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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion: Second Appeals arising from Suits Nos. 87 & 88 of 1967

Factual and Procedural Background

These two connected Second Appeals arise from judgments/orders dated 5-3-1974 passed by the Civil Judge, Roorkee at Saharanpur in Suitors Nos. 88 of 1967 and 87 of 1967. Both appeals involve common questions of law and fact and are disposed of together.

Brief factual matrix (from the text):

  • In Suit No. 88 of 1967 (Appeal No. 1605 of 1974) Satish Mohan (plaintiff-appellant) sued for recovery of Rs. 1,400 deposited by him in the State Bank of India by N.D.G.C. Nos. 910291 and 910293 dated 15-12-66, pledged in favour of the Executive Engineer, Northern Ganga Canal, Roorkee, together with interest. He alleged he was a contractor and that the defendant department (Ganga Canal Division) accepted his tender but later claimed forfeiture of his deposit because an agreement was not signed and an additional 3% security was not deposited. The plaintiff contended the condition for further 3% security did not exist in the tender notices and that the Department suffered no loss; he sought refund.
  • In Suit No. 87 of 1967 (connected Appeal No. 1606 of 1974) Amrish Kumar (plaintiff), brother of Satish Mohan, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2,400 deposited on 15-12-66 (different N.D.G.C. numbers). His pleaded case is stated to be "exactly the same" as in Suit No. 88 of 1967, except for amounts and N.D.G.C. numbers.
  • Procedure: Plaintiffs served notices under Section 80 C.P.C. (dated 10-4-1967, served 12-4-1967) and after expiry of two months filed suits. The Munsif (trial court) decreed both suits (judgments dated 21-5-70 and 16-5-70), awarding recovery with costs, pendente lite and interest @ 6% p.a. The Civil Judge, Roorkee allowed appeals and set aside the Munsif's judgments by order dated 5-3-1974, giving rise to these second appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the forfeiture of the amount is illegal on the grounds given in para 11 of the plaint?
  2. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?
  3. Is the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. valid?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs alleged the department wrongfully forfeited the security deposits and was bound to return the security because the condition to deposit further 3% was not part of the tender notices actually communicated to them.
  • The plaintiffs asserted the department suffered no loss and that the State of U.P. is liable to refund the amounts.
  • Plaintiffs served the statutory notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and filed suit after the prescribed period.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant accepted service of the Section 80 C.P.C. notice but contended the notice was illegal and invalid, therefore, the suit should be dismissed.
  • The defendant asserted that the tender acceptance required signing the agreement within seven days from acceptance and deposit of additional security; when the plaintiff failed to sign and deposit the further security, acceptance could be withdrawn and earnest money forfeited (relying on clause 14 of the tender notice as alleged).
  • The defendant claimed the plaintiff deliberately avoided service of registered envelopes and had not received communications sent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Inccharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242; AIR 1974 SC 471 The principle that admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions under section 58 of the Evidence Act, if true and clear, are strong proof and can be binding; distinction between pleading/judicial admissions (waiver of proof) and evidentiary admissions (which are not conclusive). The court quoted this authority to explain when admissions in pleadings may be treated as conclusive proof. However, the court also emphasised that in the present case the lower courts wrongly relied on unproved documents and pleadings treated as evidence contrary to the requirement of proof; the precedent was used to clarify the limits of reliance on pleadings and admissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the text:

  1. Examination of procedure and record: The appellate court reviewed the trial court's English order sheet dated 5-5-1970 and noted an entry indicating that "no oral evidence was led by the parties and the case was adjourned for judgment" and that certain documents on the lists required proof (English order sheet dated 6-11-1979 showed plaintiffs filed papers and that "Rest require proof").
  2. Identification of evidentiary deficiency: The court found that despite the order that the "rest of the documents require proof," the documents filed along with list 34 C-1 and list 22 C-1 had been exhibited and used by the trial court and the first appellate court even though they were not legally proved or admitted. The back of those documents bore the notation "Not admitted."
  3. Legal principle on proof of documents: The court emphasised that a document which is not a public document or not admitted cannot be exhibited or relied upon unless it has been proved by oral evidence or otherwise. No oral evidence was adduced in the case to prove those documents.
  4. On the role of admissions: The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Inccharam to explain that admissions in pleadings (judicial admissions) may be binding and constitute a waiver of proof, whereas evidentiary admissions are not conclusive. The court used this to stress that reliance on pleadings as evidence has limits and must conform to rules of proof.
  5. Conclusion from the above facts and principles: Because the courts below had proceeded on the wrong assumption that the unproved documents were admissible and had used pleadings and unproved documentary allegations as evidence, that method was "unusual and contrary to law" and resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.
  6. Parties' concession: In light of these procedural and evidentiary defects, learned counsel for the parties fairly conceded that the judgments of the courts below should be set aside and the case remanded for fresh decision according to law.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's final decision was to allow both appeals. The opinion states the core ruling as follows:

APPEALS ALLOWED; the judgments and decrees of the Munsif (dated 21-5-1970 and 16-5-1970 in Suits Nos. 87 and 88 of 1967 respectively) and the judgment of the Civil Judge, Roorkee at Sharanpur dated 5th of March 1967 are set aside, and the cases are remanded to the trial court for decision afresh according to law on priority basis.

Consequences and implications:

  • The direct effect is that the earlier judgments/decrees are vacated and the matters must be retried or decided afresh by the trial court in accordance with law and proper evidentiary proof requirements.
  • The court directed that the cases be given priority on remand and ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent; it rests its decision on the established rules regarding proof of documents and the limits of reliance on admissions in pleadings, applying those principles to the record's procedural deficiencies.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the matters and language contained in the provided opinion; no facts or legal conclusions beyond the text have been added.

    Satish Mohan Bindal v. The State Of U.P .

    1. These two connected Second Appeals are directed against the judgments and order dated 5-3-1974 passed by Civil Judge, Roorkee at Saharanpur in Suits Nos. 88 of 1967 and 87 of 1967 respectively.

    2. In both the appeals, common questions of law and facts are involved and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. Brief facts of the Appeal No. 1605 of 1974 arising out of Suit No. 88 of 1967 are that Satish Mohan Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1400/- deposited by him in the State Bank of India through N.D.G.C Nos. 910291 and 910293dated 15-12-66pledged in favour of the Executive Engineer, Northern Ganga Canal Roorkee and for interest due thereon with the allegations that the plaintiff was a contractor and the defendant owns, maintains and runs Ganga Canal Division. The aforesaid division of the defendant invited tenders from contractors for certain works on 15-12-66. The plaintiff-appellant gave his tender for the works mentioned in the plaint and deposited a sum of Rs. 1400/- in terms of the tender notices. It is further alleged that the plaintiff received letter No. 10425/-T-34 dated 4-1-67 on 9-1-67from the Executive Engineer, Northern Division Ganga Canal Roorkee wherein the Executive Engineer had referred the sending of letters dated 21-12-66 and 29-12-66 and had also disclosed that the said letters contained a request to deposit 3% further security and to sign the agreement. The plaintiff gave reply of the aforesaid letter on 12-1-67 to the effect that the letters dated 21-12-66 and 29-12-66 referred by the Executive Engineer were never communicated to the plaintiff and the condition of depositing 3% further security did not exist in the tender notices. Letter No. C-69.A-2 dated 13-2-67 was given by the Executive Engineer to the plaintiff as reply to the plaintiff's letter dated 12-1-67. The defendant department had disclosed to the plaintiff that a sum of Rs. 1400/- deposited by the plaintiff had been forfeited as the agreement had not been signed and that the further deposit of 3% had not been made by the plaintiff. The action of for feitures was said to have been taken under clause 14 of the tender notice. The Department had neither given work nor had refunded money deposited by the plaintiff and was wrongly insisting on the action of forfeiture. According to the plaintiff, the Department was bound to return his security and was not entitled to forfeit the security amount. The Government has suffered no loss and the State of U.P is liable to refund the amount deposited by the plaintiff. The plaintiff served upon the defendant notice dated 10-4-1967 under S. 80 C.P.C and the service was made on 12-4-67. After expiry of two months, suit was filed.

    3. The defendant accepted the notice under section 80 C.P.C but pleaded that the same was illegal and invalid. As such, the suit was liable to be dismissed. According to the case of the defendant, tender notices were accepted on 15-12-66 and in accordance with the same, the plaintiff, whose tenders were accepted, was to sign the agreement within 7 days from the date of acceptance of the tenders failing which the acceptance of tenders was liable to be withdrawn and earnest mongy forfeited. The plaintiff was requested to attend the office within a week to sign the agreement and to deposit Rs. 625/- and Rs. 1500/- as security in respect of the works. The plaintiff deliberately avoided the service of the registered envelopes and did not receive the same.

    4. The facts of the connected Appeal No. 1606 of 1974 arising out of Suit No. 87 of 1967 are that Amrish Kumar, Contractor, who happens to be brother of aforesaid Satish Mohan, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2400/- deposited by him at State Bank of India, Roorkee vide N.D.G.C Nos. 910295, and 910294, 910296, dt. 15-12-66 pledged in favour of the Executive Engineer, Northern Ganga Canal, Roorkee. The plaintiff's case in this suit is exactly the same as in the Suit No. 88 of 1967 aforesaid except the amounts and N.D.G.C Numbers. The case of the defendant in this case is also the same as in the Suit No. 87 of 1967.

    5. In the Court of the Munsif, following issues were framed in both the cases:—

    1. Whether the forfeiture of the amount is illegal on the grounds given in para 11 of the plaint?

    2. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

    3. Is the notice of Section 80 valid?

    6. It is clear from the English order sheet dated 5-5-1970 that no oral evidence was led by the parties and the case was adjourned for judgment. Both the suits were decreed with costs with pendente lite and further interest @ 6% per annum on the amounts which were deposited in the State Bank of India by Munsif vide his judgments dated 21-5-70 and 16-5-70 in both the suits respectively. The Civil Judge, Roorkee, vide his judgment dated 5-3-1974 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decrees passed by the learned Munsif in Suits Nos. 88 of 1967 and 87 of 1967. Hence these appeals.

    7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties in both the appeals and going through the judgment of the Munsif and Civil Judge. I am fully satisfied that the judgments of both the Courts below are based on such evidence which is not proved. From the English order sheet dt. 5-5-1970 it is quite clear that none of the documents on which the Munsif and the Civil Judge have based their judgments, have been legally proved in the trial court. English order sheet dated 6-11-1979 in Suit No. 88 of 1967 as under:—

    “Plaintiffs files 12 papers list 34 C.I paper No. 2 public Ex. 1 Defendants files 7 papers list 22 C.I Paper No. 3 public Ex. 1 Rest require proof.”

    8. It is strange that in spite of the aforesaid order that rest of the documents require proof, all the papers filed along with list 34 C-1 have been exhibited while none of the documents was admitted. Same is the case with list 22 C-1. The trial court as well as the appellate Court have utilised the documents on record as evidence without their being proved. Both the Courts below have utilised the allegations made in the pleadings as evidence even without being admitted, tinder these circumstances learned counsel for the parties have fairly conceded that the judgments of both the Courts below in both the appeals should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the trial court for deciding the case according to law afresh.

    9. There is no doubt that admission in pleadings or judicial admissions by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties as held by Supreme Court in the case of Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Inccharam (1974) 1 SCC 242 : AIR 1974 SC 471 in para 26 as under:

    “….Admissions, if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties on the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”

    10. The trial court as well as the appellate court proceeded with the case on wrong assumptions that the documents filed by the aforesaid parties along with lists 34C1 and 22C1 were admissible documents in spite of the aforesaid order of the Munsif that they require proof. Not admitted is clearly written on the back of the documents exhibited. A document which is not a public document or not admitted cannot be exhibited and looked into unless it is proved by oral evidence or otherwise. No oral evidence has been adduced in this case. In this view of the matter, these documents and their contents which are not admitted or proved should not have been exhibited and used without being proved. This method of exhibiting the document and using them to decide the cases is unusual and contrary to law and it has resulted into grave miscarriage of justice, which requires interference by this Court.

    11. In view of the above discussions, I have come to the conclusion that the ends of justice will be fully met if the orders of the lower courts are set aside and the cases are remanded to the trial court for decision afresh according to law.

    12. In the result, both the appeals succeed and are allowed.

    13. The judgment and orders of Munsif, Roorkee dated 21-5-1970 and 16-5-70 in Suits Nos. 87 of 1967 and 88 of 1967 respectively and that of Civil Judge, Roorkee at Sharanpur dated 5th of March 1967are set aside and the cases are remanded to the trial Court for deciding afresh according to law on priority basis. In the circumstances of these cases, the parties shall bear their own costs.

    14. Appeals allowed.

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    Comments

    Satish Mohan Bindal v. The State Of U.P .
    (May 17, 1985)