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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges an order dated 24 April 1984 of the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi, in Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1983, which dismissed the appellant's appeal and maintained his conviction and sentence under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The sentence imposed was rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000, with an additional one month rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.

The petitioner was prosecuted on allegations that on 19 June 1980 Food Inspector C.P. Dwivedi, after disclosing his identity, purchased Suhagin brand Vanaspati Ghee from the petitioner, took a sample according to procedure, and on receipt of the Chemical Examiner's report (showing deficiency of Vitamin-A), filed a complaint. The Judicial Magistrate, Sandila convicted and sentenced the petitioner on 7 January 1983. The petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the Sessions Judge on 24 April 1984. The present revision was argued before the court, with learned counsel Sri Mahesh Chandra appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate for the State.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sanction/consent for prosecution under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was validly and properly granted (i.e., whether the prescribed authority applied its mind and issued a speaking order), and if not, whether the trial based on that sanction is vitiated.
  2. Whether, in view of a subsequent amendment to the statutory standard for Vitamin A in Vanaspati Ghee (Appendix-B, Standard A-19), the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the amended (beneficial) standard such that the sample taken from him would not be regarded as adulterated.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The sanction for prosecution (the written consent under Section 20 of the P.F.A. Act) was defective because it was issued on a printed proforma with blanks filled in and did not show the application of mind by the Prescribed Authority; therefore the trial was vitiated.
  • The prescribed standard for Vitamin-A in Vanaspati Ghee was subsequently amended so that the requirement became only that the sample show a positive test for Vitamin-A (rather than the earlier specific numerical minimum of 25 I.U. per gram at the time of packing). The petitioner argued that this subsequent amendment is a beneficial change and should be given retrospective effect, so that the analyst's finding of 13.6 I.U (which shows presence but less than 25 I.U) should not amount to adulteration under the amended standard.
  • It was also contended that Vitamin-A strength decays naturally and that the legal requirement is satisfied if the sample at retail shows a positive test for Vitamin-A; reliance was placed on authority (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mai Ram alias Bhaya Ram) supporting retrospective application of a substituted, beneficial standard.

This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State's (respondent's) specific legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramanbhai Shivabhai Prajapati v. State of Gujarat, 1991 (1) EFR 547 Decrying the practice of issuing sanction/consent orders on printed proforma without real application of mind. Relied upon to support the proposition that a sanction issued on a printed form with blanks filled in, not showing the application of mind, is defective and can vitiate the prosecution.
R.N. Gujral v. Pritipal Gupta, 1988 FAJ 532 Authority criticizing proforma sanctions and emphasizing requirement of application of mind by sanctioning authority. Used to bolster the court's conclusion that the sanction (Ex. Ka-6) was not a speaking order and therefore imperfect.
Gahini Nath Bhimrao Patekar v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 EFR 603 Precedent addressing validity of sanction/consent orders and the need for material consideration by the sanctioning authority. Cited to reinforce the view that absence of documented application of mind renders such sanction orders legally defective.
Deepchand Agarwala @ Deepak Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, 1995 (1) FAC 14 Case law criticizing mechanical sanction orders and emphasizing proper exercise of discretion by the prescribed authority. Adopted as supporting authority for ignoring a non-speaking printed sanction order.
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Deepak Sood, 1993 (1) EFR 508 Authority on the legal requirements for sanctioning prosecution and the need to avoid vexatious prosecutions by ensuring the sanctioning authority applies its mind. Relied on as part of the body of decisions holding proforma sanctions inadequate to sustain prosecution.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mai Ram alias Bhaya Ram, 1974 FAC 19 Decision supporting retrospective application of a substituted beneficial standard for purity when a new standard replaces an older standard. Relied upon to support the petitioner's submission that a subsequent, beneficial amendment to the standard for Vitamin-A should be given retrospective effect in his favour.
Ratan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 Supreme Court authority cited for principle that substituted beneficial standards/notifications may be given retrospective operation. Invoked (via Municipal Corporation of Delhi) to justify retrospective application of the amended Vitamin-A standard so as to benefit the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis corresponding to the petitioner's two contentions.

First, the court examined the sanction/consent order (Ex. Ka-6) under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which makes written consent of the Prescribed Authority a condition precedent to prosecution under Section 7. The court explained that the Prescribed Authority must apply its mind to the facts and documents before it and that this application of mind must be reflected in the sanction order so as to avoid vexatious or mala fide prosecutions. A sanction order need not be judicial in form but must be a "speaking order" demonstrating consideration of the relevant material.

On the facts, the sanction reproduced in the opinion was a printed proforma with blanks filled in and signed by the Chief Medical Officer. The Food Inspector (P.W.1) who proved Ex. Ka-6 admitted that he did not personally put up documents before the Chief Medical Officer, was not present when the order was passed, and could not specify what documents were forwarded. The sanction order itself did not identify the papers considered or the materials relied upon. On this basis, and in light of authorities discouraging proforma sanctions, the court concluded that Ex. Ka-6 did not demonstrate application of mind and was therefore defective; accordingly it could be ignored and could not support taking cognizance of the offence.

Second, the court analyzed the statutory standard for Vitamin-A in Vanaspati Ghee in Appendix-B (Standard A-19). The earlier standard required that Vanaspati Ghee "contain not less than 25 I.U of Synthetic Vitamin 'A' per gram at the time of packing" and "shall show a positive test for Vitamin 'A' when tested by Antimony Trichloride (Carr-Price) reagent." The opinion notes that the earlier requirement of 25 I.U was under GSR 790(E) dated 10 October 1983, but was later amended by GSR 910(E) dated 27 June 1986 so that the statutory requirement became the substituted entry reproduced in the opinion (emphasizing a positive test rather than a specific numeric minimum at the time of testing).

The analyst's report in the petitioner's case recorded presence of Synthetic Vitamin-A to the extent of 13.6 I.U per gram (less than 25 I.U). The petitioner argued, and the court accepted, that the subsequently substituted/amended standard was beneficial and should be given retrospective effect (relying on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mai Ram and Ratan Lal). Because the amended standard did not require demonstration of a numeric minimum at the time of retail testing but only a positive test for presence of Vitamin-A, the analyst's finding (showing presence) meant the sample was not adulterated under the amended standard. The court therefore held the petitioner entitled to the benefit of the revised/substituted standard.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is allowed; the orders of conviction and sentence under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, passed by the courts below are set aside.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The conviction and sentence maintained by the courts below were quashed on two independent bases: (a) the sanction/consent order (Ex. Ka-6) was defective for want of application of mind and was to be ignored; and (b) the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the subsequently substituted/amended standard for Vitamin-A in Vanaspati Ghee, under which the analyst's finding did not establish adulteration.
  • The petitioner's bail bonds, if he was on bail, are discharged; if he is in custody he is to be set at liberty forthwith.
  • The opinion applies established principles (as reflected in the cited authorities) about the invalidity of mechanical proforma sanction orders and the retrospective application of beneficial substituted standards; it does not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond those applications.

Disposition: Revision allowed.

    Maya Prakash v. State Of U.P And Another Opposite Parties.

    1. This revision petition is against an order dated 24th April, 1984. passed by 5 Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi in Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1983, dismissing the appeal and maintaining the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under Sections 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for rigorous imprisonment of six months and fine of Rupees 1000/- and in default of payment of fine further rigorous imprisonment of one month. Petitioner was prosecuted on the allegations that on 19 June, 1980 Food Inspector C.P Dwivedi after disclosing his identity to the petitioner, purchased Vanaspati Ghee of Suhagin Brand, out of which he took a sample of the Ghee in accordance with the procedure and on receipt of report of Chemical Examiner, which confirmed that the sample of Ghee was deficient in the prescribed limit of vitamin-A, he filed complaint against the petitioner. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate, Sandila on 07 January, 1983. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said order was also dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Mahesh Chandra and learned Government Advocate have been heard at length.

    2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two legal contentions, firstly that the trial of the petitioner stood vitiated on account of imperfect sanction for his prosecution and secondly that in view of amendment of the prescribed standard of contents of Vitamin-A in Vanaspati Ghee, the petitioner could not have been convicted for the offence under the charge against him.

    3. In order to appreciate the first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, it is desirable that the sanction/consent order issued by the competent authority is reproduced below:—

    “Office of the Chief Medical Officer Hardoi

    No. Pros-1/79/Dated 16-11-80

    Sri O.P Diwdi

    Food Inspector,

    Primary Health Centre-Hariswan

    District Hardoi

    I have thoroughly gone through, the complaint report along with the papers submitted by Sri O.P Diwdi P.I Hariawan u/s 7/16 P.F.A Act, 1954 in respect of sample of Vanaspati (Suhagin) for Institution and conduct the case.

    I am satisfied that the prima facie case is made out against Sri Maya Prakash S/o Jaganath Prasad R/o Hardeoganj P.S Kotwali. Distt. Hardoi under Ss. 7/16 P.F.A Act 1954, as amended upto date hence prosecution sanctioned.

    So, I hereby, authorise Sri O.P Diwdi P.I Hariawan to institute and conduct the prosecution for contravening the provisions of P.F.A Act, under authority vested on me by virtue of S. 20 of P.F.A Act, read with U.P Govt. Gazette Notification No. 6001/16-10-722/5 dated 18 September, 1976 published in U.P Govt. Gazette dated 13-11-76.

    Chief Medical Officer

    Hardoi.”

    4. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, referred to as the Act provides that a written consent of the Prescribed Authority is a condition precedent for launching of prosecution for an offence under Section 7 of the Act. Written consent of the Prescribed Authority is invariably referred to as sanction for prosecution. The Prescribed Authority in order to sanction the prosecution of a person under the Act is required to apply its mind on the facts of the case, so as to satisfy himself that a prima facie case is made out for the prosecution of the person. The portion of the order underlined shows the blanks filled in hand-writing whereas rest of the order is a printed material. The sanction order is not a mere empty formality because the Prescribed Authority has to apply its mind to the relevant documents, which are placed before it, which go to show the commission of an offence under the Act. The application of its mind by the Prescribed Authority necessarily is to be depicted in the order of sanction. It may not be an order in the nature of judicial order, still it has to be a speaking order, so as to show the application of mind. The process of application of mind is inbuilt in Section 20(1) of the Act for the simple reason of avoiding launching of vexatious prosecution. In the absence of application of mind by the Prescribed Authority to the facts of the case, based on the documents placed before it, the sanction becomes bad in law and not in compliance with the legal requirement inbuilt in the section aforesaid. If from the sanction order the application of mind is not made out, the conviction and sentence passed against the accused person under Section 16(a)(1) of the Act is not sustainable in law.

    5. The sanctioned order reproduced above, shows that it is a printed form, blanks of which have been filled in and bears the signature of the Chief Medical Officer. This document, which is Ka-6 on the record of the case, has been proved by the Food Inspector C.P Dwivedi, appearing as P.W 1. who stated that he had sent the relevant documents to the Chief Medical Officer, who gave his consent and identified the signature of Dr. A.S Gupta on the same. In his cross-examination he admitted that he himself did not put up the relevant documents before the Chief Medical Officer nor he was present when the order Ex. Ka-6 was passed. He also did not say as to which documents he had forwarded for obtaining consent of the Chief Medical Officer. Now a perusal of the consent order of the Chief Medical Officer, Ex. Ka-6, reproduced above, further confirms that it does not specify the papers which were put up before him for his consideration. The sanction order on the face of it becomes imperfect or defective as it does not satisfy the legal requirement of application of mind. The sanction order Ex. Ka-6 is also not a speaking order, as it does not show any reason as to why launching of prosecution against the petitioner was necessary in the public interest. Admittedly the sanction order Ex-Ka-6 is on a printed proforma and only blanks have been filled up, which demonstrates total non-application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. The practice of issuing consent order or sanctioning prosecution under Section 20 sub clause (1) of the Act on a printed or cyclostyled proforma on the blanks filled up have been depricated in various decisions for references Ramanbhai Shivabhai Prajapati v. State of Gujarat, 1991 (1) EFR 547, R.N Gujral v. Pritipal Gupta, 1988 FAJ 532; Gahini Nath Bhimrao Patekar v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 EFR 603; Deepchand Agarwala @ Deepak Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, 1995 (1) FAC 14 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Deepak Sood, 1993 (1) EFR 508. The consent order Ex. Ka-6 in the circumstances being not in conformity with the legal requirement is to be ignored and vitiates the whole trial on its basis and no cognisance could have been taken by the court of the offence on the basis of this consent order. The sanctioning authority was required to first state what was adulterated as per the report of the Analyst and what material it has perused and what was material for granting prosecution in the light of public interest. Absence of such a material in the sanctioning order is a lacuna, which vitiates the entire prosecution and accused is entitled to its benefit. The learned courts below failed to appreciate that the requirement of Section 20 of the Act have not been complied with in this case.

    6. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is equally acceptable. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner Appendix-B to the Act enumerates the requisite standard of various edible articles and in order that the articles of food are pure, these are to conform to the standards given in this Appendix. Vanaspati Ghee is at serial-Standard No. A-19 of Appendix-B. The sample of Vanaspati Ghee taken from the petitioner was found to be adulterated on the basis of the Analyst report because the contents of Vitamin ‘A’ were found in the sample only to the extent of 13.6 I.U as against 25 I.U, as given in clause (xi) of Appendix-B Standard A. 19, i.e for standard requisite of Vanaspati Ghee. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is amendment of clause (xi) subsequently by which the only requirement is that the sample should show positive test for Vitamin ‘A’ i.e to say that the sample should not show the presence of Vitamin ‘A’ to any extent. The standard regarding the presence of Vitamin ‘A’, as shown in clause (xi) is reproduced below:—

    “(xi) It shall contain not less than 25 I.U of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ per gram at the time of packing and shall show a positive test for Vitamin ‘A’ when tested by Antimony Trichloride (Carr-Price) reagent (as per IS: 5886-1970);”

    7. It would be seen that earlier the presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ was required to be in Vanaspati Ghee to be not less than 25 I.U which was on the basis of GSR 790(E) dated 10, October, 1983 whereas by amendment vide GSR 910(E) dated 27 June, 1986, published in the Gazette of India Extra Ordinary and the amended entry as reproduced above became the statutory requirement so far as presence of Vitamin ‘A’ in a given sample of Vanaspati Ghee. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amendment has to have retrospective effect being a beneficial Legislation. It was also contended that the presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ in Vanaspati Ghee cannot be extracted by any method and on account of natural decay its strength decreases in the Vanaspati Ghee and the requirement of law is met if at the retail point the test of the Vanaspati show positive i.e presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ in the same. Learned counsel has relied upon the decision of Delhi High Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mai Ram alias Bhaya Ram, 1974 FAC 19, which was a case of Haldi powder. The already existing requisite standard of Haldi was substituted by a new one through a subsequent notification. The High Court relied upon a decision of Supreme Court in Ratan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 and it was held that the notification which substituted new standard in place of old must be given retrospective operation. Since the new standard of presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ in Vanaspati does not indicate any extent to which the Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ is required to be present at the time of test, the report of the Public Analyst in the case pertaining to the sample taken from the petitioner confirms the presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ the extent of 13.6 I.U, according to the revised standard, the sample in no way was adulterated or sub-standard. The only requirement now “presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ in the Vanaspati Ghee should show the presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ to the extent of 25 I.U per gram at the time of packing and not at the time of its sale at (sic). There is no reason that the petitioner cannot be given the benefit of the revised or substituted standard of the presence of Synthetic Vitamin ‘A’ in Vanaspathi Ghee. The courts below have erred in not extending the benefit to the petitioner, to which he was legally entitled.

    8. No other plea or point was contended, which needs any reference. In view of the observations above, this revision petition is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence under Sections 7/16 of the Act, passed by the courts below are set aside. Petitioner, if on bail, his bail bonds are discharged. If he is in jail, shall be set at liberty forthwith.

    9. Revision allowed.

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    Maya Prakash v. State Of U.P And Another Opposite Parties.
    (Sep 12, 1997)