1. The present appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), is directed against the order of the Tribunal dated August 14, 2003, for the assessment year 1997-98 by which the Tribunal has rejected the appeal of the appellant filed against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dated January 21, 2002. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) rejected the appeal as barred by limitation. The question for consideration is whether the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal are justified in refusing to condone the delay and rejecting the appeal as barred by limitation.
2. The assessment order dated February 27, 2000, passed by the Income-tax Officer, Ghazipur, for the assessment year 1997-98 was served upon the appellant on March 18, 2000, and, therefore, the limitation for filing the appeal was up to April 17, 2000, while the appeal was filed on September 29, 2000, beyond time by 158 days. The appellant filed application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. In the application, it was explained that since in the case legal and important point relating to the jurisdiction of the assessing authority was involved, the local counsel Sri Satendra Prasad, advocate, rushed with the order to counsel of the High Court to seek the opinion on the point. The matter was consulted with several counsel including the retired judges and it was advised to file a writ petition. The writ petition was also prepared by Sri Shakeel Ahmad, advocate, but subsequently, the local counsel Sri Satendra Prasad thought to move an application under section 154 of the Act for rectification of the order. Thus, the proceeding took a long time which resulted in the delay in filing the appeal. It was submitted that the delay was not caused intentionally or negligently. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has refused to condone the delay and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has been confirmed by the Tribunal. We have heard counsel for the parties.
3. The matter is listed for admission of the appeal. With the consent of the parties, the same is being disposed of finally at the admission stage.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal have taken a pedantic view while considering the application for condonation of delay. It has been consistently held by the apex court that in the matter of condonation of delay a liberal and pragmatic view should be taken. The reasons given by the appellant for the delay appears to be sufficient cause and, accordingly, the delay is liable to be condoned.
5. The law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
6. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji reported in [1987] 167 ITR 471, hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows (page 472):
“The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. ‘Every day's delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
7. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 the apex court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as under (headnote):
“The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.”
8. In Shankarrao v. Chandrasenkunwar reported in 1987 Supp SCC 338, the Supreme Court took the view that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.
9. In Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil reported in [2002] 253 ITR 798, the apex court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under (page 799):
“In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach….”
10. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Smt Shanti Misra, Adult, [1977] 47 Comp Cas 453; (1975) 2 SCC 840 : AIR 1976 SC 237, the hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction.
11. In Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156, it was observed that the true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal.
12. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575, the hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
13. In O.P Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh reported in (1984) 4 SCC 66 : AIR 1984 SC 1744, the the hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 : AIR 1996 SC 1623, hon'ble Supreme Court considered the large number of its earlier judgments including Binod Bihari Singh v. Union Of India. reported in (1993) 1 SCC 572, M/S Shakambari & Co.Petitioner/ v. Union Of India. reported in 1993 Supp (1) SCC 487, Warlu v. Gangotribai reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 37, Randal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in AIR 1962 SC 361, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi, [1979] 118 ITR 507; (1979) 4 SCC 365 : AIR 1979 SC 1666; [1979] 49 Comp Cas 463, Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan† , (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953, and held that expression “each day's delay must be explained”, does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made and it must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner.
14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Tribunal dated August 14, 2003, and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dated January 23, 2002, are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to decide the appeal on the merits after giving opportunity of hearing in accordance with the law.