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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as a conductor in U.P.S.R.T.C., Zero Board, Depot, Allahabad. He was served with a chargesheet on 23 September 1997 alleging that on 4 September 1997 he misbehaved with Sri Jawahar Lal, Assistant Traffic Inspector, near the Zero Road Bus Station canteen; the chargesheet connected that incident to an earlier event on 29 August 1997 when the petitioner was allegedly caught taking ten passengers without tickets. The petitioner replied to the chargesheet on 20 December 1997. An enquiry officer submitted a report on 1 September 1998, and on 8 September 1998 the petitioner was issued a notice proposing the punishment of removal from service.

The petitioner requested on 15 September 1998 that the enquiry report be supplemented by witness statements/cross-examination and other evidence; he later submitted a detailed reply on 9 January 1999. In respect of another incident, the petitioner was removed from service on 30 January 1999 but was reinstated by higher authority by order dated 21/26 June 2000 with a minor punishment of stoppage of five annual increments. The petitioner was asked for a fresh reply on 11 December 2000 and submitted another reply on 7 February 2001 reiterating his earlier stand. Respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order dated 19 April 2001 removing the petitioner from service. The petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking quashment of that order; the High Court heard the matter on merits and decided it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When and in what circumstances is an order of punishment to be interfered with by the Court?
  2. Whether and when the Court can interfere in the quantum of punishment?
  3. Whether, after exchange of pleadings, the petitioner should be relegated to the alternative remedy?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned order of removal is illegal, arbitrary and based on non-existent facts; there is no corroborative evidence for the charges.
  • Respondents improperly relied on earlier misconduct (the 30 January 1999 removal) and an alleged incident of 8 March 2001, thereby treating the petitioner as a habitual offender—both considerations were factually incorrect or irrelevant to the charge in issue.
  • The charges are not supported by independent corroboration and thus the major punishment cannot be sustained.
  • The petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself because, along with the show-cause notice, the relevant evidence was not supplied.
  • Respondents considered incidents (e.g., 8 March 2001) for which the petitioner had no opportunity to defend, and the punishment was disproportionate.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The charge of assault on a superior officer is serious; arguments about disproportionate punishment are therefore not available to the petitioner.
  • Respondent No. 2 correctly concluded that the petitioner was in the habit of various misconducts and that his continuance in service was not in the Corporation's interest.
  • The disciplinary authority conducted a detailed enquiry, collected full evidence and afforded full opportunity to the petitioner; the impugned decision was therefore proper.
  • The petitioner has an effective remedy of appeal against the impugned order, so the Court should not interfere.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed three questions for determination (scope of interference with punishment, interference with quantum, and whether the petitioner should be relegated to an alternative remedy) and proceeded to examine the evidence and procedure actually followed.

On the scope of interference, the Court stated that it must be satisfied that the disciplinary exercise was carried out after affording adequate opportunity, collecting reasonable evidence to support the charges, and that the action was bona fide. In the present case the Court found multiple deficiencies:

  • There was effectively no independent corroborative evidence for the alleged assault of 4 September 1997; the complaint named a single other person, Mohan Lal Tiwari, who thereafter had died, leaving only the complainant Jawahar Lal's statement.
  • There was no medical report to substantiate the alleged abrasion suffered by the complainant, nor was any police report lodged; these absences undermined the reliability of the charge as recorded by respondent No. 2.
  • The departmental proceedings did not produce or disclose witness statements or documents to the petitioner despite his specific request dated 15 September 1998 for the copy of statements and other evidence relied upon by the enquiry officer; the Court noted the petitioner’s detailed reply of 9 January 1999 was not taken into account by respondent No. 2.
  • Respondent No. 2 appears to have relied on irrelevant or non-pertinent considerations—specifically, the earlier order of removal dated 30 January 1999 (which was later modified to reinstatement with stoppage of five increments by the higher authority on 21/26 June 2000) and an alleged incident of 8 March 2001 for which no enquiry had been held—thus these factors could not legitimately support the impugned order.
  • The Court concluded that respondent No. 2 wrongly shifted the burden to the petitioner to prove his innocence instead of the department proving the charge by independent evidence; the petitioner had denied the assault and was not required to prove a negative in circumstances where the department had not produced minimum independent proof.
  • The Court quoted the departmental response that alleged full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses but observed that no details or supporting documents were filed with that assertion, rendering it a vague denial rather than proof that an adequate opportunity had been provided.

On the quantum of punishment, the Court noted the established principle that it may interfere where punishment is shockingly disproportionate to proved charges, but it also recognized restraint where a proper enquiry supports serious charges. Because the Court found the disciplinary conclusion itself vitiated by the defects described above, the punishment could not be sustained and therefore had to be set aside.

On the question of alternative remedy, the Court observed that when the writ petition was entertained the respondents were given time to file a counter-affidavit and did not raise the objection of availability of alternative remedy at that stage; after exchange of pleadings and hearing on merits, and given the Court's finding that the disciplinary exercise was vitiated, the petitioner should not be relegated to seek alternative remedies. The Court reiterated the principle that after exchange of pleadings and absent very serious disputed questions of fact requiring detailed factual adjudication, a writ petition need not be dismissed merely on the ground of an alternative remedy.

Holding and Implications

IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 19 APRIL 2001 QUASHED; PETITIONER TO BE REINSTATED

Direct effect: The writ petition succeeds. The impugned order of respondent No. 2 dated 19 April 2001 is quashed, and the petitioner is to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce any new legal precedent; it rests its decision on the absence of corroborative evidence, procedural inadequacies (failure to supply evidence and unfair burden-shifting), and reliance on irrelevant factors by the disciplinary authority. No broader or novel legal principle is articulated beyond these conclusions, and the decision's effect is confined to quashing the specific impugned order and directing reinstatement.

    Baboo Lal Dubey v. Regional Manager, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Allahabad, And Another

    1. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order, dated 19 April, 2001 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition), as has been passed by respondent No. 2 by which, the petitioner has been removed from service.

    2. For the purpose of convenient understanding, the facts in brief, can be summarised as thus. The petitioner who has been working as conductor in U.P.S.R.T.C, Zero Board, Depot, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) was served with the chargesheet on 23 September, 1997. It is mentioned in the charge-sheet that on 4 September, 1997, he misbehaved Sri Jawahar Lal, the Assistant Traffic Inspector in the Corporation at about 8.15 A.M near Zero Road Bus Station Canteen. It is mentioned that the aforesaid misconduct was a result of annoyance of the petitioner as on 29 August, 1997, he was caught by Sri Jawahar Lal aforesaid while taking ten passengers without tickets. The chargesheet was replied by the petitioner on 20 December, 1997. Thereafter, on 1 September, 1998, report was submitted by the enquiry officer pursuant to which on 8 September, 1998 notice was issued to the petitioner proposing punishment of removal from service. On receipt of the show-cause notice, the petitioner moved application on 15 September, 1998 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) through which it was prayed that incomplete enquiry report has been supplied to him as with the report, no statement of any witness/cross-examination has been given and, therefore, whatever evidence has been collected in the enquiry may also be supplied with the enquiry officers' report. It is said that although nothing was received by the petitioner but on 9 January, 1999 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) he submitted his detailed reply. It appears that in respect to another incident/charge, the petitioner was removed from service on 30 January, 1999 but thereafter, the higher authority on being satisfied with the petitioner's appeal/representation by order, dated 21/26 June, 2000, re-instated the petitioner by giving minor punishment of stoppage of five annual increments. Thereafter, on 11 December, 2000, the petitioner was asked to submit fresh detailed reply to the show-cause notice referred above. The petitioner appears to have again submitted his reply on 7 February, 2001 in which again he reiterated the facts and stand as were stated in the earlier reply, dated 9 January, 1999 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition). On completion of the aforesaid, respondent No. 2 appears to have taken a final decision by the impugned order, dated 19 April, 2001 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition), by which the petitioner has been removed from service. It is against the order of respondent No. 2 referred above, the petitioner has come up to this Court by means of this writ petition.

    3. Parties learned counsel have been heard at length and pleadings as are on record, have been examined. As jointly requested, the matter has been heard on merits and is being finally decided.

    4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order of removal of the petitioner from service besides being illegal, arbitrary, is based on consideration of non-existent facts and in fact, there is absolutely no corroborative evidence in respect to charges levelled against the petitioner. It is further submitted that the respondents have also taken into account earlier misconduct of the petitioner upon which, he was ordered to be removed from service on 30 January, 1999 and also alleged incident, dated 8 March, 2001, of taking nine passengers without tickets and thus the respondent No. 2 on the finding that the petitioner appears to be involved in series of misconduct and he is habitual one his continuance in service is not in the interest of Corporation which is factually incorrect has passed the impugned order. It is argued that as the impugned order amounts to major punishment, the charges being not supported by any corroborative evidence, the order cannot be sustained. It is further argued that petitioner has not been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as along with show-cause notice, no evidence was supplied and further the respondents having taken into consideration, the non-existent facts and the charges of misconduct, dated 8 March, 2001, to which the petitioner has no opportunity to defend and punishment being disproportionate, same is liable to be quashed.

    5. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the charge against the petitioner of assault by him on a superior officer, being serious in nature, the arguments of learned counsel that the punishment is disproportionate, is not available to him. It is further argued that the respondent No. 2 having found the petitioner to be in habit of indulging himself in various kinds of misconduct, has rightly held that his continuance in service is not in the interest of Corporation. It is pointed out that after detailed enquiry, after collecting full fledged evidence and after affording full opportunity to the petitioner, impugned decision has been taken to which no exception can be taken. Lastly, it has been submitted that the petitioner has effective remedy to file appeal against the impugned order and therefore, no interference is called for.

    6. Upon hearing aforesaid arguments, the Court proceeds to examine the matter. In view of the pleadings and the arguments, three questions arise to be dealt with by this Court which can be formulated as below:

    (1) When and in what circumstances, the order of punishment is to be interfered by the Court.

    (2) Whether and when the Court can interfere in the quantum of punishment.

    (3) Whether after exchange of pleadings, whether the petitioner is to be relegated to the alternative remedy.

    7. So far as the first question about the scope of interference by this Court in the order of punishment is concerned, first the Court has to be satisfied that the exercise by respondents is after affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner and after collecting reasonable evidence to support the charges and further that the action on the part of the respondents is bona fide. So far the case in hand is concerned, for the reasons which are indicated herein, it is clear that it is a case of absolutely no evidence to support the charges, rather the impugned order is based on a consideration of non-existent facts and also of some subsequent events/misconduct to which admittedly the petitioner has no opportunity. It is said that the petitioner was intercepted on 29 August, 1997 while he was taking ten passengers without tickets by Jawahar Lal, Assistant Traffic Inspector, on account of which, being annoyed, on 4 September, 1997, petitioner assaulted Sri Jawahar Lal referred above, near canteen of Zero Road Bus Station. Although, the bus stand and so far situation of the canteen is concerned, there cannot be any manner of doubt that large number of witnesses from the public as well as of the department must have been available but in the complaint by Sri Jawahar Lal name of one Mohan Lal Tiwari was given in whose presence, the alleged assault took place. The aforesaid Mohan Lal Tiwari as has come in the order has unfortunately died. Thus, except the statement of complainant Jawahar Lal, there appears to be absolutely no corroborative evidence in respect to the charge in question. The respondent No. 2 appears to have based his decision having been greatly influenced by the circumstances that earlier the petitioner was also ordered to be removed from service on 30 January, 1999 and thereafter, on being reinstated, again he was found taking nine passengers without tickets. So far the order, dated 30 January, 1999, is concerned, suffice it to say that the same was interfered by higher authority by order, dated 21 June, 2000, and, the order of petitioner's removal from service was modified with the diversion of reinstatement with stoppage of five annual increments. So far the misconduct, dated 8 March, 2001 is concerned, admittedly, neither that is the subject-matter of charge on which the matter has proceeded nor any enquiry in that respect has ever taken place and, therefore, both the aforesaid considerations, i.e, earlier order of removal from service and the incident, dated 8 March, 2001, appear to be not valid considerations for the charge in issue. It also appears that the respondent No. 2 has wrongly shifted burden on the petitioner to prove his innocence, whereas it was for the department to have proved the charge against the petitioner on the basis of independent evidence in support of the charges. The complaint against the petitioner is that on account of assault by him, Jawahar Lal referred above fell down resulting in slight abrasion on his left hand. It is clear from the finding so recorded by respondent No. 2 in the impugned order that neither there is any medical report in respect to abrasion which the complainant is said to have received, nor he has lodged any report with the police and, therefore, the incident of assault and felling down of the complainant, getting abrasion, all these things were required to be supported by atleast some independent evidence in this respect, which has admittedly not been done. Even the name of any other witness has not been given in the complaint which was made by the complainant before the departmental authority ordering enquiry. The very approach of the respondent No. 2 that as the petitioner has not been able to substantiate his version that he has not assaulted the complainant and there appears to be no reason that why informant has given incorrect information and, therefore, charge against the petitioner is proved, appears to be wrong. The petitioner has clearly denied the incident of assault and thus he was not supposed to prove the negative thing. It appears that the respondent No. 2 has wrongly shifted heavy burden on the petitioner to prove his innocence without taking case of minimum proof in respect to charges. Some of the extract/observation in this respect as are contained in the impugned order will be useful to be quoted here:

    8. In respect to arguments/averments of the petitioner that no witness has been examined, although reply has been given in Para. 15 of the counter-affidavit which states that “full opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine departmental witnesses and to produce his own defence” but neither detail of any witness nor any document in support thereof has been filed along with the counter-affidavit which clearly reveals that it is only for the purposes of denial, a vague assertion that the opportunity has been given to cross-examine departmental witnesses, has been made.

    9. In view of the aforesaid, it appears that in respect to incident in question, neither any report was lodged nor any witness was named or examined nor there is any medical examination to corroborate the version and therefore, on the facts, the view that charges are proved on the basis of mere statement of informant, cannot be accepted to be valid exercise for taking impugned decision. It also appears that alongwith show-cause notice when the copy of report was given to the petitioner, he in his letter, dated 15 September, 1998, addressed to the disciplinary authority asked for providing the copy of statement and other documents/evidence on the basis of which, the enquiry officer has submitted report so that he may give effective reply, but that was never given and also the detailed reply as has been given by the petitioner on 9 January, 1999 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) has not at all been taken into account and in a most sweeping manner, mainly on the premises that the petitioner has not adduced any evidence in support of his version, the impugned decision has been taken. It also appears that the circumstances that the petitioner was earlier removed from service and, after his reinstatement, by order, dated 21 June, 2000, he again indulged in the misconduct on 8 March, 2001, was heavily weighed in the mind of respondent No. 2, although, it has been held earlier, that in respect to the incident, dated 8 March, 2001, no enquiry whatsoever has proceeded and, therefore, it cannot be asserted that to what extent, the mind of respondent No. 2 was influenced by the aforesaid consideration and therefore, on an examination of entire facts, this Court is of the view that the decision as has been taken by respondent No. 2 suffers from apparent illegality which needs interference by this Court. To sum up, the charge against petitioner was neither corroborated by any independent evidence nor the petitioner has been given reasonable opportunity to defend himself and further the respondent No. 2 has taken into account nonexistent and irrelevant factors and, therefore, the order of punishment is to be interfered by this Court.

    10. So far as question of quantum of punishment is concerned, it has been repeatedly said that if the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charges, then also interference may be made by this Court but at the same time, it has also been said that if the charges are serious and if the High Court has not found any fault in the enquiry proceeding in which the charges have been found to be proved then for interfering in the quantum of punishment so awarded by the disciplinary authority, the Court should restrain himself. However, so far as case in hand is concerned, as it has already been held that on the facts, the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority is vitiated, very punishment so given by the impugned order has to go.

    11. So far the question of dismissal of writ petition for availability of alternative remedy is concerned, suffice it to say that at the time when the writ petition was entertained, learned counsel for the respondent was allowed time to file counter-affidavit and at that time, this objection was not raised and, therefore, now after exchange of pleading, after hearing the argument on merits, having come to the conclusion that the impugned exercise is vitiated, there appears to be no justification for relegating the petitioner to approach higher forum as provided under the relevant regulations, as has been repeatedly said by this Court and also by Apex Court. After exchange of pleadings, at the stage of hearing the writ petition need not be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy unless very serious disputed question of facts are involved and detailed finding on facts are to be recorded/adjudicated, writ petition need not be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy.

    12. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the petitioner is entitled to get relief from this Court.

    13. Accordingly, writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of respondent No. 2, dated 19 April, 2001 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition), is hereby quashed. Needless to say that the petitioner will be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.

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    Baboo Lal Dubey v. Regional Manager, Ut...
    (Apr 4, 2003)