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  • provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908),
  • Evidence Act. In Transfer of property Act,
  • Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • SECTION 68 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 229 B
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908),
  • Evidence Act. In Transfer of property Act,
  • Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • SECTION 68 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 229 B
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges a judgment dated 16-7-1996 of the Board of Revenue which held that a scribe cannot be treated as an attesting witness unless the attesting witnesses were dead or not in a position to be examined.

Factual matrix (as stated in the opinion): Mohd. Hanif was the Bhumidhar of plot No. 201 (2 Bighas, 7 Biswas). He had three sons. One son, Mohd. Yusuf (the plaintiff), filed a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act claiming exclusive Bhumidharship based on a Will dated 13-5-1979 allegedly executed by Mohd. Hanif in Yusuf's favour. The other two sons (opposite parties) denied the Will's execution, called it forged, and claimed one-third share each.

Procedural history (as stated): The trial court, by judgment dated 29-6-1993, dismissed the suit because the Will was not proved by attesting witnesses. On appeal the Commissioner allowed the appeal in favour of the plaintiff on the basis that the scribe proved the Will, and decreed the suit. The defendants filed a second appeal: the Board of Revenue allowed that appeal, finding (inter alia) that the Will was not proved by attesting witnesses, that there was no explanation for disinheriting the other brothers, and that a scribe cannot be treated as an attesting witness unless the attesting witnesses were dead or not available. The present writ petition was filed assailing the Board of Revenue's judgment. The court heard counsel for both sides and reviewed the record and legal provisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a scribe who signs or is otherwise involved in the preparation/registration of a Will can be treated as an attesting witness for the purpose of proving execution of a Will required to be attested, particularly where the attesting witnesses have not been examined.
  2. Whether the Will dated 13-5-1979 was proved and whether there was any satisfactory explanation on record to justify disinheriting the two other sons.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Will dated 13-5-1979 was proved by the scribe.
  • The testator (Mohd. Hanif) was residing in Bombay and executed the Will of his free will and mind in favour of the petitioner.
  • Cases cited by petitioner were meant to vindicate the proposition that a scribe can be treated as an attesting witness in appropriate circumstances.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The Will was not proved to have been executed by Mohd. Hanif; it was alleged to be forged.
  • All three brothers succeeded to the property (i.e., no exclusive Bhumidharship vested in the petitioner).
  • At least one attesting witness is necessary to prove a document required to be attested.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Jabbar v. Venkata Sastri ((1969) 1 SCC 573 : AIR 1969 SC 1147) Person who signs a document for some other purpose (e.g., as scribe, identifier or registering officer) is not an attesting witness; witness must sign animo attestandi (for the purpose of attesting) and must have seen the executant sign or received personal acknowledgement. The court relied on this Apex Court decision to hold that a scribe is not an attesting witness unless the strict tests set out by the Apex Court (animo attestandi, presence/acknowledgement) are fully satisfied; applied to find the scribe in this case did not meet those requirements.
AIR 1939 PC 117 (Privy Council decision) Registering officer cannot be regarded as an attesting witness where it is not proved that he signed in the presence of the executant. The court referenced this decision (via the Abdul Jabbar discussion) to support the proposition that signatures appended for registration/identification purposes are not animo attestandi and thus do not amount to attestation.
Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh (AIR 1955 SC 346) Persons who identified the testator at registration and signed the endorsement were not attesting witnesses because their signatures were not animo attestandi. The court applied this principle to underscore that signatures of identifiers at registration do not automatically constitute attestation; used as part of the reasoning that the scribe in the present case was not an attesting witness.
Smt. Bhuwan Kumari v. Akbar Ahmad (2002 (93) Rev Dec 915) Cited by petitioner in support of the contention that a scribe could be an attesting witness in certain circumstances. The court noted this case was relied upon by the petitioner but found the decisions relied upon by the petitioner to be unavailing in the facts of the present case.
Haripada Maity v. Annada Prosao Haldar (AIR 1930 Cal 750) Cited by petitioner (as part of authorities on attestation/scribe issues). The court recorded that this decision was relied upon by the petitioner but concluded that the authorities relied on by the petitioner did not assist his case on the facts before the court.
Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage (2002 (93) Rev. Dec. 98 : (2002) 2 SCC 85 : AIR 2002 SC 637) Cited by petitioner to support that a scribe could be an attesting witness if he signed just after the testator. The court acknowledged reliance upon this decision by the petitioner but found such authorities unavailing for the petitioner's case on the record before it.
Jayarajand Ms. v. Mohana (2004 (96) Rev. Dec 347) Relied on by opposite parties to support the proposition that at least one attesting witness is necessary to prove a document required to be attested. The court noted this authority as supporting the point that at least one attesting witness is necessary; the broader ratio of Abdul Jabbar and related authorities was treated as controlling.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reviewing the statutory provisions relevant to execution and attestation of documents: Section 68 of the Evidence Act (requiring that, where a document is required by law to be attested, at least one attesting witness be called if such a witness is alive and capable), the definition of "attested" in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act (which prescribes attestation by two or more witnesses and that witnesses sign in the presence of the testator).

The central legal point examined was whether the scribe of the Will could be treated as an attesting witness where the attesting witnesses themselves were not examined. The court relied on the Apex Court decision in Abdul Jabbar v. Venkata Sastri which sets out essential conditions of valid attestation: (1) two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign or have received from him a personal acknowledgement of his signature; and (2) each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant with animo attestandi (for the purpose of attesting). The court emphasized the requirement that the witness's signature be made animo attestandi and that a person who signs for some other purpose (e.g., to certify he is a scribe, identifier or registering officer) is not an attesting witness.

The court observed that the attesting witnesses in this case were not examined to prove the Will, and there was no evidence on record that they were dead or untraceable on the dates fixed for evidence. Notices were not shown to have been issued to the attesting witnesses to require them to prove the Will. The scribe's cross-examination indicated that the Will was not registered in his presence and that he did not go to the Sub-Registrar's office at the time of registration.

The court noted that a scribe can, in principle, be an attesting witness only if (i) the attesting witnesses are dead or incapable of giving evidence even after being summoned, and (ii) the strict tests laid down by the Apex Court are fully satisfied — namely that the witness signed animo attestandi, saw the executant sign and received a personal acknowledgement of the signature at the time of registration. On the material before the court, the scribe did not meet these requirements.

The court also examined whether the Will provided any convincing explanation for disinheriting the other two sons. It found no satisfactory reason in the Will or on the record to justify exclusion of the two sons; the circumstances surrounding the making of the Will raised suspicion and the Board of Revenue was justified in disbelieving the Will on this ground as well.

Finally, the court considered the authorities cited by the petitioner (which were cited to show circumstances where a scribe might be treated as an attesting witness) and held those decisions to be unavailing in the present facts. The ratio of Abdul Jabbar and the supporting authorities controlled the outcome.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion): The Board of Revenue's decision stands — the Will dated 13-5-1979 was not proved by attesting witnesses and the scribe in this case did not satisfy the conditions necessary to be treated as an attesting witness. The Board's disbelief of the Will (including its finding that there was no satisfactory reason recorded for disinheriting the two sons) is upheld.

The opinion does not state that it sets any new legal precedent beyond the application of existing authorities (it applies established ratios, notably Abdul Jabbar). The outcome is confined to the facts and evidence before the court.

    Mohd. Yusuf v. Board Of Revenue, U.P Allahabad And Others

    1. Petition in hand has been filed assailing the judgment dated 16-7-1996 passed by the Board of Revenue by which it has been held that a Scribe cannot be treated to be attesting witness unless attesting witnesses were dead or were not in a position to be examined.

    2. It would appear from the record that one Mohd. Hanif was Bhumidhar of land in suit comprising in plot No. 201, admeasuring 2 Bighas, 7 Biswas. He had three sons who are parties to the present proceedings. Mohd. Yusuf one of the sons instituted a suit under Section 229 B of the U.P.Z.A and L.R Act claiming himself to be the exclusive Bhumidhar of the land in question on the basis of a Will dated 13-5-1979 which it was alleged was executed by his father Mohd. Hanif in his favour. In the written statement, the other two sons of Mohd. Hanif i.e the contesting Opp. parties repudiated the plaint allegations and denied exclusive rights as Bhumidhar of the plaintiff over the property in question and claimed ⅓rd share each to all the three brothers. The contesting parties also denied execution of Will and termed it as forged one. The trial Court by means of judgment dated 29-6-1993 dismissed the suit on the ground that Will was not proved by attesting witnesses. In appeal, the Commissioner clinched the issue in favour of plaintiff on the ground that though attesting witnesses were not examined but the Scribe proved the Will. In consequence, the suit was decreed in appeal. This decision of the Commissioner led to filing of second appeal by defendant respondents which was allowed by the Board of Revenue recording a finding that there was no explanation in the Will for dis-inheriting the other brothers of the petitioner and further that the Will was not proved by attesting witnesses and a Scribe cannot be treated to be an attesting witnesses unless attesting witnesses were dead or were not in a position to be examined. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner premised his submission by canvassing that the Will dated 13-5-1979 was proved by the Scribe and Board of Revenue erred in law in holding to the contrary. He further submitted that the father of the petitioner was residing in Bombay and he, with his free will and mind, executed the Will in favour of the petitioner. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Parties contended that the Will was not proved to have been executed by Mohd. Hanif and all the brothers succeeded the property in question.

    3. Before proceeding to scan the respective submissions on the aspect, it would be apt to acquaint myself with the provisions of the relevant Sections. Section 68 of the Evidence Act being germane to the point involved, it is quoted below.

    “68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.

    Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof the execution of any document not being a Will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.”

    4. It would thus crystallize from the provisions of the above section that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.

    5. The term “attested” has not been defined in the Evidence Act. In Transfer of property Act, the said term has been defined in Section 3 and being relevant it is quoted below.

    “‘attested’ in relation to an instrument, means (and shall be deemed always to have meant) attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has been the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has been some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark or of the signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant: but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.”

    6. Similarly, Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act lays down the meaning of attestation as under:

    “Section 63(c): The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.”

    7. The question that surfaces in the perspective of above discussion, is whether a Scribe of the Will can be said to be an attesting witness who could prove a document required attestation. The self same question cropped up before Apex Court in a case in Abdul Jabbar v. Venkata Sastri (1969) 1 SCC 573 : AIR 1969 SC 1147. In para 8 of the said decision, the Apex Court enunciated the point in question in the following manner.

    “Briefly put, the essential conditions of a valid attestation under Section 3 are: (1) two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign the instrument or have received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature; (2) with a view to attest or to bear witness to this fact each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. It is essential that the witness should have put his signature animo attestandi, that is, for the purpose of attesting that he has seen the executant sign or has received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature. If a person puts his signature on the document for some other purpose, e.g to certify that he is a scribe or an identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness.”

    8. The Apex Court regard being had to a decision of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1939 PC 117 further held that a registering officer cannot be regarded as attesting witness as it is not proved that he signed the document in the presence of executant. A person identifying the witness puts his signatures on document to authenticate the fact that he had identified the executant and the same is not intended that he had put his signatures for the purposes of attesting witnesses. The Apex also placed credence on a decision in Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh AIR 1955 SC 346 (351) in which it was held that the two persons who had identified testator at the time of registration of document and had appended their signatures at the foot of the endorsement by Sub-Registrar were not the attesting witnesses as their signatures were not animo attenstandi. Coming to the present case, it would appear that the attesting witnesses were not examined to prove the Will. There is not an iota of evidence on record to show that the witnesses were dead or were not traceable on the date fixed for evidence. It is borne out from the record that the attesting witnesses were not called by issuing notices to prove Will. The Scribe in his cross-examination, it would appear, has stated that Will was not registered in his presence and he did not go to the office of Sub-Registrar at the time of Registration. No doubt, a scribe can be said to be an attesting witness, provided the two attesting witnesses are dead or incapable to give evidence even after being summoned for giving evidence if the test laid down by the Apex Court is fully satisfied to the effect that the witnesses should have put his signature animo attestandi i.e for the purpose of attesting and he has seen executant sign and has received from him a personal acknowledgement of his signatures at the time of registration. This clearly goes to prove that scribe in the present case does not satisfy the requirements laid down by the Apex Court and cannot be said to be an attesting witness.

    9. Yet another aspect to be taken into reckoning is whether the Will spells out any special reasons for disinheriting other two sons by the father. This aspect was reckoned with and the Will was rightly disbelieved by the Board of Revenue. The circumstances in which the Will was scribed and brought into existence do foment doubts whether the Will was at all executed by Mohd. Hanif to the exclusion of the rights of other two sons. No convincing explanation is forthcoming in order to show that the two sons were rightly disinherited by Mohd. Hanif and in the circumstances, the Will was rightly disbelieved. There should be some valid justification on record to show that father nursed any grievance against the remaining two sons whom he actually wanted to disinherit. There being nothing either in the Will or on record, it arouses suspicion that the Will alleged to be executed by Mohd. Hanif was authenticated one.

    10. Lastly, I come to grips with the case-laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are Smt. Bhuwan Kumari v. Akbar Ahmad 2002 (93) Rev Dec 915, Haripada Maity v. Annada Prosao Haldar AIR 1930 Cal 750, Dhruba Sahu (dead) and after him Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage. 2002 (93) Rev. Dec. 98 : ((2002) 2 SCC 85 : AIR 2002 SC 637) in vindication of his stand that a scribe could be attesting witness if he has signed just after testator. The learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Parties relied upon a decision in Jayarajand Ms. v. Mohana 2004 (96) Rev. Dec 347 to bring home the point that at least one witness is necessary to prove a document.

    11. In view of decision of the Apex Court in Abdul Jabbar v. Venkata Sastri ((1969) 1 SCC 573 : AIR 1969 SC 1147) (supra), it is amply borne out that if a person puts his signature on the document for some other purpose e.g to certify that he is a scribe or an identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness. It is not borne out from the record that any of the attesting witnesses were either dead or were not available to prove the Will nor is there anything on the record to show that any notice was issued to any of the attesting witnesses requiring them to prove the Will in question.

    12. In the circumstances, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are unavailing and the ratio flowing from them cannot be taken aid of to lend cogency to the petitioner's case.

    13. As a result of foregoing discussion, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed.

    14. Petition dismissed.

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    Mohd. Yusuf v. Board Of Revenue, U.P Allahabad And Others
    (Sep 16, 2004)