1. This is an application by the respondent under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) that the election petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act for non compliance of the provisions of section 81 of the Act. The election of the respondent to the Parliament from 50, Ghazipur Parliamentary constituency in which the poll was held on 20th May 1991, has been challenged by the petitioner who also filed his nomination to contest from the aforesaid constituency but his name did not appear in the list of contesting candidates on the ground that his nomination was withdrawn, though according to the petitioner the fact was that he never withdrew his nomination.

2. It is contended by the respondent that Section 81 of the Act is mandatory where-under an election petition may be presented only to the High Court by any candidate or any elector but the instant election petition was presented by the petitioner to the Registrar of the High Court on 15th July 1991. It is averred that the presentation of the election petition to the Registrar under Rule 3, Chapter XV-A of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short, the rules) is not a lawful compliance of the provisions of section 81 of the Act and, therefore, the same deserves to be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act.

3. The question for consideration is whether presentation of the election petition to the Registrar under Rule 3, Chapter XV-A of the Rules is lawful compliance of the provisions of section 81 and whether the election petition deserves to be dismissed on the literal interpretation of Section 81 that the presentation of an election petition to the Registrar under Rule 3, Chapter XV-A of the Rules is not the presentation to the High Court within the meaning of Section 81 of the Act. The controversy revolves round the interpretation of Section 81 of the Act and of certain other provisions.

4. The question as formulated above being virgin in the field of election law appears to be somewhat difficult but interesting.

5. Article 329(b) of the Constitution starting with a non obstante clause directs that notwithstanding anything in this Consitution no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. Section 80 of the Act mandates that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part, meaning thereby Part VI. Section 81(1) of the Act states that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate or any elector. Sri Raj Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the respondent submits that in no case can the presentation of an election petition to the Registrar under Rule 3, Chapter XV-A of the Rules be said to be the presentation within the meaning of Section 81 of the Act. His submission is that an election petition can be presented in such manner as may be provided in Part VI of the Act by the appropriate Legislature. The Act of 1951 has been enacted by the Parliament and that does not lay down any manner for presenting an election petition in Part VI. Section 81 of the Act simply says that an election petition may be presented on one or more grounds as specified in Sections 100 and 101 of the Act to the High Court. Neither Article 329(b) of the Constitution nor do the provisions falling in Part VI of the Act set out any manner for presenting an election petition. Section 81 simply specifies the authority i.e. the High Court whom an election petition may be presented. Section 169(i) of the Act provides that the Central Government may after consulting the Election Commission by notification in the official gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 169, the Conduct of the Election Rules, 1961 (for short, the rules of 1961) have been framed which also do not prescribe any manner for presenting an election petition to the High Court.

6. The submission of Sri Jain, counsel for the respondent is that the scheme of Article 329(b) of the Constitution and of Sections 80 and 81 of the Act falling in Part VI is that an election petition can be presented only to the High Court and to none else and a Registrar of the High Court net being the High Court is not competent to entertain any election petition on behalf of the High Court. Article 216 of the Constitution states that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. A Chief Justice and the other Judges are, therefore, integral part of every High Court. If literal interpretation as suggested by Sri Jain that an election petition may be presented only to the High Court is accepted then it would follow that an election petition would have to be presented to the Chief Justice and the entire body of the Judges, who are the main component of the High Court. Principal duty of the High Court is to adjudicate upon a dispute brought to it by the affected parties and others. Could it be feasible for a Chief Justice and the entire body of Judges to sit together now and then to receive election petition ? If it is made mandatory that only a Chief Justice and other Judges who compose of the High Court, can receive election petitions filed by the candidates or the electors, then considerable time would be spent by every High Court only in discharging the ministerial duty, that is, receiving election petitions from the candidates or the electors. As an election petition is to be filed within 45 days which limitation is mandatory under Article 329(b) of the Constitution, the High Court consisting of a Chief Justice and other Judges will very often be required to assemble only to receive election petitions at a very short notice if a petition is brought to it at a last minute. This process will not only cause considerable inconvenience to the Chief Justice and the companion Judges but also to the litigant public over whom precedence would have to be given to the routine work, that is, receiving an election petition immediately limitation of which is on the verge of expiry. From the very circumstance that the High Court is a large body which cannot sit in full strength now and then only to perform ministerial act, it is imperative that roles regulating ministerial duties of routine nature must be framed to further the object of the statute. The framers of the Constitution or the Legislature might not have envisaged giving priority to the ministerial task over the judicial task of the High Court. I am, therefore, of the firm view that such a wooden interpretation as suggested by Sri Jain, cannot be given to Section 81. The words "High Court" have been substituted in Section 81 for the words "Election Commission" by act no. 47 of 1961. Though election petition is to be presented to the High Court institutionally but that does not mean that ministerial act of receiving election petition has to be performed necessarily by the High Court consisting of a Chief Justice and companion Judges. In the High Court not only election petitions are presented but several other proceedings equally important, namely, appeal, revision, reference, writ petition etc. are instituted. There seems to be: no good reason for the Parliament to make a special provision for the presentation of an election petition only. Whereas most of the other proceedings are instituted in the Registry, presentation of an election petition literally to the Chief Justice and to the entire body of Judges is neither expedient nor necessary, rather presentation of an election petition to the Registrar of the High Court will be more convenient, practicable and feasible. Since no special purpose will be served by presenting an election petition to the Chief Justice and the entire body of his colleagues, it is difficult to accept the Contention of Sri Jain that presentation of the instant petition to the Registrar under Rule 3, Chapter XV-A of the Rules is vitiated.

7. No doubt, Article 329(b) stresses that, no election of members of the Parliament or| State Legislature shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in such manner as may be provided for, by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature, but it is important to note that no procedure for presenting an election petition to the High Court has been provided by Parliament in Part VI of the Act, though Section 80 comprised in that part prohibits that no election unless presented in accordance with the provisions of Part VI, shall be called in question. When no manner for presenting an election petition to the" High Court is prescribed by the statute or the rules framed thereunder then it is open to the High Court to frame appropriate rules to discharge its constitutional and statutory duty, namely, trial of the election petitions filed before it by election petitioners. Once an election petition is brought to the High Court, it cannot refuse to entertain the same on the ground that no procedure for presenting them before it has been prescribed by the appropriate Legislature. An election petition can be presented only to the High Court and, therefore, it is for High Court to regulate the presentation and trial of the election petition.

8. Matter viewed this way, it must be held that the High Court inserted Chpater XV-A under the caption: "Special provisions Re-

lating to the Trial of the Election petition" in the Rules by notification dated 7th March, 1967 to regulate the election petitions presented to it. These rules have been made by the Allahabad High Court in exercise of powers conferred by Art. 225 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling it in that behalf (Emphasis mine).

9. Harping on Article 329(b) Sri Jain submits that the procedure regulating election petition can be made only by an appropriate Legislature, that is the Parliament and that could be made only in Part VI of the Act in view i of Section 80 of the Act. This submission lacks merit. The High Court being a superior court has plenary powers to regulate all matters on which it exercises jurisdiction. An election petition has to be tried only by the High Court. If that is so, matters relating to election petitions right from the stage of their presentation have to be regulated by the High Court which is fully competent to regulate its procedure. If any law is enacted in Part VI of the Act by the Parliament laying down procedure for presentation of election petitions then the Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court can operate only in the field not covered by such statutory procedure. In short, the Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court, will be subject to the provisions which may be framed by the Parliament in Part VI of the Act or elsewhere in this behalf. The rules framed by the Allahabad High Court cannot override the statutory provisions. Since no procedure laying down the manner for presenting an election petition has been enacted so far by the Parliament in Part VI of the Act, question of the Rules being vitiated or being ultra vires does not arise.

10. If literal interpretation of Section 81 of the Act that an election petition can be presented only to the High Court composed of a Chief Justice and other Judges in the manner to be provided in Part VI of the Act, is accepted then presentation of election petitions would be stalled as no manner for presentation has yet been provided in Part VI. No interpretation which may bring the judicial process to grinding halt, can be accepted. Till such time the procedural law regulating the election petitions is made either in Part VI of the Act or elsewhere in that Act or under the rules of 1961 framed thereunder, the regulatory process may be supplemented by the rules framed under Article 225 and all other powers enabling the Allahabad High Court in that behalf. The gap created in Part VI of the Act by not enacting actual procedure for presentation of election petitions may be bridged by the rules of the High Court. Article 225 of the Constitution provides that in so far as material that the jurisdiction of any existing High Court and respective powers of the Judges thereof relating to the administration of justice in the Court including any power to make rules of Court shall be the same as immediately before the Constitution. Article 225, it is true, preserves inter alia the pre-Constitution powers of existing High Court to frame rules. Sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that before commencement of the Consitution, rule making power was vested in Allahabad High Court under Article 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the U.P. High Court Amalgamation Order, 1948. Without going into the merits of this averment of Sri Khare, I approach the question whether or not Allahabad High Court was empowered to make rules as contained in Chapter XV-A of the Rules to regulate election petitions from a different angle. Article 329(b) of the Constitution, read with Section 81 of the Act makes it clear that an election petition can be presented only to the High Court and the election petition once presented shall be tried thereby. If the High Court is enjoined upon by the Constitution to decide election petitions then the High Court being a superior court and a court of Record within the meaning of Article 215 of the Constitution will have ample powers to frame rules regulating the election petitions, under Article 329(b) itself. The power to do a thing necessarily carries with it the power to regulate the manner in which the thing may be done. It is an incident of the power itself and indeed without it the exercise of the power may in practice be frought with difficulties which will frustrate rather than further the object of the power (See State of U.P. v. Batuk Deopati Tripathi, 1978 Lab IC 839 (SC) : (1978 All LJ 477) Batuk Deopati Tripathi (District Judge) who was a member of U.P. Civil Judicial Service, was compul-sorily retired by a decision taken by the Administrative Committee of the Allahabad High Court. He challenged his compulsory retirement mainly on the ground that the Administrative Committee of Allahabad High Court was not a competent body to retire him compulsorily and that he could have been retired compulsorily only by the High Court which is composed of the Chief Justice and all companion Judges. It was urged before the Supreme Court that no pre-Constitution power was vested in the Allahabad High Court to frame rules in such a way so as to empower an Administrative Committee, much smaller body of the High Court to retire any member of the judicial service compulsorily. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that Article 225 is not the sole repository of the High Court's power to frame rules. The power to frame rules can be traced to Article 235 of the Constitution which provides that control over the District Court and courts subordinate thereto, shall be vested in the High Court. The Supreme Court held that power conferred by Article 235 of the Constitution on the High Court can be exercised only by framing rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it, may be exercised. So the rule making power is embedded in the power conferred by the Constitution on any authority to do something. In the case in hand, a conjoint reading of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, Section 80 and Section 81 of the Act clearly points out that election petitions presented to the High Court have to be tried thereby. When power to hold trial has been conferred on the High Court, power to make regulatory provisions is incidental to that power and, therefore, apart from Article 225, the power to make rules under Chapter XV-A for regulating election petitions can be found to exist under Article 329(b) of the Constitution itself and under the relevant statutory provisions.

11. Therefore, the insertion of the rules in Chapter XV-A of the Rules cannot be characterised as overstepping by the Allaha-

bad High Court. As already pointed out the rules contained in Chpater XV-A of the rules will be subject to the regulatory provisions, if any framed by Parliament either in Part VI of the Act or anywhere else in the Act or in the rules of 1961 framed thereunder.

12. No Regulatory provisions have so far been framed by the Parliament in Part VI of the Act. The reason for such omission is not far to seek. The High Court being a superior court and a court of Record can frame rules for regulating election petitions which may be more effective, efficient and convenient For the Parliamentarians or the rule making Authority acting under Section 169 of the Act, it would be quite difficult to frame suitable regulatory provisions with that precision with which they may be framed by the High Court. This is why the Legislature has not intruded in the area for over the years though enabling provisions are specified in the Constitution as well as in the Statute.

13. For the reasons, the submission of Sri R. K. Jain that presentation of the election petition to the Registrar of the High Court is invalid, has to be rejected and the petition cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act for non-compliance of Section 81 of the Act. The application is, therefore, dismissed.

14. List on 4th August, 1992 for orders.

15. Learned counsel for the respondent has orally requested that as the judgment of this court delivered today raises a substantial question of law of general importance, a certificate be granted to enable the respondent to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. The question decided by this court vide judgment delivered today being a substantial question of law of general importance, a certificate, as prayed is given under article 134a of the constitution.

16. Application dismissed.