court explained that once an appeal is filed and entertained by the appellate authority, the High Court should not normally adjudicate the same controversy by writ unless the appellate authority has acted without jurisdiction. The court noted that the petition did not displace the jurisdiction of the appellate authority (paras 36–38).

Step 4 — Appellate authority's wider powers: The Court accepted the submission (and cited authority) that appellate bodies have a broad scope of interference and that the appellate tribunal in this field has wide powers to decide the controversy on merits (para 38, quoting Dipak Chandra Ruhidas).

Step 5 — Conclusion on maintainability and directions: Considering the above, the Court concluded that the writ petition was not maintainable because of the existence of alternate statutory remedy and the pendency of connected appeals (para 23). However, to avoid prejudice to the petitioner arising from delay, the Court directed that if the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 20 within one month, the appellate authority should entertain it on merits notwithstanding delay or laches and decide it expeditiously together with the pending Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003—preferably within four months. The Court also ordered that the parties maintain status quo for four months or until disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier (paras 23–24).

The Court did not engage in a detailed adjudication on the substantive merits (for example, whether Rule 60 was breached or whether the compromise complied with RBI guidelines) because it found the procedural threshold of alternative remedy and pending appeal determinative of maintainability. The Court indicated that the appellate authority should consider the substantive grounds raised by the petitioner (including those recorded in the opinion) when deciding the appeal (para 23).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ petition dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory remedy (appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993).

Implications (direct consequences recorded in the opinion):

  • The petitioner is permitted to prefer an appeal under Section 20 of the Act within one month from the date of the judgment; if so preferred, the appellate authority is directed to entertain the appeal on merits without being influenced by delay or laches (para 23).
  • The appellate authority is directed to decide the newly preferred appeal simultaneously with the pending Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003 (filed against the order dated 19.8.2003) and to do so expeditiously and preferably within four months from receipt of certified copy of this Court's order (para 23).
  • Parties are to maintain status quo for a period of four months or until disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier (para 23).
  • No order as to costs was made; the writ petition was dismissed subject to the above (para 24).
  • The Court noted that the appellate authority is competent to consider the substantive grounds (including Rule 60 non-compliance and alleged mala fide conduct) and that the High Court would not set precedent on those substantive issues because it declined to enter into merits in this writ (paras 21, 23).

The opinion does not purport to set out or declare a new legal precedent on the substantive questions (e.g., on the correctness of the Recovery Officer's cancellation of the sale or on the validity of the compromise); rather, it directs that those issues be adjudicated by the appellate authority in the appeals described above.

Disposition: Writ Petition dismissed (subject to the directions given above). No order as to costs.

    Virendra Singh v. The Debt Recovery Tribunal & Ors.

    Devi Prasad Singh, J.:— M/s. Vishwa Polly Processors Pvt. Ltd. (in short hereinafter referred as the Company) was granted Cash Credit Hypothetication Limit (in short CC Limit) by the State Bank of India, Cantt. Branch, Kanpur for utilisation of fund during business transaction. When the said company failed to pay the dues, respondents Bank sent a demand notice for the payment of dues but it could not be liquidated by the company. Feeling aggrieved a regular suit bearing No. 331 of 1997 was filed for recovery of a sum of Rs. 29,89,578 plus interest. On promulgation of Recovery of Debt Dues to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short hereinafter referred as the Act), the suit was transferred to Debt recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur, then to Allahabad.

    2. By judgment and order dated 6th September, 2002 the suit was decreed in favour of State Bank of India, Cantt. Branch, Kanpur for an amount of Rs. 29,89,578/-. In consequence thereof, a recovery certificate No. 299 dated 6.9.2002 was issued by Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for the recovery of decretal amount against the company. By order dated 21.3.2003 the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad had passed an order for attachment of immovable property of the Company. In pursuance to the provision for recovery of tax under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short hereinafter referred as the Rule) Form 16 was issued for attachment of immovable property of the company bearing House No. B-21, Indira Nagar, Lucknow. Admittedly, the Rule for recovery of dues is appendix as Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

    3. By order dated 7th March, 2002 M/s. Vishwa Polly Processors Pvt. Ltd. and others were directed to appear before Recovery Officer of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad on 7th March, 2003 for setting the terms of proclamation of sale. According to petitioner's Counsel in spite of service of notice none appeared before the recovery officer on 7.3.2003 The cost of the house in accordance to valuation report prepared by the valuer of the State Bank of India dated 9th March, 2003 was Rs. 34,93,900/-. According to petitioner's Counsel, since the said valuation was not arrived on the basis of principles adopted in making valuation for distress sales, the Recovery Officer has fixed the reserve price to the tune of Rs. 22.0 lacs. The reserve price fixed by the Recovery Officer was not challenged by either of the parties or any interested persons, hence, it attains finality. On 9th June, 2003, the Recovery Officer had passed an order for auction or sale of the mortgaged property i.e House No. B-217, Indira Nagar, Lucknow with the State Bank of India, Cantt. Branch, Kanpur. In consequence thereof the proclamation of sale was issued on 9th June, 2003 and advertisement was published in the newspaper Dainik Jagran, Lucknow Edition relating to the auction of said property on 30th July, 2003. Admittedly, the auction had taken place on 30th July, 2003 by the Recovery Inspector appointed by the Recovery Officer. Petitioner and five other persons participated as bidders in the auction. The petitioner's bid was for Rs. 22,50,000/- and being highest one the Recovery Officer had accepted the same. The document relating to the acceptance of bid was signed by Recovery Officer as well as Shri A.K Agarwal, the then Branch Manager of State Bank of India, Cantt. Branch, Kanpur. Immediately after finalisation of auction in compliance of relevant terms and conditions petitioner had deposited 25 per cent of the bid amount, which was accepted by the Recovery Officer. According to petitioner's Counsel on 13.8.2003 petitioner had deposited the remaining entire bid amount along with pounding charges, i.e within the stipulated period of 15 days from the date of auction and the same was taken on record by the Recovery Officer. The judgment-debtor Mr. Ashok Kumar Verma had filed an objection to set aside the auction and sale. However, he had not deposited the amount specified in the proclamation of sale which is mandatory under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 60 of the Second Scheduled of Income Tax Act referred hereinabove. For convenience Rule 60 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is reproduced as under.

    “60. Application to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit—(1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale, on his depositing,

    (a) the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered with interest thereon at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum, calculated from the date of the proclamation of sale to the date when the deposit is made, and

    (b) for payment to the purchaser as penalty, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money, but not less than one rupee.

    (2) Where a person makes an application under Rule 61 for setting aside the sale of his immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make, or prosecute an application under this rule.”

    4. On 19th August, 2003 the Recovery Officer without issuing any notice to the auction purchaser passed an ex parte order by setting aside the auction sale dated 30th July, 2003 which was settled in petitioner's favour, on the ground of inadequacy of price. Copy of order dated 19.8.2003 was attached as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. The order dated 19.8.2003 has been impugned by the petitioner in Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003 filed on 9.9.2003 before the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad. On 10th September, 2003 the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad had given liberty to the petitioner to make a mention before the Recovery Officer relating to the pendency of appeal. The judgment-debtor had filed an application before the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for impleadment as a party in the said appeal. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Prashant Chandra the judgment-debtor could not have been made party in view of provision contained in Sub-rule 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules. For convenience Rule 15 of the Rules is reproduced as under:

    “Who may be joined as respondents—(1) In an appeal by a person other than Bank or financial institution, the Bank or financial institution who has to recover any debt from any person under Section 19 of the Act, before the Tribunal against whose order the appeal has been preferred, shall be made the respondents to the appeal.

    (2) in an appeal by the Bank or a financial institution the other party shall be made the respondents to the appeal.”

    5. On account of pendency of appeal before the Tribunal on 12th September, 2003 petitioner had moved an application for stay of further proceedings relating to the sale of House No. B-217, Indira Nagar, Lucknow. However, the Recovery Officer had rejected the petitioner's application for stay of further auction and fixed 15.10.2003 for adjudication of fresh term of sale. Hence, on 19th September, 2003 the petitioner had moved another application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for stay of proceedings before the Recovery Officer. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad by order dated 22.9.2003 had stayed the proceedings pending before the Recovery Officer till disposal of appeal. Copy of the order dated 22.9.2003 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad has been attached as Annexure-7 to the writ petition. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad on 1.12.2003 had allowed the application of judgment-debtor for impleadment as a party. Accordingly the judgment-debtor was impleaded as respondent No. 3 in the appeal.

    6. According to petitioner's Counsel when the proceeding before the Recovery Officer was stayed by Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, by order dated 22.9.2003 on failing to get their objective fulfilled the State Bank of India had moved an application on 4.2.2004 before the Appellate Bench of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for seeking permission to enter into compromise with respondent No. 3. The Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad by impugned order dated 23.2.2004 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition had permitted the respondents State Bank of India to finalise the compromise with the borrower (respondent No. 3 before the Tribunal) in accordance to guidelines of Reserve Bank of India. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad the impugned order dated 23rd March, 2004 petitioner had approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Initially, by an interim order the proceeding before the Recovery Officer was stayed by this Court. It appears that in pursuance to permission granted by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad the respondents State Bank of India had moved an application dated 24th March, 2004 before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad and prayed that the compromise of the recovery may be recorded. By an order dated 25th March, 2004 the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad held that application of the Bank was not maintainable. On 31st March, 2004 the certificate was issued by State Bank of India, Cantt. Branch, Kanpur certifying that compromise has been settled subject to payment of Rs. 24,00,000/- on 26th March, 2004. Thereafter, respondents Bank had moved an application dated 4th April, 2004 before the Appellate Bench of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad with the prayer that compromise entered between the judgment-debtor and Bank may be recorded.

    7. While assailing the impugned order dated 23.2.2004, learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Prashant Chandra had raised following grounds:

    (1) When the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad had decreed the suit and the Recovery Officer had proceeded to recover the dues in accordance with law, it was not open to the Bank or the judgment-debtor to enter into the compromise.

    (2) Under Rule 60 of the Second Scheduled of Income Tax Act application to set aside auction and sale of the immovable property could not have been entertained by the Recovery Officer unless the judgment-debtor would have deposited the entire auction amount with interest at the rate of 15 per cent for payment to the purchaser. Since the petitioner had not deposited the amount in pursuance to Rule 60 the order passed by the Recovery Officer to set aside the auction and sale was substantially illegal and not tenable under law.

    (3) By the impugned order dated 23.2.2004 the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad had permitted to finalise the compromise with the borrower strictly in accordance with guidelines of Reserve Bank of India and to that extent the interim order dated 22.9.2003 was relaxed. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad further directed that respondents Bank shall furnish the full particulars of compromise under the guidelines of Reserve Bank of India. According to petitioner's Counsel instead of following the Reserve Bank of India guidelines a compromise was entered into between the Bank and the borrower with oblique motive as per NPA guidelines.

    (4) A decree of the competent Court like Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad can, not be modified, annulled or set aside and amount also cannot be enhanced or reduced by compromise after finalisation of the decree.

    (5) According to petitioner's Counsel the compromise entered into between the judgment-debtor and respondents Bank had got no approval from the higher authorities which is mandatory under the Reserve Bank of India guidelines as well as other relevant provision. Petitioner's Counsel had further submitted that the Branch Manager A.K Agarwal had acted with mala fide and oblique motive to extend undue help to the judgment-debtor. Feeling aggrieved applications were also moved for appropriate action against the Branch Manager.

    (6) The parties had entered into compromise in their disregard of impugned order itself. Accordingly, the subsequent event shows mala fide exercise of power by the Recovery Officer in collusion with the Bank authorities and judgment-debtor.

    (7) In one other case DRC 167 of 2002 Oriental Bank of Commerce Branch Manager M.G Marg, Agra, Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, the Debt Recovery Tribunal had allowed the appeal on similar ground as raised by the petitioner. Copy of judgment and order dated 26.8.2003 filed by Debt Recovery Tribunal while deciding the appeal No. 10 of 2003 has been filed as Annexures-9 to the writ petition. The appellate judgment shows that after considering the Rules 52 to 63 of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, the Debt Recovery Tribunal had given a finding that in the event of non-compliance of Rule 60 and another provisions Recovery Officer has got no right to cancel the bid more so in an arbitrary manner. Accordingly, the submission is, the Debt Recovery Tribunal does not have right to adopt different standard in identical cases while adjudicating a dispute. The judgment of coordinate Bench of the Tribunal is binding.

    8. In support of aforementioned contention Mr. Prashant Chandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the judgments reported in VIII (1998) SLT 380 : I (1999) CLT 15 (SC) : (1998) 8 SCC 1, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, I (2003) SLT 153 : I (2003) CLT 98 (SC) : (2003) 2 SCC 107, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation, (2004) 5 SCC 793, H.S.E.B v. Ramnath, II (2004) SLT 734 : (2004) 7 SCC 166, S.J.S Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, I (2004) SLT 381 : I (2003) CLT 443 (SC) : (2004) 3 SCC 553, ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd., III (2003) CLT 133 (SC) : IV (2003) SLT 810 : (2003) 6 SCC 675, Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, VIII (2001) SLT 437 : (2002) 1 SCC 100, Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal., II (2001) SLT 37 : (2001) 3 SCC 54, Matter of Dr. “K” A Judicial Officer, II (1997) CLT 345 (SC) : (1997) 5 SCC 76, Achutanand Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayan, I (2005) BC 258 (DB) : AIR 2005 Orissa 32, Allied Chemicals Laboratories v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery, Tribunal, Cuttack, II (1999) BC 57 (SC) : V (1999) SLT 310 : 1999 SOL Case No. 354, The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Graoco Industrial Ltd.

    9. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the opposite parties had raised preliminary objection that against the impugned order statutory appeal lies under Section 20 of the Act. The further submission of Mr. Swayambhoo Chandranshul and Mr. Sharad Dwivedi holding brief of Mr. D.P Dwivedi, learned Counsel for the opposite parties is that Debt Recovery Tribunal has got right to permit for compromise at any time before the enforcement of decree. According to learned Counsel for opposite parties, since for relief No. 2 the petitioner had already filed an appeal under Section 30 of the Act (against the order dated 19.8.2003 passed by Recovery Officer) the present writ petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties had proceeded to submit that unless sale is not confirmed Bank has got right to redemption in view of settled law by Apex Court and this Court.

    10. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties had relied upon the judgment reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 : AIR 2003 SC 3044, Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, VI (2000) SLT 565 : (2000) 7 SCC 241, Laxmi Narain v. S.S Pandiayan, VIII (1999) SLT 601 : (1999) 8 SCC 511 : AIR 1999 SC 3750, U. Nilan v. Kannayyam through LRs, II (2001) BC 642 (SC) : V (2001) SLT 778 : (2001) 6 SCC 569 : AIR 2001 SC 3208, Punjab National Bank v. O.C Krishnan, II (2003) BC 695, National Bank Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, I (1996) BC 509 : AIR 1996 Cal. 323, Sushil Kumar Jaiswal v. Bank of India, I (2000) CLT 365 : II (2000) SLT 500 : (2000) 3 SCC 190, Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri v. Bhaskar Balwant Aher (d) through LRs., (1975) 1 SCC 858, Bathumal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta, (2004) 4 Educational and Service Cases (Alld) 2366, Naring Bahadur Singh v. Din Dayal Upadhayaya, (2004) 4 Educational and Service Cases (Alld.) 2037, State of U.P v. U.P Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh, Allahabad, AIR 2004 Raj. 241, Munna Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 Raj. 246, Arjun Singh v. A.D.J Behror, 2005 (23) LCD 124 (Ald.), Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh v. State of U.P, III (2003) CLT 26 (SC) : IV (2003) SLT 404 : (2003) 6 SCC 220, Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal, III (2003) CLT 93 : IV (2003) SLT 892 : (2003) 7 SCC 66, Dipak Chandra Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar, III (2003) SLT 402 : (2003) 5 SCC 395, Bimal N. Desai v. State of Karnataka, IV (2002) SLT 49 : (2002) 5 SCC 521, Minor Irrigation Rural Engineering Services v. Sahngoo Ram Arya; judgment and order dated 11.3.2004 in W.P No. 543 (MS) 2004, Smt. Krishna Kumari Talwar… v. Debt Recovery Tribunal…., Lucknow Passed by this Court, III (2003) SLT 755 : (2003) 5 SCC 399, Seth Chand Ratan v. Pandit Durga Prasad (d) By LRs, I (2005) SLT 97 : (2005) 1 SCC 604, State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibres Ltd., 2005 (23) LCD 476, Sultan Leather Finishers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional District Judge, Unnao, (1995) 1 SCC 161, New, Kilinworthy Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Ashoka Industries Ltd., (1977) 3 SCC 247, Narandas Karsondas v. S.A Kamtam, (1989) 4 SCC 344 : AIR 1989 SC 2113, Maganlal v. Jaiswal Industries, Neemach, 2004 (22) LCD 382, Achaldas Durgaji Oswal (Dead) Through LRs. v. Ramvilas Gangabisan Hethi (Dead) Through LRs, 2004 (22) LDC 1093, Kanpur Agra Transport Co. Kanpur v. Amarjeet Singh, 2005 (23) LDC 459, Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (Dead) Through Lrs., AIR 1951 Cal. 202, Raj Kumar Roy v. Mritunjai Das, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 316 : AIR 1989 SC 1426, Tara Singh (deceased by LRs) v. Kehar Singh, (1973) 3 SCC 614 : AIR 1972 SC 806, Ahmed Bin v. Mohd. Badshah Alias Bashah Mian, AIR 1966 SC 1707, Hari Nagar Sugar Mills v. M.W Pradhan, (2000) 7 SCC 240, Lakshmi Narayanan v. S.S Pandian.

    11. On the basis of case laws referred hereinabove the submission of learned Counsel for the opposite parties is that since against the cancellation of sale dated 19.8.2003 petitioner had preferred an appeal under Section 30 of the Act and which is pending in the same manner petitioner should file an appeal under Section 20(1) of the Act against the subsequent impugned order dated 23.2.2004 Respondents Counsel further submits that in view of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure the judgment-debtor was entitled to enter into compromise with the Bank. However, no illegality could be pointed out by the opposite parties in the procedure adopted by the Recovery Officer to auction the property in question in favour of petitioner. The further submission of respondents Counsel is that the petitioner has got no locus standi to challenge the impugned order of the compromise entered between the parties.

    12. Before entering into the merit of the case since a question relating to the maintainability of writ petition has been raised by the petitioner it is necessary to consider this issue first so that in case the controversy is relegated to appellate authority, then the appellate authority will be able to decide the appeal on merit without being influenced by judgment of this Court.

    13. This Court has got wide power to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India even if an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner, in case no interference will cause to serious miscarriage of justice or the authority or trial Court had exercise jurisdiction which was not vested in it, Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (supra). The argument advanced by Mr. Prashant Chandra relating to the entertainment of writ petition vis-a-vis availability of alternative remedy is a settled proposition of law.

    14. In a case reported in II (2003) SLT 118 : I (2003) ACC 332 (SC) : (2003) 3 SCC 524, Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where remedy of appeal is not available to aggrieved person against the order passed by District Judge then such person may prefer a revision before High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be filled only in case of revisional remedy is not available to an aggrieved party.

    15. For convenience relevant portion from the case of Sadhana Lodh (supra) is reproduced as under:

    “…… this being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in such a situation a writ petition unreserved under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

    16. In one another case reported in (2003) 9 SCC 219, Sambhavnath Digambar Jain v. Mohanlal, where the application under Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected by the trial Court declining to permit the defendant to amend the written statement and counter-claim, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that such application can be challenged by invoking revisional jurisdiction.

    17. For convenience Paras 3 and 4 of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sambhavnath's case (supra) is reproduced as under:

    “The respondents herein filed a suit against the appellant for setting aside the said order of the Registrar. On 13.9.1982, the appellant filed written statement wherein an averment was made that the portion of property where the girl's school was running was the property of the Trust. It may be mentioned that the Registrar did not included the said portion of the school as Trust property. On 15.9.1982, the appellant filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sought to incorporate in its counter-claim the said school as a Trust property. On 15.9.1982, the appellant filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sought to incorporate in its counter-claim the said school as a Trust property by way of an amendment to its written statement. The said application was rejected by the trial Court and being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed a revision which was dismissed as not maintainable. That is how the parties are before us.

    Learned Counsel for the appellant has urged that the order passed by the Trial Court was revisable and view taken by the High Court is erroneous. We are of the view that the High Court for ends of justice ought to have considered the application on merit keeping in view Rule 6-A of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in accordance with the law. We, therefore, hold that the above order rejecting the application of the appellant by the trial Court was revisable.”

    18. Keeping in view the law settled by Apex Court referred hereinabove and relied upon by the parties undoubtedly this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition. In the present case admittedly under Section 20 of the Act statutory appeal lies. For convenience Sub-section 1 of Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is reproduced as under:

    “Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal—(1)

    Save as provided in Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, of deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter,”

    19. Apart from availability of statutory appellate remedy there is one more reason comes in the way to entertain the present writ petition. Against the order of cancellation of sale dated 9.8.2003 passed by Recovery Officer, admittedly petitioner had preferred an appeal, which is pending. The relief No. 2 relates to said controversy. Any observation or interference by this Court under Writ jurisdiction will amount to interference with a proceed ding pending before the appellate authority. Even if the present writ petition is entertained for relief No. 1, the observation of finding given by this Court shall affect the decision of appeal pending before the appellate authority. Once a person files an appeal against an order by exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction and the appellate authority entertains the appeal to decide the same on merit, then it shall not be open to such person to challenge the same order under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, under writ jurisdiction, unless the appellate authority had entertained the appeal without jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of appellate authority has not been questioned by the petitioner.

    20. The principle of law to this extent may be very well drawn from the Division Bench judgment of this Court, Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh v. State of U.P (supra), and judgment of Apex Court, State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibers Ltd. (supra).

    21. Since, by the impugned order the Debt Recovery Tribunal had granted permission to settle the dispute or compromise in view of RBI guidelines which has got direct nexus with the pending controversy before the appellate authority, it shall not be proper to interfere with the impugned order under the writ jurisdiction. The substantial illegality, infirmity or binding nature of other judgment of the Tribunal under similar circumstance can very well be considered by appellate authority by entertaining the appeal under Section 20 of the Act. The Apex Court in a case Dipak Chandra Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar (supra), held that the power of appellate Court is much wider than power conferred to High Court or Supreme Court. The appellate authority has got wide power to go into, interfere and decide the controversy in question.

    22. For convenience Para 15 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:

    “Section 116-A provides for an appeal. The said provision must be given a liberal and purposive construction. The scope of an appeal should be held to be wider than an application for judicial review or a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”

    23. In view of above, on account of availability of alternative statutory appellate remedy the present writ petition is not maintainable. It shall be open to the petitioner to prefer an appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. On account of pendency of controversy in this Court since more than a year has been passed and also on account of fact that an interim order was passed in petitioner's favour, the appellate authority is directed to entertain the appeal on merit without being influenced by delay and laches. In case, the appeal is preferred within a period of one month from today, the appellate authority shall decide the same simultaneously along with the pending Misc Appeal No. 154 of 2003 filed against the order dated 19.8.2003 in accordance to law. While deciding the appeal the appellate authority shall consider the ground raised by petitioner's Counsel referred hereinabove apart from other grounds, which may be raised in the memo of appeal. The appellate authority shall decide both the appeals in accordance to law expeditiously and preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this Court. Parties shall maintain status quo for the period of four months or till disposal of appeal whichever is earlier.

    24. Subject to aforesaid observation, the writ petition is dismissed on account of availability of alternative remedy. No order as to cost.

    25. Writ Petition dismissed.

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    Virendra Singh v. The Debt Recovery Tribunal & Ors.
    (May 18, 2005)