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Judgment Summary — M.M. Husain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Two petitioners, Shaboo and Ranga (alias Israil), are detained in the District Jail, Bahraich, serving concurrent sentences awarded in Sessions Trial No. 89 of 1979: six months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 325/149 IPC and three months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 147 IPC.

The petition under Article 226 sought a writ of habeas corpus (or other appropriate relief) on the ground that, after crediting periods during which they were detained in jail as undertrial prisoners in connection with other crimes, they have already served the sentences awarded in S.T. No. 89 of 1979 and therefore their present detention is illegal.

Procedural history relevant to the petition: - A First Information Report (Crime No. 409 of 1978) was lodged on 27-8-1978; the case proceeded as S.T. No. 89 of 1979. The petitioners surrendered when the case was registered, were granted bail, remained on bail through trial, were convicted on 11-4-1980 and remained on interim bail. Their Criminal Appeal No. 244 of 1980 was dismissed on 25-9-1981, confirming the sentences. Shaboo was taken into custody on 5-12-1981 and Ranga surrendered on 7-12-1981.

The petitioners had also been detained at different times in relation to other criminal cases (Crime Nos. 562 of 1978, 528 of 1979 and 484 of 1981), and now sought that those detention periods be credited under Section 428 Cr.P.C. against the sentences in S.T. No. 89 of 1979.

This petition was earlier heard by a Bench of this Court which referred the matter to a larger Bench because it considered that prior Bench decisions required reconsideration in view of Supreme Court authority.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the intent and scope of Section 428 Cr.P.C.; specifically, whether the period of detention that may be set off under Section 428 must be detention undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case in which the accused is ultimately convicted.
  2. Whether periods of detention in other, distinct cases can be set off against the sentence awarded in a particular case under Section 428 Cr.P.C.
  3. Whether, and in what circumstances, detention in one case may be deemed to be detention for another case (for purposes of set-off), particularly where the detenue was also wanted in the second case but was not formally produced there due to negligence of authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners argued that the periods they remained in jail as undertrials in connection with other crimes (Crime Nos. 562/1978, 528/1979 and 484/1981) should be credited under Section 428 Cr.P.C. against the sentences imposed in S.T. No. 89 of 1979 (Crime No. 409 of 1978).
  • On that basis, they contended they have already served the sentences awarded in S.T. No. 89 of 1979 and that their continued detention is illegal, entitling them to immediate release by writ.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Government of A.P. v. A.V. Rao (1977 3 SCC 298) Section 428 permits set-off only for detention during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case in which the accused is convicted; detention under other laws (e.g., Preventive Detention Act) cannot be set off against sentence in a Penal Code case. Adopted as an unambiguous declaration of law constraining Section 428 to apply only to pre-conviction detention in the same case; this Supreme Court authority framed the principal legal limitation applied by the Court in this petition.
Mr. Boucher Piarre Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar (1975 1 SCC 192) Section 428 operates prospectively on the remaining sentence and curtails it by setting off the period of detention undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial of the case. Cited to illustrate that Section 428 is designed to reduce a convict's remaining liability by crediting pre-conviction detention; used to support the general purpose and operation of the provision.
Hardeo Singh v. The State of Punjab (1975 3 SCC 731) Approval of the principle that Section 428 curtails liability by setting off pre-conviction detention. Referenced as supportive authority for the interpretation that Section 428 confers a benefit limited to pre-conviction detention in the same case.
Suraj Bhan v. Om Prakash (1976 1 SCC 886) Section 428 confers a benefit on a convict, reducing his liability to undergo imprisonment by the period already served as an undertrial; it is not a vehicle to challenge conviction or sentence generally. Used to reinforce that Section 428's scope is to give credit for undertrial detention in the case itself, not to open collateral challenges to conviction.
Nasim v. State of U.P. (1978 A.W.C. 833) A Bench decision of this Court had applied the Supreme Court reasoning and, on its facts, treated earlier detention as being applicable to the subsequent convicted case. Cited as an earlier Bench decision relied upon by petitioners; the present Court explained Nasim's factual basis and clarified that Nasim does not establish a general rule that detention in one case is always deemed detention in all other cases.
Onkar Singh v. Police Officer Prashashan (1979 A.W.C. 277) Similar Bench decision of this Court, interpreting Section 428 consistent with Supreme Court authority and extending set-off on the particular facts of that case. Cited and discussed; the Court clarified that Onkar Singh, too, was fact-specific and does not displace the principle that set-off under Section 428 is generally limited to detention in the same case unless exceptional facts justify otherwise.
K.C. Dass v. State (1979 Cr. L.J. 562, Delhi High Court) Held that Section 428 allows set-off only for periods spent during investigation, inquiry or trial in the "basic case" in which the accused is convicted. Cited as consistent authority from another High Court supporting the view that only detention in the same case qualifies for set-off.
Jaswant Lal Harjivan Dass Dholakia v. State (1979 Cr. L.J. 371, Bombay High Court) Similar holding that set-off under Section 428 is confined to detention in the basic case leading to conviction. Adduced to show consistency among High Courts for the narrow interpretation of Section 428.
Mohan Lal alias Satish v. State of U.P. (1979 L.L.J. 272) Review of an earlier Bench order where, on review, the Bench found negligence in producing a detenue and extended set-off by deeming earlier detention to be applicable to a later case on facts. Used as an illustration of the limited, fact-specific exception: where authorities' negligence caused failure to produce an accused in the later case, detention in the earlier case may be deemed detention for the later case and set-off allowed.
Bench decisions in Writ Petition No. 1086 of 1979 and Writ Petition No. 1085 of 1979 (this Court) Held that set-off under Section 428 is limited to periods spent in jail during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case; in one instance a review led to relief where negligence was established. Cited by the Court as consistent with the Supreme Court and other High Courts and as part of the consistent view that set-off is normally confined to detention in the same case; reinforced the limited exceptional rule where authorities' negligence is shown.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the text of Section 428 Cr.P.C. and quoting the Joint Parliamentary Committee's stated objective for its enactment: to alleviate unduly long pre-conviction detention suffered by undertrials and to ensure that period of detention during investigation, inquiry or trial of a case is credited against any subsequent sentence in that same case.

The Court then surveyed authoritative decisions: - It relied on Supreme Court authorities (notably Govt. of A.P. v. A.V. Rao and earlier cases such as Mr. Boucher Pierre Andre) to conclude that Section 428 must be read as permitting set-off only for the period of detention undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case in which the accused is ultimately convicted. - The Court observed that the Supreme Court in A.V. Rao expressly refused to allow detention under other legal regimes (e.g., preventive detention) to be set off against sentences in Penal Code proceedings, thereby limiting Section 428 to detention in the same case. - The Court recognized that some High Courts and Bench decisions of this Court had, on their facts, extended set-off by treating detention in earlier cases as detention for later cases; however, the Court emphasised that these were fact-specific conclusions justified by circumstances such as negligence by authorities in producing the accused where he was also wanted in the subsequent case.

Applying these principles to the present petitioners: - The petitioners were on bail throughout the pre-conviction period in respect of Crime No. 409 of 1978 (which became S.T. No. 89 of 1979); hence they had no period of pre-conviction detention in the very case for which they were convicted that could be set off under Section 428. - The periods they spent in custody in connection with other crimes (Crime Nos. 562/1978, 528/1979 and 484/1981) were detentions in different cases and, on the facts, occurred subsequent to or otherwise were not detention in the basic case (S.T. No. 89 of 1979). Therefore those detention periods do not qualify for set-off under the ordinary rule in Section 428. - The Court acknowledged the narrow exception recognized in prior decisions: where an accused was already detained in one case but was also wanted in a second case and, due to negligence of authorities, was not formally produced in the second case, then the period of detention might be deemed to be for the second case and set off may be allowed. The Court found no such exceptional factual circumstance here that would justify deeming the other detentions to be detention in S.T. No. 89 of 1979.

On these grounds the Court concluded that the petitioners had no pre-conviction detention in S.T. No. 89 of 1979 to be set off; their present detention is lawful; and the petition must fail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE PETITION IS DISMISSED.

Direct implications for the parties: - The Court held the petitioners' detention in Bahraich jail to be valid. - It was noted that, in the normal course, Shaboo will complete his sentences on 6-5-1982 and Ranga (alias Israil) on 8-5-1982. - The petitioners were not entitled to release on the ground invoked because they had no period of pre-conviction detention in the convicted case to be set off under Section 428.

Broader implications: - The Court reaffirmed that Section 428 Cr.P.C. ordinarily permits set-off only for detention undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case in which the accused is ultimately convicted. - The Court clarified that prior Bench decisions which extended set-off on their facts do not establish a general rule; rather, treating detention in one case as detention for another is a question of fact and can be allowed only in exceptional circumstances (for example, where negligence by authorities prevented formal detention/production in the subsequent case). - The Court declined to certify a question of law of general importance for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and refused the petitioners' oral request for a certificate to appeal, holding that no substantial question of law of general importance arose beyond existing Supreme Court pronouncements.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what the opinion contains.

    Shaboo And Another v. State Of U.P And Another

    M.M Husain, J.:— The two petitioners, namely Shaboo and Ranga alias Israil, are detained in the District Jail of Bahraich for serving out concurrent sentences of six months' R.I under Section 325/149 I.P.C and three months' R.I under Section 147 I.P.C awarded to them in Sessions Trial No. 89 of 1979, of the Sessions Division of Bahraich. Their contention in this petition moved under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is that after crediting the period during which they have remained in jails as undertrial in connection with other crimes, they have already served out the sentences awarded to them in the aforesaid Sessions Tiral. Their prayer, therefore, is that a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued to the opposite parties to set them at liberty forthwith as their detention in jail is now illegal.

    2. One Jitendra Singh lodged a first information report against the two petitioners at P.S Kotwali Bahraich on 27-8-1978. A case under Sections 147 and 323/149 I.P.C bearing Crime No. 409 of 1978 was registered against them on the basis of that report. The said case, when sent up for trial, was registered as S.T No. 89 of 1979. Both the petitioners surrendered themselves in Court as soon as the case was registered against them. They were immediately bailed out and remained on bail till convicted by the trial Court on 11-4-1980. Even after their conviction they were granted interim bail by the trial Court. They filed Criminal Appeal No. 244 of 1980 in this Court against their conviction. They remained on bail during the pendency of the appeal also which was ultimately dismissed on 25-9-1981, and the two sentences of six months and three months' R.I respectively, awarded to them by the trial Court for offences under Sections 325/149 and 147 I.P.C were confirmed. After the confirmation of their sentences by this Court Shaboo was taken into custody on 5-12-1981, whereas Ranga surrendered himself on 7-12-1981. Both of them are in jail since then. Besides the aforesaid case, the two petitioners were also involved in three other cases, namely, crime Nos. 562 of 1978, 528 of 1979 and 448 of 1981. They were taken into custody in connection with these cases and bailed out on different dates.

    3. In connection with Crime No. 562 of 1978 Shaboo remained in jail from 18-10-1978 to 5-12-1978 for forty-nine days, whereas Ranga remained in jail for sixty-one days from 3-11-1978 to 3-1-1979. Shaboo remained in jail for fifty-nine days i.e from 18-9-1979 to 16-11-1979 in connection with Crime No. 528 of 1979, whereas Ranga remained in jail from 11-1-1978 to 28-2-1980 i.e for sixty-one days in connection with that case, Shaboo again remained in jail for a total fifteen days in two instalments i.e, from 25-9-1981 to 6-10-1981 and 12-10-1981 to 14-10-1981 in connection with Crime No. 484 of 1981, whereas Ranga remained in jail for twenty days i.e from 25-9-1981 to 14-10-1981 in connection with that crime. The petitioners contend that in connection with the sentences awarded to them in S.T No. 89 of 1979 they had to remain in jail, at the most, for six months. The periods during which they remained in jail in connection with Crimes No. 562 of 1978, 528 of 1979, and 484 of 1981, should be credited towards their sentences awarded in S.T No. 89 of 1979, as laid down by Section 428 Cr. P.C and after that set off they have already served out those sentences and should no longer be detained in jail.

    4. This petition had earlier come up for hearing before a Bench consisting of H.N Seth and S.S Ahmad, JJ. Reliance was placed before their lordships upon two Bench decisions of this Court, namely Nasim v. State of U.P . 1978 A.W.C 833., decided by Hari Swarup, J. and one of us, and, Onkar Singh v. Police Officer Prashashan . 1979 A.W.C 277., decided by Hari Swarup and U.G Srivastava, JJ. In Nasim's case (supra) reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court's decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anne Tenkateshwar Rao . 1977 3 SCC 298.

    5. The learned Judges who had earlier heard this petition came to the conclusion that in Government of A.P v. A.V Rao (supra) the Supreme Court, by a process of reasoning had held that in certain circumstances the period of detention in some other context can also be treated as period of sentence in connection with a case in which a person had eventually been convicted and the said period can be set-off against the sentence awarded to him. They further held that in their opinion detention in connection with some other case could not be considered or treated as a detention in connection with the case in which he had eventually been convicted and no question of setting off the period of detention in connection with other case against the sentence awarded to him could possibly arise. The Hon'ble Judges referred the matter to a larger Bench with the following observation:

    “As in our opinion the views taken by Hari Swarup and D.N Jha, JJ. in Nasim's case (supra) and that taken by Hari Swarup and U.C Srivas-tava, JJ. in Onkar Singh's cass (supra) requires reconsideration, we direct that the papers be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to decide this petition.”

    6. We are thus required to consider the intent and scope of Section 428 Cr. P.C in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Government of A.P v. A.V Rao (supra) and the two aforesaid Bench decisions of this Court in Nasim v. State (supra) and Onkar Singh v. Police Officer Prashashan (supra).

    7. Section 428 Cr. P.C is a new provision of law incorporated in the Code of 1973. It reads as follows:

    “Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment—Where an accused person has, on conviction been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation inquiry or, trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.”

    8. The object of its enactment as pointed out by the Joint Committee of the Parliament while recommending its introduction, is that:

    “………in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very long period as undertrial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in Jail as undertrial prisoner. Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometime Courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as undertrial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case, so that in many cases, the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a period out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. The committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the overcrowded jails of today are under trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs.”

    9. It is thus obvious that Section 428 Cr. P.C is intended to relieve the anguish of undertrials for their prolonged detention in jail during the investigation, inquiry or trial of a case. Its object is to confer a special benefit upon a convict whereby his liability to undergo the imprisonment, ultimately imposed upon him in a case, stands reduced by the period during which he has remained in jail as an undertrial prisoner in the same case. It simply aims at setting off or crediting the period of pre-conviction detention of the accused of a case towards the sentence ultimately awarded to him after his conviction in that very case.

    10. In Mr. Boucher Piarre Andre v. Superintendent Central Jail Tihar . 1975 1 SCC 192, the Supreme Court considered Section 428 Cr. P.C and observed at the end of para 2 of the judgment that;

    “The Section operates prospectively on the sentence which yet remains to be served and curtails it by setting off the period of detention undergone by the accused persons during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case.”

    11. While concluding para 3 of the judgment, their Lordships further observed that:

    “……Section 428 must clearly be held to be applicable to the case of the petitioner and his liability to undergo imprisonment must be restricted to the remainder of the term imposed on him, after setting off the period for which he was detained during the investigation, inquiry and trial of the case against him.”

    12. This decision was cited with approval by their Lordships in Hardeo Singh v. The State of Punjab . 1975 3 SCC 731. In Suraj Bhan v. Om Prakash . 1976 1 SCC 886, their Lordships again observed that:

    “Indeed, Section 428 does not contemplate any challenge to a conviction on a sentence. It confers a benefit on a convict reducing his liability to undergo imprisonment out of the sentence imposed for the period which he had already served as an under-trial prisoner.”

    13. In Govt. of A.P v. A.V Rao (supra), on which decision raliance was placed by a Bench of this Court in Nasim's case (supra) the Supreme Court more specifically laid down that:

    “It is true that Section 428 speaks of the period of detention undergone by an accused person, but it makes it clear that the period of detention which is allowed to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the same case in which he has been convicted. Therefore, the period during which the appellants accused were in detention under Preventive Detention Act could not be set off under Section 428 against term of imprisonment imposed on them on their conviction in Sessions cases for offence under Penal Code.”

    14. The above observations of the Supreme Court contain an unambiguous declaration of law that the ‘period of detention’ contemplated by Section 428 Cr. P.C refers to the detention of the accused during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case in which he is ultimately convicted and the period of his pre-conviction detention in that very case can be credited or set off towards the sentence ultimately awarded to him.

    15. After having thus interpreted Section 428 Cr. P.C their lordships, on the basis of the peculiar facts of that case granted set off to the appellants for the detention case for the reason that when they were required in subsequent cases they being already under detention could also be detained in connection with those subsequent cases. Since the benefit conferred upon them by Section 428 Cr. P.C was denied due to the negligence of the concerned authorities that benefit in the interest of justice was extended to them with a finding that their detention in the earlier case should also be deemed to be their detention for the purposes of the subsequent cases with effect from the dates when they were sent in those subsequent cases.

    16. The Delhi High Court in K.C Dass v. State . 1979 Cr. L.J 562., and Bombay High Court in Jaswant Lal Harjivan Dass Dholakia v. State . 1979 Cr. L.J 371., have also laid down that the period of detention which Section 428 Cr. P.C allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment awarded to the accused upon conviction must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the “Basic case” in which he has been convicted. In Writ Petition No. 1086 of 1979 decided on 10-8-1979 by a Bench of this Court consisting of K.S Verma, J. and one of us, set off under Section 428 Cr. P.C was claimed by the petitioner in a case convicted at Lucknow for his detention as under trial in a case at Indore. The Bench observed that:

    “Under the above provisions the only period which could be set off against the term of imprisonment is the period spent by the accused in jail during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case. As such the period during which the petitioner remained in jail in connection with some other case cannot be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed against him in the case decided at Lucknow. In view of the above the petition is misconceived and is hereby dismissed.”

    17. A petition for the review of the aforesaid order was moved and the judgment pronounced by the Bench in that review petition is reported as Mohan Lal alias Satish v. State of U.P . 1979 L.L.J 272.. It shows that the Bench later on came to the conclusion that the authorities were negligent in producing the detenue before the Magistrate at Lucknow even after his availability at Indore and benefit of that negligence, upon the analogy of Supreme Court's decision in Govt. of A.P v. A.V Rao (supra) was to go to the detenue. On that account the Bench held that the detention of the accused in the case of Indore should also be deemed to be his detention for the purposes of the case at Lucknow since the date when he was wanted at Lucknow and was available at Indore. The interpretation of Section 428 Cr. P.C earlier done by the Bench in its order dated 10-8-1980 remained unaltered inspite of the review petition having been subsequently allowed. Thus the consistent view of the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts regarding the scope of Section 428 Cr. P.C is that set off towards the sentence ultimately awarded to an accused in a case has to be allowed to him only with respect to the period spent by him in jail as an under trial in that very case.

    18. Broadly speaking in Nasim v. State (supra), and Onkar Singh v. Police Officers Prashashan (supra), also Section 428 Cr. P.C has been givent he same interpretation which was given to it by the Supreme Court and other High Courts and by a Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1085 of 1979 decided on 10-8-1979. On facts, it was held in those cases that the detention of petitioners in earlier cases should be deemed to be their detention for the purposes of the subsequent cases also. With these findings of fact benefit of Section 428 Cr. P.C was extended to the petitioners of those cases. Some observations made in Nasim's and Onkar Singh's cases (supra) are however capable of giving an impression that if a person is detained ??? several cases his detention in one case shall invariably be deemed to be detention in all the cases. We would, therefore like to clarify and explain that the view of the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh's case (supra), and that expressed by this Court in Nasim v. State and Onkar Singh v. Police Officers Prashashan and Mohan Lal alias Satish v. State (supra) is that under Section 428 Cr. P.C the period of detention as an under trial, of an accused in a particular case, can be set off only towards the sentence ultimately awarded to him in that very case. Whether or not the detention of a person in one case should also be treated to be his detention for the purpose of any other case, wherein he is wanted is a question to be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No set formula can be laid down in that behalf. If the facts and circumstances of a particular case indicate that a person already detained in one case was also subsequently wanted in another case and he was not formally detained in that other case on account of the negligence of the concerned authorities, and for no fault of his, he can, with all justification, claim that his detention in the earlier case should also be deemed to be his detention for the purposes of the second case. In that event benefit of Section 428 Cr. P.C can be extended to him. Coming to the case of the present petitioners it has already been indicated above that they were all along on bail in the case bearing Crime No. 409 of 1978 which gave rise to S.T No. 89 of 1979 on 27-8-1978. They have as such, no preconviction detention period to their credit which may be set off against the sentences ultimately awarded to them in that case. In other crimes, namely No. 562 of 1978, 528 of 1979 and 484 of 1981 they were subsequently involved. They cannot claim any benefit of those detentions in S.T No. 89 of 79, in which case they were involved much prior to their involvement in the three crimes wherein they subsequently remained in jail. It is not disputed that in the normal course Shaboo will complete his awarded sentences of S.T No. 89 of 1979 on 6-5-1982 and Ranga alias Israil will complete the same on 8-5-1982. At present their detention in Bahraich jail is perfectly valid. This petition has therefore no merits. We accordingly dismiss it.

    19. At the time of pronouncement of Judgment an oral request has been made that certificate to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court be granted. We have decided the habeas corpus petition on the basis of pronouncements made by the Supreme Court and in our opinion no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case to be decided by the Supreme Court. The leave prayed for is rejected.

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    Comments

    Shaboo And Another v. State Of U.P And Another
    (Mar 30, 1982)