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  • provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Payment of Salaries Act, 1971, and U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1981.
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  • provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Payment of Salaries Act, 1971, and U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1981.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This special appeal was filed by the District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar and another against the judgment and order dated 16 April 1999 passed by a learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 9767 of 1994 (Diwakar Lal and 3 others v. District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar and others).

P. N. N. Inter College, Kanpur is a recognised Intermediate College governed by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Payment of Salaries Act, 1971, and U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1981. Four posts of Lecturers fell vacant; after the Commission failed to select and recommend candidates for more than two months, four Assistant Teachers in L.T. grade were given ad hoc promotion to Lecturer posts (names and subjects are recorded in the opinion).

These promotions produced resultant short-term vacancies (termed "Phalit Riktiyan" / short term vacancies) in the L.T. Grade. The college management filled those resultant short-term vacancies by short-term ad hoc appointments of the petitioners (Diwakar Lal, Deepak Kumar Shukla, Surcndra Mohan Srtvastava, and Lal Bahadur). Appointment letters were issued and the petitioners joined and discharged duties; papers were sent to the District Inspector of Schools.

The District Inspector of Schools refused approval of those appointments and withheld financial sanction, and thereafter passed an order in February 1994 (the opinion records the impugned order as dated 9th/10th/19th February 1994 in different paragraphs and also refers to Annexure-10 to the writ petition). The petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 9767 of 1994 seeking reliefs including salary; an interim order dated 9 March 1994 directed respondents to pay salary to the petitioners with effect from 2 July 1993 or show cause.

After exchange of affidavits the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition by judgment dated 16 April 1999; this special appeal challenges that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents (District Inspector of Schools) could be permitted to support the impugned order by raising a new ground in the counter-affidavit (specifically, that the posts were not properly advertised) which did not appear in the original impugned order.
  2. Whether the ad hoc appointments to resultant short-term vacancies (Phalit Riktiyan) were invalid because they were not advertised in two newspapers of wide circulation and, more generally, whether absence of advertisement renders such short-term/stop-gap appointments void.
  3. Whether, when a resultant short-term vacancy becomes a substantive vacancy, the ad hoc appointment made against the short-term vacancy automatically comes to an end (i.e., the effect of decisions such as Smt. Pramila Mishra and related authority on the continuity of ad hoc incumbents).
  4. Whether the impugned order of the District Inspector of Schools (the February 1994 order) was sustainable in law under the Removal of Difficulties Orders, 1981.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Respondents before the writ court) Arguments

  • The District Inspector of Schools refused to approve the petitioners' short-term ad hoc appointments and withheld financial sanction; the impugned order (Annexure-10) asserted that resultant vacancies could not be filled up under the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981.
  • In the counter-affidavit the respondents raised an additional ground that the posts were not properly advertised (i.e., that advertisement requirements had not been met), and relied on that ground to defend the impugned order.
  • On appeal, the learned standing counsel submitted that, relying on Smt. Pramila Mishra (1997 (2) UPLBEC 1329), ad hoc appointments made against resultant short-term vacancies will come to an end automatically when the resultant short-term vacancy becomes substantive.

Respondents in the Appeal / Petitioners in the Writ (Diwakar Lal and others)

  • The petitioners joined pursuant to appointment letters, performed their duties satisfactorily, and sought regularization or payment of salary; they obtained an interim order directing payment of salary from 2 July 1993 unless respondents showed cause.
  • The petitioners contended that the appointments were in terms of the Removal of Difficulties Orders, and that the management acted to prevent interruption of teaching services; they also relied on prior decisions and the chronology that the ad hoc appointments were made on 1 July 1993, i.e., prior to certain higher court decisions affecting the advertisement requirement.
  • The petitioners challenged the respondents' attempt to raise a new ground in the counter-affidavit which did not appear in the impugned order and sought quashing of the impugned administrative order and a direction for continuation of service and payment of salary until regular candidates appointed by the Commission join.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 That a party cannot support an impugned administrative order by raising a new ground for the first time in counter-affidavit before a higher authority or court. The learned single Judge relied on this principle to hold that respondents could not sustain the impugned order by introducing a new ground (non-advertisement) in the counter-affidavit.
Ashika Prasad Shukla v. District Inspector Schools, Allahabad, 1998 (3) UPLBEC 1722 (DB) Observed that if an appointment for a short-term vacancy was made prior to certain key decisions (including K. N. Dwivedi and Radha Raizada), the appointment without advertisement in two newspapers would not be invalid; emphasis on timing and notice-board requirement. The court relied on this Division Bench observation as an alternative basis to uphold ad hoc appointments made on 1 July 1993 (i.e., prior to the Full Bench decision in Radha Raizada and the judgment in K. N. Dwivedi).
K. N. Dwivedi v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 461 Referenced as one of the decisions which affected the requirement of advertisement for such appointments (timing relevant to validate pre-decision appointments). The court treated appointments made prior to this judgment as not being rendered invalid by non-advertisement, on the reasoning adopted from Ashika Prasad Shukla.
Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551 (FB) Full Bench decision cited as affecting advertisement requirements for certain appointments; timing of appointments relative to this Full Bench decision was material to validity. The court observed that the instant appointments were made prior to this Full Bench decision, and thus the absence of advertisement did not invalidate them given compliance with the notice-board requirement.
Arun Tiwari v. Zila Mansari Shikshak Sangh (AIR 1998 SC 331 and related citations) Supreme Court authority holding that statutory provisions requiring advertisement are procedural in nature; in emergent or stop-gap appointments the requirement of public notice/advertisement may be dispensed with to meet urgent needs. The court endorsed the principle that advertisement requirement is procedural and can be dispensed with for short-term/stop-gap appointments to avoid paralysing educational institutions; this supported validation of the ad hoc appointments.
1996 (7) SCC 577 (paras 66 and 67); and cited Education Cases (1982 UPLBEC 695 Pr 7 (DB), 1983 Education Cases 51 (DB), 1984 UPLBEC 484) Additional authorities cited for the proposition that advertisement requirements are procedural and may be relaxed in emergent/temporary appointment situations. These authorities were cited to reinforce the principle that strict advertisement formalities need not invalidate temporary/stop-gap appointments made to meet emergent educational needs.
Smt. Pramila Mishra, 1997 (2) UPLBEC 1329 Holds that ad hoc appointments made against resultant short-term vacancies will come to an end automatically when the resultant short-term vacancy becomes substantive. Appellants relied on this decision to argue that ad hoc appointees' service should cease when the vacancy became substantive; the court noted this principle but found appellants had not established the factual foundation to apply it in the appeal.
1992 (2) UPLBEC 1420 Referenced in the opinion to support the view that incumbents working on ad hoc basis against short-term vacancies should not be automatically removed from service in certain circumstances. The court cited this authority as supporting the proposition that ad hoc incumbents should normally be allowed to continue until regular ad hoc appointment is made for a substantive vacancy; used in concluding relief for petitioners.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in several discrete steps, closely following the single Judge's analysis while adding appellate scrutiny on factual material placed before it:

  1. On the procedural point of raising new grounds: the single Judge correctly observed that respondents attempted to support the impugned administrative order by offering an additional ground in the counter-affidavit (that the posts were not properly advertised) which did not appear in the impugned order of the District Inspector of Schools. Relying on Mohinder Singh Gill, the court held that respondents could not be permitted to carve out a new case or raise a new ground for the first time before the higher authority or court to validate the order.
  2. On the substantive validity of appointments despite absence of advertisement: the single Judge (and this court agreeing) treated the non-advertisement objection in the alternative. Relying on Ashika Prasad Shukla and earlier decisions (including K. N. Dwivedi and Radha Raizada), the court observed that the ad hoc appointments in the instant case were made on 1 July 1993, i.e., prior to the Full Bench decision of Radha Raizada and the K. N. Dwivedi judgment. Given that timing and the fulfillment of notice-board requirements, the court held that absence of advertisement in two newspapers did not invalidate the short-term ad hoc appointments.
  3. The court further relied on Supreme Court authority (e.g., Arun Tiwari and other cited decisions) for the proposition that statutory provisions requiring advertisement are procedural in nature and, where appointments are temporary/stop-gap to meet emergent situations, rules may dispense with public notice in newspapers. The court emphasised the pragmatic purpose of such relaxation — to prevent paralysis of teaching activity and to meet local staffing needs where candidates from remote areas are unlikely to take short-term posts.
  4. The court rejected the respondents' factual substitutes and documentary inconsistencies: appellants filed a photocopy of the impugned order in which the word "Phalit" had been altered to "Phaltoo". The learned standing counsel failed to explain the interpolation; the court considered the original order produced in court and found the correct word to be "Phalit". This discrepancy caused the court to regard the authority's documents as not safely reliable and declined to decide disputed questions of fact introduced at the appellate stage by supplementary affidavits.
  5. On the submission based on Pramila Mishra (that ad hoc appointments end automatically when short-term vacancies become substantive), the court found that the appellants had not laid the necessary factual foundation as precise details regarding the timing of vacancies and periods of incumbency were missing. The court refused to adjudicate factual disputes raised for the first time at the appellate stage.
  6. Considering the merits and the public interest in continuous functioning of the educational institution, and noting that there was no complaint about the petitioners' performance, the court concluded that the single Judge's directions (quashing the impugned order and directing continuation of service and payment of salary until regularly selected candidates join) required no interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED

The court dismissed the special appeal for lack of merit and ordered no costs. The learned single Judge's judgment and order dated 16 April 1999 were endorsed.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The impugned administrative order of February 1994 (recorded as Annexure-10 in the writ petition and variously referred to in the opinion) was quashed by the learned single Judge and that result was sustained on appeal.
  • The court directed that where the petitioners have been working as ad hoc teachers and no regular appointment has been made against those posts, the petitioners shall be allowed to continue to work and shall be paid salary until regularly selected candidates sent by the Commission join the posts in question (i.e., continuation and pay pending regular selection and joining).

Broader implications: The opinion reaffirms existing principles from earlier authorities that the requirement of advertisement for temporary/stop-gap educational appointments is procedural and may be relaxed in emergent situations; the court did not purport to lay down novel precedent beyond applying those principles. The judgment primarily resolves the parties' rights in the specific factual matrix before the court.

Result: Appeal dismissed; no costs.

    District Inspector Of Schools, Kanpur Nagar v. Diwakar Lal

    1. This special appeal by the District Inspector of Schools. Kanpur Nagar and another has been Filed against the judgment and order dated April 16, 1999 passed by learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 9767 of 1994. Diwakar Lal and 3 others v. District Inspector of Schools. Kanpur Nagar and others.

    2. P. N. N. Inter College, Kanpur (called 'college') is, admittedly, a recognised Intermediate College governed by the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Payment of Salaries Act, 1971, and U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1981. Four posts of Lecturers in the College fell vacant. Requisition was sent to the Commission, Still the posts remained vacant for more than two months as the Commission failed to select and recommend candidates. Hence, four Assistant Teachers in L. T. grade were promoted on the posts of Lecturer in the College--purely on ad hoc basis as follows :

    1. S. K. Srtvastava, L. T. Grade Teacher--given ad hoc promotion--on post of Lecturer Chemistry.

    2. S. K. Tiwari, L. T. Grade Teacher--given ad hoc promotion--on post of Lecturer Economics.

    3. Ram Surat Misra, L. T. Grade Teacher--promoted ad hoc on--post of Lecturer Sanskrit.

    4. Mohan Lal Yadav, L. T. Grade Teacher--promoted ad hoc--on the post of Lecturer Geography.

    3. Consequently, 'short term vacancies' occurred on four posts of Assistant Teachers in L. T. Grade under Removal of Difficulties Second Order 1981. The management sought to fill up the resultant short term vacancies by making short term ad hoc appointments of the petitioners--Diwakar Lal, Deepak Kumar Shukla, Surcndra Mohan Srtvastava and Lal Bahadur and appointment letters (Annexures-1, 2, 3 and 4 to the writ petition) were issued. Papers were sent to the District Inspector Schools and they were allowed to Join the posts. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition, it is stated that these petitioners actually joined the College and started discharging their duties to the full satisfaction of the Management. The District Inspector of Schools refused to approve these appointments and withheld financial sanction. The petitioners made representations until the District Inspector of Schools officially passed order dated 9th February. 1994. {Annexure-10 to the writ petition) Informing the Manager of the College that resultant vacancies could not be filled up under Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981.

    4. Feeling aggrieved petitioners filed abovementioned Writ Petition No. 9767 of 1994 and an interim order dated 9th March, 1994, was passed ; relevant extract is reproduced below :

    .....meanwhile respondents are directed to pay salary to the petitioner with effect from 2.7.1993. in accordance with law or show cause.....

    Parties exchanged counter and rejoinder-affidavits.

    5. This writ petition has been finally disposed of by the learned single Judge vide judgment and order dated 16th April, 1999. which has given rise to the present special appeal.

    6. The learned single Judge observed that respondents, apart from the ground mentioned in the Impugned order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 9th February, 1994 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), made an attempt to support their defence by offering an additional ground in the counter affidavit to the effect that the posts were not properly advertised.

    7. The learned single Judge held that by adding a ground in the counter-affidavit, which did not find mention in the Impugned order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, the respondents cannot be permitted to support the Impugned order by carving out a new case or raise a new ground for the first time before the Appellate/higher authority or Court to make the order valid. In support, reference was made to the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner. AIR 1978 SC 851.

    8. The learned single Judge In the alternative considered that assuming the post was not advertised, the appointment in question shall not be rendered Invalid relying upon the judgment in the case of Ashika Prased Shukla v. District Inspector Schools. Allahabad, 1998 (3) UPLBEC 1722 (DB) : Pr 14, wherein this Court observed that if an appointment of Assistant Teacher for short term vacancy is made prior to the Judgment dated 13th January. 1994, tn the case of K. N. Dwivedi v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 461. and that of Radha Ralzada without advertisement In two newspapers of wide circulation, the appointment will not be invalid. This observation was made by the Division Bench in the case of Ashika Prasad Shukla (supra), after the decision in the case of Radha Ralzada v. Committee of Management, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551 (FB). The learned single Judge, in the present case, found that the petitioners in the Instant case were appointed as ad hoc teachers in terms of short term vacancies on 1st July, 1993, i.e.. prior to the Full Bench decision of Radha Raizada (supra), and also the judgment In the case of K. N. Dwivedi (supra) and held that the appointments in question on ad hoc vacancies could not be faulted if advertisement was not made in two newspapers since the then existing requirement of law to notify the vacancy on the notice board was duly fulfilled.

    9. The judgment of the learned single Judge cannot be faulted on any ground and the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to show otherwise.

    10. The view taken by the learned single Judge on the question of absence of advertisement is otherwise not bad. Appointments in question also not rendered void ab initio as held in AIR 1998 SC 331. (paras 7, 19 and 20), Arun Tiwari v. Zila Mansari Shikshak Sangh. Supreme Court held that it is now well-settled that statutory provision requiring advertisement is procedural in nature. Rules may, in order to meet an emergent situation and when appointment is not substantive but by way of stopgap/temporary arrangement : dispense with public notice /advertisement in newspaper. Also see 1996 (7) SCC 577 (paras 66 and 67), 1982 UPLBEC 695 Pr 7 (DB) Education Cases, 1983 Education Cases 51 (DB) and 1984 UPLBEC 484. If the condition of giving advertisement, akin to the requirement of advertisement in the case of regular selection/substantive appointment is to be followed, then it will frustrate the whole purpose to meet an unexpected or emergent situation to avoid larger harm. Even otherwise this Court takes notice of the fact that candidates from outside places or other remote corner of the States of the country are not likely to come forward for short term/ temporary or stop gap appointments and normally the local candidates or the candidate In the adjoining areas alone will be willing to take up such appointments.

    11. Therefore, apart from endorsing the view taken by learned single Judge, rejecting additional ground taken in the counter-affidavit by the respondents In the writ petition for countenancing the claim of the petitioners does not help the case of the respondents (present appellants). With respect to the validity of the ground disclosed by the District Inspector of Schools in the impugned order, the learned single Judge observed that the objection raised by the District Inspector of Schools was not sustatnable in law. It is held that under Removal of Difficulties Orders, 1981, and second Removal of Difficulties Order power was conferred on management of a recognised college under law with the object that educational institutions do not suffer irreparably by resorting to the procedure prescribed for regular selection, teaching in the college will be completely paralyzed. In the result, the learned single Judge, allowed the writ petition, issued a writ in the nature of ceritorari quashing the order dated 19th February, 1994, passed by District Inspector of Schools (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) and also issued a writ of mandamus directing that In case the petitioners have been working in the institution as ad hoc teachers and no regular appointment were made against these posts, the petitioners will be allowed to work and shall be paid salary till regularly selected candidate sent by the Commission Joins the post In question.

    12. In appeal the learned standing counsel has submitted that in view of the decision In the case of Smt. Pramila Mishra, 1997 (2) UPLBEC 1329 (para 4), the appointment of ad hoc teachers made against resultant short term vacancies (Phalit Riktiyan) will come to an end automatically when such a resultant short term vacancy became substantive.

    13. We find that learned standing counsel has not laid foundation for his argument sought to be developed in special appeal as the relevant details regarding vacancies and the specific period of working of the respective incumbents (who were promoted as Lecturers) has not come on record With precision and clarity. In absence of relevant details, the submission of the Appellants could not be properly appreciated. A supplementary-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Respondents (Petitioners in the writ petition) to overcome the shortcoming. Perusal of the supplementary-affidavit and supplementary counter-affidavit go to show that the facts mentioned therein will require this Court to adjudicate on questions of fact. This Court is neither competent nor willing to enter into disputed questions of fact or adjudicate the same at this stage : particularly on the basis of the facts brought before this Court for the first time through supplementary-affidavit at appellate stage.

    14. On merit, it may be noted that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools dated 10th February, 1994. (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) clearly mentions that appointments were made against the resultant short-term vacancies (Phalit Riktiyan). However, on the other hand, appellants have filed a photostat copy of this very order as annexure to the affidavit sworn by Dr. K. L. Varma. District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar (PP 16). In the said annexure word "Phalit" has been changed by making addition so as to read it as "Phaltoo", i.e., surplus. Learned standing counsel being confronted with the same failed to explain the interpolation. We have perused the record as well as original copy of the order received by the Manager (produced before us by Shri Ashok Khare, Advocate) and it is found that the correct word used is 'Phalit' In the original order dated 10th February, 1994, passed by District Inspector of Schools. In view of this discrepancy, we are of the opinion that the documents filed by the authority cannot be safely relied upon.

    15. Consequently, this Court refuses to go into factual dispute.

    16. The learned counsel for the appellant states that Deepak Kumar Shukla has already left the college and Joined another college elsewhere as such he is not Interested in the reliefs in present proceedings. In view of the judgment in 1992 (2) UPLBEC 1420, we are of the opinion that the Incumbents working on ad hoc basis against short term vacancies should not be automatically thrown out of service-in view of the decision in the case of Pramila Mishra (supra), when 'short term' vacancy became 'substantive vacancy'. In such a situation, an ad hoc appointee should normally be allowed to continue (if there is no complaint about his working), till a regular ad hoc appointment is made against substantive vacancy as contemplated under Removal of Difficulties Orders.

    17. In the Instant case, we find that petitioners-respondents were appointed in the year 1993. There Is no complaint about their working as teachers in the college. Nothing has been brought on record to otherwise disqualify and/or discontinue them in service. Management and authorities appear to have no complaint about their performance as teacher and seems satisfied with their functioning. From the supplementary-affidavit, ft transpires that some of the vacancies became substantively vacant in August, 1993, itself. There is nothing on record to show that District Inspector of Schools took any step to make regular ad hoc appointment when 'short term vacancy' became 'substantive vacancy' In accordance with Removal of Difficulties Order even though several years have passed.

    18. Taking a pragmatic view as well as interest of the educational Institution, we have no doubt that the direction given by the learned single Judge requires no Interference.

    19. The appeal lacks merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed.

    20. No costs.

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    District Inspector Of Schools, Kanpur Nagar v. Diwakar Lal
    (May 25, 2000)