AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 6-B(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • Art. 324 of the Constitution, S. 133 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951,
  • supra). Section 165(2) of the Company's Act, 1948,
  • Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Wages Act
  • S. 165(6) of the Companies Act, 1948.
  • S. 72(1) of the Rent Act, 1968,
  • S. 10(1) of the Central Act
  • Indian Companies Act, 1956,
  • S. 10 of the Central Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 6-B(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • Art. 324 of the Constitution, S. 133 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951,
  • supra). Section 165(2) of the Company's Act, 1948,
  • Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Wages Act
  • S. 165(6) of the Companies Act, 1948.
  • S. 72(1) of the Rent Act, 1968,
  • S. 10(1) of the Central Act
  • Indian Companies Act, 1956,
  • S. 10 of the Central Act
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Indian Explosives, Ltd. (Fertilizer Division) — Yashoda Nandan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the fertilizer division of Indian Explosives, Ltd., which conducted disciplinary proceedings against sixteen workmen (eleven of whom are respondents 4 to 14). The workmen did not appear at the domestic enquiry and ex parte findings led to dismissal orders against all sixteen.

An industrial dispute was raised (order dated 12 June 1973) and respondent 1 (State of Uttar Pradesh) referred issues to the First Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, including the propriety of the dismissals. While the reference was pending, the parties entered a written instrument described as a "settlement" dated 16 July 1973 providing that the question of termination would be referred to Sri B.B. Lal and that his findings would be binding. That instrument was purportedly registered under S.6-B(3) on 31 July 1973. On joint application, the Government withdrew the reference (order dated 27 August 1973), but the Tribunal (apparently unaware of the Government order) passed an ex parte award on the same day upholding the dismissals. The Government stayed enforcement (25 September 1973) and subsequently rejected that award (26 September 1973).

Sri B.B. Lal reviewed the matter and on 8 November 1973 gave findings: that dismissal of eleven of the sixteen was justified, modifications for others, and recommended limited ex gratia payments. The petitioner implemented those findings in part; five employees were reinstated, one employee was not proceeded against further, and certain laid-off workmen received recommended ex gratia payments.

Respondents 3 to 14 (the union and workmen) filed a writ petition in this Court, dismissed as premature. They sought a reference under S.4-K; the Government initially refused. Misc. Writ Petition No. 6004 of 1974 challenged that refusal; in that petition the Government filed a counter-affidavit saying Sri B.B. Lal's findings were binding. On 22 August 1977 the writ petitioner applied that the writ be dismissed as "not pressed" after an assurance was obtained that the case would be referred; the Court dismissed the writ accordingly.

On 6 September 1977 the State made a reference under S.4-K to the Third Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur, regarding dismissal of eleven workmen (respondents 4–14). The petitioner filed a written statement raising preliminary objections and sought (on 8 November 1978) to amend the written statement; the Tribunal refused to allow that amendment. This Court later (order dated 2 May 1979) allowed the petition by the employer challenging that refusal and directed the Tribunal to permit the amendment.

By an order dated 18 December 1979 (the order under challenge), the Tribunal rejected the petitioner's preliminary objection that the order of reference was bad in law and framed two preliminary issues: (1) whether the present dispute was not an industrial dispute in view of the employer's objections; and (2) whether the order of reference was bad in law in view of other objections.

The petitioner moved under Article 226 to quash the Government's reference of 6 September 1977 and the Tribunal's order of 18 December 1979. The Court (Yashoda Nandan, J.) after detailed consideration dismissed the petition with costs and vacated any interim orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appropriate Government, having earlier declined to make a reference under S.4-K, can later reconsider and make such a reference in respect of the same industrial dispute.
  2. Whether principles of natural justice (in particular the right to prior notice and hearing) are attracted and require the Government to hear the employer/workmen before making a reference under S.4-K, either initially or on reconsideration.
  3. Whether the instrument described as a "settlement" (and the review by Sri B.B. Lal) had the legal character of a settlement under S.2(i) and S.6-B of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and thereby finally resolved the industrial dispute.
  4. Whether, on the facts, there was material before the Government justifying the conclusion that an industrial dispute continued to exist at the time of the impugned reference (i.e., whether the Government failed to apply its mind).
  5. Two preliminary issues framed by the Tribunal: (1) whether the present dispute is not an industrial dispute (paras. 37 of the written statement); and (2) whether the order of reference is bad in law (paras. 56-A and 57 of the written statement).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Sri Soli Sorabji) Arguments

  • Once the Government had declined to make a reference, the employer could reasonably expect finality (a "quietus") and arrange affairs on that basis; a later change of mind by the Government should entitle the management to be informed of the material on which the Government proposes to act and to be given an opportunity to present its version before a reference is made.
  • The principles of natural justice apply to administrative decisions that affect civil rights or legitimate expectations; cited A.K. Kraipak, Smt. Menaka Gandhi and Mohinder Singh Gill for that proposition and relied on several High Court judgments (K. Abdul Salam & Co., Tiruchy Rolling Mills, Shanti Theatre, Muthukrishnan, American Express International Banking Corporation) as supportive precedents.
  • Argued that the "settlement" and the binding review by Sri B.B. Lal amounted to a settlement under the Act (S.2(i), S.6-B) which fully and finally resolved the dispute and therefore the subsequent reference was incompetent.
  • Argued that between the Government's earlier refusal and the later reference there was no material change justifying reversal, suggesting failure to apply mind and absence of material to justify finding of a continuing industrial dispute.

Contesting Respondents' (Sri K.P. Agrawal) Arguments

  • Relied on decisions of the Kerala High Court (Abdul Rahiman Haji v. Abdul Rahiman), E.G. Verghese v. Secretary of Staff Union, and Kirloskar Electric Company v. Workmen, among others, to support the position that the Government's power to refer may be exercised without affording prior hearing and that references serve a preliminary/administrative purpose distinct from adjudication.
  • Contended (by implication and as represented in the Tribunal's approach) that the Government had material (including continued agitation, hunger strike and strike notices) and had applied its mind before making the reference, and that the so-called settlement did not constitute a statutory settlement terminating the industrial dispute under the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Western India Match Co. Workers' Union [(1970) 1 SCC 225] Government may reconsider an earlier refusal to refer under statutory provision (expression "at any time"); earlier refusal does not oust later jurisdiction. Applied to hold that the Government could change its mind and make a reference later; employer has no vested right to be heard before a fresh reference is made and the mere lapse of time or reliance by employer does not affect jurisdiction.
Binny, Ltd. v. Their Workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 806] Authority concerning Government power to refer and limits of contentions based on earlier refusal. Court found no support in Binny for the petitioner's contention that a later reference is permissible only if fresh material emerges or that management must be heard before a subsequent reference.
Avon Services (Production Agencies) (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana [1978 — II L.L.N 503] Reinforces principle that Government does not lack power to make a later reference; fresh material not always necessary; continuation of dispute itself may justify reference. Relied on to reject contention that second reference was incompetent absent fresh material; held continuance of dispute is itself relevant.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] Principles of natural justice (e.g., absence of bias) apply in administrative selections and certain administrative decisions. Recognized as authority that natural justice can apply to administrative actions; used to delineate limits where audi alteram partem is attracted but not to support a general right to pre-hearing in all administrative decisions.
Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] Applied audi alteram partem where fundamental rights or serious civil rights are affected by administrative action. Used to illustrate that natural justice applies where rights or legitimate expectations of a serious nature are directly affected, but not universally to all administrative acts such as references under S.4-K.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner [(1978) 1 SCC 405] Principle that administrative decisions affecting legitimate expectations or civil rights may attract natural justice (example: jeopardizing election rights). Referred to as supporting the general proposition that natural justice may apply where legitimate expectations or civil rights are directly jeopardized; court used it to frame the test for applicability.
R. v. Aston University Senate Ex parte Roffans [(1969) 2 Q.B. 538] English authority recognizing that extent of what is at stake influences whether hearing is required. Cited to support the view that the gravity of consequences must be considered in deciding whether audi alteram partem applies.
Schmid v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [(1969) 2 Ch. Div. 149] Discusses "legitimate expectation" and when a hearing may be required (example of an alien's expectation). Quoted for the proposition that legitimate expectation (not mere hope) may entitle a party to a hearing; used to distinguish cases where no such expectation exists.
Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 A.C. 40] Authority on circumstances where administrative bodies may be bound to give affected persons an opportunity to make representations. Invoked to frame the principle that where rights/interests/legitimate expectations are at stake fairness may require hearing; but not determinative for references under S.4-K.
Regina v. Barnet and Camden Rent Tribunal Ex parte Prev Investments Ltd. [(1972) 2 Q.B. 342] ("Frey case") Decision that a local authority's power merely to refer matters to a tribunal is a preliminary administrative act and does not itself require hearing because the substantive decision will be made by the tribunal after hearing. Applied as a central precedent: a reference under S.4-K is analogous — the reference is a preliminary action and does not itself determine substantive rights, so audi alteram partem is not required at the reference stage.
Norwest Holst (Norwest Hoist) Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade [(1978) 1 Ch. Div. 202] Appointment of inspectors/ordering inquiries as preliminary administrative acts; natural justice not required prior to appointing inspectors where only investigation is mandated. Used to support the view that preliminary administrative decisions (to investigate or to refer) do not attract the normal rules of natural justice so long as the decision-maker acts in good faith.
Asher v. Secretary of State for Enforcement (unreported; cited in Norwest discussion) Authority relied on to hold that decision to order an extraordinary audit or investigation is a preliminary administrative decision and does not require disclosure or hearing. Quoted in the Norwest context as supportive authority; used to buttress the conclusion that preliminary investigative orders need not be preceded by hearing.
Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 A.C. 297] Natural justice characterized as "fair-play in action." Quoted to define natural justice and to underline that what fairness demands depends on circumstances and impact on rights/expectations.
Peragamon Press (cited in Norwest discussion) Passage of Lord Reid regarding prosecutorial decisions — prima facie case needed but not requirement to seek views of accused before deciding to prosecute. Used to analogize that deciding to cause an inquiry or raise proceedings need not involve seeking comments of the party beforehand.
K. Abdul Salam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu [1973 — I L.L.N 306] High Court decision treating reference decisions as having quasi-judicial trappings (relied on by petitioner). Court rejected the approach of Abdul Salam as inconsistent with Supreme Court authorities and applied its reasoning to decline following that view.
Tiruchi (Trichy) Rolling/Steel Mills Ltd. v. Gnanasambandam [1975 — I L.L.N 76] High Court authority in similar vein to Abdul Salam on hearing before reference. Identified as one of the High Court decisions whose reasoning the Court found unpersuasive when contrasted with Supreme Court precedents.
Shanti Theatre (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1979) 55 I.F.J. 389] High Court authority cited for the proposition that hearing may be required before reference. Court noted this decision but disagreed with its conclusions as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Muthukrishnan (G.) v. New Horizon Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. [1980 — II L.L.N 70] High Court Full Bench decision cited by petitioner in support of hearing requirement. Noted and rejected by this Court insofar as it derived its view from an inaccurate application of Supreme Court judgments.
American Express International Banking Corporation v. Union of India [1979 — I L.L.N 588] High Court decision cited by petitioner in context of natural justice/legitimate expectations. Mentioned among High Court cases whose reasoning the Court did not accept as overriding Supreme Court authority.
Abdul Rahiman Haji v. Abdul Rahiman [(1979) 39 F.L.R 357] Kerala High Court decision supporting the view that hearing is not required before certain administrative reference-like acts. Identified as being substantially in accord with the Court's view and correctly laying down the law in the Court's opinion.
E.G. Verghese v. Secretary of Staff Union [1976 Ker. L.T. 842] Kerala High Court authority relied on by respondents. Accepted as supportive of the Court's conclusion that prior hearing is not mandatory before making a reference under S.4-K.
Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd. v. Workmen of Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd. [1974 — I L.L.N 383] Kerala High Court decision cited by respondents on the scope of Government's reference powers and hearing requirements. Cited as correctly laying down law consistent with the Court's conclusions.
State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy [A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 53] Earlier Supreme Court authority referred to in criticism of High Court decisions treating Government as quasi-judicial when making references. Noted that some High Court observations disregarded this earlier Supreme Court view; used to support the present Court's rejection of High Court decisions treating references as quasi-judicial acts.
Brown v. A.U.E.W. [(1976) 1 C.R. 147] Discusses distinction between legitimate expectation/legal right and mere hope; used to illustrate limitations on claim to hearing. Quoted to demonstrate that "legitimate expectations" cannot be equated with mere hopes — relevant to petitioner's contention of expectation of no later reference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in stages and remained closely tied to the authorities and facts before it.

1. Nature of the decision and scope of natural justice: the Court emphasized that the maxim audi alteram partem (right to be heard) must be applied with attention to the nature of the decision and gravity of its consequences. It reiterated established principles that natural justice (characterised as "fair-play in action") applies where a decision directly and inevitably affects civil rights or legitimately jeopardizes legitimate expectations. Administrative acts that are merely preliminary to further adjudicatory proceedings — where substantive rights will be determined after a full hearing — do not necessarily attract the requirements of prior hearing.

2. Precedent synthesis: the Court examined Supreme Court authorities (A.K. Kraipak, Menaka Gandhi, Mohinder Singh Gill) and various English authorities (Roffans, Schmid, Frey/Ridge v. Baldwin, Norwest Holst) to draw the controlling test: whether the administrative decision itself directly affects civil rights or legitimate expectations. The Court accepted that natural justice applies where fundamental rights or direct civil rights/legitimate expectations are at stake but rejected the notion of universal application to all administrative acts.

3. Specific application to S.4-K references: applying Frey and Norwest Holst, the Court held that the Government's decision to make a reference under S.4-K is a preliminary administrative act — a mechanism to bring the dispute before an adjudicatory tribunal. An order of reference does not itself decide the substantive issues; the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court will have the opportunity to conduct a full adjudication with evidence, cross-examination, and reasons. Consequently, the Court concluded that there is no in-built processual requirement of notice and hearing before the Government makes a reference under S.4-K, whether initially or upon reconsideration.

4. On "change of mind" by Government: the Court relied on Western India Match and related authorities to hold that an earlier refusal to refer does not exhaust the Government's power; the Government may later reconsider and make a reference if satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The mere lapse of time or the employer's having rearranged affairs does not oust jurisdiction. While the Government should, as a matter of fairness, take into account inconvenience to the employer, that consideration affects discretionary exercise but not jurisdiction.

5. Legitimate expectation and employer's position: the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that a governmental refusal initially gives rise to a legitimate expectation that no future reference will be made and hence a right to be heard on reconsideration. The Court treated such expectations as, at best, hopes; absent a statutory or legal right, the employer had no entitlement to pre-reference hearing.

6. Character of the "settlement" and Sri B.B. Lal's review: the Court examined whether the July 1973 instrument and subsequent review by Sri B.B. Lal constituted a "settlement" under S.2(i) and S.6-B of the Act. It concluded that what the parties referred to as a settlement was actually an agreement to submit the dispute to Sri B.B. Lal's arbitration; it was not a statutory settlement terminating the industrial dispute because the formal requirements (including those of S.5-B(3) and timing relative to references under S.4-K) were not complied with. Consequently, the dispute continued to exist for purposes of S.4-K.

7. Sufficiency of Government's material and application of mind: the Court accepted that the record disclosed ongoing agitation by the workmen (hunger strike, strike notices, continued union demands) and found that these facts were within the knowledge of the Government via labour department officers. The Government's subsequent conclusion that the dispute had not been fully and finally settled and its decision to make a S.4-K reference were, on the record, the product of application of mind and supported by material.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was DISMISSED with costs to the opposite parties; interim orders (if any) were vacated.

Implications (direct effects and legal observations)

  • Direct effect: The Government's reference dated 6 September 1977 and the Tribunal's order of 18 December 1979 stand; the petitioner has no entitlement to a prior hearing before the Government makes a reference under S.4-K, whether initially or upon reconsideration.
  • On settlement: The instrument described as a "settlement" and Sri B.B. Lal's review did not constitute a statutory settlement under S.6-B and did not finally and completely resolve the industrial dispute for purposes of the Act; therefore such instrument did not preclude a later S.4-K reference.
  • On natural justice and references: The Court reiterated that the principles of natural justice apply where substantive civil rights or legitimate expectations are directly and inevitably affected; an order of reference under S.4-K is a preliminary administrative act and does not by itself determine substantive rights, so the rule of prior hearing is not attracted at that stage.
  • No expansion of precedent beyond the opinion: The Court applied and reconciled existing Supreme Court and authoritative English decisions to the facts; it rejected certain High Court authorities which treated reference decisions as quasi-judicial. The decision is founded on the interpretation and application of existing authorities rather than creating a novel legal principle beyond those authorities.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond what the opinion states.

    Indian Explosives Ltd. (Fertilizer Division), Panki, Kanpur v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others

    Yashoda Nandan, J.:— The Indian Explosives, Ltd., is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, and is engaged in the business or manufacture and sale of explosives and fertilizers. The petitioner before us is its fertilizer division having its factory at Panki, Kanpur. By means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner prays for a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, direction or order to quash and/or set aside the reference order made by respondent 1, the State of Uttar Pradesh, dated 6 September 1977, and the order of respondent 2, the Third Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur, dated 18 December 1978, disposing of certain issues framed as a consequence of the written statement filed by the petitioner raising certain preliminary objections.

    2. The material facts on the basis of which this petition is based are that disciplinary proceedings were commenced by the petitioner against sixteen of its workmen, eleven of whom having been impleaded as respondents 4 to 14 in this petition. The workman did not appear at the domestic enquiry and consequently on the basis of the ex parte findings recorded during enquiry proceedings, orders for dismissal were passed against all the sixteen workmen. An industrial dispute having been raised by an order, dated 12 June 1973, respondent 1, referred to the First Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, certain issues between the petitioner and its workmen including the propriety of the dismissal of the aforesaid sixteen workmen. During the pendency of the aforesaid reference, the petitioner and its workmen entered into what has been described as a “settlement” on 16 July 1973, duly signed by the parties including the dispute regarding the dismissal of the sixteen workmen. The settlement, inter alia, provided that the question whether the termination of the services of the aforesaid sixteen workmen was justified and/or legal would be referred to Sri B.B Lal, Adviser to the Governor, Uttar Pradesh, and, “his findings will be binding on both the parties. The so-called settlement further provided that both the parties would submit a petition to the State Government to withdraw the Adjudication Case No. 4540, dated 12 June 1973, in respect of issues covering dismissal and lay-off of the workmen aggrieved. The settlement purported to have been registered in accordance with the requirement of S. 6-B(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on 31 July 1973. Pursuant to the joint application by the petitioner and its workmen, respondent 1 by means of an order, dated 27 August 1973, withdrew the dispute referred to it from the Tribunal seized of the reference. Nonetheless, perhaps because the order of the State Government had not been communicated to the Industrial Tribunal, it passed an ex parte award, dated 27 August 1973, to the effect that the petitioner was justified in dismissing the sixteen workmen. On 25 September 1973, the Government of Uttar Pradesh stayed the enforcement of the abovementioned award and subsequently on 26 September 1973, rejected the same. Sri B.B Lal started reviewing the orders regarding the dismissal of the sixteen workmen as contemplated by the settlement relied upon by the petitioner. It is stated that at the hearings held by Sri B.B Lal on various dates the representatives of the petitioner as well as sixteen workmen effected, the labour union and also the Labour Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh were present. It is alleged that the sixteen workmen including respondents 4 to 14 and the union (respondent 3) which has espoused their cause, unreservedly participated in the proceedings and raised an objection to the competence or jurisdiction of Sri B.B Lal to decide the matter referred. On 8 November 1973, Sri B.B Lal passed an order giving findings regarding the dispute and held that the dismissal of eleven out of the sixteen workmen was justified and orders of dismissals for the remaining workmen were to be modified. Sri Lal recommended that the management should pay one-third of the basic wages and dearness allowance for the period of lay-off as an ex gratia payment. It is claimed that the petitioner fully implemented and gave effect to the findings of Sri B.B Lal, which, according to the settlement, were binding on all parties Five of employees, who had been dismissed, were reinstated and the petitioner did not reinitiate proceedings against one of the workmen and also accepted the recommendation of Sri Lal and paid to the workmen who had been laid-off one-third of their wages as ex gratia amount. Respondents 3 to 14 who remained dissatisfied with the order of Sri Lal filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed as being premature. Respondent 1 having been moved by respondent 3 to make a reference under S. 4-K of the Act an industrial dispute relating to dismissal of respondents 4 to 14 rejected the representation on the ground that the award of Sri B.B Lal was final and binding on the parties. Respondents 3 to 14 thereupon filed in this Court Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 6004 of 1974, challenging the decision of the State Government refusing to make a reference of the dispute. It is alleged that in that writ petition a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government of Uttar Pradesh wherein the stand was taken that the findings given by Sri B.B Lal were binding on both the parties to the dispute and since some of the workmen had already availed of the benefits given by Sri Lal it was not open to the petitioner to challenge the remaining part of the findings which went against the workmen. On 22 August 1977, an application was made by the petitioner in Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 6004 of 1974, that it may be dismissed as “not pressed” since the workmen had been given an assurance by the then Labour Minister that their case would be referred for adjudication to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. On the same day consequently this Court dismissed the aforesaid writ petition in terms of the application made on behalf of the writ petitioner. On 6 September 1977, the Government of Uttar Pradesh made the impugned reference under S. 4-K of the Act to respondent 2 regarding the dismissal of eleven workmen, i.e, respondents 4 to 14. The petitioner filed a written statement raising number of preliminary objections and subsequently on 8 November 1978, made an application for amendment of its written statement by adding additional ground. The application for amendment was rejected by the Tribunal but ultimately this Court by an order, dated 2 May 1979, allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the Tribunal refusing to permit amendment to the written statement and directed the Tribunal to allow the amendment application. By means of the order, dated 18 December 1979, which is under challenge in this petition, respondent 2 rejected the preliminary objection of the petitioner that the order of reference is bad in law. The two preliminary issues decided against the petitioner were framed as follows:

    “(1) Whether the present dispute is not an industrial dispute in view of the objections raised by the employers in Para. 37 of their written statement; and

    (2) whether the order of reference is bad in law in view of the objections raised by the employers in Paras. 57 and 56-A of their written statement.”

    3. In view of the Supreme Court decisions in Western India Match Company, Ltd. v. Western India Match Company Workers' Union [(1972) 3 SCC 806 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1975], Binny, Ltd. v. Their workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 806 : A.I.R 1972 S C. 1975] and Avon Services (Production Agencies) (Private), Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, [1978 — II L.L.N 503], Sri Soli Sorabji did not contend that once the Government had declined to exercise its power under S. 4-K of the Act it had no jurisdiction left on a reconsideration of the matter to, at a later stage, make a reference under that provision. He also did not contend and in our view rightly so that it is necessary for the Government to hear the management or the workmen concerned in some form or the other before making a reference in the first instance itself. He, however, contended that once the Government had refused to make a reference because either in its opinion there was no industrial dispute or It was not expedient to make one, the employer could act on the expectation that there would be a quietus, and to proceed to arrange his affairs on that basis and if the Government in respect of the same dispute altered its mind at a later stage, it was incumbent on it to bring to the notice of the management the material on which it proposed to make a reference and to take into consideration the management's version before taking a decision to refer the dispute for adjudication. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150], Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 587] and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner [(1978) 1 SCC 405 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 875], for the contention that the principles of natural justice were attracted even to an administrative decision if the civil rights of a party were effected or his or its legitimate expectations were jeopardized. He submitted that in Western India Match Company, Ltd., Binny, Ltd. and Avon Services (Production Agencies) (Private), Ltd. cases (vide supra), this question had neither been raised nor decided by the Supreme Court. He pressed in aid the judgments of the Madras High Court in K. Abdul Salam and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu [1973 — I L.L.N 306], decided by Rama Prasada Rao, J., Tiruchy Rolling Mills, Ltd. v. Gnanasambandam (S.) [1975 — I L.L.N 76], decided by K. Veeraswami, C.J, Vardarajan, J., Shanti Theatre (Private), Ltd., Madras v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1979) 55 I.F.J 389), Muthukrishnan (G.) v. Administrative Manager, New Horizon Sugar Mills (Private), Ltd. [1980 — II L.L.N 70], decided by a Full Bench consisting of Ramaprasada Rao, C.J and Ismail and Ramanujam, JJ. and American Express International Banking Corporation v. Union oj India [1979 — I L.L.N 588], decided by Manash Nath Roy, J., which do support his contention.

    4. Sri K.P Agrawal, representing the contesting respondents, on the other hand, relied on the decisions of the Kerala High Court in Abdul Rahiman Haji v. Abdul Rahiman [(1979) 39 F.L.R 357], decided by V.P Gopalan Nambiyar, C.J and Balagangadharan Nair, J., E.G Verghese v. Secretary of Staff Union [1976 Ker. L.T 842] and Kirloskar Electric Company, Ltd. v. Workmen of Kirloskar Electric Company, Ltd. [1974 — I L.L.N 383], decided by E.S Venkataramiah, J.

    5. We propose to consider the question raised to start unembarrassed by the several decisions of the High Courts relied upon by Sri Soli Sorabji:

    “In the quest for justice under the rule of law there has been no more spontaneously acceptable idea than the principle embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem.”

    There is a noticeable enlargement of the tendency at present to apply the principle embodied in the maxim to a wide range of decision making processes yet there was a lingering judicial ambivalence on the question as to whether it was applicable to decision of a purely administrative character or was confined in its operation to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings alone. The three judgments of the Supreme Court in A.K Karipak, Smt. Menaka Gandhi and Mohinder Siugh Gill cases (vide supra), in the sphere of administrative law set at rest all doubts, if any, on the subject. It may be noticed here, however, that in A.K Kraipak case (vide supra), it was merely held that the requirement of absence of bias holds good to selections to public services and it was not concerned with the question whether a party had a right to pre-hearing in circumstances such as we are dealing with. In Smt. Menaka Gandhi case (vide supra), the maxim audi alteram partem was applied where the decision affected the fundamental rights of Smt. Menaka Gandhi. In Mohinder Singh Gill case (vide supra), the Supreme Court applied that principle to a decision which affected the appellant's legitimate expectations to a civil right, namely, to be declared elected to a Parliamentary seat which was put in jeopardy by an order of the Election Commission purporting to have been passed in exercise of powers vested in it under Art. 324 of the Constitution, S. 133 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, and all other powers enabling it so to do to cancel the poll which had already taken place in the constituency.

    6. None of these decisions are authorities for the proposition that the precepts of natural justice are of universal application to all administrative actions irrespective of the characteristics of the proceedings or its impact on those concerned. Instead of indiscriminately applying the maxim, we must keep in mind the note of warning sounded by Lord Denning, M.R, when he said that

    “this rule of common law is a powerful weapon to prevent injustice but like all powerful weapons it can cause great damage if it is not used skilfully and properly.”

    Natural justice has been equated with “fair-play in action” Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 A.C 297]. What is the test to be applied to determine as to whether in a particular situation fair-play requires that a party be beard before an administrative decision is taken. In answering this question, we must take into account not only the nature and characteristics of the proceedings resulting in the decision but also invariably the gravity of the consequences of the decision.

    7. The Division Court in R. v. Aston University Senate Ex. P. Roffans [(1969) 2 Q.B 538], took into account the fact that “so much was at stake.” In Schmid v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [(1969) 2 Ch. Div. 149]. Lord Denning, M.R stated:

    “The speeches in Ridge v. Baidwin [1964 A.C 40], show that an administrative body may in a proper case be bound to give a person, who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representation. It all depends on whether he has some rights or interest or I would add some legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.”

    Thus unless some civil rights of a party are affected or his legitimate expectations to some rights are jeopardized the principles of natural justice are not attracted. It may be clarified here that when we speak of civil rights we do not mean merely property rights but civil rights in the sense expounded by Krishna Iyer, J, in Mohinder Singh Gill case (vide supra). To attract the principles of natural justice the deprivation of civil rights must take place directly and inevitably as a result of the administrative decision itself and not only incidentally or as a secondary result to borrow the language used by Ormrod, L.J, in Norwest Hoist, Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade [(1978) 1 Ch. Div. 202], merely as “unfortunate side effects.”

    8. Considerable light is thrown on the question as to in what exigencies the principle of pre-hearing is excluded in the decision of P.N Bhagwati, J., in Smt. Menaka Gandhi case [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 587] (vide supra), wherein he observed as follows:

    “Now, it is equally true that since the right to prior notice and opportunity of hearing arises only by the duty to act fairly, or to use the words of Lord Morris of Berthy-Gest from ‘fair-play in action,’ it may equally be excluded where, having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its implication and even warrants its exclusion. There are certain well-recognized exceptions to the audi alteram partem rule established by judicial decisions and they are summarized by S.A De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd Edn., at pages 168 to 179. If we analyze these exceptions a little closely, it will be apparent that they do not in any way militate against the principle which requires fair-play in administrative action. The word ‘exception’ is really a misnomer because in these exclusionary cases, the audi alteram partem principle is held inapplicable not by way of an exception to ‘fair-play in action’ but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. The audi alteram partem rule is intended to inject justice into the law and it cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice, or to make the laws lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation.”

    9. Just as there is no escape from the conclusion that anybody making a decision which adversely affects the rights of a party or jeopardizes his or its legitimate expectations must observe the rule of natural justice it is equally true conversely that a decision which does not directly affect anyone's civil rights because for example it is merely a preclude to further proceedings in the course of which the parties concerned would have a right to be heard before an impartial tribunal will not itself be subject to the requirements of natural justice. Reference here might be made to the decision in Regina v. Barnet and Camden Rent Tribunal Ex parte Prev Investments, Ltd. [(1972) 2 Q.B 342], to which we shall later refer to as Frey case, Under S. 72(1) of the Rent Act, 1968, which was under consideration either the lessor or lessee or a local authority could refer contracts of tenancy to the Rent Tribunal of the district in question. Salmon, L.J, while holding that it was of the utmost importance to uphold the right and indeed the duty of Courts to ensure that the powers conferred on a local authority or the executive shall not be exercised unlawfully when the exercise of such powers affects the basic rights of an individual took, the view that

    “cases such as these in which a license is being sought for the purpose of enabling the applicant to carry on his business and earn a living, or in which town planning permission is sought, or a compulsory purchase order is being challenged, vitally affect the basic rights of the persons concerned and seem to me to differ very substantially from the case we are now considering. In a case such as the present, no decision is taken by the authority invested with a power which vitally affects the basic rights of the individual. The only decision taken by the local authority is to refer the matter to the rent tribunal so that the rent tribunal may consider whether or not the rent is too high. The party concerned (that is to say, the landlords) have every opportunity of appearing before the tribunal and it is the decision of that tribunal which affects their basic rights”

    Reference might also be made to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Norwest Holst, Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade [(1978 1 Ch. Div. 202] (vide supra). Section 165(2) of the Company's Act, 1948, to the extent relevant was in the following terms:

    “Without prejudice to their powers under the last foregoing section, the Board of Trade—

    (a) shall appoint one or more competent inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company and to report there;

    (b) may do so if it appears to the board that there are circumstances suggesting …

    (ii) that the persons concerned with its formation or the management of its affairs having in connexion therewith been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct towards it or towards its members…”

    It was under this section that the Minister appointed two gentlemen Sri Davies and Sri Harding, Queen's counsel and a chartered accountant as inspectors to investigate the affairs of the Norwest Hoist, Ltd. The secretary of the company wrote to the Secretary of State that he had been instructed by the board of directors of the above named company that it did not appear to the board that there were any circumstances which would justify the exercise of his discretionary power under the section to appoint inspectors. He went on to say that it had, therefore, instructed him to request the Secretary of State or disclose to it the circumstances, together with an indication of the evidence in support thereof, upon which he relied in exercising or purporting to exercise the discretionary power to appoint inspectors. The Secretary of State relied that there was no requirement laid down in the Act to provide this information, and the appointment had been made under the provisions contained in S. 165(b)(ii). The group secretary of the company replied back that:

    “… Your reference to the provisions of S. 165(b)(ii) of the Act places a wide category of persons within the company under possible suspicion of having been guilty of most serious offences. The board considers that the failure of the Secretary of State to give any indication of the nature of the alleged offences of the person or persons allegedly responsible seems hardly just or equitable …

    As the Secretary of State has declined to disclose the information requested in my letter of 25 March, it is not accepted that Sri Davies and Sri Harding have been validly and lawfully appointed as inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company.”

    The secretary of the company was informed by means of a letter from the Secretary of State's Private Secretary that the Secretary of State had no intention of withdrawing the appointment, and, in the circumstances, it was for the board to take such action as it might be advised. The company made a motion for summary judgment under R.S.C Order 14. Another motion was made by the department of trade for an order that the plaintiff's action be struck out. One of the grounds on which the company sought relief was that in appointing the inspectors the Minister had acted in violation of the principles of natural justice since the appointments had been made without the company being informed of the material before the Minister on which he had been led to make the appointment of the inspectors and without giving it an opportunity of being heard in opposition to the proposed appointments. Foster, J, rejected the contention. He relied on the decision of Megarry, J., in Asher v. Secretary of State for Enforcement (unreported decision), from which the relevant passage has been quoted in extenso in the decision as reported. The passage relied by Foster, J., was as follows:

    “In Frey case (vide supra), the decision of the authority was merely to refer certain tenancy agreements to a rent tribunal, the substantive decision whether or not to reduce the rents would be made by the rent tribunal after a hearing of the contentions on either side, and was not being made by the local authority … Now in this case the decision of the Secretary of State is a mere decision to order an extraordinary audit. Like the local authority in Frey case (vide supra), he has no power to demand information before deciding whether or not to order the audit. Like the rent tribunal in Frey case (vide supra), on the other hand the district auditor has wide powers to require information to be provided: See S. 225 of the Act of 1933. Both on the authority of Frey case (vide supra), and on principle, I would hold that in deciding whether or not to order an extraordinary audit the Secretary of State is bound not by the Wednesbury standards but by the Frey's standards.”

    Before the Court of Appeal again it was argued that the principles of natural justice applied and accordingly both sides should have been heard before the inspectors were appointed. The contention was repelled by Lord Denning, M.R, who held that:

    “There are many cases where an inquiry is held not as a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry but simply as a matter of good administration. In these circumstances there is no need to give preliminary notice of any charge, or anything of that sort…

    So also with the appointment of inspectors, under S. 165(b)(ii). The inspectors are not to decide rights are wrongs. They are to investigate and report. This inquiry is a good administrative arrangement for the good conduct of companies and their affairs. It is not a case to which the rules of natural justice apply. There is no need for them to be given notice of a charge, or a fair opportunity of meeting it…

    All we are concerned with is S. 165. As to it, I would say that, so long as the Minister acts in good faith, it is not incumbent upon him to disclose the material he has before him, or the reasons for the inquiry.”

    Ormrod, L.J, agreed with the conclusion reached of Lord Denning in the following words:

    “In the present case, we are concerned with the making of a decision by the Minister to appoint inspectors under S. 165(6) of the Companies Act, 1948. The purpose of the appointment is to investigate the company in order to find out what has been going on in other words, to find the facts. At such an inquiry the company and its officers will be asked to answer the allegations or complaints against them, if there are any, and give any explanation which they wish to give. So in this case what we are concerned with is only the preliminary stage, the decision of the Minister to appoint inspectors It is said that such an appointment is likely to damage the company whose affairs are to be investigated; therefore, the Minister must act in accordance with the ordinary principles of justice, which means notifying the company of the basis on which the investigation is to proceed and giving it an opportunity, in advance, of being heard.

    In my judgment the ordinary principle of natural justice do not require anything of the kind. At this stage the Minister is not required to notify the company or seek its comments before ordering an Investigation. It is only necessary to refer very shortly to a passage in Lord Reid's Speech in Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 A.C 297] which is conveniently cited in Sachs, L.J's judgment in Peragamon Press case [1971 Ch. 388 at 403]. The passage reads:

    ‘Every public officer who has to decide whether to prosecute or raise proceedings ought first to decide whether there is a prima facie case, but no one supposes that justice requires that he should first seek the comments of the accused or the defendant on the material before him. So there is nothing inherently unjust in reaching such a decision in the absence of the other party.’

    To my mind that passage applies precisely to the present case. The only conceivable distinction between the present case and that passage is the use of words to prosecute or raise proceedings. Here the raising of proceedings has taken the form of ordering an investigation by the inspectors at which the person involved will have their opportunity of stating their case. That, to my mind, is a distinction without a difference…

    But it seems to me it is quite impossible as Mr. Brodie in argument would require him to do in reaching that decision, which is simply a decision to cause further inquiries to be made, to here what the company has to say about it in advance. It is unfortunate if the announcement by the Minister that he is appointing inspectors causes damage to the company's trading position or its credit, if it causes great inconvenience or puts the company to expense, but all these are unfortunate side effects of the absolute necessity that some one should exercise some form of supervision over the activities of a limited company.”

    [Emphasis supplied.]

    Geoffrey Lane, L.J, agreed with the other two learned Law Lords.

    10. Thus, it has been recognized by Judges of undoubted eminence that a decision on substantive rights of parties is one thing and a mere decision that another body investigate and decide on those substantive rights is quite another, and the principle of hearing is not applicable to the latter class of cases.

    11. We might next consider the question as to what is meant by, “legitimate expectations” when it is used in connexion with the question as to whether the principles of natural justice are attracted. This expression occurs in the judgment of Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls in Sehmid v. Secretary of State of Home Affairs [(1969) 2 Ch. Div. 149] (vide supra), to which our attention was invited during the course of this arguments by Sri Soli Sorabji. The relevant passage has been extracted in an earlier part of this judgment. He illustrated what he meant by giving the example of an alien, whose permission to stay in the United Kingdom had been, before the expiration of the term originally granted, withdrawn. In such circumstances he according to the Master of Rolls might well have a right of hearing because he had legitimate expectations that he would be allowed to stay for the period for which permissions had been originally granted. Schmidt, it was held, however, had no right to a hearing because he had been allowed to stay for the period originally granted. He might have hoped but had no reason to build up a legitimate expectation that he would be granted permission to stay beyond that period. A very similar view was expressed by Widgery, L.J, who stated that:

    “But here again the alien who has entered with a permit giving him a period of residence has no kind of right to require an extension of that period. The position is exactly the same as that of a man who takes a lease of a house for three months and wishes to renew it for a further period. The landlord can reject his application out of hand. No question of natural justice or anything of that kind arises because there is no right in the tenant which can be infringed.”

    12. Paul Jackson in Natural Justice, 2nd Edn., Page 109, has noticed the distinction between “legitimate expectation” and a mere hope in the following words:

    “As example of the distinction between a legal right or legitimate expectation, on the one hand, and personal disappointment at an unwelcome decision on the other, is provided by Brown v. A.U.E.W [(1976) 1 C.R 147]. A and B had been candidates in union election. A won but the executive council set the result aside and ordered a second election. A appealed to the union appeal body which upheld the contention that the executive council had no right to set aside the first result. In the meantime, however, the second ballot had been held, in which B obtained the greater number of votes. B claimed that he had a right to be heard by the appeal body before it reached its conclusion on the validity of the executive council's decision. Walton, J., found, on the true construction of the rules, that the council had no power to set aside the first ballot, and hence the appeal body had no option but to reach the conclusion it did. However, the learned Judge went on to say that in any case B's claim to a hearing would have failed because the dispute or lis was between A and the executive council. Although B in one sense, had an interest in the outcome of the proceedings no legal right of his was at stake. Ha had entered the ‘second election on knowing that it might turn out to be a nulity.’ ‘Legitimate expectations’ thus cannot be synonymized with ‘wishful hopes'.”

    13. The various judgments of the High Courts on which Sri Soli Sorabji placed reliance in support of his contention drew their inspiration from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Western India Match Company, Ltd. v. Western India Match Company Workers' Union [(1970) 1 SCC 225 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1205] (vide supra), Binny, Ltd. v. Their workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 806 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1975] (vide supra) and Avon Services (Production Agencies) (Private), Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, [1978 — II L.L.N 503] (vide supra), and consequently becomes necessary to analyze these decisions in some detail.

    14. In Western India Match Company, Ltd. case [(1970) 1 SCC 225 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1205] (vide supra), one of the contentions raised by counsel for the appellant-company was that the Government having once declined to refer the dispute, could not change its mind after a lapse of nearly six years since the dispute arose and though the expression “at any time” in S. 4-K did not apparently signify any limit it must be construed to mean that once the Government had refused to make the reference after considering the matter and the employer thereupon had been led to believe that the dispute was not to be agitated in a Tribunal and had consequently made his own arrangement the Government cannot, on a further agitation by the union, take a somersault and decide to refer for adjudication. The contention was repelled by the Supreme Court in the following words:

    “As already stated the expression ‘at any time’ in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence…

    In the light of the nature of the function of the Government and the object for which the power is conferred on it, it would be difficult to hold that once the Government has refused to refer, it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter either because new facts have come to light or because it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference…. The reason given in these decisions is that the function of the Government either under S. 10(1) of the Central Act or a similar provision in a State Act being administrative, principles such as res judicata applicable to judicial acts do not apply and such a principle cannot be imported for consideration when the Government first refuses to refer and later changes its mind. In fact, when the Government refuses to make a reference it does not exercise its powers; on the other hand it refuses to exercise its power and it is only when it decides to refer that it exercises its power. Consequently, the power to refer cannot be said to have been exhausted when it has declined to make a reference at an earlier stage. There is thus a considerable body of judicial opinion, according to which so long as an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the Government is of the opinion that it is so, that fact that it had earlier refused to exercise its power does not preclude it from exercising it at a later stage. In this view, the mere fact that there has been a lapse of time or that a party to the dispute, was, by the earlier refusal, led to believe that there would be no reference and acts upon such belief does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make the reference…

    It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. Such a consideration would, we should think, be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it. These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its jurisdiction under S. 4-K of the Act. Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and, therefore, in construing the expression “at any stage,” in S. 4-K it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it.

    In the present case, though nearly four years had gone by since the earlier decision not to make the reference, if the Government was satisfied that its earlier decision had been arrived at on a misapprehension of facts, and, therefore, requited its consideration, neither its decision to do so nor its determination to make the reference can be challenged on the ground of want of power….

    When the Supreme Court observed that consideration of the inconvenience which may be caused to the employer because of lapse of time between the two decisions is a matter which the State Government should take into account it did not, in our opinion, mean to say that the power of the Government under S. 4-K is rendered nugatory or gives rise to a right to the management to be heard before the Government subsequently does make a reference. It merely suggested that in all fairness — the Government is expected to take such matters into account while making a reference and yet explicitly held that these are matters which have nothing to do with the power or jurisdiction of the Government to act under S. 4-K. In fact, as held fey the Supreme Court, when in the first instance the Government either by omission or by a positive order declines to make a reference, there is no exercise of the power under S. 4-K of the Act and, therefore, in our opinion, when the State Government ultimately does choose to make a reference the question of affording the management a hearing before taking a different decision does not and cannot arise.”

    15. In Binny, Ltd. v. Their workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 806 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1975] (vide supra), we are unable to discover any observation which can be of any help to the petitioner in support of the contention that if at one stage the Government had declined to make a reference it must act either only when fresh material comes to its notice which were not in existence earlier or not within its know ledge at the time when it declined to make a reference or because it had done so on account of some misapprehension or that it must hear the management before passing an order of reference either under S. 10 of the Central Act or under S. 4-K of the Act.

    16. In Avon Services (Production Agencies) (Private), Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, [1978 — II L.L.N 503] (vide supra), the Supreme Court while disposing of an argument similar to that advanced in Western India Match Company, Ltd. v. Western India Match Company Workers' Union [(1970) 1 SCC 225 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1205] (vide supra), observed in Para 8, at page 509 of 1978 — II L.L.N:

    “It follows that the Government does not lack the power to make the reference in respect of the same industrial dispute which it once declined to refer. But it was urged that the ratio of the decision would show that the Government must have some fresh material made available to it subsequent to its refusal to make a reference, for the formation of a fresh opinion, for making the reference. It is not absolutely necessary that there ought to be some fresh material before the Government for reconsideration of its earlier decision. The Government may reconsider its decision on account of some new facts brought to its notice or for any other relevant consideration and such other relevant consideration may include the threat to industrial peace by the continued existence of the industrial dispute without any attempt at resolving it and that a reference would at least bring the parties to the talking table. A refusal of the appropriate Government to make a reference is not indicative of an exercise of power under S. 10(1), the exercise of the power would be a positive act of making a reference. Therefore, when the Government declines to make a reference the source of power is neither dried up nor exhausted. It only indicates that the Government for the time being refused to exercise the power but that does not denude the power. The power to make the reference remains intact and can be exercised if the material and relevant considerations for exercise of power are available; they being the continued existence of the dispute and the wisdom of referring it, in the larger interest of industrial peace and harmony. Refusal to make the reference does not tantamount to saying that the dispute, if it at all existed, stands resolved. On the contrary the refusal to make a reference, not compelling the parties to come to a talking table or before a quasi-judicial Tribunal would further accentuate the feelings and a threat to direct action may become imminent and the Government may as well reconsider the decision and make the reference. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that if the Government had on an earlier occasion declined to make a reference, unless it be shown that there was some fresh or additional material before the Government, the second reference would be incompetent. It has not been shown that the dispute had ceased to exist and the very existence of the dispute enables the Government to exercise the power under S. 10(1) and it has been rightly exercised. The view which we are taking is in accord with the decision of this Court in Binny, Ltd. v. Their workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 806 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1975] …”

    In this case the Supreme Court clearly rejected the submission that if the Government had on an earlier occasion declined to make a reference unless it is shown that there was some fresh material before it a second reference would be incompetent. It positively rules that the continuance of the industrial dispute is by itself a relevant consideration.

    17. Applying the tests discussed above and keeping in mind the nature of the decision, other practical consideration and the consequence on the parties as well as the community at large, we are clearly of the opinion that neither the employer nor the workmen can claim any right to be heard before an order of reference is made either initially or on second thoughts. Concentration of the other means of production in few hands on the one and a growing awareness of their rights by the exploited and now organized labour on the other gave rise not often to class struggle and strife in the industrial and commercial segment of the society which carried imminent danger of not only disturbing the law and order situation but also disrupting production and distribution of commodities necessary for the economic well being of the nation. While a contended labour force can play an all important role in making a meaningful contribution to the progress and prosperity of the nation a frustrated and desperate working class living practically on the verge of starvation with little to lose is possessed of an unfathomable capacity to destroy even if it may involve self-immolation.’ Legislatures and Governments responsible for the national weal could not understandably remain idle spectators of the grave and perilous consequences which existing or apprehended industrial disputes could effectuate. The Legislatures consequently rightly undertook the task of passing enactments to facilitate expeditious resolution of such disputes and to ensure truce meanwhile in the manner provided for by such legislations. When an order is passed under S. 4-K of the Act, the power in substance is exercised on behalf of the public at large and in the interest of the community. Conflict between workmen and the employers is fraught with the potentiality of without a moment's notice erupting into a ruinous conflagration imperilling the industrial and financial stability of the country. It was to meet such critical and sensitive situations that the Government was armed with such powers as are exercisable under Ss. 3 (b) and 4-K. The nature of the power that is exercizeable under S. 4-K. and the objective to secure which it has to be used rules out by necessary implication the existence of any in-built processual requirement of notice and hearing. It is inconceivable that the Legislature could ever have intended that while an industrial dispute was building up and immediate action on the part of the Government is imperatively needed to ensure a cease-fire arrangement in the industrial and commercial area between the disputants it should be required to go through the self-defeating ritual of issuing notices and hearing the parties we have advisedly used the word ritual because in such circumstances notice to and hearing parties would amount to nothing else in view of the fact that a decision to make a reference under S. 4-K beyond causing some inconvenience not to one alone but to both parties does not by itself decide any of the issues in controversy. An order of reference of its own force, does not affect substantive rights of the parties, which have to be ultimately decided by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court when it cornea to be seized of the adjudication case. In the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court the parties to the dispute have a right to lead evidence, to cross-examine witnesses and to a full-fledge hearing. It is the award rendered which really affected the rights of the parties. We are consequently of the view that the principles laid down in Frey (vide supra) and Norwest Holst, Ltd., [(1978) I Ch. Div. 202] (vide supra), cases clearly apply to a decision to make a reference under S. 4-K whether the reference is made in the first instance or as a consequence of reconsideration of the matter even though once the Government has refused to make a reference of the same dispute. This single consideration, in our judgment, would have sufficed to reject the contention based on non-compliance with precepts of natural justice.

    18. In our opinion, there is also no merit in the contention that once the Government has declined to make a reference of a particular industrial dispute, any civil rights of the management come into existence which are adversely affected as a consequence of a reversal of the decision. In the first place, the rights of employers to enter into contracts of employment with workmen and to determine their conditions of service are not uncontrolled even if there is no industrial dispute pending adjudication. The right of the employer to deal with his workmen and to determine their conditions of service and terms of employment are subject to various limitations which mast be incorporated in the certified standing orders under the Central and State enactments dealing with the subject. The Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Wages Act and similar other enactments considerably control the rights of the employer to deal with their workmen. Even when there is no industrial dispute pending adjudication as a consequence of an order passed under S. 4-K of the Act, S. 4-I places restrictions of the right of the employer to affect changes in the conditions of service applicable to his or its workmen in respect of any of the matters specified in the Third Schedule. If the employer disregards the provisions of S. 4-I of the Act, he can be subjected to penalties under S. 14 of the Act. It is true that further constraints on the managements rights are placed by S. 6-E of the Act when a reference is made under S. 4-K thereof, but they are not the outcome of the order of reference itself but are merely “unfortunate side-effects” thereof. In any case, such constraints follow irrespective of the question as to whether a reference is made soon after the industrial dispute is raised or later after an initial denial.

    19. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that once the Government has refused to make a reference, the employer can reasonably expect that there is no possibility of the reference being made later without his being heard and thus can proceed to arrange his affairs accordingly and hence when if without hearing it or him an order is passed under S. 4-K his legitimate expectations are thwarted is also, meritless. In view of the Supreme Court decision in Western India Match Company, Ltd. case [(1970) 1 SCC 225 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1205] (vide supra), and the subsequent judgments of the same Court, the petitioner must have been well aware and should have been conscious of the fact that since the industrial dispute in question had not been resolved in any manner contemplated by the Act the Government was free at any stage to refer it to the Industrial Court or Tribunal under S. 4-K. The petitioner thus had no business to build up any legitimate expectation that a reference will not be made at a later stage. At best the petitioner had hope that since the Government had once refused to make a reference of the dispute it will not do so in future. If the employer had no right to be heard in the first instance before a reference is made under S. 4-K of the Act, we see no reason to hold that he acquires such a right merely because the exercise of power had been deferred.

    20. Before making a reference under S. 4-K, the Government can act sua moto on the information received from any quarter whatsoever which it considers to be worthy of reliance. The Government can act on information received through officials of the Labour Department or its police or intelligence agencies or even on the basis of facts coming to its knowledge from parties absolutely unconcerned with the dispute. The mere fact that in the instant case the Government chose to do so on the basis of representations received from the union of the workmen aggrieved, in our view, makes no difference to the situation.

    21. For the reasons given above, in our judgment, the petitioner had no right to be heard or to be informed of the circumstances which prompted the Government to make the impugned reference.

    22. We have in the rather unduly detailed discussion in the preceding paragraphs already dealt with the various considerations that weighed with the learned Judges who decided K. Abdul Salam and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu [1973 — I L.L.N 306], Tiruchi Steel Rolling Mills, Ltd. v. Gnanasambandam (S.) [1975 — I L.L.N 76], Shanti Theatre (Private), Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1979) 55 I.F.J 389], Muthukrishnan (G.) v. New Horizon Sugar Mills (Private) Ltd. [1980 — II L.L.N 70] and American Express International Banking Corporation v. Union of India [1979 — I L.L.N 588], and have set out the reasons for our inability to concur with their views. It is consequently futile to enter into an analysis of those decisions all over again. It appears to us that they proceeded on an inaccurate application of the Supreme Court judgments referred to therein. The observations made in Abdul Salam case (vide supra), which has been approved in practically all the others suggesting that while taking a decision to refer an industrial dispute the Government has the characteristic trappings of a quasi-judicial Tribunal even disregards the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered as far back as on 5 December 1972, in State of Madras v. C.P Sarathy [A.I.R 1953 S.C 53], in which a directly different view was specifically taken.

    23. The judgments of Kerala High Court in Abdul Rahiman Haji v. Abdul Rahiman [(1979) 39 F.L.R 357] (vide supra) and Kirloskar Electric Company, Ltd. v. Workmen of Kirloskar Electric Company, Ltd. [1974 — I L.K.N 383] (vide supra), have, in our opinion, correctly laid down the law and the reasons contained in those decisions are substantially in accord with those given by us.

    24. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Tribunal had erred in law in holding that the reference was competent since on the facts such dispute as existed between the parties stood finally and completely resolved as a consequence of the settlement arrived at between the parties and the review order of Sri B.B Lal which had been given effect to it was submitted that merely because a number of issues were in dispute and relief had only been partially granted, ft could be reasonably urged that the dispute continued to exist since it had been clearly settled between the parties that the order passed by Sri B.B Lal would be binding on the parties, it was urged that the settlement entered into between the parties to abide by the decision of Sri Lal amounted to a settlement as defined in S. 2(i) of the act and had been duly registered in accordance with the requirements of S. 6-B thereof. This contention, in our opinion, has no force and must be rejected. An industrial dispute once raised can come to an end only if it has been resolved in one of the manners contemplated by the Act. It can also disintegrate or dissolve if either the aggrieved workmen withdraw their claims which gave rise to the dispute or if one of the parties to the dispute ceases to exist altogether. The latter contingency in the instant case never arose. What has been described as a settlement was, in our view, not a settlement within the meaning of S. 2(i) or S. 6-B of the Act. A settlement within the meaning of S. 6-B of the Act implies an agreement between the disputing parties which resolves issues over which the parties are in conflict. In the instant case what has been described as a settlement was merely in the nature of an agreement voluntarily entered into between the parties to refer their dispute to the arbitration of Sri B.B Lal, if we are right, in our view, that there was nothing beyond an arbitration agreement the requirements of Sub-sec. (3) of S. 5-B were undisputably not complied with. Moreover, such a reference of the dispute to the arbitration of Sri B.B Lal could have been made only according to S. 5-B(i) before the dispute had been referred under S. 4-K of the Act to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal. The agreement in the instant case to have the dispute resolved through the intervention of Sri B.B Lal was entered into at a time when a reference under S. 4-K was already pending before the Industrial Tribunal. Under the circumstances, respondent 2 has, in our opinion, rightly taken the view that what has been described as a settlement was only morally binding on the workman as well as the petitioner. It was not a settlement under S. 6-B of the Act which had any enforceable character under the provisions of the Act.

    25. It was lastly urged that when the State Government passed the order challenged under S. 4-K of the Act, it had no material before it justifying the conclusion that there was an industrial dispute in fact pending. Between 1 June 1974, when the State Government rejected the application made by respondent 3 for reference of the dispute for dismissal of respondents 4 to 14 to an Industrial Tribunal and 6 September 1977, when the instant order of reference was made, there was no change in the situation which could have justified the State Government altering its earlier decision. This indicated, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, an absolute failure on the part of the State Government to apply its mind to the expediency or otherwise of making a reference. This contention, in our judgment, has no merit. Respondents 4 to 14 as well as respondent 3, the union, which espoused their cause remained throughout dissatisfied with the order of dismissal of eleven workmen and consistently continued to agitate their grievance. They filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the order of Sri B.B Lal refusing to accept the workmen's demand for their reinstatement. When the writ petition was dismissed, respondent 3 moved the State Government for a reference of the dispute under S. 4-K of the Act. On the Government's refusal to do so, Writ Petition No. 6004 of 1974, was filed for a mandamus to the State Government to refer the dispute to a Tribunal. The writ petition was got dismissed as “not pressed” only when an assurance was obtained by the workmen from the Government that the dispute would be referred for adjudication. From the impugned order of the Tribunal on the basis of material before it, it appears that in the subsequent agreements reached between the management and the union in 1974 and 1978, there was a mention of the demand regarding the reinstatement of the aggrieved employees. The order discloses that before the Tribunal the employers' witness Sri H.K Mohanty, the company's industrial relations manager, admitted that there was a rely hunger strike by the workmen on the question of reinstatement of the eleven workmen. The workmen's witness, Sri Arvind Kumar, who was the general secretary of the union had also stated that apart from hunger strike, the union had given notice for strike also if the demand of the union in regard to the eleven workmen concerned was not conceded by the management. All these facts, it has been held by the Tribunal, on the basis of evidence before it, were within the knowledge of the Government as the officers of the Labour Department were making efforts for the avoidance of industrial strife. The admission made by the State Government in the counter-affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 6004 of 1974, to the effect that the findings given by Sri B.B Lal were binding on both the parties was evidently made on a misapprehension of the true legal position.

    26. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, it has been stated that though no doubt initially the State Government had refused to refer the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, in view of the fact that the same matter was reviewed by Sri B.B Lal it was later realized that the decision of Sri Lal was not legally enforceable under the povisions of the Act and as such the industrial dispute continued to subsist between the parties. In Para. 21 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent 1, it had been stated that the State Government considered the matter again and formed the opinion that the dispute had not been fully and finally settled between the parties and, therefore, the Government decided to make a reference under S. 4-K of the Act suo moto. In these circumstances, we find it impossible to hold either that no industrial dispute did in fact exist at the time when the order of reference was made or there was failure on the part of the State Government to apply its mind to the relevant facts before passing the order, dated 6 September 1977.

    27. Having given our careful considerations to the contentions raised, we dismiss this petition with costs to the opposite parties. Interim orders, if any, passed by this Court are hereby vacated.

    28. Before parting with this case, we acknowledge our indebtedness to the learned counsel who put forward their respective contentions with commendable ability.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Indian Explosives Ltd. (Fertilizer Division), Panki, Kanpur v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others
    (May 7, 1981)