Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Tarun Agarwala, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The revisionist (landlord) leased premises to the defendant postal authorities by a registered lease dated 31.10.1972 for five years. After expiry of that term no fresh lease was executed. The landlord served a composite notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, determining the tenancy, but the defendants did not vacate the premises. The landlord sued for ejectment, possession, and for rent and damages for use and occupation; he contended the premises was a public building exempt from U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.

The defendants resisted, asserting rent had been paid and that the tenancy could not be determined. The trial court dismissed the landlord's suit, holding that the composite notice was valid but that the defendants could claim benefit of Section 39 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in view of U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 and the Supreme Court judgment in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera; because the defendants had deposited arrears, costs and interest under Section 20(4), the trial court held Section 39 applied and defendants could not be evicted.

The landlord filed the present revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act challenging the trial court's dismissal. The Revisional Court heard counsel for both sides and analysed the statutory amendments and relevant Supreme Court authorities before deciding the revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 is applicable to the present case?
  2. Whether the defendants are entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter "the Act") after the promulgation of Ordinance No. 28 of 1983?

Arguments of the Parties

Revisionist's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The 1983 amendment to Section 2(1) of the Act was prospective and could not apply to a suit filed in 1982.
  • The position of law as amended in 1976 (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976) governed suits filed in 1982, meaning the Act was not applicable to public buildings leased to the Central Government and, therefore, Section 39 had no application in this case.
  • The trial court's grant of Section 39 benefits to the defendants was erroneous.

Defendants' Arguments

  • By virtue of Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 the Act became applicable to the premises and the defendants could not be evicted except on grounds mentioned in Section 20 of the Act.
  • The defendants had deposited the entire arrears of rent, damages and interest and thus were entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act.
  • The defendants relied on the Supreme Court decision in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera (cited as AIR 1985 SC 817 / 1984 ARC 265) in support of their position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984 ARC 265) / AIR 1985 SC 817 Held that where a building completed 10 years of existence during the pendency of the suit, the Act became applicable; tenant was entitled to protection under the Act and to Section 39 if arrears, damages and interest were deposited. The trial court relied on this decision to apply the 1983 Ordinance to a suit filed in 1982 and to grant benefit of Section 39; the Revisional Court reviewed this reliance in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions and rejected applying Vineet Kumar to the present facts.
Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi, (1987) 4 SCC 382 Held that parties' rights are to be determined by rights available on the date of the suit; Section 39 applies only to suits pending on commencement of the Act (15.7.1972). The Revisional Court cited this case as establishing the correct rule that Section 39 is available only to suits pending on 15.7.1972 and used it to reject application of Section 39 to the present suit filed in 1982.
Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, AIR 1988 SC 2031 Expressed the same view as Nand Kishore Marwah, impliedly overruling Vineet Kumar. Used to support the proposition that Vineet Kumar is no longer authoritative and that rights are determined as on the date of institution of suit.
Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti, 1990 (1) ARC 233 Reinforced the view that Vineet Kumar should not be followed and that the rights are assessed as on the date of the suit. Relied upon as part of the line of decisions narrowing Vineet Kumar and supporting the Revisional Court's conclusion on applicability of Section 39.
Ramesh Chandra v. IIIrd ADJ and Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 751 Part of the Supreme Court jurisprudence aligning with Nand Kishore Marwah and overruling the earlier Vineet Kumar ratio. Referenced to show the settled position that rights are to be determined by the position prevailing on the date of suit and that Vineet Kumar is not good law for cases like the present one.
Bhola Nath Varshney v. Mulk Raj Madan, (1994) 2 SCC 127 Further authority in the line holding that Vineet Kumar's approach was not to be followed; rights assessed as on the date of suit. Used to underpin the Revisional Court's reliance on the later Supreme Court decisions to deny Section 39 to the defendants.
Kishan alias Krishan Kumar v. Manoj Kumar, AIR 1988 SC 999 Overruled Vineet Kumar and held that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could be continued and decrees executed even though exemption ended during pendency. Cited as support for the proposition that a suit filed in a period of exemption is governed by the law as on the date of suit and the later change does not alter rights; helped the court conclude the 1983 Ordinance could not be applied back to a 1982 suit.
State of U.P. and Ors. v. Malik Zarid Khalid, (1988) 1 SCC 145 Held that the 1976 amendment to Section 2(1) was intended to be effective between 5.7.1976 and 18.5.1983 and that Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was not intended to be read back; government tenants could claim immunities only after 18.5.1983. Applied by the Revisional Court to conclude that Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 could not be invoked in suits filed prior to 18.5.1983 (such as the present 1982 suit) and therefore the 1983 Ordinance did not affect this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory history of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and its material amendments:

  • Original Act (effective 15.7.1972) excluded buildings belonging to or vested in Government of India, State Government or any local authority, and tenancies created by grant from the State or Central Government.
  • U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 (effective 5.7.1976) amended Section 2(1) to exclude "any public building" and defined "public building" in Section 3(o) to include buildings belonging to or leased by Central or State Government or local authority (and public sector corporations).
  • U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 (promulgated 18.5.1983) further amended Section 2(1)(a) to read that the Act would not apply to any building "of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord"; this amendment was carried forward through subsequent ordinances and regularised by U.P. Act No. 17 of 1985 made effective from 18.5.1983.

With this statutory framework, the court identified two central questions: (a) whether the 1983 Ordinance applied to the present case (suit filed in 1982); and (b) whether defendants were entitled to Section 39 benefit after promulgation of the 1983 Ordinance.

The court then examined the relevant Supreme Court decisions. It noted that Vineet Kumar had held that where a building attains ten years' existence during pendency of the suit the Act becomes applicable and a tenant could claim Section 39 if arrears were deposited. However, a subsequent line of Supreme Court decisions (including Nand Kishore Marwah, Atma Ram Mittal, Kishan alias Krishan Kumar, Suresh Chand, Ramesh Chandra, Bhola Nath Varshney and others) dissented from or overruled Vineet Kumar's approach, establishing that parties' rights are to be determined by the law as on the date of the suit and that Section 39 is available only to suits pending on the commencement date of the Act (15.7.1972).

The Revisional Court relied particularly on State of U.P. v. Malik Zarid Khalid to observe that the 1976 amendment was effective between 5.7.1976 and 18.5.1983 and that the 1983 Ordinance was not intended to operate retrospectively to suits filed before 18.5.1983. Considering that the present suit was instituted in 1982, the court concluded the law in force for this suit was the position after the 1976 amendment (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976), not the 1983 Ordinance.

Applying these legal propositions to the facts (suit filed in 1982 and the building being over ten years old at that time), the court held that the Act, as amended in 1976, excluded the building from the Act's operation and therefore the defendants could be evicted after service of a notice determining tenancy. Consequently, the Revisional Court found the trial court was incorrect in applying the 1983 Ordinance and granting Section 39 relief to the defendants.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is allowed; the impugned order dated 20.9.1984 is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff (landlord) is decreed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The landlord's suit for ejectment and possession succeeds; the trial court's decision denying ejectment and granting benefit of Section 39 to the defendants is reversed.
  • The court held that Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 is not applicable to a suit filed in 1982; the provisions of Section 2(1)(a) read with Section 3(o) as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 govern this case.
  • The defendants are not entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act because that section applies only to suits pending on the date of commencement of the Act (15.7.1972), and no new rule of law or broader precedent was announced by this Revisional Court beyond applying existing Supreme Court authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts.

This summary is confined to the materials and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce any information beyond that text.

    Ram Kumar And Another v. Union Of India And Another

    JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.

    1. The revisionist is the landlord of the premises in question, which was taken on a lease by the defendant postal authorities by a registered lease deed dated 31.10.1972 for a period of five years. After the expiry of the lease period, no fresh lease deed was executed between the parties. The landlord served a composite notice Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and Under Section 80, C.P.C. determining the tenancy. Inspite of receiving the notices, the opposite parties did not hand over vacant possession of the premises in question. Accordingly, the landlord filed a suit for ejectment of the opposite parties and for possession. The landlord further prayed that the rent and damages for use and occupation of the premises be also decreed against the defendants. The landlord alleged that the premises in question is a public building and is exempted from the operation of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972.

    2. The defendants resisted the suit and contended that the rent had been paid and that there was no default in the payment of rent. The defendants alleged that the tenancy could not be determined and the defendants could not be ejected from the premises in question.

    3. The trial court, after determining the points in issue, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/landlord. The trial court held that the composite notice issued Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and Under Section 80, C.P.C. was a valid notice determining the tenancy. The trial court, however, held that the defendants are entitled to claim the benefit of Section 39 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in view of the amendment made in the Act by U. P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983. The trial court found that in view of the amendment vide Ordinance No. 28 of 1983, the building comes under the purview of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and therefore, the defendants could not be evicted. The trial court further found that even though the suit was filed in 1982, the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 would be applicable in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera., 1984 ARC 265. The trial court therefore, held that since the defendants had deposited the arrears of rent, cost and interest Under Section 20 (4) of the Act, they are entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act and are not liable for ejectment.

    4. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the landlord has filed the present revision Under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

    5. Heard Sri B. Dayal, the learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri Shishir Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties,

    6. Before adverting to the arguments raised by the counsel for the parties, it is essential to consider the provisions of the Act and the amendments made in Section 2 (1) of the Act from time to time.

    7. Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted and came into force w.e.f. 15.7,1972. Section 2 of the Act excluded certain buildings from the operation of the Act. Section 2 (1) (a) and 2 (1) (b) as it originally stood and brought into force on 15.7.1972 reads as under :

    "Section 2 (1). Nothing in this Act shall apply to :

    (a) any building belonging to or vested in the Government of India or the Government of any State or any local authority ; or

    (b) any tenancy created by grant from the State Government or the Government of India in respect of a building taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government."

    8. Section 2 (1) was amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 w.e.f. 5.7.1976. The amended Section 2 (1) of the Act reads as under :

    "Section 2 (1). Nothing in this Act shall apply to :

    (a) any public building ; or"

    9. By U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, Section 3 (o) was inserted which reads as under :

    "Section 3 (o) "public building", means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation."

    10. Thus, prior to the amendment of Section 2 (1) of the Act by Amendment Act No. 28 of 1976, the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to a building, which belonged to or vested in State Government, Central Government or a local authority. The Act also did not apply to a building, which was taken on a lease or requisitioned by the Central Government, State Government or a local authority.

    11. After the 1976 Amendment, the Act was not applicable to a building, which belonged to or taken on lease or requisitioned by the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any public sector corporation. This position continued till the next amendment was made by the U. P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 promulgated on 18.5.1983. The amendment of section 2 (1) (a) sought by this Ordinance reads as under :

    "Section 2 (1).-Nothing in this Act shall apply to the following, namely :

    (a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord ; or"

    12. This amendment was kept alive by a series of Ordinances, namely. Ordinance No. 43 of 1983, 6 of 1984, 8 of 1984, 20 of 1984 and 9 of 1985. Eventually, U. P. Act No. 17 of 1985 was enacted on 20.8.1985 regularising the aforesaid Ordinances and this Act No. 17 of 1985 was made effective from 18.5.1983.

    13. The result of this amendment was that w.e.f. 18.5.1983, the Act was not applicable to a building of which the Central Government, State Government local authority or a public sector corporation was the landlord.

    14. In the light of the aforesaid amendment, the learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the amendment made in Section 2 (1) of the Act w.e.f. 18.5.1983 was only prospective in nature and would not apply to a suit filed in 1982. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the amendment made in Section 2 (1) in the year 1976 was applicable in the suit which was filed in the year 1982 and therefore, the Act was not applicable to a public building leased out by a landlord to the Central Government. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 39 of the Act had no application and that the benefit of Section 39 granted by the court below was wholly erroneous.

    15. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendants submitted that by virtue of the ordinance 28 of 1983, the act became applicable and the defendants could not be evicted except on the grounds mentioned in Section 20 of the Act. The learned counsel for the defendants further submitted that they had deposited the entire arrears of rent, damages and interest and therefore, they are entitled for the benefit available Under Section 39 of the Act. In support of this submission the learned counsel for the defendants have relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera., AIR 1985 SC 817.

    16. Admittedly, in the present case, two facts are not disputed namely, that the suit was filed in 1982 and that the building was more than 10 years old at the time when the suit was filed.

    17. The question that arises for consideration are two folds, namely :

    (a) Whether Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 is applicable to the present case?

    (b) Whether the defendants are liable to get the benefit of Section 39 of the Act after the promulgation of Ordinance No. 28 of 1983?

    18. In Vineet Kumar's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that since the building completed 10 years of its existence during the pendency of the suit, the Act became applicable and therefore, the tenant was entitled to seek the protection of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the tenant could not be. evicted from the premises in question except on the grounds mentioned In Section 20. Since the tenant had deposited the arrears of rent, damages and interest, the benefit of Section 39 was available to the tenant.

    19. In Nand Kishore Marwah and Ors. v. Samundri Devi, (1987) 4 SCC 382, the Supreme Court dissented with its earlier judgment in Vineet Kumar's case (supra) and held that the rights of the parties will be determined on the basis of the rights available to them on the date of the suit. The Supreme Court further held that Section 39 of the Act would be applicable to those suits, which were pending on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e., 15.7.1972. If the suit was pending on 15.7.1972, only then the benefit of Section 39 of the Act was available to the tenant.

    20. Similar view was again expressed by the Supreme Court in Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia., AIR 1988 SC 2031, impliedly overruling Vineet Kumar's case, and in Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti, 1990 (1) ARC 233 and in Ramesh Chandra v. IIIrd ADJ and Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 751, and again by the Supreme Court in Bhola Nath Varshney v. Mulk Raj Madan, (1994) 2 SCC 127. The Supreme Court in Kishan alias Krishan Kumar v. Manoj Kumar, AIR 1988 SC 999, overruled Vineet Kumar's case and held that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could be continued and a decree passed therein could be executed even though the period of exemption come to an end during the pendency of the suit.

    21. In State of U. P. and Ors. v. Malik Zarid Khalid, (1988) 1 SCC 145, the Supreme Court held that the amendment In Section 2 (1) of the Act by U. P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1976, was intended to be effective between 5.7.1976 and 18.5.1983 and that the amendment made by Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was not intended to be read back. The Supreme Court held that the Government who are tenants will be in position to claim all the immunities available to other tenant under the Act after 18.5.1983 when Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 came into force.

    22. In view of the decisions given by the Supreme Court, the position that emerges is that the benefit available Under Section 39 of the Act is only applicable to those suits, which were pending on the date of commencement of the Act, i.e., 15.7.1972. If the suit was pending on 15.7.1972, only then, the benefit of Section 39 of the Act was available to the tenant. It is also clear that the amendment made in Section 2 (1) by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 was effective between the period 5.7.1976 and 18.5.1983. The Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was effective only from 18.5.1983 onwards and reliance on Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 could not be made available to a suit filed prior to 18.5.1983.

    23. In the present case, the suit was filed in the year 1982 and therefore, the provisions of Section 2 (1) (a) read with Section 3 (o) as amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 will apply in the present case, inasmuch as, the suit was filed in 1982. Since the Act was not applicable, therefore, the revisionist could evict the defendants after serving a notice determining the tenancy. Thus, I hold that since the suit was filed in the year 1982, the provision of Section 2 (1) of the Act as amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 was applicable. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was not applicable in the present case. The defendants are not liable to get the benefit of Section 39 of the Act as the said section is applicable to those suits which were pending on the date of the commencement of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, i.e., 15.7.1972.

    24. In view of the aforesaid, the revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 20.9.1984 is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ram Kumar And Another v. Union Of India And Another
    (May 12, 2004)