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  • SECTION 20 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act and I invoke Section 103 of C.P.C
  • provisions of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 20
  • Section 100, C.P.C
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • SECTION 20 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act and I invoke Section 103 of C.P.C
  • provisions of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 20
  • Section 100, C.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal concerning Specific Performance)

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from Original Suit No. 287 of 1977, instituted by Sher Singh (the plaintiff/respondent) for specific performance of an agreement dated 20-11-1973 relating to a plot described as 9 Biswa (Khasra No. 581) in village Bhoken. The pleadings in the plaint describe an agreement to sell the land for Rs. 3,000/-, of which Rs. 2,500/- was alleged to have been paid as part payment and the remaining Rs. 500/- to be paid at execution of the sale deed. (The opinion also contains an initial reference that the agreement related to the land "after getting Rs. 500/- from the plaintiff"; both statements appear in the record.)

The defendants contested the suit, denying material allegations and asserting a defence that the plaintiff and one Adia (also referred to as Ariya in the record) conspired to usurp the land; they pleaded that the agreement was a "showy agreement" executed under the plaintiff's advice to protect the land from Adia's claim. The trial Court framed five issues and, on material issues, found that the agreement was executed and that Rs. 2,500/- had been paid; it found no fraud or collusion and decreed the suit on 24-01-1978.

The decree was confirmed by the first appellate Court (Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1978) by judgment dated 07-03-1979. The present (second) appeal was admitted; during the pendency an amendment to add grounds 15 and 16 (challenging failure to consider Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act and alleging material irregularity in refusal to consider discretionary relief) was permitted. The High Court allowed the appeal in part: it modified the judgments by remitting the matter to the trial Court for fresh consideration solely on the aspect of discretionary relief under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, keeping all other findings intact, and gave directions concerning an offered monetary adjustment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Courts below acted with material irregularity in decreeing the suit for specific performance without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (i.e., whether the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance despite circumstances that might make such relief inequitable).
  2. Whether the lower appellate Court committed a manifest error of law in not taking into consideration the ground challenging the trial Court for having acted with material irregularity in decreeing the suit for specific performance (the ground that the discretion vested in the Court under Section 20 was not properly exercised or considered).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Shri M.K. Gupta)

  • The appellant did not challenge the courts' findings on genuineness of the agreement or the receipt of Rs. 2,500/-; the sole contention related to the exercise (or non-exercise) of judicial discretion under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.
  • Both lower Courts failed to consider whether this was a fit case to refuse specific performance in exercise of discretion: the agreement gave the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendants and was executed to defeat the claim of Adia/Ariya (a harijan) who had sought rights over the land.
  • Evidence suggested the plaintiff was in permissive possession and had earlier filed a revenue application to record his name; the defendants were away on employment and executed the agreement under pressure or for the purpose of defeating third-party claims — hence the Court should have refused specific performance under Section 20(2).
  • The appellants additionally offered at the hearing to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- and to return the advance to adjust equities between the parties (an offer relied upon to seek a course of remand/redress consistent with Supreme Court precedent cited later).

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Shri A.N. Bhargava)

  • The findings recorded by the Courts below are findings of fact and should not be interfered with under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code (CPC); no substantial question of law arises for interference.
  • The plea now emphasised (relating to Section 20 discretion) was not raised before the Courts below and, therefore, the appellant should not be permitted to raise it for the first time in this appeal.
  • Emphasised facts about the parties (for example the plaintiff's illiteracy and the defendants' education/employment) to urge that discretion should be exercised in favour of the plaintiff/respondent and the appeal dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharani Shanti Devi P. Gaikwad v. Sayjibhai Haribhai Patel, (2001) 5 SCC 101 (AIR 2001 SC 1462) Held that grant of decree for specific performance is discretionary under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act; discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles and may be declined where enforcement would be inequitable. The Court invoked this principle to emphasize that specific performance need not be granted merely because it is lawful and to consider whether it would be inequitable to enforce the agreement in the present facts.
V. Muthu Sami v. Angammal, (2002) 3 SCC 316 (AIR 2002 SC 1279) Reiterated that discretion under Section 20 should be exercised on settled judicial principles; court may decline specific performance where inequity or other grounds apply. Used to reinforce the guiding principle that the High Court must examine discretionary aspects before affirming a decree for specific performance.
A.C. Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik, (2001) 6 SCC 600 (AIR 2001 SC 2783) Held that where the terms and circumstances show the plaintiff seeks to take unfair advantage or has not come with clean hands, specific performance may be refused. The Court relied on this precedent and compared factual parallels: attempts to record possession in revenue records, defendants being away, and contradictory statements on possession — supporting the view that discretion required re-examination.
Manohar Lal v. Maya, (2003) 9 SCC 478 (AIR 2003 SC 2362) Cited in support of the proposition regarding refusal of specific performance where inequity or other relevant discretionary considerations arise. Placed alongside other Supreme Court rulings as supportive authority for examining discretion under Section 20(2); relied upon as part of the body of authority guiding the remand for reconsideration.
K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., (1999) 5 SCC 77 (AIR 1999 SC 2309) Cited in the context of principles governing discretionary refusal of specific performance and related equitable considerations. Included among rulings relied upon to demonstrate circumstances in which courts may decline specific performance; formed part of the doctrinal background for remanding the matter.
Velayudhan Sathyadas v. Govindan Dakshyani, (2002) (reported as cited) Established that when equities are to be adjusted (for example, when parties offer to adjust by payment), the proper course for the High Court can be to set aside the decree and remit the matter for fresh consideration on the relevant aspect. The Court followed this authority directly: because the appellants offered to pay Rs.1,00,000/- to adjust equities, the High Court set aside and remitted the matter for fresh consideration limited to the discretionary relief aspect, following the Supreme Court's approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by limiting the contest to the narrow question framed by the parties and the record: whether Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act was applicable and whether the lower Courts properly exercised the discretion to grant specific performance. The Court noted (and the appellant's counsel conceded) that the findings of fact regarding the genuineness of the agreement and the payment of Rs. 2,500/- would not be challenged; the controversy was confined to whether discretionary relief (specific performance) should have been granted.

The Court summarized Section 20 and in particular sub-section (2), which enumerates circumstances where the Court may refuse specific performance (including where the contract gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage; where performance would involve unforeseen hardship for the defendant; or where circumstances make enforcement inequitable). The Court then analyzed the evidence on record relevant to those enumerated factors:

  • Evidence indicated familial relationship (cousins), the defendants being away on employment, and the plaintiff being in permissive possession purportedly on behalf of defendants.
  • The plaintiff had filed a revenue application to record his name and an application was fixed for hearing on 20-11-1973 — the same date on which the agreement was executed. The plaintiff admitted filing that revenue application and the agreement being executed on that day.
  • There were contradictory statements by the plaintiff about possession: written agreement admitted defendants' possession while oral deposition claimed plaintiff's possession — circumstances that can indicate an unfair advantage or inequitable conduct.
  • An Additional Commissioner’s order (dated 07-12-1977 as per the record) in revision proceedings involving Ariya indicated that Ariya (also described as Adia) had pressed claims as sub-tenant; the Tahsildar had reported, and the Additional Commissioner rejected the application as vague — facts demonstrating a contemporaneous dispute and the context in which the agreement was executed.

On these factual matrices the Court found "some substance" in the appellant's contention that the contract, though not avoidable, placed the plaintiff in an unfair advantageous position and that the defendants had entered into the agreement under circumstances that warranted re-examination of discretionary relief. The Court relied on Supreme Court authorities (notably A.C. Arulappan and Maharani Shanti Devi) that the grant of specific performance is discretionary and may be refused where the plaintiff seeks an unfair advantage or where inequity is established.

Concluding the analytical portion, the Court held that the lower Courts had failed to examine the case for the purpose of Section 20(2) and that, invoking Section 103 CPC to mould relief and do justice, the appropriate course (following Velayudhan Sathyadas) was to set aside the decree only for the purpose of fresh consideration on discretionary relief. The Court therefore remitted the matter to the trial Court to reconsider only the aspect of whether specific performance should be granted in exercise of discretion under Section 20(2), leaving intact all other findings.

The opinion also records that the appellants offered to pay Rs.1,00,000/- and to return the advance as a means of adjusting equities — an offer the Court treated as relevant in deciding to remit the matter for fresh consideration and to direct conditions on any ultimate reversal in relation to discretionary relief.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the first appellate Court, insofar as they adjudicated issues other than the grant of discretionary relief under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, remain intact.
  • The matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh consideration specifically on the limited question of whether to grant or refuse specific performance in exercise of discretion under Section 20(2). The trial Court is to reconsider the grant of discretionary relief in the light of the observations in this opinion and the authorities cited.
  • The opinion records that the appellants offered to pay Rs.1,00,000/- and to return the advance; the Court directed that if ultimately the trial Court refuses to grant the decree for specific performance, it shall impose as a condition that the appellants pay Rs.1,00,000/- to the respondents as a condition precedent for reversing the decree of specific performance (that is, the Court specified a payment condition connected with the relief to be considered upon remand).

Broader legal implications: The decision applies and follows settled Supreme Court authority on the discretion to grant specific performance under Section 20 and does not purport to lay down a new precedent. The Court applied established principles and directed a limited remand in order to give effect to equitable considerations under Section 20(2).

End of summary based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion.

    Raghubir Singh And Another v. Sher Singh .

    1. This is defendant's second appeal. It arises out of original suit No. 287 of 1977 filed by Sher Singh, respondent for specific performance of an agreement dated 20-11-1973 with regard to a piece of land area 9 Biswa pukkha of the Khasra No. 581 in village Bhoken after getting Rs. 500/- from the plaintiff.

    2. The plaint was instituted on the pleas inter alia that the defendants are bhumidhar of Khasra No. 581 area 9 biswa situate in village Bhoken of which the plaintiff had been in possession, but in revenue record the names of defendants were there. The defendants on 20-11-1973 agreed to sell the aforesaid piece of land for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- out of which Rs. 2,500/- was paid and it was received by the defendants towards part payment of the amount. Remaining Rs. 500/- was to be paid at a time of the execution of the sale deed. The defendants have failed to execute the sale deed within time stipulated in the agreement and the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to get the sale deed executed, filed a suit after giving registered notice dated 5-5-1977. The defendants having failed to execute the sale deed, hence the suit, for specific performance of contract to sell. The defendants contested the suit by filing a joint written statement and they substantially denied the plaint allegation. The main defence was that the plaintiff and one Adia conspired for usuring the disputed land. The defendants were away in the city in connection with their employment, permitted the plaintiff who is related to them to look after land in question.-The plaintiff informed the defendant that Adia, a harijan will get the land as certain laws are giving into existence in favour of harijans. To save the land on the advice of the plaintiff the defendant executed an agreement to sell the land to him with the understanding that the agreement to sell shall be a showy agreement. The receipt of Rs. 2,500/- by the defendant was denied. Adia did file an application before S.D.O, Ghaziabad for declaration of his right in the disputed land which was dismissed and the appeal is pending before the Commissioner, Meerut. The disputed land is not worth less than Rs. 15,000/- and no question to sell it at a throw away price of Rs. 3,000/- arises.

    3. In the trial Court five issues were framed. On material issues the trial court found that the defendants have executed an agreement, as stated by the plaintiff after obtaining Rs. 2,500/-. There was no fraud or collusion and the plaintiff has proved his case and suit was decreed on 24-1-1978. The said decree has been confirmed in Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1978 by the Addl. Civil Judge, Ghaziabad by judgment dated 7-3-1979. Before the first appellate Court an argument was raised that on 12-1-1978 the evidence of defendants was closed. The plaintiff in the list of witnesses mentioned the name of scribe as one of the witnesses to be examined by him. The plaintiff without examining scribe discharged him and thereafter the evidence of defendants was recorded on 12-1-1978 and the evidence was also closed on that day. The Court below rejected an argument of the defendant that no proper opportunity was given to them to examine the scribe. It appears that subsequently an application after close of the evidence of the parties, was filed by the defendants for permission to examine the scribe. The application was rejected by the trial Court, the Court below also upheld the rejection of the said application by the judgment under appeal. The appellate Court also confirmed the finding of the trial Court with regard to the payment of Rs. 2,500/- to the defendant.

    4. This appeal was admitted and the grounds Nos. 1, 3 and 13 were considered as substantial question of law, at the time of admission. When the appeal came up for final hearing an application dated 23-1-2004 being Civil Misc. Application No. 166743 of 2004 was filed seeking permission to amend the memorandum of appeal by adding the following grounds in the memo of appeal as grounds Nos. 15 and 16 with a further prayer that aforesaid grounds involved, substantial question of law and may be permitted and was allowed to be raised at the time of hearing of the instant appeal:

    15. “Whether the Courts below have acted with material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction in decreeing the suit for specific performance without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and in view of which the plaintiff respondent was not entitled for a decree for specific performance”.

    16. “Whether the lower appellate Court committed a manifest error of law in not taking into consideration ground No. 14 challenging the judgment of the trial Court for the reason that the trial Court had acted with material irregularity in decreeing the suit for specific performance to which the plaintiff was not entitled in view of the said relief being a discretionary relief.”

    5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    6. Sri M.K Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant fairly stated that he is not in a position to challenge the findings recorded by the Courts below on the question of genuineness of the agreement in suit and passing of the consideration of Rs. 2,500/- to the defendants, as payment of part payment under the said agreement. The only argument which was pressed by him was with respect to Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act. He submitted that both the courts below were duty bound before passing a decree of specific performance of contract to sell to consider the question as to whether it is a fit case of exercise of discretion vested in the Court to pass a decree for specific performance of contract to sell. Elaborating the argument it was submitted that since the Courts below did not examine the question of discretion vested in them, by virtue of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, no decree for specific performance of contract should be passed against the appellants. In contra, Sri A.N Bhargava, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that findings recorded by the Courts below are findings of fact and no interference is called for by this Court under Section 100, CPC as no substantial question of law is involved in the appeal.

    7. Thus, in view of the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties, the only question left to be decided in this appeal is about the applicability and its observance of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act.

    8. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act says that jurisdiction to decree the specific performance is discretionary. A Court is not bound to grant specific relief merely because it is lawful to do so. However, the discretion of the Court is not to be exercised arbitrary but on sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 enumerated the case in which the Court may exercised discretion not to decree the specific performance. They are as follows:

    (a) Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into contract or the other circumstances under which contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not avoidable gives the plaintiff as unfair advantage over the defendant, or

    (b) Where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would not involve no such hardship to the plaintiff, or

    (c) Where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not render the contract avoidable, makes it inequitable to inforce specific performance.

    9. Sri M.K Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant submitted that it has come in evidence that the parties are cousin brothers. The defendants were out of the village in connection with their employments and permitted the plaintiff to look after the land in dispute. The agreement was executed by the defendants simply to defeat claim of Adia (ARIYA) a harijan who started setting up his title over the land in suit. The plaintiff also filed an application before Tahsildar, Ghaziabad which was registered as case No. 60 of 1973 for recording his name in revenue record. The said application was dismissed in default of the parties on 20-11-1973. This very day disputed agreement to sell was executed. From these facts an attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to show that the defendants executed the agreement in question under some pressure. Therefore, the Court below should have exercised the discretion and the decree for specific performance of contract should be refused.

    10. In contra Shri A.N Bhargava, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondents submitted that the plea now sought to be raised by the appellant was never raised before the Courts below and as such the appellant should not be permitted to raise a new plea for the first time in the appeal. It was further submitted that the appeal is concluded by findings of fact and no interference under Section 100, C.P.C is called for. The plaintiff was illiterate person who died during the litigation while defendant No. 1 Raghubir was teacher and M.A in English. Therefore, the discretion in favour of the plaintiff/respondents be exercised by dismissing the appeal.

    11. At one stage the case was adjourned on 13-1-2004 to find out any possibility of amicable settlement between the parties. The plaintiff has filed an affidavit that five houses, after investment of several lacs of rupees have been built on the land in question. He has also stated in the affidavit that the defendants have executed several sale deeds of the adjoining plots and the copy of two such sale deeds dated 3-1-2001 and 18-11-2000 are with the counsel. Therefore, the talk of compromise could not proceed further and ultimately failed.

    12. I have scrutinized the record of the case in the light of the provision of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act. There is some substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that when the terms and contract was entered into it gave unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendants. In the agreement in question it is mentioned that the first party namely, the defendants are in possession of the land in question. In oral deposition plaintiff Sher Singh, P.W 1 In the cross-examination denied the possession of the defendants/appellant over the land in question and claimed his possession over it. This along with other circumstances show that the plaintiff was in advantageous position being in permissive possession on behalf of defendants as pleaded by them. The plaintiff has also admitted in the deposition that he had filed an application before the revenue court for recording his name and 20-11 -1973 was fixed on which date the disputed agreement was executed. P.W 1 has also deposed that the defendants had come on that day and put their signatures and thumb Impression on the disputed agreement. All though in the oral deposition the plaintiff has pleaded ignorance about Adia (Harijan) who was claiming disputed property as sub-tenant. The defendants have filed certified copy of the order dated 7-12-1997 of Additional Commissioner, Meerut, Division Meerut in Revision Petition No. 31 of 1976 Ariya son of Kale v. Raghubir. From this order it is clear that Ariya filed some application not only for recording his possession on the plot in question but also recording his name as sub tenant. The Tahsildar gave his report dated 12-11-1975. The Additional Commissioner confirmed the order of the trial Court rejecting the application filed by Adiya holding it that it was not an application for correction of papers of long standing entries on the basis of such vague claim. These circumstances do clearly show that the plaintiff positively made attempt to somehow grab the property of the defendants being in permissive possession. The defendants as pleaded by them enter into the agreement in question under such circumstances. It is to be noted that Adiya and Ariya is one and the same person and he is son of Kale. It was not the case of the plaintiff that Adiya or Ariya are different persons.

    13. The Supreme Court in her highness Maharani Shanti Devi P. Gaikwad v. Sayjibhai Haribhai Patel, (2001) 4 JT (SC) 43 : ((2001) 5 SCC 101 : AIR 2001 SC 1462) has held that the grant of decree for specific performance is a matter of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so but the discretion is required to be exercised on sound and settle judicial principle. One of the grounds on which Court may decline to decree the specific performance is where it would be inequitable to enforce the specific performance. Similar view has been reiterated in V. Muthu Sami v. Angammal (2002) 2 JT (SC) 410 : ((2002) 3 SCC 316 : AIR 2002 SC 1279).

    14. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon following three ruling in support of his contention:

    1. (2001) 6 SCC 600 : AIR 2001 SC 2783, AC, A.C Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik (Smt). Naik.

    2. (2003) 9 SCC 478 : AIR 2003 SC 2362, Manohar Lal v. Maya.

    3. (1999) 5 SCC 77 : AIR 1999 SC 2309, K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd..) Ltd.

    15. The Supreme Court in the case of the A.C Arulappan ((2001) 6 SCC 600 : AIR 2001 SC 2783) (supra) has held that the terms and conditions of the agreement showed that plaintiff is trying to take unfair advantage over defendants and also not approached Court with clean hands, is not entitled to decree of specific performance of contract. The court can consider from various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Court should not grant the relief of specific performance merely it is lawful to grant it. The plaintiff, in the case in hand firstly made an attempt by filing application for recording his name in the revenue record on the basis of possession and expunging the names of the defendants there from. The said attempt was made as the defendants No. 1 was away from the village in connection of his employment as a teacher. The plaintiff has admitted in the oral deposition that the defendants are sons of his uncle. Regarding possession of disputed plot the two stands taken by the plaintiff is self contradictory. In the agreement in question the possession of the defendants is admitted. On the other hand in the oral deposition the plaintiff has stated his possession over the disputed land.

    16. The defendants also filed by way of an instance an agreement of sale dated 25-1-1974 paper No. 39 Ka in respect of plot No. 61, for 150 sq. yards executed by one Girdhar in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi for Rs. 2,850/-. The market value of the disputed land, thus if calculated in accordance with the above rate comes to Rs. 15,000/-.

    17. Thus the Courts below have failed to examine the case before passing a decree, in the light of Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act and I invoke Section 103 of C.P.C for this purpose, to do justice between the parties. The trial Court has held that since execution of the agreement has been proved the agreement cannot be brushed aside that the consideration was in sufficient or inadequate.

    18. Sri M.K Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant stated at the bar that the appellants are prepared to pay rupees one lac and to return the advance money to adjust the equities between the parties. The Supreme Court in the case Velayudhan Sathyadas v. Govindan Dakshyani (2002) 5 JT (SC) 357 has held that in such circumstances the proper course for the High Court is to set aside the decree made by the trial Court as affirmed by the first appellate authority and remit the matter to the Court for fresh consideration in so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. Following the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are modified and the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh consideration only on aspect of grant of discretionary relief to the plaintiff. The findings recorded on all other issues shall remain intact. It is made clear that if ultimately the trial Court refuses to grant the decree for specific performance of contract it shall impose as a condition to pay (Rs. 1,00,000/-) one lack to the plaintiff/respondents as a condition precedent for reversing the decree of specific performance.

    19. In the result the appeal is allowed in part as indicated above.

    20. The trial Court shall reconsider the matter in the light of the observation made above.

    21. Appeal partly allowed.

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    Raghubir Singh And Another v. Sher Singh .
    (May 4, 2004)