B.L Yadav, J.:— This is the third bail application in Crime No. 97 under Section 302, I.P.C, P.S Naugawan Sadat, district Moradabad.
2. The prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R lodged on 29-5-85 at 11.45 a.m is that the informant Yasin's son Babu, and Iqbal, son of Sardar had gone to take ice in the morning. At about 9 a.m when they were coming to the village Alampur Kech, Babu surrounded by Gama, Khacheru, the applicants, Ejaz Haider and Amir Husain. Amir Husain intercepted Babu, the deceased by giving him a lathi blow at his cycle and told him that he would give him a lesson. Amir Husain exhorted Khacheru and the latter fired from his gun in the chest of Babu, who ran to the village. Thereupon Gama fired at Babu from a country made pistol. Babu fell on the ground. Thereupon Ejaz Haider gave blow to the deceased. This occurrence was witnessed by Iqbal, who was accompanying the deceased and one Ramzani and Ismail. The police station was at a distance of 4 km. from the place of occurrence. The post mortem report has been filed. The deceased received injuries from the gun and country made pistol. When the charge sheet was submitted the name of Ejaz Haider was not there. It appears that during investigation the police did not find evidence against Ejaz Haider. Heard the learned counsel for the applicants as also the learned State Counsel. For the applicants it was urged that the name of Ejaz Haider was mentioned in the F.I.R and it appears that the police in collusion with the accused Ejaz Haider, did not submit charge sheet against him. The case of the applicant was similar to that of Ejaz Haider, against whom no charge sheet was submitted, hence it was urged that the case against the applicant also becomes doubtful. The statement of most of the witnesses were recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164, Cr. P.C, 1973, as the local police was apprehending that the prosecution witnesses might change their statements subsequently. It is on account of this suspicion that the statement had been recorded under Section 164 of the Code. Under these circumstances the veracity of the prosecution version becomes doubtful and there was no possibility of conviction. The applicants were accordingly entitled to bail.
3. On behalf of State it was urged that the case of applicants was distinguishable from the case of Ejaz Haider. In the FIR also separate role has been assigned to the accused. Simply because the police did not submit charge sheet against Ejaz Haider, it cannot be inferred that the case of the applicants was also doubtful. As there remains constant pressure from accused on prosecution witnesses Section 164 of the Code was enacted with a view that in case there was some suspicion that the prosecution witnesses may change their version under the pressure of the accused, the statement of such witnesses can be recorded by a Magistrate. On that account the statement of prosecution witnesses would not become doubtful. Further this point appears to be covered by the discussion of facts and the points decided in the earlier order disposing of the first bail application. The same point cannot be urged in second or third bail application.
4. I am conscious that order on a bail application need not be detailed one but as the legal points were argued from both sides which require a bit detailed discussion. After hearing the counsel for the parties at considerable length, the first point for determination is as to whether the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants about the statements of most of the prosecution witnesses being recorded under Section 164 of the Code was considered in the first order disposing of the bail application or not. Suffice it to say that the right of bail is statutory right, rather it is a constitutional right. Even though it may be second or third bail application, but unless it is apparent from a reading of the first bail order that the point urged in the subsequent bail applications was also considered and rejected, it cannot be said that the point urged in the second or third bail application would be deemed to have been considered in the first bail application just by implication. In the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no provision of constructive res judicata similar to the provisions contained under Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Unless the point argued in subsequent bail application appears to have been considered and discussed in the first order itself, the same cannot be deemed to have been considered under the analogy of constructive res-judicata. What should be the giude-line when one party says that a particular point was argued while other says it was not?
5. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Sriniwas Naik . 1982 19 A.C.C 79 Sum., it was observed as follows:
“Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation…………We are bound to accept the statement of Judges recorded in their judgment as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of Judges to be contradicted by the statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence.”
6. By a perusal of the first bail order it is clear that the point about Section 164 was not considered.
7. The second point for determination is whether the witnesses whose statements were recorded under Section 164 of the Code were reliable and can the conviction be based on that. Section 164 appears to be supplementary to Section 163 of the Code. The relevant statutory provision of Section 163 of the Code is set out below:
“163(1). No police officer or other person in authority shall offer, make, or cause to be offered or made, any such inducement, threat or promise as is mentioned in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(2) But no police officer or other person shall prevent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from making in the course of any investigation under this Chapter any statement which he may be disposed to make of his own free will.”
8. Section 164 so far as it is relevant reads:
“164. Recording of confessions & statements:—
(1) Any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, record any confession or statement made to him in the course of an investigation under this Chapter or under any other law for the time being in force, or at any time afterwards before the commencement of the enquiry or trial.”
9. A bare reading of the aforesaid two provisions makes it clear that Section 163 enacts that no police officer or any other person including a Judicial Magistrate shall prevent any person from making any statement during the course of investigation. The main provision is that contained under Section 163(2) whereas Section 164 appears to be just supplementary.
10. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition), page 40, it has been stated that “the office of all the Judges is always to make such constructions shall suppress the mischief, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commods, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act; probono publico. In Whitney v. I.R.C . 1926 A.C 37., it has been held that a statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure the object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.” It has been observed in Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition), Chapter 5, page 64, that “the cardinal rule for construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves.” In Capper v. Baldwin . 1965 2 Q.B 53., it has been observed that the function of the Court is to interpret an Act ‘according to the intent of them that made it’, and the intention must be deduced from the language used. There is a maxim, ‘UTRES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT’, which connoted that a statute of any enacting provision must be so construed as to make it more effective and operative. According to American Jurisprudence (2nd Edition) Vol. 1 pages 838 to 839 (paras 36-37), the prime object of construction of law is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. The courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an Act directly or indirectly by construction, (see Guiseppi v. Welling,4 Tenders v. Savannch River Venner Co. . 202 S.C 363..
11. In view of those elementary principles of interpretation of statute, the intention of the Parliament in enacting Section 169(2) and Section 164(1) has to be ascertained. The intention in bringing Section 163(2) and Section 164(1) on the statute book was that the witnesses may not change their statements subsequently on account of fear or pressure from the defence or from other relevant quarter. In social conditions prevailing in our country it has come to the notice that tampering of prosecution witnesses has become a favourite pastime of the accused persons. Further very often it has been noticed chat the prosecution witnesses resile from their statements recorded under Section 161 or from similar statements made, may be under the pressure of the persons inspiring terror or interested in defence. Under these circumstances if an investigating officer chose to get the statement of prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 164(1) before a Judicial Magistrate he need not be blamed. This is a method provided by the wisdom of our parliament to deter the prosecution witnesses from changing their version of story subsequently at the trial. I am of the considered opinion that to this extent the effect is salutary. Otherwise also the witnesses would feel hesitant in changing their statements at subsequent stage or at the trial, once the same has been recorded under Section 164(1) of the Code.
12. As regards the next limb of the argument that as to whether a statement recorded under Section 164 becomes doubtful and the same has to be rejected and no conviction can be based on that, suffice it to say that there is no such principle of credibility of witnesses that once the statement has been recorded under Section 164 that cannot be relied upon even though the witness does not change his statement at the trial. It is well settled that any statement recorded under Section 164 cannot be discarded simply on that count even though there is no contradiction nor the witnesses have changed their statements when they were produced in the sessions trial. Unless the witnesses resile from their statement recorded under Section 164, these statements cannot be deemed to be doubtful.
13. In Balak Ram v. State of U.P . 1975 A.C.C 138., the Supreme Court observed in para 48 at page 2174 as follows:
“It cannot be overlooked that the statements of Jhilmili, Ram Prakash and Aryendra were recorded under Section 164, Criminal P.C in June 1971, soon after the incident. The Investigating Officer says that he got the statements recorded by way of precaution. That could be true and it would be wrong to find fault with the Investigating Officer merely because he got the statements of these witnesses recorded under Section 164 or can the evidence of a witness be discarded for the mere reason that his statement was recorded under Section 164. But the High Court overlooked that the evidence of witnesses whose statements are recorded under Section 164 must be approached with caution”
14. It it, therefore, clear that the effect of recording the statement of witnesses under Section 164 is a question primarily regarding appreciation of evidence and it cannot be said that the witnesses should necessarily be held to be unreliable on the ground that these statements were recorded under Section 164.
15. The next aspect is as to whether a statement recorded under Section 164 is a substantive evidence. I am of the opinion that as the defence has no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements have been recorded under Section 164, such statements can never be treated as substantive evidence of the particulars of the fact. But the same can certainly be used for contradiction or corroboration of witnesses who made it. At the same time it is also made clear that such statements cannot be used for contradicting the statement of other witnesses other than those who made it. The correct use of the statement recorded under Section 164 is that it can be used by defence for the purposes of cross-examination of witnesses who made the said statement. It shall be open to the defence to show that the statement so recorded was not correct or that it was contradictory to the statement made by the witnesses at the trial or that the witnesses resiled from their statements earlier recorded under Section 164. (See also Ram Kishan Singh v. Harmit Kaur . 1972 3 SCC 280.
16. As regards the next argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that since the police did not submit charge sheet against Ejaz Haider, hence the case may be deemed to be doubtful against the other accused including the applicants, in this connection to support his argument the learned counsel for the applicants strongly relied on Balak Singh v. State of Punjab . 1975 A.C.C 302.. But that was a case decided after the entire evidence was led at the trial. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that when the prosecution case has already been honoured against the accused and it has been discarded against some of the accused, in that event the entire prosecution case can be assumed to be doubtful. In the instant case it was only at the stage of investigation that the police did not submit charge sheet against Ejaz Haider. The prosecution witnesses or the informant had no opportunity to make statement at the trial. What local police does in an investigation of a criminal case is not to be taken as the statement of witnesses. The police has got different approach to make base on innumerable considerations and that should not be treated to be decisive factor in respect of the entire prosecution. At this stage while the bail application is being disposed of it would be too early to say as to what would be the evidence that would be led in the case on behalf of prosecution. Therefore, Balak Singh's case (supra) is based on entirely different facts and principles.
17. The maxim ‘Falsus in uno Falsus in Omnibus’ i.e false in one thing false in all, is also relevant. This maxim, as it has been consistently held, does not apply to India particularly in criminal trials. It means that any witness may make a statement which may be incorrect to some extent but that does not inevitably follow that other portion of the statement which is correct has also to be disbelieved. To put it differently, the statements of witnesses may be tainted with falsehood, and very often there is fringe or embroidery to a story. The falsehood should be considered in weighing the evidence. But when there is reason to believe that the main part of the deposition is true, the same should not be rejected simply because of want of veracity on some minor point. In the instant case as the informant appears to have stated that he did not mention the name of Ejaz Haider when he dictated first information report, it does not follow that the names of other accused including the applicants were also incorrectly mentioned in the first information report. (See also State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Hazara Singh . 1980 Supp SCC 641 and Kesho Ram Bora v. State of Assam . 1978 BLJR 8. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, no new grounds have been made out in the third bail application and the same deserves to be dismissed.
18. In the result, the third bail application has got no substance and the same is accordingly rejected.