Katju, J.:— Heard Sri K.P Agarwal learned counsel for petitioner.
1A. The petitioners are workmen of Pepsico India Holdings, Ltd., which is a purely private company and is not State under Art. 12 of the Constitution.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the company has terminated the services of certain employees and is doing unfair labour practices. In our opinion, the petitioner has an alternative remedy for raising an industrial dispute under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, and hence this writ petition should not be entertained as held by the Full Bench of this Court in Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Union [1991 (2) L.L.N 1084], also the writ petition is not maintainable as it is against a purely private body.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has invited our attention to the decisions of the. Supreme Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani [1989 (2) L.L.N 281], Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1993) 1 SCC 645 : A.I.R 1993 S.C 2178]; K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering [1997 (3) L.L.N 304], etc., and has submitted that a writ lies even against a private body. It is not doubt true that in certain exceptional cases, a writ against a private body has been held to be maintainable, but in our opinion these are only exceptional cases and it does not create a general rule. Ordinarily no writ lies against a private body (except a writ of habeas corpus) No doubt Art. 226 of the Constitution is very widely worded. Article 226(1) states:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in Art. 32(***) every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate case, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement or any of the rights conferred by Part II and for any other purposes.”
4. It may be noted that the above provision states that a writ can be issued to “any person or authority” and it further states that a writ can be issued for enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and “for any other purpose.” However although very wide language is used in Art. 226, by judicial interpretation a narrower meaning has been given. In our opinion the language of Art. 226 cannot be read literally. For example Art. 226 states that a writ can be issued “for any other purpose” but this does not mean that a writ can issue for granting a divorce or for deciding criminal trials. The words “for any other purpose” have to be interpreted to mean that a writ shall ordinarily be issued for the purpose for which writs were traditionally issued by the British Courts on well-established principles.
5. Similarly it has been stated in Art. 226 that a writ can be issued to any person, but once again these words cannot be read literally. A writ can be issued to the persons to whom writs were traditionally issued by British Courts on well-established principles and not literally to any person whomsoever. Thus, white the language of Art. 226 on the face of it is very wide, it does not mean that writs can be issued for any purpose whatsoever and to any person whomsoever. Writs will ordinarily be issued to the persons, and for the purpose, for which writs were traditionally issued by the British Courts on well-established principles. No doubt the powers of the Indian High Court under Art. 226 are wider than those of the British Courts, as held in Dwrika Nath v. I.T.O [A.I.R 1966 S.C 81], but they are not so wide as to empower the Indian High Courts to pass any order whatsoever in writ jurisdiction. There are well settled limitations on such powers.
6. The decisions that the learned counsel for the petitioner cited were cases where a public duty was involved, and in such exceptional cases a writ was issued to a private body. There is no such public duty involved here.
7. In several decisions it has been held that a writ does not ordinarily lie against private bodies, e.g, Praga Tools Corporation v. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1306], Carlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Company, Ltd. v. Jagtiani [A.I.R 1952 Cal. 315], Chander Mohan Khanna v. National Council of Educational Research and Training [1992 (1) L.L.N 16]. Thus, while exercising writ jurisdiction the Court must keep in mind the history and origin of the high prerogative writs in England and in India, and it cannot be guided by the words used in Art. 226 alone. The ordinary principle therefore remains that a writ will not ordinarily be issued to a private body (except a writ of habeas corpus).
8. In Scooter India v. Vijai Eldred [1998 (5) L.L.N (Supp.)], the Supreme Court held that a writ should not be ordinarily entertained when there is an alternative remedy under industrial law. This has also been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Union [1991 (2) L.L.N 1084] (vide supra).
9. Since admittedly the respondent-company is a purely private body and is not instrumentality of the State and since the petitioner has an alternative remedy under industrial law in our opinion, we are not inclined to interfere in this case.
10. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that in a large number of Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals in Uttar Pradesh there is no Presiding Officer in view of certain directions given by this Court in certain writ petitions in pursuance of the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association [1998 (1) L.L.N 961]. The petitioner may approach the State Government for appointing Presiding Officers to these bodies and we recommend to the State Government to make appointments to fill up the posts as expeditiously as possible.
Petition is dismissed.