Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.N. Sapru, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This group of five connected second appeals arises from a suit filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh (the plaintiff) claiming ownership of land forming part of the Right Bhakra Canal and seeking eviction of several defendants. The plaintiff alleged it had leased specific plots to the defendants (leases dated in 1951–1952 for three-year terms) but that the defendants (other than Ram Prasad) had encroached upon adjoining land and made permanent constructions in contravention of the lease terms that permitted only temporary constructions. The plaintiff alleged rent was reserved by the lease, that rent was unpaid for the periods pleaded, and that notices to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served; the plaintiff sought eviction, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation.

The defendants denied the plaintiff's case, asserting they had grants for building purposes, had been placed in possession, had made permanent constructions believing they were entitled to do so, and therefore the plaintiff's suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence. They also pleaded payment of rent (alleging no receipts were issued), challenged the damages claimed as excessive, denied receipt of a valid notice to quit (or alleged waiver), and said the Crown Grants Act did not apply to Rampur. The defendants also relied on an injunction obtained from a civil court restraining eviction except in accordance with law.

At trial the plaintiff's counsel conceded that the Crown Grants Act did not apply to Rampur. The trial court held that the lease deeds required registration under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and, being unregistered, were inadmissible in evidence. The trial court treated the defendants as licensees (not lessees), found estoppel and acquiescence barred the plaintiff's suit insofar as eviction was concerned, and decreed recovery of a premium equivalent to rent while dismissing other reliefs. The plaintiff appealed.

The lower appellate court nevertheless examined the unregistered lease instruments for collateral purposes, concluded that an interest in the property had been created and that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed, found encroachment by defendants (except Ram Prasad), rejected estoppel/acquiescence because the lease only permitted temporary constructions, and decreed ejectment, arrears of rent and damages. The defendants then filed these second appeals, which are the subject of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an unregistered lease-deed (one requiring registration under the Registration Act/Transfer of Property Act) can be examined by an appellate court for the purposes relied upon by the lower appellate court — in particular, whether it may be used to establish a relationship of landlord and tenant or to establish lease terms such as area, duration, rent, right to sublet and permission to make permanent constructions, notwithstanding Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act.
  2. Whether the lower appellate court erred in holding that the unregistered lease created a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants.
  3. Whether the evidence establishes encroachment by the defendants upon land adjoining the leased plots.
  4. Whether the defendants' plea of estoppel and acquiescence (and related equitable defences) bars the plaintiff's suit for eviction and related reliefs.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (State of Uttar Pradesh) Case and Arguments

  • The State asserted ownership of the disputed land and that it had leased plots to the several defendants on specified dates; rent was reserved by those leases and remained unpaid.
  • The plaintiff alleged that defendants (other than Ram Prasad) had encroached upon adjoining land beyond their leased plots and had made permanent constructions in contravention of the leases that permitted only temporary structures.
  • Before the trial court the plaintiff's counsel conceded that the Crown Grants Act did not apply to Rampur (the territory where the land lay).
  • In the second appeal context the plaintiff (through standing counsel) relied on authorities (including Padma Vithoba Chakkavya v. Mohammad Multani) to support the proposition that certain unregistered documents may be looked into to determine the character of possession; the plaintiff did not contest that an unregistered instrument could be looked into to determine character of possession.

Defendants' Case and Arguments (including submissions by Sri G.P. Bhargava)

  • Defendants maintained they had been given grants of land for building purposes and were put into possession; they had raised permanent constructions and denied encroachment (except where no encroachment was alleged, as in Ram Prasad).
  • They argued that the plaintiff's officers knew of and acquiesced in the permanent constructions and were therefore estopped from evicting them; they denied receipt of valid notices to quit (or alleged waiver); they asserted they had paid rent (without receipts issued).
  • In the second appeals counsel (Sri G.P. Bhargava) contended that the lease deed was inadmissible under Section 49/Section 17 registration provisions and under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and therefore the lower appellate court erred in using the unregistered lease for any purpose other than collateral purposes. He argued the lease could not be used to determine lease area, term, rent, or to create a landlord-tenant relationship, and that the defendants were licencees entitled to rely upon estoppel and Section 60(b) of the Easements Act (licence may be irrevocable where licensee has executed a permanent work and incurred expenses).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Chhotey Lal v. Durga Bai (A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 661) Referred to by the lower appellate court in support of examining an unregistered lease for collateral purposes. The court records that the lower appellate court relied on this and similar decisions to justify looking into the unregistered lease; the present court evaluates and restricts such use under Section 49.
Fateh Chand v. Mst. Radha Rani (A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 625) Referred to by the lower appellate court among authorities permitting collateral examination of documents. Noted as part of the lower appellate court's reliance; this court nonetheless holds limits on admissibility under Section 49 and disallows the uses made by the lower appellate court.
Vadasseri Taravattil Karnavan v. Appaswami Konan (A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 3950 Vol. 42) One of the decisions cited by the lower appellate court regarding examination of documents. Referenced as part of the lower appellate court's authorities; the present court does not adopt the expansive use made by the lower appellate court and confines permissible purposes to those in Section 49 proviso.
Ram Kishore v. Ambika Prasad (A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 515) Cited by the lower appellate court in support of examining the unregistered deed for collateral purposes. Noted as relied on below; this court clarifies that the lower appellate court went beyond permissible collateral use under Section 49.
Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachchan Singh (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 199) Supreme Court: a document which should have been registered but was not cannot be admitted to alter the character of prior possession; Varada Pillai distinguished. The authority discusses when an unregistered document may be admissible to show nature of possession. The court cites paragraph 14 and holds that Kirpal Kaur does not assist the defendants here because, in the instant case, possession of the defendants started after execution of the lease deed (so the principle permitting reference to such a document to explain subsequent possession is applicable here, unlike in Kirpal Kaur where the document would have altered prior possession).
Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal (46 Ind. App. 285 / A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 44) Authority that an unregistered document may be admissible to explain the nature of possession (example: a petition used to show donee's possession was as owner and not as trustee). Quoted in the opinion to show circumstances where an unregistered instrument may be referred to for character of possession; the court uses this to distinguish when such reference is permissible.
Padma Vithoba Chakkavya v. Mohammad Multani (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 70) Holds an endorsement/cancellation on a sale deed may be inadmissible if unregistered, but an endorsement taken along with a sale deed may be admissible to show character of possession; Varada Pillai relied upon. The plaintiff cited this decision; the court records that the plaintiff's counsel relied on it and that the defendants' counsel did not contest that an unregistered lease could be looked into for the purpose of determining character of possession.
Sitharam Raja v. Subba Raju (A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 12) Referenced on the question whether adverse possession can be asserted against a minor in certain circumstances. Referred to in the Padma Vithoba discussion quoted in the opinion; here it is noted but not directly applied to the facts of the instant case.
Ratan Lal Sharma v. Purshottam Harit (1974 1 SCC 671) Held an award required registration and being unregistered was inadmissible in evidence for pronouncing judgment in accordance with it. The court observes that this decision does not define the scope of "collateral purposes" under which an unregistered document may be looked into and therefore was not helpful to the defendants on the central collateral-use question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis centers on the application of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act (with cross-reference to registration requirements under the Transfer of Property Act) and on the permissible scope of placing unregistered documents before a court.

Key steps in the court's reasoning:

  1. Statutory baseline — Section 49 was reproduced and interpreted. The court emphasized that an instrument requiring registration (e.g., a lease creating an interest) cannot "affect any immovable property comprised therein" or "be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property" unless registered. The proviso permits reception of such a document only in limited circumstances (specific performance, evidence of part performance under Section 53-A, or evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument).
  2. Application to the leases — The court held that the unregistered lease-deed could not be treated as creating an interest and thus could not establish a landlord-tenant relationship between plaintiff and defendants. That use is expressly prohibited by clause (a) of Section 49 because a lease creates an interest in immovable property.
  3. Permissible (collateral) uses — The court accepted that the proviso to Section 49 permits reception of an unregistered document for certain collateral purposes, notably to show the character of possession (e.g., whether possession is permissive or adverse). The court distinguished authorities and explained that because, in this case, defendants' possession began after the execution of the lease, the document may be referred to for the narrow purpose of determining the nature of possession (permissive or adverse).
  4. Prohibited uses by the lower appellate court — The court found that the lower appellate court had gone beyond permissible collateral use. In particular, the lower appellate court impermissibly relied on the lease to determine substantive lease terms (area leased, duration, rent, right to sublet, permission to erect temporary/ permanent constructions) and thereby concluded a landlord-tenant relationship existed. Those uses fall within the prohibitions of clauses (a) and (c) of Section 49 and were therefore legally impermissible.
  5. Consequences for findings below — Because the lease could not be used to establish tenancy or to prove the lease terms relied upon by the lower appellate court, the court held that the lower appellate court's conclusion about landlord-tenant relationship was erroneous in law. However, the court upheld the lower appellate court's factual finding that the defendants (other than Ram Prasad) had encroached upon land in excess of the leased area, since the plaintiff's ownership was undisputed and the encroached area could be established from other evidence.
  6. Remand for fresh determination on estoppel/acquiescence — The court concluded that the question whether the suit was barred by estoppel or acquiescence (the defendants' principal equitable defence) must be decided without reference to the lease's terms. The lower appellate court had negatived estoppel/acquiescence based on recitals in the lease rather than on the oral and other evidence; because that reliance was impermissible, the matter must be remanded to the lower appellate court to determine the nature of the defendants' possession and whether estoppel/acquiescence applies, on the basis of admissible evidence other than the lease terms.
  7. Other matters — The court observed that the defendants' counsel made a statement at the bar that his clients were willing to pay prorata rent for the encroached land and to take fresh leases; the court noted this as a matter for settlement between the parties and did not decide on it substantively.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEALS ALLOWED; MATTERS REMANDED.

Direct effect and orders made by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The second appeals are allowed. The cases are remitted to the lower appellate court to be decided afresh in light of the observations made in this opinion.
  • The lower appellate court is directed not to rely upon the terms of the unregistered lease-deed to establish a landlord-tenant relationship or to determine lease terms (area, duration, rent, right to sublet, permission to erect permanent constructions). Those uses are barred by Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act.
  • The lease-deed may be examined only for collateral purposes permitted by Section 49's proviso, specifically to determine the nature of the defendants' possession (e.g., whether permissive or adverse); however, even that issue must be decided on admissible evidence and, in this case, the defendants have pleaded licence (permissive possession), so the court must examine other admissible evidence to decide estoppel/acquiescence.
  • The lower appellate court's factual finding of encroachment by the defendants (other than Ram Prasad) is left standing.
  • Parties are to bear their own costs. The order also governs the listed writ petitions (Nos. 842, 843, 344 and 763 of 1968).

Broader implications (as expressed in the opinion):

The court clarifies and applies the limits imposed by Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act: an unregistered instrument that should have been registered cannot be received as evidence to create or affect an interest in immovable property or to prove substantive terms of such an instrument; it may be received only for the narrow collateral purposes enumerated in the proviso (e.g., to show character of possession in appropriate circumstances). The opinion instructs lower courts to confine the use of unregistered documents accordingly and to decide equitable defences (such as estoppel and acquiescence) on the admissible record without recourse to prohibited uses of unregistered instruments.

No section of this summary invents facts or law beyond those explicitly stated in the provided opinion. Where the opinion limited or remitted issues to the lower appellate court, the precise factual determinations were left to that court on remand.

    Arshad Ali Khan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh

    B.N Sapru, J.:— These five second appeals are connected and can be decided together. The plaintiff is the State of Uttar Pradesh. Its case was that it was the owner of the disputed land which forms part of the Right Bhakra Canal. It leased out land to the defendants on various dates. According to its case, it leased out two posts of land to Arshad Ali on September 25, 1951 for three years. It further leased out a plot of land to Jaswant Singh defendant for three years on July 10, 1952. There was a lease executed in favour of Munshi Lal by the State on July 10, 1952 for three years and another lease executed in favour of Imtiaz Husain for a period of three years on February 10, 1952. In the case of Ram Prasad it is said that the plaintiff State leased out a plot to him on July 10, 1952 for a period of three years. The plaintiff's case was that the defendants other than Ram Prasad had encroached on land adjacent to the plots leased out to them as shown in the site plan attached to the plaint. It is further the case of the plaintiff that under the terms of the lease the defendants were permitted to make temporary construction on the leased out plots, but that the defendants in contravention of the terms of the lease had made permanent constructions thereon. It is necessary to add that according to the plaint case a rental was reserved under the terms of the lease deed. The plaintiff's case that the defendants had not paid rent for the period mentioned in the plaint, and that they had been served with a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act but they had vacated the land. The plaintiff therefore, filed the suit and had prayed for a decree for eviction of the defendants from the land in dispute, and also for arrears of rent and for damages for use and occupation of the land both committed within the lease and also the land said to have been encroached upon. In the case of Ram Prasad no encroachment was alleged.

    2. The defendants contested the suit with the allegation that they were given grants of land for building purposes, and had been put into possession of the land and they had made permanent constructions thereon. The defendants denied (except in the case of Ram Prasad where no allegation of encroachment was made) that they had encroached on any land belonging to the plaintiff. The defence case further was that the plaintiff's officers, and agents were aware that they were raising permanent constructions of a valuable nature on the land in suit in the belief that they were entitled to make these constructions, and as such, the suit for eviction was barred by estoppel and acquiescence. The defendants further pleaded that they had paid rent to the plaintiff but had not been issued receipts, of the rent received by the plaintiff. The damages claimed for use and occupation was also asserted to be excessive. It was further pleaded that the defendants had not received any notice to quit and that notice, if any, had been waived. The defence case further was that they had obtained as injunction from a civil court restraining the plaintiff for evicting them from the land in suit except in accordance with law. It was further pleaded that the Crown's Grants Act did not apply to the territories of erstwhile State of Rampur when the grant was made, as had been asserted by the plaintiff. The defendants, therefore, asserted that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief as against them. The trial court framed the necessary issues. It was asserted before the trial court by the counsel for the plaintiff that the Crown Grants Act did not apply to the State of Rampur where the disputed land is admittedly situate. This finding was recorded on the basis of the concession made by the counsel for the plaintiff. Having found that the Crown Grants Act did not apply to the. State of Rampur, the trial court held that the so-called lease required registration under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and being an unregistered document, it was inadmissible in evidence. As regards encroachment the trial court held that the lease deeds being inadmissible the defendants were not lessees of the land in suit, and that the Commissioner's report did not prove any encroachment, and as there was no further evidence to prove encroachment on behalf of the plaintiff, its case that the defendants other than Ram Prasad had encroached on the land was not proved. The trial court further found that the defendants were licensees of the plaintiff and were in possession in that capacity. It further found that the defendants had failed to prove that they had been granted a license of the land in dispute with permission to build thereon, and as such, the constructions were unlawful. Another finding of the trial court was that the constructions had been within the knowledge of the plaintiffs servants and that the defendants evidence that the Ziledars and other employees of the plaintiff saw them making the constructions and advised them to construct in a particular way is correct, and as such, the suit for eviction was barred by estoppel and acquiescence. Having found that the defendants were not lessees of the land, the trial court found it unnecessary to determine whether the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on the defendants. It accordingly decreed the suit for recovery of what it called the premium for a licence which was equivalent to the rent agreed under the lease deed and dismissed the suit for other reliefs.

    3. The plaintiff filed an appeal. The lower appellate court agreed with the trial court that the lease deed was required to the registered and as it was not registered, it could not be admitted in evidence, but it looked into it for collateral purpose. It has held that if the lease deed is held to be a licence as held by the trial court, it could be looked into as a document granting licence, which required no registration. After referring to the decisions of various courts in the cases of Chhotey Lal v. Durga Bai . A.I.R 1950 Alld. 661., Fateh Chand v. Mst. Radha Rani . A.I.R 1956 Alld. 625. and Vadasseri Taravattil Karnavan v. Appaswami Konan . A.I.R 1955 N.U.C 3950 Vol. 42. and Ram Kishore v. Ambika Prasad . A.I.R 1966 Alld. 515. it came to conclusion that the lease deed (referred to as the deed of grant by the lower appellate court) could be looked into for collateral purposes of finding out the nature of possession of the defendants over the property and also of its extent.

    4. The lower appellate court therefore referred to the lease deed and found out the area leased out to the defendants. It further found on the basis of the lease deed that the defendants had been permitted to put up temporary Chhappars on the land which could be removed on the expiration or determination of the grant. It further found that the lease deed gave the lessee the right to sublet the land with the permission of the Executive-Engineer. It was further held by the lower appellate court again on the basis of the lease deed that if due to natural calamity the plaintiff remitted the whole or part of the rent, the lesssee would remit the rent payable but their sub-tenants, if any. The lower appellate court has also looked into the lease deed for finding out the period for which it was granted and for the amount of the rent reserved in the lease. It has also found with reference to the lease that there was a right of re-entry in the plaintiff under certain specified conditions. Having looked into the lease the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that under the lease deed an interest in the property was created in favour of the defendants respondents, and that the relation between the plaintiff and the defendants was that of a landlord and tenant. The lower appellate court has observed in its judgment that as an interest in the property was created in favour of the defendants, they could not be deemed to be the licences of the land in suit. In this connection the lower appellate court was impressed with the fact that under the lease deed the lessee was entitled to sublet the land. It has said in its judgment that a licence was not transferable, and hence, this was again an indication that the defendants were not licencees of the land in dispute. The lower appellate court further held that the fact that rent had been offered and accepted and from other circumstances in the case a valid tenancy could be inferred It, therefore, recorded a finding that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants.

    5. After looking into the lease deed and the report of the petitioner and the map prepared by him, it found that the area in possession of the defendants other than Ram Prasad was in excess of the area leased out and as such, encroachment by the defendants was established.

    6. The lower appellate court further found that under the lease deed the defendants had only been permitted to put up temporary constructions on the land in suit and that immediately after taking possession of the land under grant they had raised permanent constructions showed that the constructions had not been made with the consent or the permission of the plaintiff. In this connection it observed that in view of the terms of the lease regarding the making of temporary constructions the defendants' evidence that they had made the constructions with the consent or permission explicit or implied of the plaintiff through its agent could not be considered. It further found that in view of the fact that the lease deed showed, that it had been granted for a fixed term it only permitted temporary constructions, the defendants' plea that they had made permanent constructions with the consent of the plaintiff or its agent could not accept and, therefore, the suit was not barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. The lower appellate court has found that the notice to quit was valid and that the mere fact that the plaintiff did not file a suit against the defendants for about three years did not mean that the notice to quit had been waived. The lower appellate court in view of its finding referred to above allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for ejectment from the land originally leased and from the land found to have been encroached upon by the defendants (except in the case of Ram Prasad), a decree was also granted in favour of the plaintiff for arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The lower appellate court further directed that the plaintiff would get pendenti lite and future damages in respect of the entire land as mentioned in the judgment. It further permitted the defendant to remove the constructions within a period specified in the judgment.

    7. The defendants have now filed second appeals which are being decided now. Sri G.P Bhargava appearing on behalf of the defendants has urged that the lease deed being inadmissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act it cannot be looked into for any purpose other than a collateral purpose. The learned counsel has urged that the lower appellate court has erred in law in looking into the lease for other than collateral purposes. His argument is that the lease deed could not be looked into for finding out the area of the land leased out, the duration of the lease, the amount of rent reserved or the other terms and conditions of the lease. His further argument is that no relationship of landlord and tenant was created by the lease deed and the status of the defendants was that of licencees who had been induced to believe that they could raise permanent constructions on the land in suit and, as such, the suit was barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. In this connection a reference to the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act may be made which provides.

    “A licence may be revoked by the landlord unless the licence acting upon the licence has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in its execution.”

    8. On the question whether the unregistered lease deed could be looked into for determining the nature of possession of the defendants, a reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachchan Singh . A.I.R 1958 S.C 199. where it was observed in paragraph 14 as follows:

    “It is then said that the agreement of February 6, 1932 showed that since its date her possession was permissive. The High Court has held that the agreement was admissible to prove the nature of her possession. In Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal . 46 Ind. App. 285 it was held that a document which should have been registered but was not, was admissible to explain the nature of the possession of a person. What had happened there was that two widows who were in possession of a property in equal shares, presented a petition to the Collector on October 10, 1895, whereby after reciting that they had on October 8, 1895, given away the property as Stridhan to one Duraisani, they prayed that orders might be passed for transfering the villages into her name. On this petition the property was registered in the name of Daraisani and she was put in possession and thereafter continued in possession till her death in 1911. The question was whether Duraisani had acquired the title to the property by adverse possession. It was held that though the petition in the absence of registration could not be admitted to prove a gift, it might be referred to for showing that the subsequent possession of Duraisani was as a donee and owner of the land and not as trustee or manager for the two donors and therefore to show that the nature of such possession was adverse to them. We cannot agree that on the authority of Varada Pillai's case the agreement of February 6, 1932, can be admitted in evidence in the case in hand to show the nature, of Harnam Kaur's possession of the lands subsequent to its date. In Varada Pillai's case. Durasani had got into possession only after the petition and claimed to retain possession only under the gift mentioned in it. The petition was therefore, admissible in evidence to show the nature of her possession. In the present case Harnam Kaur had been in possession before the date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating to destroy the naure of the previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession and, therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it which admittedly cannot be done for want of registration. To admit it in evidence for the purpose sought would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by Section 49 of the Registration Act.”

    9. In the instant case, the possession of the defendants started after the execution of the lease deed and, as such, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court would not assist them. Another case which has been referred to in the course of arguments is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Padma Vithoba Chakkavya v. Mohammad Multani . A.I.R 1963 S.C 70. wherein paragraph 8 it was observed as follows:—

    “The endorsement of cancellation on the back of the sale deed in favour of Rajanna dated December 21, 1923, has been held, as already stated, to be inadmissible in evidence as it is not registered. The result of it is only that there was no transfer of title by Rajanna to the second defendant, and the family would in consequence continue to be the owner, and that is why the appellant is entitled to redeem. But the endorsement taken along with the sale deed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant is admissible in evidence to show the character of possession of the latter. Vide Varada Pillai v. Jeewarathnammal . A.I.R 1919 P.C 44., and that was clearly adverse to the owner. The answer of the appellant to this contention is that Rajanna himself was a minor at the time when this arrangement is stated to have taken place, and in consequence no title in adverse possession can be founded on it. We agree that if Raj anna was a minor when he entered into this arrangement that would not operate to alter the character of the possession of the first defendant as mortgagee. The respondent contended that there can be adverse possession against a minor in certain circumstances, and relied on the decision in Sitharam Raja v. Subba Raju . A.I.R 1922 Mad. 12., in support of this position. That is not questioned, but the point for decision is whether possession lawful at the inception can be adverse under an arrangement entered into by a minor. Now, a minor is in law incapable of giving consent, and there being no consent, there could be no change in the character of possession, which can only be by consent, and not by any unilateral act. Therefore, the crucial point for determination is whether at the time of the cancellation of the sale deed dated December 21, 1923 Rajanna was a minor or a major. According to the respondent he was a major and there is evidence also on record in support of this contention. According to the appellant Rajanna was a minor at that time and he died a minor in 1930. On his disputed question of fact there has been neither an issue framed nor evidence adduced. Under the circumstances we think it desirable that the matter should be remanded to the court of District Munsif for a fresh inquiry on this question. The plaintiff should on remand be required to suitably amend the plaint so as to convert the suit into one for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage of the year 1916. The first defendant will then file his written statement in answer thereto. An issue will be framed whether Rajanna was a major at the time when the sale deed was cancelled. If it is held that he was a major, then the possession of the first defendant thereafter would be adverse and on the findings given by the courts below, the suit will have to be dismissed as barred by limitation. But if it held that Rajanna was then a minor, then there would be no question of adverse possession and the plaintiff would be entitled to redeem the mortgage. The decree of the lower court is accordingly set aside and the matter remanded to the court of the District Munsif for fresh disposal as stated above. Costs, incurred throughout in all the courts will abide the result.”

    10. This decision has been cited by the Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, and Sri G.P Bhargava does not contest the position that the lease deed can be looked into for the purpose of determining the character of the defendant's possession of the land. Learned counsel for the appellant Sri G.P Bhargava has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratan Lal Sharma v. Purshottam Harit . 1974 1 SCC 671 where it was observed as follows:—

    “It is not necessary to express any opinion on the first argument as we are of opinion that the award requires registration, and, not being registered, is inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in accordance with it. So we pass on to the remaining two arguments of the appellant.”

    11. This decision is of no assistance to the defendant in the present case as it does not attempt to define what are collateral purposes for which an unregistered document which requires registration can be looked into. In this situation it would be useful to refer to the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. Section 49, in so far as it is relevant is reproduced below:

    “No document required by Section 17 of by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered shall—

    (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or

    (b) confer any power to adopt, or

    (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or confering such power, unless it has been registered:

    Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter 11 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registered instrument.”

    12. The lower appellate court held that the unregistered lease-deed established a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. This is clearly prohibited in view of the provisions of clause (a) of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. It is well known that a lease creates an interest in the property. As such, the lower appellate court erred in law in holding that the unregistered lease deed created relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants.

    13. The lease deed could in view of the proviso to Section 49 be received as evidence of a collateral transaction, or required to be affected by a registered instrument. The amount of rent agreed between the parties could be found from the other evidence produced in the case regarding offer and acceptance of the rent without a reference to the lease deed. The various stipulations in the lease deed which formed an integral part of the lease deed cannot be examined. The lease deed could be looked into for determining the nature of the possession of the defendants in order to find out whether it was adverse or permissive. However, that problem does not arise in the instant case, as the defendants have not set up a plea of adverse possession and have pleaded licence. They accordingly admit the plea that their possession is permissive.

    14. According to the plaintiff the defendants other than Ram Prasad had encroached on the land adjoining the land leased out under the lease deed to defendants. The lease deed could not be referred for finding out what was the area leased out to the defendant. However, the plaintiff's ownership of the land having not been disputed by the defendants, the lease deed could be referred to for the purpose of finding out what was the area encroached upon. Therefore, the finding of the trial court that there was no encroachment proved in the case cannot be sustained.

    15. As has been held earlier, the lease deed could not establish a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. However, it is clear that the possession of the defendants was permissive. The lease deed being inadmissible in evidence it is not possible to find out the period for which it was granted. The lower appellate court was not justified in law in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties by a reference to the terms of the lease. The lower appellate court in its judgment has taken into consideration that under the terms of the lease deed the defendants could sublet the land and that they could only make temporary constructions thereon and that the lease was for a fixed term. This was clearly prohibited by a provision of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, as it was receiving evidence of a character prohibited by clauses (a) and (c) of the said section. The purposes for which the lower appellate court has looked into the lease deed were not collateral transactions not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

    16. The lower appellate court negatived the plea of estoppel and acquiescence by a reference to the terms of the lease deed, in particular, by a reference to the terms which prescribed the duration of the lease and that providing only for the making of temporary constructions. This was again in contravention of the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. The lower appellate court, as observed earlier, has not referred to the oral evidence produced on behalf of the defendants in this connection, and has negatived the defendants case only on the basis of the recitals in the lease deed. In the result, the appeal has to be allowed and the case has to be sent back to the lower appellate court to determine the nature of the defendants' possession over the land in suit and find out whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. The lower appellate court will not take into consideration the terms of the lease while determining this question, but will decide it on the basis of other evidence on the record. The finding of the lower appellate court regarding encroachment by the defendants will stand. Sri G.P Bhargava appearing on behalf of the defendants made a statement at the bar that his clients are prepared to pay prorata rent for the land alleged to have been encroached upon by them, and they are also prepared to take fresh leases. This is of course a matter for settlement between the parties themselves.

    17. In the result the appeals are allowed and the cases are sent back to the lower appellate court to decide the matter afresh in the light of the observations made above. Parties will bear their own costs. This order will also govern writ petitions Nos. 842, 843, 344 and 763 of 1968.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Arshad Ali Khan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh
    (Oct 13, 1977)