1. This petition is under Section 482, Cr. P. C. filed by the husband praying that the entire proceedings under Section 125, Cr. P. C. be quashed and the petitioner may be discharged from paying the maintenance allowance to opposite party No. 1, i. e. Smt. Najima Begum. The application under Section 125, Cr. P. C. was filed by Smt. Najima fiegum on 8-6-76 praying that Rs. 200/- be allowed to her as maintenance as her husband had neglected to maintain her and had married again. The learned Magistrate after recording the evidence of both the parties passed an order dated 18-7-78 awarding Rs. ISO/- as maintenance to the wife. He recorded a finding that the applicant Smt. Najima Begum wanted to study. Her father too was hot alive. She herself was not in a position to maintain herself and that she observes Parda according to Muslim custom. Abdul Salim went up in revision (Cr. Revision No. 77 of 1978)' which was decided by 1st Addl. Sessions Judge on 29-9-1978. The learned Sessions Judge reproduced the finding of the learned Magistrate that she was unable to maintain herself and that she could not be forced to live with her husband -as her husband lives with Smt. Akleela. It further observed that Smt, Najima Begum has now become dependent on her widowed mother. She wants to study and maintain herself, Her widowed mother is doing tution and tailoring to support her family. After considering the status of the parties and the circumstances of the case the learned Sessions Judge reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs, 150/- per month to Rs. 100/- per month.

2. This petition has been filed mainly on the ground that there was no averment in the application under Section 125, Cr. P. C. that Smt. Najima Begum was unable to maintain herself. It is also stated that even in her statement she did not take any such plea. It was then alleged that now she has got her own income from tution and, as such, she is able to maintain herself. It was stated that in the absence of essential ingredients under Section 125, Cr. P. C. the orders of both the Courts below are liable to be quashed.

3. This petition was contested on the ground that no such ground was taken in the memo of revision. Certified copy of the grounds of revision is Annexure-3 of the counter-affidavit. It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that the findings recorded by the lower Court that she was unable to maintain herself was based upon the evidence on record. It was also stated that it was not alleged either in the written statement or even in the statement of Salim that the petitioner had income of her own. It was thus entirely a new plea which was taken in the petition for the first time. The learned Counsel for the respondent has also drawn my attention to the original notice which was sent to Smt. Sultani, mother of Smt. Najima Begum and Smt, Najima Begum as well. In this notice it was stated on behalf of Abdul Salim himself that after the death of Chand Khan, husband of Smt. Sultani, Smt. Sultani was left with no means of livelihood. No doubt, it was alleged in that notice that Smt. Najima Begum had taken ornaments etc. worth Rs. 2,000/- which both of them wanted to misappropriate.

4. It is true that under Section 125, Cr. P. C. an important ingredient is that the wife if found unable to maintain herself will be entitled to claim maintenance. I, however, do not think that by this phrase it is meant that she should be absolute destitute and should first be on the street, should beg and be in tattered clothes and then only she will be entitled to move an application under Section 125, Cr. P. C. which too may take sometime and that time may be enough for her death. A woman, no doubt, has to depend on some of her maternal relations for her maintenance when she leaves her husband's house. She can be maintained for some time by her relations. But that alone will not be sufficient. What is necessary is that she herself should be in a position to maintain herself and that it should not be much below the status which she was used to at the place of her husband.

5. Apart from these considerations the learned Magistrate recorded a clear finding that she was unable to maintain herself. This finding could have been assailed in revision but no ground was taken to that effect. The revisional Court too has reproduced that finding. In my opinion the revisional Court was the proper Court where such a finding should have been assailed on the ground that it was without any evidence. There is no provision for a second revision in the High Court. The second revision is clearly barred under Sections 397(3) and 399(3). By taking recourse to Section 482, Cr. P. C. in such case it amounts to circumventing the provision of Sections 397 and 399, Cr. P. C. In a similar case when an attempt was made to circumvent the provisions of Section 397(3), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such an application in the High Court should not be treated even one under Section 227 of the Constitution and it rejected that application. Now the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down certain principles with regard to an application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. in the case of Amar Nath and the same have been reiterated in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. . The principles laid down are as follows:

(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party, (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

6. No doubt in the later decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court modified its earlier view in Amar Nath's case to some extent by holding that the bar under Section 397(2) will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has, however, made the following observation in this connection:

But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or effect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction.

7. This does not mean that it is now open to the High Court to interfere in any case ignoring the power under Section 397(2) or Sub-section (3). As held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court such cases would be few and far between when this Court would be required to interfere under Section 482, Cr. P. C. I had taken almost similar view much earlier in the case of Mangal Singh v. Snit. Dalvindra 1975 All WC 496 in which I had held that the High Court may exercise its power - under Section 482, Cr. P. C. even though it amounts to second revision when the order passed by the lower Court is shocking to judicial conscience or in such similar circumstance. In the present case there is no doubt that there was a clear remedy open to the petitioner by filing the revision and he did avail that remedy. The petitioner could have sought such error correct in revision. The petition under Section 482, Cr, P. C. could not have been filed by way of a second revision for correcting such error when even such ground was not taken in the grounds of revision filed before the learned Sessions Judge. The new plea taken in the petition that the respondent is now earning by way of tution cannot be looked into at all. In case any chance has occurred in the circumstances of the parties the proper remedy is under Section 127, Cr. P. C. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Ghurpatari v. Smt. Sampati (FB). In my opinion that case is /distinguishable as there is nothing to show that any such clear finding had been recorded by the lower Courts in that case. Moreover that case was decided before the guidelines had been laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on the case of Amarnath and Madhu Limaye. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Bishambhar Dass v. Smt. Angini 1978 All Cr C. 73 and J. M. Dutta v. State of U.P. 1977 All Cr C 258 decided by Hon'ble Chaturvedi, J. They are the cases where this Court interfered in its revisional jurisdiction. He has also referred to the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Zubedabi v. Abdul Khader 1978 Cri LJ 1555. It does not appear that the decisions of Supreme Court in Amarnath and Madhu Limaye (supra) were considered in that case. It also does not appear that any definite finding had been recorded by the lower Court in that case that the wife was unable to maintain herself. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the amount of maintenance is excessive which should be reduced. In view of my finding that it is not at all a fit case which would justify interference by this Court by exercising its extraordinary power under Section 482, no question arise of reducing the allowance of maintenance. Before closing my judgment I shall also like to refer to the case of Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia in which Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following observations to the effect that too technical view is not to be taken in such case though these observations were made in reference to another ingredient of Section 125:

Section 125 requires, as a sine qua non for its application, neglect by husband or father. The Magistrate's order proceeds on neglect to maintain; the Sessions Judge has spoken nothing to the contrary and the High Court has not spoken at all. Moreover, the husband has not examined himself to prove that he has been giving allowances to the divorced wife. His case, on the contrary, is that she has forfeited her claim because of divorce and the consent decree. Obviously, he has no case of non-neglect. His plea is his right to ignore. So the basic condition of neglect to maintain is satisfied. In this generous jurisdiction, a broader perception and appreciation of the facts and their bearing must govern the verdict and chopping little logic or tinkering with burden of proof.

8. In the result the petition is dismissed. Stay order dated 7-11-1978 is vacated.