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Case Number

C.M.W.P No. 43250 of 2000 connected with C.M.W.P No. 3301 of 2001

Advocates

S.G.Hasnain
B.D.Mandhyan

Judges

M. Katju
Rakesh Tiwari, JJ.

Acts

Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act
SECTION 17 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Section 6/17 of the Land Acquisition Act
SECTION 3 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
SECTION 6 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
SECTION 4 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
LAND ACQUISITION ACT

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition (with connected Writ Petition No. 3301 of 2001) challenges two notifications under the Land Acquisition Act: a notification dated 21.11.1996 published by public notice dated 24.8.1999 under Section 4(1) and a notification dated 23.8.2000 published through public notice dated 23.8.2000 under Section 6/17 (referenced as Annexures-7 and 10). The petitioners claim ownership of two plots (Nos. 30 and 31) in village Wajidpur and allege that the land was abadi (residential/settled) land with constructions thereon. They sought a mandamus restraining the respondent from proceeding with acquisition and from demolishing constructions.

The petitioners assert that the S.D.M. initially declared the land abadi by order dated 12.8.1999 and that the land was recorded as such; they challenge the timing and legality of Gazette and newspaper publications of the Section 4 notification and contend there was no urgency or public purpose to justify dispensing with procedural requirements such as Section 5A. They allege procedural irregularities including simultaneous completion of Section 6/17 proceedings on the same day and publication in newspapers not widely circulated.

The State and the acquiring body (Mandi Samiti, Khurja) filed counter-affidavits denying the petitioners' claims. The State contended that the S.D.M. subsequently set aside the abadi declaration (order dated 14.9.2000), that the Section 4 publication steps were completed and that the Section 6 notification was issued within statutory time (within one year of the last publication of Section 4), and that the urgency and public purpose (construction of a market yard) justified the procedure. The Mandi Samiti supported urgency and public purpose, denied substantial constructions, and asserted the land was agricultural at the time of the initial Section 4 notification.

The Court heard learned counsel for the parties and, after considering the pleadings, evidence and authorities, delivered a common judgment dismissing the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the notifications under Section 4(1) (dated 21.11.1996 / public notice 24.8.1999) and Section 6/17 (dated 23.8.2000) of the Land Acquisition Act were legally valid.
Whether the land in question (claimed to be abadi with constructions) could be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, or whether such constructions/abadi status exempted the land from acquisition.
Whether the acquisition proceedings (including simultaneous completion of Section 6/17 formalities and publications in certain newspapers) were vitiated by procedural irregularities or delay such that the proceedings had lapsed.
Whether the acquisition was for a public purpose and whether urgency under Section 17 justified dispensing with ordinary procedural enquiry (including the application of Section 5A).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The petitioners claim ownership of the challenged plots and allege the land was abadi and used for residential purposes, with constructions on it (supported by khasra entries and an SDM order dated 12.8.1999 declaring the land abadi — Annexures-1 to 6).
They challenge the validity and timing of publications: they allege the notification under Section 4 (allegedly notified 21.11.1996) was only published by public notice on 24.8.1999, and thus there was no urgency justifying dispensing with Section 5A; they contend there was no public purpose.
They allege procedural illegality: that Section 6/17 proceedings were completed simultaneously on 23.8.2000; that the newspapers used were not widely circulated; that there was no Gazette publication of the Section 6 notice and that therefore the proceedings have lapsed beyond prescribed time.
They made representations (e.g., representation dated 28.9.1999 — Annexure-8) and relied on a revenue report (Annexure-9) they claim supported abadi status and site inspection results.

Respondents' (State and Mandi Samiti) Arguments

The State contended the SDM's earlier order declaring the land abadi was set aside by SDM order dated 14.9.2000 (Annexure-C.A.1), and that the land was agricultural at the time of the initial Section 4 notification.
The State and Mandi Samiti argued that the Gazette and newspaper publications occurred (dates referenced in the record), and that the last publication deemed relevant was 24.8.1999, so that issuance of the Section 6 notification on 23.8.2000 was within one year and therefore valid.
They asserted that any delay in publication was due to: (a) the acquiring body making the necessary funds available only on 12.8.1999; and (b) administrative time taken by the Director and the State, but that the Section 6 notification remained within time and was lawful.
They denied substantial constructions or abadi status (Mandi Samiti said only boundary walls existed), denied bungling or improper motive, and maintained that the newspapers used were widely circulated locally. They also asserted compensation would be adequate.
They maintained the acquisition was for an urgent public purpose: construction of a new market yard for Mandi Samiti, necessitated by congestion and lack of facilities at the existing market yard, making the scheme one of planned development requiring urgency under Section 17.
They argued simultaneous publication on the same day did not vitiate acquisition and that completion of formalities on one day was practicable and lawful in the circumstances to prevent lapse of proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ram Charittar and Ors. v. State of V. P. and Ors. (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15586 of 2001, decided 4.10.2002)	Held (following Supreme Court and this Court decisions) that the Court cannot go into whether the declared purpose is a public purpose.	The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that it should not examine the genuineness of the Government's declaration of public purpose in this acquisition.
Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033	Unless there is colourable exercise of power, the Court cannot go behind Government's declaration to test whether the purpose is public.	The Court cited it to reinforce that absent colourable exercise of power, it must accept the Government's declaration of public purpose.
State of U. P. v. Smt Pista Devi and Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 251	Even if superstructures are standing on the land, they cannot be left out of acquisition.	The Court applied this principle to hold that buildings or superstructures on the land do not exempt the land from acquisition.
Ajay Krishan Shinghal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 721	Acquisition for planned development is a public purpose.	The Court relied on this authority to characterize the market yard acquisition as a planned-development public purpose.
Bal Krishan Gulati v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1991 (2) AWC 1210	Where there is a recital of urgency, the Court should not ordinarily interfere.	The Court invoked this principle to support non-interference with the Government's recital of urgency in this case.
M/s. Garg Farms and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1989 (2) AWC 1137	If Government formed the opinion that a matter is urgent under Section 17(2) and had some material for that opinion, the Court should not interfere.	The Court used this precedent to sustain the acquiring authority's claim of urgency and to decline to interfere on that ground.
Kunwar Lal and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors., (1989) 1 UPLBEC 772	Dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A depends on subjective satisfaction of the State Government; declaration under Section 6(3) is conclusive evidence that land is needed for a public purpose.	The Court cited it to emphasize the deference due to the Government's subjective satisfaction and the conclusive nature of a Section 6(3) declaration.
Ram Narain Rai v. State of U. P., 1991 (1) AWC 341	Expressed the same view as Kunwar Lal regarding the conclusiveness of Government's declaration under Section 6(3).	The Court cited this to reinforce the point that such declarations are conclusive evidence of need for a public purpose.
Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector, AIR 1969 SC 255	Interpretation of "land" to include benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth (i.e., buildings/trees) for purposes of the Land Acquisition Act.	The Court relied on this authority (and similar authorities) to hold buildings and trees are legally treated as part of "land," so they are includible in acquisition (with compensation payable).
S. P. Gupta v. State of U. P., 7980 ACJ 583 (as cited in the opinion)	Authority for the proposition that structures and attachments can be regarded as land for acquisition purposes.	Used to support the conclusion that even if constructions existed, they do not prevent acquisition of the land under the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the pleadings, the timeline of statutory publications, the counter-affidavits and the authorities relied upon by the parties. Its reasoning proceeded in key steps grounded in statutory text and precedent as presented in the opinion:

Deference to Government's declaration of public purpose: The Court reiterated the established principle (following Supreme Court authority and earlier decisions of this Court) that, absent proof of a colourable exercise of power, courts will not probe the correctness of the Government's declaration that land is needed for a public purpose. The Court cited authorities such as Jage Ram and its own earlier precedents to support this deference.
Characterisation of the acquisition as public purpose and urgency: Applying precedents (including Ajay Krishan Shinghal, Bal Krishan Gulati and M/s. Garg Farms), the Court accepted that construction of a market yard for the Mandi Samiti, which would serve agriculturists, constituted a public purpose and that there was urgency justifying the application of Section 17 provisions.
Treatment of buildings and trees: The Court relied on the statutory definition in Section 3(a) (quoted in the opinion) and authorities such as Chaturbhuj Pande and S. P. Gupta to hold that buildings and trees are included within the legal conception of "land" for acquisition purposes. Thus, even if structures existed or the land had been declared abadi at one point, those facts did not prevent acquisition (though compensation would be payable for structures/trees).
Validity of procedural steps and timelines: The Court examined the publication history as pleaded and in the counter-affidavit — noting the public notice dated 24.8.1999 and issuance of the Section 6 notification on 23.8.2000 — and concluded that the Section 6 notification was issued within one year from the last publication of Section 4 (i.e., within statutory time). The Court accepted reasons offered by the State (e.g., making available the requisite money, administrative delays) and held that simultaneous publication on the same day did not vitiate the acquisition.
Credibility of the petitioners' claims regarding abadi status and constructions: The Court noted that the respondents denied the presence of substantial constructions and pointed to the SDM's cancellation of the earlier abadi order; even if constructions existed, the Court found the law permitted acquisition of such land.
Overall conclusion based on combined legal and factual evaluation: Given the foregoing, the Court found no merit in the petition and concluded it could not, based on the material before it, interfere with the acquisition process.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISMISSED

The Court's final decision was to dismiss the writ petition (and connected petition) for lack of merit. The opinion states explicitly that the acquisition of the land for the market yard is for a public purpose and that there was urgency. The Court further held that:

The notification under Section 6 dated 23.8.2000 was valid as being within one year of the relevant publication under Section 4 (24.8.1999).
Even assuming buildings or an abadi classification, the land (including buildings/trees) can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act; such attachments do not invalidate acquisition (though compensation is payable).
There was no illegality in the publication process or procedure that warranted interference by the Court.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' challenge to the acquisition was rejected; the acquiring authority may proceed with the acquisition and related steps subject to statutory requirements (including payment of compensation as applicable). The Court recorded "No order as to costs."
On precedent and broader law: The Court relied on and applied existing precedents concerning deference to Government declarations of public purpose, the inclusion of buildings and trees within "land," and non-interference where urgency is recited and supported by material. The opinion does not purport to create new legal doctrine; rather it applies established authorities.

This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

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Manveer Singh And Another v. State Of U.P And Others

1. This writ petition along with connected Writ Petition No. 3301 of 2001 are being disposed of by a common judgment.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The petitioners have challenged the impugned notification dated 21.11.1996 published by public notice dated 24.8.1999 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and the notification dated 23.8.2000 published through public notice dated 23.8.2000 under Section 6/17 of the Land Acquisition Act vide Annexures-7 and 10 to the writ petition. The petitioners have also prayed for a mandamus directing the respondent not to proceed in the matter of acquisition proceedings and not to demolish the constructions on the land in dispute.

4. The petitioner No. 1 claims to be owner of plot No. 30 and the petitioner No. 2 of plot No. 31 in village Wajidpur, paragana and Tahsil Khurja, district Bulandshahr. It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the writ petition that the said land has been used by the petitioners as abadi land. The khasra entries are Annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition, it is alleged that the petitioners have raised constructions over the said land and then sought permission to change the nature of the land under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. On the application of the petitioner, the S.D.M., Khurja after receiving report of the Tahsildar and other officers of the revenue department passed an order dated 12.8.1999 declaring the land as abadi land. True copies of the orders in this connection are Annexure-3 and 4 to the writ petition. After declaration of the land as abadi land, they were recorded as such in the revenue record vide Annexures 5 and 6.

5. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, it is alleged that the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 21.11.1996 alleged to have been published on 21.11.1996 and also in two daily newspapers, 'Rashtriya Sahara' and 'Dainik Jagaran' on 21.12.1996 and 5.8.1998 and the said declaration has been mentioned in the public notice dated 24.8.1999 and notification was issued under Section 4/17 of the Act through the aforesaid notice. True copy of the public notice is Annexure-7 to the writ petition. The said notice/declaration dated 24.8.1999 states that the land is sought to be acquired for construction of a market yard for Mandi Samiti, Khurja.

6. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition, it is alleged that according to the public notice dated 24.8.1999, it has been declared that the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was notified on 21.11.1996 which was published in the Gazette dated 21.11.1996 and thereafter published in two newspapers on 21.12.1996 and thereafter on 5.4.1998. However, the public notice has been made only on 24.8.1999 and hence it is alleged that there was no urgency for dispensing with Section 5A of the Act. It is also alleged that there was no public purpose for the acquisition.

7. In paragraph 11 of the writ petition, it is alleged that the petitioners made representation to the Director, Land Acquisition on 28.9.1999 stating that there were constructions over the land in question which is abadi land. True copy of the representation is Annexure-8 to the writ petition. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition. It is alleged that on the representation of the petitioner, the Director, Land Acquisition sought a report from the Collector with regard to the site and nature of the plots. The revenue authorities made an inspection and submitted a report on 24.2.2000 in respect of the said plots and other plots. In this report, it has been mentioned that the said plots are abadi. True copy of the report is Annexure-9 to the writ petition. In paragraph 13 of the writ petition, it is alleged that the some other plots can be acquired instead of the plots of the petitioners.

8. In paragraph 14 of the writ petition it is alleged that despite the report of the revenue authorities the Collector, Bulandshahr published a public notice on 23.8.2000 under Section 6/17 of the Act, copy of which is Annexure-10 to the writ petition. The said notice has been published in two newspapers.

9. In paragraph 15 of the writ petition, it is alleged that all the proceedings prescribed under Section 6/17 of the Act were done simultaneously on the same day, i.e., 23.8.2000 and hence, this procedure is illegal. In paragraph 16 of the writ petition, it is alleged that the newspapers in which the said notice under Section 6/17 of the Act were published are not widely circulated newspapers and all the acquisition proceedings cannot be done simultaneously on the same day. In paragraph 17 of the writ petition, it is alleged that the acquisition proceedings are not for public purpose. In paragraph 18 of the writ petition, it is alleged that no Gazette publication has been made of the notice under Section 6 and the procedure under the said provision has not been followed and the proceedings have lapsed as they are beyond the prescribed time.

10. Two counter-affidavits have been filed in this case. In the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State Government, it is stated in paragraph 5 thereof that the petitioner had tried to get the land in dispute declared as abadi but the S.D.M. has subsequently set aside the order declaring the land as abadi. The order of the S.D.M. dated 14.9.2000 setting aside the earlier order dated 12.8.1999 declaring the land as abadi is Annexure-C.A. 1 to the counter-affidavit. In paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the publication of the Gazette notification under Section 4 of the Act was made on 21.12.1996 and 5.4.1998 and the general information was made on 24.8.1999. The delay has occurred due to the fact that the acquiring body has made available the necessary amount only on 12.8.1999. However, the urgency was already existing and hence, the notification under Section 6 was issued well within time.

11. In paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit, it is alleged that the S.D.M. has himself inspected the spot and passed the order dated 14.9.2000 referred to above. The petitioner has not shown any permission from any competent authority for sanction of the map for the construction. At the time of the initial notification under Section 4, the land was recorded as agricultural land. The order under Section 143 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was passed after the initial notification under Section 4 and even that order has subsequently been set aside as stated above. In paragraph 12, It is stated that the Gazette notification was published on 23.8.2000 and the notification was also published in two newspapers on the same day. It is stated that the simultaneous publication does not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. True copy of the U. P. Gazette notification dated 23.8.2000 under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is Annexure-C.A. 2. In paragraph 13, it is denied that there was any bungling. It is further stated that the newspapers in which the notices were published are widely circulated in the locality. The public notice was also given on 23.8.2000 and the same was also made available to the Gram Pradhan on the same day. All this was done as the matter was important and the proceedings would have lapsed if the publication under Section 6 would not have been done well within time. In paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the publication of the notification under Section 6 was in accordance with law. In paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that all the legal formalities regarding the publication were complied with. In paragraph 16 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the substance of the notice was made available to the Gram Pradhan on 28.3.2000. It is alleged that the entire acquisition proceedings are in accordance with law. The two newspaper publications are Annexures-C.A. 3 and 4 to the counter-affidavit.

12. In paragraph 18 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the acquiring body was made available the requisite money, and hence on making available the requisite money, the necessary publication under Section 4 was made on 24.8.1999 and thereafter a proposal was sent to the Director, Land Acquisition by the Collector, Bulandshahr, on 10.9.1999. Some time was taken by the Director and the State Government before the final publication under Section 6 but it is well within the time. In paragraph 25 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the public notice dated 28.3.2000 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is in accordance with law. In paragraph 27 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the land in dispute is agricultural land and the petitioner wants to take illegal advantage by saying that he has raised constructions. In paragraph 29 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the Mandi Samiti, Khurja, is facing great difficulty in carrying out its activities.

13. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the Mandi Samiti, Khurja. In paragraph 3 of the same, it is stated that the land has been acquired for construction of the market yard of Mandi Samiti, Khurja. The said construction of market yard is urgent and the acquisition is for planned development. The provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act have been applied as it is an urgent scheme which brooks no delay because of the fact that the old existing market yard was highly congested and unable to handle the large arrivals of agricultural produce. The existing market yard lacks the facilities of storage, parking, etc. and it has outlived its utility. Residential colonies have grown at that place and therefore there is crying need to shift the whole sale trade from the old market yard which is situate in a densely populated area to a place outside the city and construct a hygienic market yard.

14. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the land in dispute was agricultural holding on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. For the purpose of saving the land from acquisition or claiming exorbitant compensation, the petitioner moved an application under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, and the S.D.M. without making proper enquiry allowed the application and declared the land as abadi. However, when the Mandi Samiti came to know about the order, it moved an application and on that application, the S.D.M. by the order dated 14.9.2000, has cancelled his earlier order.

15. In paragraph 7, it is stated that the land in dispute is not abadi. In paragraph 8, it is stated that there is no construction on the land in dispute but the petitioner has built some boundary walls. In paragraph 9, it is stated that the notification under Section 4 was issued on 21.11.1996 and it was also published in two newspapers on 21.12.1996 and 5.8.1998 but the last publication of the notification was done by affixing public notice at the place where the land in dispute is situate on 24.8.1999. Therefore, the last publication of the notification would be deemed to be 24.8.1999 and the notification under Section 6 was issued on 23.8.2000. Hence, the notification under Section 6 has been issued within one year from the date of publication of notification under Section 4. The delay in publication was due to the official lapses and that would not affect the acquisition. It is stated that there is urgency in the matter as the market yard has to be constructed soon. In paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit, it is denied that the plots are abadi site and have big rooms. In paragraph 11, it is stated that the report from the office of the Director of Land Acquisition was manipulated and was a result of the political pressure to abandon the land and acquire some other land. The land in question was selected by the Committee consisting of responsible officers and it is more suitable land for construction of a market yard. The petitioner would get adequate compensation. It is denied that there are houses and shops over the land in dispute. The notification under Section 6 has been issued on 23.8.2000, within one year from the last publication of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. In paragraph 12, it is stated that there is nothing illegal in simultaneous publication. The acquisition would have lapsed if the notification had not been made in the Gazette dated 23.8.2000. In paragraph 14, it is stated that it is not impossible to publish notification under Section 6 simultaneously on 23.8.2000 and also get it published in two local newspapers on the same day. There is no improper motive involved and it is a straightforward scheme of acquisition of the land for the construction of market yard.

16. We have also perused the rejoinder-affidavit.

In our opinion, there is no merit in this petition. The acquisition of the land for the market yard of a Mandi Samiti is clearly for a public purpose and there is urgency as stated in the counter-affidavit. This Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15586 of 2001, Ram Charittar and Ors. v. State of V. P. and Ors., decided on 4.10.2002, following several decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court has held that the Court cannot go into the question whether the purpose for which the land was needed is for public purpose or not.

17. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033, it was held by the Supreme Court that unless it Is shown that there was colourable exercise of power, the Court cannot go behind the declaration of the Government and find out in a particular case whether the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not. In State of U. P. v. Smt Pista Devi and Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 251, the Supreme Court held that even if there are some superstructures standing on the land, they cannot be left out from the acquisition. In Ajay Krishan Shinghal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 721, it was held that acquisition for planned development is a public purpose. In Bal Krishan Gulati v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1991 (2) AWC 1210, it was held that where there is a recital of urgency, the Court should not ordinarily interfere. In M/s. Garg Farms and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1989 (2) AWC 1137, this Court held that if the Government formed the opinion that the matter was one of urgency under Section 17(2) and It had some material for this opinion, the Court should not Interfere. In Kunwar Lal and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors., (1989) 1 UPLBEC 772. it was held that dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A depends on subjective satisfaction of the State Government. It was also held that where the declaration has been made by the State Government under Section 6(3) that a particular land is needed for a public purpose, the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that It is so needed. The same view has been taken by this Court in Ram Narain Rai v. State of U. P., 1991 (1) AWC 341.

18. It may be pointed out that Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act states :

"(a) the expression "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth."

19. The above definition shows that even building and trees will be deemed, by a legal fiction, to be land for the purpose of Land Acquisition Act as they are attached to or permanently fastened to the earth vide Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector, AIR 1969 SC 255 (Paras 8 and 9), S. P. Gupta v. State of U. P., 7980 ACJ 583, etc. Hence, it cannot be said that when land is being sought to be acquired, the buildings or trees standing thereon have to be exempted. No doubt compensation has to be given for the building and trees also, but it does not mean that exemption from acquisition must be granted to the building or trees, or the land on which the building or trees stands. If a contrary view is taken it can disrupt the entire scheme for which the acquisition is being done.

20. The allegations of the petitioner that they had residential houses on the land in dispute have been denied by the respondents. The order declaring the land in question as abadi has also been subsequently cancelled by the S.D.M. However, even assuming that there was some construction on the land in question, this Court cannot interfere with the acquisition because the word 'land' in Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act includes 'buildings and trees' also. Hence, even assuming that the land was abadi or there were constructions on the land in question, in our opinion, the said land can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and this Court cannot interfere. Moreover, we are of the opinion that in fact, the land in question was agricultural land and it was only after the notification under Section 4 that the petitioner tried to give a colour that the land was abadi and there were constructions.

21. In our opinion, there was no illegality in the notification under Section 6 issued on 23.8.2000 as it was within one year from the publication of the notification under Section 4 on 24.8.1999.

22. The construction of market yard of Mandi Samiti is clearly for public purpose as it will serve the agriculturists and it is urgent.

23. Thus there is no merit in this petition and it is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs .

Manveer Singh And Another v. State Of U.P And Others

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Respondents' (State and Mandi Samiti) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Manveer Singh And Another v. State Of U.P And Others

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