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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was preferred by the State of U.P., the Collector, Ballia, and the Land Acquisition Officer, Ballia, against the judgment dated 25-9-1973 in Misc. Reference No. 3 of 1971 made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Some land belonging to the claimant-respondent was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The notification under Section 4 was issued on 4-11-1965, the Section 6 notification on 1-12-1965, and possession was recorded in the opinion at two places as taken on 10-10-1966 and later as 19-10-1966. Being dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimant-respondent sought a reference to the District Judge (Reference No. 3 of 1971). The District Judge relied on an exemplar sale deed dated 3-8-1965 (executed by Badri Lal in favour of Smt. Sujan Kumar) as the best comparator and, having regard to evidence including the statement of Bhagwati Datt Tewari (P.W.4), fixed compensation at the rate of Rs. 30,770 per acre.

Note: the opinion itself contains inconsistent references to factual particulars: the sale deed is once described as being in respect of "10 acres" and elsewhere as a "small piece of land measuring .10 acres"; possession is referred to both as 10-10-1966 and 19-10-1966. The summary below reproduces the text's content without reconciling those inconsistencies.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compensation awarded by the District Judge (Rs. 30,770 per acre) was excessive and should be reduced.
  2. Whether the claimant-respondent is entitled to the benefits of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (solatium at 30% and enhanced interest at 9% or, alternatively, 15% under the proviso to S.28) notwithstanding that the appeal was filed long before the Amending Act and that no cross-objection was filed.
  3. Whether the proviso to Section 28 (providing for 15% interest when excess compensation is paid into court after one year from possession) applies in the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Standing Counsel for the appellants contended that the amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge was excessive and should be reduced.
  • The Standing Counsel also argued that because no cross-objection had been filed by the claimant-respondent, the claimant was not entitled to the benefits under the Amending Act (solatium and enhanced interest).

Claimant-Respondent's Arguments

  • The claimant-respondent's counsel maintained that the compensation fixed by the District Judge represented just compensation.
  • The claimant-respondent further contended entitlement to solatium at the rate of 30% and interest at the rate of 9% (in substitution for 6%) under the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984; alternatively, the claimant sought application of the proviso to Section 28 (15% interest) on the excess amount.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad ((1984) 2 SCC 324; AIR 1984 SC 892) Two principles: (a) transactions in regard to smaller properties are not always a proper guideline for large tracts; (b) when using smaller property transactions as a basis, some reduction (ranging in cases between 1/4 and 1/3) may be appropriate. The court relied on these principles to uphold the District Judge's choice of the small-sale exemplar and to conclude that the deduction to be applied is not necessarily a fixed 1/3; a deduction may range between 1/4 and 1/3 depending on circumstances. This supported refusal to reduce the District Judge's award of Rs. 30,770 per acre.
Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((1977) 2 SCR 633 : (1977) 1 SCC 684 : AIR 1977 SC 1560) Illustration that valuation of smaller properties may not provide a proper guideline for large tracts. Quoted in the Kausalya Devi discussion and relied on to support the proposition that small-transactions are not always reliable comparators for large acquisitions.
Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab ((1977) 1 SCR 329 : (1977) 1 SCC 330 : AIR 1977 SC 580) Similar proposition that transactions in smaller properties may not be proper guideline for larger tracts. Referenced as one of the authorities supporting the principle stated in Kausalya Devi; used to justify the approach to adjustments when comparing small-sale transactions with larger acquisitions.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty ((1959) Suppl (1) SCR 404 : AIR 1959 SC 429) Authority indicating that a reduction of 25% (one-fourth) may be appropriate when basing valuation of larger property on small-property transactions. Used as an example of precedents where a specific percentage reduction (25%) was applied; informed the court's view that required deduction need not be uniformly one-third.
Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (AIR 1963 SC 1516) Authority on appellate power: the appellate court may grant relief under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC even if a party who could have filed a cross-objection under Order 41, Rule 22 did not do so. Relied on to support the proposition that the appellate court can grant relief under O.41 R.33 CPC despite absence of a cross-objection where circumstances justify such relief.
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh ((1985) 3 SCC 737 : AIR 1985 SC 1576) Construction of the Amending Act: S.30(2) of the Amending Act makes amended provisions of S.23(2) and S.28 applicable to proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30-4-1982 or filed thereafter, whether before the Collector or courts, even if they had finally terminated before the Amending Act. Applied to conclude that the Amending Act's enhanced solatium and interest provisions could be applied to proceedings pending as of the relevant date, and thus to justify granting benefits of the Amending Act by exercise of appellate power under O.41 R.33 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (A) assessment of the compensation quantum awarded by the District Judge; and (B) entitlement to benefits under the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.

A. Compensation quantum

  • The court reviewed the District Judge's finding that the sale deed dated 3-8-1965 was the best exemplar because it was executed shortly before the Section 4 notification and the land in that sale was geographically and qualitatively comparable (described as "barely one furlong" away and of the same nature).
  • Noting the evidence (P.W.4 Bhagwati Datt Tewari) that the value of the land at acquisition time was Rs. 1,000 per Katha, the District Judge fixed compensation at Rs. 30,770 per acre.
  • The appellants urged that the District Judge's compensation was excessive. The court found the District Judge's reasons to be cogent and saw no error warranting interference.
  • The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Smt. Kausalya Devi Bogra and related authorities establishing that small-property transactions are not invariably reliable guides for large tracts and that, where used, an appropriate deduction (varying between one-fourth and one-third in precedents) should be applied.
  • Using the sale deed's rate, the nominal calculation produced Rs. 45,000 per acre; applying a one-third deduction would yield Rs. 30,000 per acre. The District Judge had awarded Rs. 30,770 per acre; the court held that the required deduction is not necessarily a fixed one-third and that the District Judge's figure did not call for reduction.

B. Application of the Amending Act — Solatium and Interest

  • The claimant-respondent sought solatium at 30% and interest at 9% (or alternatively 15% under a proviso) under the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The appellants pointed out that no cross-objection had been filed and the appeal dated from 1974, long before the Amending Act.
  • The court examined the scope of Order 41, Rule 33 CPC (appellate power to pass such further or other decree or order as required) and relied on Panna Lal to state that relief under R.33 can be given even when a cross-objection was not filed, where circumstances justify it.
  • Relying on Bhag Singh, the court construed Section 30(2) of the Amending Act to mean that amended provisions (including amended S.23(2) and S.28) apply to proceedings relating to compensation that were pending on 30-4-1982 or filed thereafter, before the Collector or courts, even if they had finally terminated before the Amending Act. On that basis, the court considered it appropriate to grant the claimant the benefit of the Amending Act by exercising powers under O.41 R.33 CPC.
  • However, regarding the proviso to S.28 (providing for 15% interest where excess compensation is paid into court after expiry of one year from possession), the court analyzed the precise wording and temporal condition. The proviso requires payment into court of the excess (or part of it) after the expiry of one year from possession for 15% interest to be chargeable from the expiry of that year.
  • Because in this case the District Judge determined the excess only after about seven years from possession, it would have been impossible for the Collector to deposit the excess within one year of possession. The court held that the proviso's condition was therefore not satisfied; awarding 15% interest would, in practice, mean that most references decided after a year would attract 15% — a result the court found unlikely to reflect legislative intention. Consequently, the claimant was not entitled to 15% interest under the proviso.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT JUDGE MODIFIED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The appeal by the State of U.P., the Collector and the Land Acquisition Officer fails and is dismissed.
  • The District Judge's award of compensation is upheld in substance but the court modifies the judgment to grant the claimant-respondent the benefit of the Amending Act as follows:
    • Solatium at the rate of 30% on the market value of the land as determined under Section 23(1) of the Act.
    • Interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the excess amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge, from the date of taking possession (the opinion specifies 19th October 1966) until the date of payment of compensation.
  • The claimant-respondent is not entitled to 15% interest under the proviso to Section 28 in the facts of this case.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

Broader implications and precedent impact:

  • The court applied existing Supreme Court precedents on the use of small-property sales as comparators for larger acquisitions and on the appellate power to grant relief under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC. The decision clarifies the court's reluctance to apply the proviso to Section 28 (15% interest) where the excess amount could not possibly have been deposited within one year of possession because the excess was only determined much later.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond its application of existing authorities; the decision resolves the parties' rights in this matter by upholding the District Judge's valuation and by extending to the claimant the benefits of the Amending Act (subject to the court's interpretation of the proviso to S.28).

    State Of U.P And Others v. Raj Narain Singh And Another

    N.D Ojha, J.:— The appeal been preferred by the State of U.P, the Collector, Ballia, and the Land Acquisition Officer, Ballia, against the judgment dt. 25-9-1973 in Misc. Reference 3 of 1971 under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

    2. Some land belonging to the claimant-respondent 1 was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The relevant notification under S. 4 was issued on 4-11-1965. The notification under S. 6 was issued on 1-12-1965, and possession taken on 10-10-1966. Being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimant-respondent prayed for a reference being made to the District Judge and reference No. 3 of 1971 mentioned above was made. Reliance before the District Judge was placed on behalf of the claimant-respondent on certain sale deeds as exemplars. The District Judge was of the view that the sale deed dt. 3-8-1965 executed by Badri Lal in favour of Smt. Sujan Kumar in respect of 10 acres of land for a sum of Rs. 4500/- was the best exemplar, inasmuch as it was executed a few months before the Notification under S. 4 of the Land. Acquisition Act and the land sold by it was barely one furlong from the land acquired and was of the same nature as the land acquired. Relying on the statement of Bhagwati Datt Tewari (P.W 4) who stated that the value of the land at the time of its acquisition was Rs. 1000/- per Katha, the District Judge came to the conclusion that the proper compensation to be awarded in respect of the land of the claimant-respondent would be at the rate of Rs. 30,770/- per acre. This he did in view of the fact that the sale deed dt. 3-8-1965 which was found by him to be the best exemplar was in respect of a small area whereas the land acquired under the Notification under S. 4 referred to above was more than 20 acres in area.

    3. It has been urged by the Standing Counsel, appearing for the appellants that the amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge is excessive. On the other hand it has been urged by the counsel for the claimant-respondent that the amount as awarded by the District Judge represented just compensation and that the claimant-respondent was also entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% and interest at the rate of 9% in place of 6% in view of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act).

    4. Having heard counsel for the parties we find it difficult to agree with the submission made by the counsel for the appellants that the compensation as awarded by the District Judge is excessive. The reasons for holding that the sale deed dt. 3-8-1965 constituted the best exemplar are cogent reasons and as such it cannot be said that the District Judge committed any such error in determining the compensation on the basis of the said sale deed which may justify interference in the present appeal. It is true that the said sale deed was of a small piece of land measuring .10 acres, but in that regard it would be useful to keep in mind the following observations of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad, (1984) 2 SCC 324 : AIR 1984 SC 892:

    “Two principles relating to the matter of fixation of compensation relevant for the present purpose may be kept in view. When large tracts are acquired, the transaction in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline. Therefore, the valuation in transactions in regard to smaller property is not taken as a real basis for determining the compensation for larger tracts of property (see Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 633 : (1977) 1 SCC 684 : AIR 1977 SC 1560, Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCR 329 : (1977) 1 SCC 330 : AIR 1977 SC 580). In certain other cases this Court indicated that for determining the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property a deduction should be given. In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, (1959) Suppl (1) SCR 404 : AIR 1959 SC 429, a reduction of 25% was indicated while there are certain other cases where the view is that the reduction should be to the extent of ⅓. Again, in the very scheme for fixation of compensation provided by the Land Acquisition Act there is bound to be some amount of arbitrariness.”

    5. Calculated at the rate on which the land which was the subject-matter of sale deed dt. 3-8-1965 was sold, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 45,000/- per acre. If a deduction to the extent of ⅓ is made as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kausalya Devi ((1984) 2 SCC 324 : AIR 1984 SC 892) (supra) the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 30,000/- per acre. As seen above the District Judge has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 30,770/- per acre and on the evidence on record we are of opinion that no case has been made out for reducing the amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge, inasmuch as the deduction to be made is not necessarily to be to the extent of ⅓. It may vary between ¼ and ⅓ even according to the case of Smt. Kausalya Devi (supra).

    6. As regard the submission made by the counsel for the claimant-respondent about solatium and interest on the basis of the Amending Act, it was urged by the standing counsel that since no cross-objection had been filed, the claimant-respondent was not entitled to either of these amounts. The Amending Act came into force on 24-9-1984. It is by this Amending Act that the amount of solatium was raised to 30% and of interest to 9%. The present appeal was filed in the year 1974 and apparently no cross-objection could have been filed by the claimant-respondent on the basis of the Amending Act In Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516 it was held: “We are not, at present advised, prepared to agree that if a party who could have filed a cross-objection under O. 41, R. 22 of the Civil P.C has not done so, the Appeal Court can under no circumstance give him relief under the provisions of O. 41, R. 33 of the Code.”

    7. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court relief under O. 41, R. 33 CPC, can be granted even in those cases where a cross-objection could have been filed, but was not filed if the circumstances justify granting relief under the said provision. In the instant case, as already pointed out above, no cross-objection could have been filed by the claimant-respondent. Rule 33 of O. 41, CPC, inter alia contemplates that the Appeal Court shall have power to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. In Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737 : AIR 1985 SC 1576, while construing the provisions of the Amending Act it was held that under S. 30 sub-s. (2) of the Amending Act the provisions of the amended S. 23 sub-s. (2) and S. 28 are made applicable, to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act.

    8. It would not be a correct interpretation of S. 30 sub-s. (2) to say that the provisions of the amended S. 23 sub-s. (2) and S. 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. Even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April 1982 and an appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April 1982 or is filed subsequent to the date, the provisions of the amended S. 23 sub-s. (2) and S. 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed in such appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that it is a fit case where the claimant-respondent may be given the benefit of the Amending Act in exercise of the power conferred on this Court by O. 41, R. 33, CPC.

    9. Counsel for the claimant-respondent then urged that in view of the proviso inserted in S. 28 of the Act by the Amending Act the claimant-respondent was entitled to 15% interest on the excess amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge. We, however, find it difficult to agree with this submission. The proviso so added to S. 28 reads as hereunder:—

    “Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into court before the date of such expiry”.

    10. Even a plain reading of the proviso makes it clear that a direction in regard to payment of 15% interest would be justified only if the excess amount of compensation awarded by the court, namely the District Judge is not paid within one year from the date on which possession is taken. In the instant case, as seen above, possession was-taken on 19-10-1966. The reference was decided by the District Judge on 25-9-1973 and it is by this judgment that compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector was awarded. In other words the determination about the excess amount of compensation by the District Judge was made after about seven years of possession having been taken. When the excess amount had itself not been determined by the District Judge within one year of the possession being taken it would be requiring the Collector to perform an impossible task to deposit the excess amount within the said period of one year. It is thus apparent that when the excess amount of compensation was determined after about seven years of the taking of possession the said amount obviously could by no stretch of imagination have been deposited within one year of the taking of possession. It does not need any authority for the proposition that law does not require a person to perform an impossible task.

    11. The matter may be looked into from another angle. In those cases where possession is taken under S. 17 of the Act award is invariably given on some date subsequent to the taking of possession which may itself take about a year. In those cases also where award is given and possession is taken thereafter and a reference is made, in the normal course such a reference is not decided before the expiry of one year. As such, whenever the District Judge awards an amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector it would be after a year of the taking of possession whether the possession is taken under S. 17 or after giving the award. The obvious result would be that the amount in excess awarded by the District Judge would be impossible to be deposited within one year of taking possession in almost every case, and if the submission made by the counsel for the claimant-respondent is accepted, the rate of interest in every case will for all practical purposes get substituted from 9% to 15%. This obviously does not seem to us to be the intention of the legislature even on a plain reading of the proviso in question. On the other hand the intention of the legislature in amending S. 28 seems to be to award interest at the rate of 9% in place of 6% and recourse to award of 15% interest under the proviso is to betaken only in these exceptional cases where the requirements of the said proviso are fulfilled. In our opinion, therefore, the claimant-respondent is not entitled to 15% interest.

    12. In the result even though the appeal fails and is dismissed, the judgment appealed against passed by the District Judge is modified to this extent that the claimant-respondent shall be entitled to solatium on the market value of the land acquired as determined under S. 23(1) of the Act at the rate of 30% and interest on the excess amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge at the rate of 9% from the date of taking over possession, namely, 19th Oct., 1966 till the date of payment of compensation.

    13. In the circumstances of the case there shall however, be no order as to costs.

    14. Order accordingly.

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    State Of U.P And Others v. Raj Narain Singh And Another
    (Dec 5, 1985)