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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 1970. Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 20 of the U.P Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972,
  • Sec. 4, Transfer of Property Act, the provision of the Indian Contract Act
  • Sec. 7(1) of the public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act
  • action.12. Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) of the 1947 Rent Control Act
  • (Sec. 64, Contract Act), novation (Sec. 62) or assignment (Sec. 40).
  • Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) of the 19-17 Rent Control Act.
  • Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control. Act of 1972
  • Sec. 101 of the English Act of 1862.17.
  • Sec. 108(c), Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sec. 186 of the companies Act, 1913.
  • Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control Act
  • Sec. 25, Small Causes Courts Act.
  • Sec. 28 of the Limitation Act,
  • Sec. 25(3) of the contract Act
  • Sub-sec. (2)(b) of that section
  • Sec. 60 of the contract Act
  • Rent Control Act of 1972
  • Sec. 37, Contract Act,
  • (Sec. 63 Contract Act)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 1970. Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 20 of the U.P Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972,
  • Sec. 4, Transfer of Property Act, the provision of the Indian Contract Act
  • Sec. 7(1) of the public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act
  • action.12. Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) of the 1947 Rent Control Act
  • (Sec. 64, Contract Act), novation (Sec. 62) or assignment (Sec. 40).
  • Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) of the 19-17 Rent Control Act.
  • Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control. Act of 1972
  • Sec. 101 of the English Act of 1862.17.
  • Sec. 108(c), Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sec. 186 of the companies Act, 1913.
  • Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control Act
  • Sec. 25, Small Causes Courts Act.
  • Sec. 28 of the Limitation Act,
  • Sec. 25(3) of the contract Act
  • Sub-sec. (2)(b) of that section
  • Sec. 60 of the contract Act
  • Rent Control Act of 1972
  • Sec. 37, Contract Act,
  • (Sec. 63 Contract Act)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Satish Chandra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit for ejectment was pressed by the opposite party on the sole ground of non-payment of rent despite service of a notice of demand. At trial the court upheld that plea and decreed eviction. The defendant (tenant) sought revision under Sec. 25 of the Small Causes Courts Act.

Findings recorded in the revision: the defendant had been a monthly tenant (rent Rs. 200) since 1958; arrears for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1970 amounted to Rs. 19,200; a notice demanding payment and to quit was served on 9 July 1973. The defendant did not pay those arrears. During the suit the defendant deposited rent for 1 May 1973 to 28 February 1975 (with interest and costs) totaling Rs. 5,972.43. The trial court concluded that because the defendant had not paid the arrears for January 1963 to December 1970 he was not entitled to relief under Sec. 20(4) of the U.P. Rent Control Act, 1972.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "the entire amount of rent and damages ... due from him" in Sub‑section (4) of Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, includes arrears of rent the recovery of which has become barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant/Tenant's Arguments (Mr. Saksena)

  • Sec. 20(4) does not require the tenant to deposit arrears of rent the recovery of which has become barred by limitation.
  • The tenant is entitled to relief against eviction even though he had not deposited rent for the period January 1963 to December 1970, i.e., time-barred arrears should not be included in "entire amount."
  • Relied upon the Supreme Court decision in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram (interpreting the word "payable" in Sec.7(1) of the Public Premises Act) and on decisions from other High Courts (including Satyendra Kumar v. M.V. Ramchandra Murthey) to support the contention that statutory wording of this kind should be read as applying only to legally recoverable (i.e., not time-barred) rent.

Opposite Party/Landlord's Plea

  • The landlord prosecuted the ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent (arrears) in spite of a notice of demand; the trial court accepted that defence and decreed ejectment. (The opinion does not set out further detailed submissions by the landlord.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 A.L.J. 503 Held that the expression "arrears of rent" is wide enough to include arrears which could not be recovered in a court of law (i.e., time‑barred arrears); tenant's equitable liability to past rent subsists though remedy may be barred. Used to support the proposition that arrears barred by limitation still form part of "arrears of rent" that a tenant must pay to avoid forfeiture/eviction.
Mahipal Singh v. Mam Chand, 1963 A.L.J. 496 After the 1954 amendment (which deleted the word "any") the phrase "arrears of rent" still includes arrears the recovery of which has become barred by time. Relied on to show legislative amendment did not alter the principle that time‑barred arrears remain part of "arrears of rent."
Behari Lal v. Babu Ram, 1964 A.L.J. 458 Reiterated the principle that "arrears of rent" includes rent for which recovery has become time‑barred; the clause is to prevent eviction rather than to provide a foundation for recovery. Followed as confirming that the tenant's obligation to pay past rent survives limitation as a basis for preventing eviction.
Bombay Dying & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 328 (para 14) Limitation bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the debt (except where Sec. 28 Limitation Act applies, which does not apply to a debt). Applied to support the conclusion that a time‑barred arrear remains an undischarged debt and therefore falls within "entire amount of rent ... due."
Mahant Singh v. U. Ba Yi, A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 110 Shows that a creditor may recover from a surety even though a suit on it is barred against the principal debtor (illustrating that barred debts can still be enforced in certain contexts). Referenced among authorities demonstrating that a barred debt remains a subsisting liability for many purposes.
Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar, I.L.R. 33 Mad. 30 Authority cited for the proposition that a barred debt does not cease to be a debt in many legal contexts. Used as supporting precedent for the general principle that limitation affects remedy not the obligation.
Dil Muhammad v. Sain Das, A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 396 Another authority cited to show that limitation bars remedy and not the underlying obligation. Relied on to reinforce the same general point regarding barred debts.
Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi, A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 67 Where a creditor has a lien over goods as security, he can enforce the lien for satisfaction of the debt even though an action would be time‑barred. Invoked as further illustration that enforcement against security or surety may survive limitation against the principal debtor; supports the principle that a debt continues to exist despite limitation barring suit.
New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, Civil Appeal No. 988 of 1968 (decided 20 April 1976) Interpreted the word "payable" in Sec. 7(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act to mean "legally recoverable" — if recovery of an amount is barred by limitation the Estate Officer could not insist that the amount was payable under that section. Considered by the tenant's counsel as supportive of excluding time‑barred rent; the court distinguished it as addressing a different statutory scheme (a special recovery procedure) and did not accept its reasoning as controlling for Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control Act.
Hans Raj Gupta v. Official Liquidator of the Dehradun‑Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 63 Privy Council held that "money due" in the context of a special recovery procedure must be confined to money due and recoverable in a suit, not amounts that could not be recovered at that date. Used in New Delhi Municipal Committee case; considered in this opinion but distinguished on the basis that Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control Act creates a substantive conditional right (relief from eviction) rather than a special recovery procedure.
Satyendra Kumar v. M.V. Ramchandra Murthey, 1975 (A.I.R. C.J. 371) Decision referenced (from Karnataka High Court) which, referring to Virupanayya Rudrayya Allimatni, treats similar wording in a different statute as requiring payment of "rent legally recoverable" (excluding time‑barred amounts). Considered by the court but distinguished as turning on a different statutory scheme (Mysore/ Karnataka Act) and not controlling the interpretation of Sec. 20(4) under the U.P. Rent Control Act of 1972.
Virupanayya Rudrayya Allimatni v. Anusuyabai, 1967 1 Mys. L.J. 231 Held under the Mysore Act that the words "rent due" should be construed to mean rent legally due and recoverable (i.e., not including time‑barred rent), given the statutory context. Referred to and distinguished on the ground that the statutory scheme considered there (Mysore Act) differs materially from Sec. 20(4) of the U.P. Rent Control Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the pivotal phrase in Sec. 20(4) — "the entire amount of rent and damages ... due from him" — and posed the precise question whether "entire amount" includes arrears the recovery of which is time‑barred.

The court examined legislative history and prior decisions interpreting similar language. It recounted authorities (Sohan Lal Kharbanda; Mahipal Singh; Behari Lal) which had held that "arrears of rent" includes amounts recoverable in equity though barred in law, and emphasized the consistent principle that the Limitation Act ordinarily bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the debt (citing Bombay Dying & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay and other authorities).

The court considered contrasting authority relied upon by the tenant: the Supreme Court decision in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram (and its reliance on Hans Raj Gupta) and High Court decisions interpreting equivalent provisions in other state Acts (Satyendra Kumar; Virupanayya). Those cases treated words like "payable" or "rent due" in the context of special recovery procedures or differently‑worded statutory schemes as referring to amounts legally recoverable (excluding time‑barred sums).

The court distinguished those authorities on the basis of context and statutory purpose. It noted that Sec. 20(4) of the U.P. Rent Control Act does not create an alternative procedure for recovery but confers upon the tenant a substantive conditional right to relief against eviction — a right that is explicitly conditional and mandatory upon payment of the rent "due." The court read the inclusion of the word "entire" as clarifying legislative intent that all unpaid rent should be paid or deposited (i.e., not limited to legally recoverable amounts) before relief from eviction can be granted.

Relying on the line of authorities that limitation bars remedy but not the underlying obligation, and on the legislative purpose of Sec. 20(4) to make the tenant put the landlord in the same position as if no default had occurred, the court concluded that time‑barred arrears are included within "entire amount of arrears of rent due" for the purposes of Sec. 20(4).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision fails and is dismissed with costs; the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of Sec. 20(4) because he did not pay the entire arrears, and the phrase "entire amount of rent ... due" includes arrears of rent the recovery of which has become barred by limitation.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the tenant's revision is dismissed and the trial court's decree for ejectment stands; the tenant must deposit the entire arrears (including those barred by limitation) to obtain relief under Sec. 20(4), which he did not do.
  • No broader, new precedent beyond the court's application of existing authorities was proclaimed in this opinion; the decision applies established principles (that limitation bars remedy not the debt) to the interpretation of Sec. 20(4) of the U.P. Rent Control Act, 1972.

This summary is strictly confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added.

    Khadi Gramudyog Trust (Gramudyog Mandal) v. Ram Ghandraji

    Satish Chandra, J.:— The only ground upon which the opposite party pressed the suit for ejectment of the tenant (applicant) was non-payment of rent in spite of a notice of demand. The trial court upheld this plea and decreed the suit for ejectment.

    2. The tenant has come to this court in revision under Sec. 25, Small Causes Courts Act. The findings are that the defendant was a tenant of the accommodation on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- since 1958. The defendant did not pay the arrears of rent for the period 1st January, 1963, to 31st December, 1970, amounting to Rs. 19,200/-. A notice demanding payment of this amount as well as to quit the accommodation was served upon the defendant on 9th July, 1973. In spite of it the defendant did not make any payment towards the rent due for the period January, 1963, to December, 1970. During the pendency of the suit the defendant deposited the rent for the period 1st May, 1973, to 28th February, 1975, together with interest and costs etc. totaling Rs. 5,972.43. Since he had not paid the arrears of rent for the period January, 1963, to December, 1970, he was not entitled to the benefit of Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control Act of 1972.

    3. Mr. Saksena, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that Sec. 20(4) did not require the tenant to deposit arrears of rent, the recovery of which had become barred by limitation. The tenant was entitled to relief against eviction even though he had not deposited the rent for the period January, 1963, to December, 1970. Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 20 of the U.P Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, provides—

    “In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-Sec. (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground.”

    4. The relevant and material words which require consideration in this case are “the entire amount of rent and damages …. due from him.” The question is would the entire amount include arrears of rent, the recovery of which has become barred by time?

    5. Sec. 3(1)(a) of the 1947 Rent Control Act, as it stood before the 1954 amendment, provided—

    “(a) That the tenant has willfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within a month of the service upon him of the notice of demand from the landlord.”

    6. The phrase “any arrears of rent” came up for interpretation in this court on a number of occassions. In Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha . 1957 A.L.J 503., it was held that the expression “arrears of rent” is wide enough to include even those arrears which could not be recovered in a court of law. The reason is obvious. The remedy of a landlord to recover an arrear may be lost by reason of the law of limitation, but the tenant's liability in equity to pay the past rent subsists. By the use of the words “any arrears” the Legislature emphasised that if a tenant is desirous of preventing the landlord from esercising his right of forfeiture by reason of the default made by the tenant in the payment of rent, then irrespective of the fact whether arrears due were time barred, the tenant should put the landlord in the same position as if no default in payment was made.

    7. In 1954 the leg suture amended Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) of the 19-17 Rent Control Act. In substance, it deleted the word “any” in the phrase “any arrears of rent.” In Mahipal Singh v. Mam Chand . 1963 A.L.J 496., the amended phrase came up for consideration. It was held that the phrase “arrears of rent” cannot be equated with “arrears of recoverable rent” or “arrears of rent” is wide enough to include even those arrears recovery of which has already become barred by time.

    8. In Behari Lal v. Babu Ram . 1964 A.L.J 458., a Division Bench reiterated that the amendment of Clause (a) in 1954 did not change the position and the principle laid down in Sohan Lal's case was still applicable. In that case I observed that the object and intent of Clause (a) to Sec. 3(1) is not to provide a foundation for the landlord's right to recover arrears of rent. It provides the basis, for preventing the tenant's eviction. The term “arrears of rent” would include rent for which a decree has been passed though its execution may have become time-barred, because passing of a decree does not extinguish the debt. It does not discharge the liability to pay the debt. It further observed—

    “In view of Sec. 4, Transfer of Property Act, the provision of the Indian Contract Act are applicable supplementarily to transfers based on contracts like sales, mortgages, leases. Under Sec. 108(c), Transfer of Property Act, a tenant is bound to pay the rent to the lessor. Sec. 37, Contract Act, says that a party to contract must perform his promise unless the performance is excused or dispensed with ‘under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law.” An obligation created (by contract subsists until discharged. The discharge can be by satisfaction, rescission (Sec. 64, Contract Act), novation (Sec. 62) or assignment (Sec. 40). It can under the Contract Act also be effected by the promisee dispensing with or remitting its performance (Sec. 63 Contract Act) or the contract becoming void (Sec. 66, Contract Act).

    The ‘other law’ must be such as to nullify the obligation itself, e.g, the Insolvency Act or the Rule of Damupat under the Hindu Law (see A.I.R 1946 Nagpur 210). The Limitation Act is not such a law. It bars only the remedy of suit.”

    9. In Bombay Dying and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay . A.I.R 1958 S.C 328 para 14. the Supreme Court ruled that it is settled law that the status of limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt, except in cases provided for by Sec. 28 of the Limitation Act, which does not apply to a debt. Under Sec. 25(3) of the contract Act a barred debt is good consideration for a fresh promise to pay the amount. Sec. 60 of the contract Act provides that when a debtor makes a payment without any direction as to how it is to be appropriated, the creditor has the right to appropriate it towards a barred debt. In several cases it has been held that a creditor is entitled to recover the debt from the surety, even though a suit on it is barred against the principal debtor. See Mahant Singh v. U. Ba Yi . A.I.R 1939 P.C 110., Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar . I.L.R 33 Mad. 30. and Dil Muhammad v. Sain Das . A.I.R 1927 Lah. 396.. Similarly, when a creditor has a lien over goods by way of security for a loan, he can enforce the lien for obtaining satisfaction of the debt, even though an action thereon would be time-barred Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi . A.I.R 1921 Cal. 67..

    10. The law in this respect is the same in England — Vide Halsburys laws of England (Hailshans Ed.) Vol. 20, page 602, para 756—as well as in the United States. See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 34, page 314.

    11. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 53, page 922, it has been stated:—

    “The general rule, at least with respect to debts or money demands, is that a statute of limitation bars, or runs against the remedy and does not discharge the debt or extinguish or impair the right, obligation, or cause of action.”

    12. Clause (a) of Sec. 3(1) of the 1947 Rent Control Act provided a conditional protection to the tenant. The purpose and object of clause (4) of Sec. 20 of the 1972 Act is similar. It affords relief against liability for eviction subject to the condition that the tenant pays the entire amount of rent due from him. The word “Entire” clarifies the legislative intent that whatever amount has not been paid should be paid or deposited to enable the tenant to pray that he be relieved against liability for eviction.

    13. Mr. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, relief upon a decision of the Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram . C.A No. 988 of 1968 decided on 20th April 1976.. In that case Sec. 7(1) of the public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act came up for consideration. It provided:—

    “7(1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, the estate officer may, by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order.”

    14. It was held that the word “payable”, though of indefinite import, must be construed in the context in which it occurs. “Payable” generally means that which should be paid. If the person in arrears raises a dispute as to the amount, the Estate officer, in determining the amount payable, cannot ignore the existing laws. If the recovery of any amount is barred by limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate officer could still insist that the said amount was payable. Sec. 7 only provided a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. The court relied on a Privy Council decision in Hans Raj Gupta v. Official Liquidator of the Dehradun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. . A.I.R 1933 P.C 63. and ultimately held that the word “payable” in Sec. 7 in the context in which it occurs means legally recoverable. If any arrears was barred by time, the same could not be recovered under Sec. 7(1).

    15. In the case of Hans Raj Gupta the Privy Council considered the phrase “money due” occurring in Sec. 186 of the companies Act, 1913. It held that the words “any money due from him or from the estate of the person whom he represents to the company” occurring in Sec. 186 must be confined to money due and recoverable in a suit by the company and they do not include any moneys which at the date of the application under Sec. 186 could not have been so recovered. Lord Russell, speaking for the judicial committee, observed that Sec. 186 was a section with an ancestral history. It is concerned only with moneys due from a contributory. It is a section which creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys. It is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights and the power of the court to order payment is discretionary. It may refuse to act under the section, leaving the Liquidator to sue in the name of the company and it will readily take that course in any case in which it is made apparent that the respondent under this procedure, if continued, would be deprived of some defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys.

    16. The provisions of Sec. 186 were held to be in pari materia with Sec. 101 of the English Act of 1862.

    17. It will thus be seen that the word “due” was held to have a special connotation in the context of the situation that the provision provided a special procedure for recovery of money without creating any new right and that the provision was discretionary. The court may well refuse to act under it. The word “due” occurring in Sec. 20(4) of the Rent Control. Act of 1972 has entirely a different context. It occurs in a section which provides, not an alternative procedure for recovery of arrears of rent, but which confers upon the tenant a right to relief against eviction. This right is founded upon the condition that the rent due must be paid. It confers no discretion on the tenant. The provision is explicit and mandatory. Unless the condition is fulfilled, the right to relief against eviction does not accure.

    18. This, coupled with the fact that a time-barred arrears of rent continues to remain an undischarged debt, clearly means that the phrase “entire amount of arrears of rent due” would include arrears of rent, recovery of which has become time-barred within meaning of clause (4) of Sec. 20.

    19. Mr. Saksena invited by attention to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Satyendra Kumar etc. v. M.V Ramchandra Murthey . 1975 A.I.R C.J 371.. This decision, though on a different point, in its turn refers to Virupanayya Rudrayya Allimatni v. Anusuyabai . 1967 1 Mys. L.J 231.. In the letter case it was held—

    “It is evident that the object of provision of Sec. 29 is to secure prompt payment of rent by the tenant to the landlord during the pendency of proceedings for eviction under the act and to discountenance any attempt on the part of the tenant from a topping the payment. A tenant who wants to avail the benefit of the Mysore Act is placed under an obligation to the prompt payment of rent and this, therefore, a penal provision. That being so the words “rent due” used in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 29 must be construed strictly unless the statute makes an express provision directing the tenant to pay even time-barred rent and no liability can be imposed on the tenant to pay arrears of rent which has become time-barred. Further if it is to be construed that the words ‘rent due’ include time-barred rent as well, it would lead to an incongueous situation. As already observed the object of the provision of Sec. 29 is to secure prompt payment of rent by the tenant to the landlord during the pendency of the proceeding for eviction under the Mysore Act. It is clear that the disability is imposed by Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 29 of the Act from contesting any proceeding without making deposit as laid down therein on a tenant against whom an obligation has been cast under Sec. 29.

    Now Sec. 21 of the Act provides that an order for eviction will be made if the tenant has not paid rent ‘legally recoverable’. Then again in Sub-sec. (2)(b) of that section relief against forfeiture of tenancy is provided for the tenant who pays arrears of rent ‘legally recoverable’. In the main proceeding, therefore, rent which the landlord would be entitled to is the rent which is legally recoverable. In Other words he is not entitled to rent which is legally not recoverable or time-barred. If it is construed that the words “rent due” in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 29 include time-barred rent also, the resolutant position would be that the benefit conferred upon the landlord in the pending proceeding, viz., under Sec. 29, would be even more than what he would be entitled to under his main application for eviction, i.e, under Sec. 21. Thus having regard to the scheme of the Mysore Act, the words ‘arrears of rent due’ occurring in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 29 should be construed with due regard to the place and the context in which they are found. If so construed it means rent legally due and recoverable by action and does not include rent which is barred by the law of limitation.”

    20. It will be seen that the main provision was that right to relief from eviction was available if the tenant pays rent legally recoverable. There is no such restriction on the laibility to pay rent in the Rent Control Act of 1972 of this state. Here the tenant has to pay the entire amount of rent due and not merely that portion which is legally recoverable. This case is hence distinguishable.

    21. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.

    22. Revision dismissed.

    Rent Control Act of 1972

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    Comments

    Khadi Gramudyog Trust (Gramudyog Mandal) v. Ram Ghandraji
    (Apr 19, 1977)