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Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Ladly Prasad, filed a suit in the court of the Munsif, Ghaziabad, seeking eviction of the defendants from disputed premises and recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were tenants at a monthly rent of Rs. 150 and that their tenancy had been terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants contested the suit, pleading inter alia that the termination notice was illegal, the tenancy had not been terminated in law, and no rent was due. Necessary issues were framed in the suit.

While the suit was pending, the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972) inserted Rule 5 into Order XV of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff applied to have the defendants' defence struck off and for an ex parte decree under Order XV, Rule 5 on the ground that the defendants had failed to deposit arrears and monthly amounts as required by that Rule. The defendants opposed that application, contending Rule 5 did not apply and, alternatively, seeking 15 days' time to comply if Rule 5 were held applicable.

The learned Munsif held that Order XV, Rule 5 applied and allowed the defendants fifteen days to deposit the dues. The Additional District Judge dismissed the defendants' revision and upheld the trial court's order. The defendants then filed a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Single Judge, without deciding the merits of the underlying tenancy dispute, directed that if the petitioners paid the amount of rent they said was due up to February 28, 1975 within one month (or before the first day of hearing at the trial court) the trial court would not strike off their defence; the Single Judge also directed continued monthly deposits as required by Rule 5. The plaintiff (appellant) appealed against the Single Judge's order to the court which delivered the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as inserted by the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972) was attracted in the suit between lessor and lessee at the stage reached in the trial court.
  2. Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, had competence to entertain the petition challenging the trial and revision court orders (i.e., whether Article 226 was a proper remedy in the circumstances).
  3. Whether the Single Judge had jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant further time to the defendants/petitioners to comply with the deposit requirements imposed by the subordinate courts, or whether the Single Judge could only quash or affirm the impugned orders.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The decisions of the courts below that Rule 5 applied to the suit were legally correct.
  • The writ petition under Article 226 was not maintainable because the appropriate remedies under the Code (appeal/revision/review) had been or could be invoked; Article 226 should not be used as a substitute for statutory remedies such as Section 115 of the Code.
  • The Single Judge had no jurisdiction to grant the petitioners additional time to make the deposits; the Single Judge could not, in effect, extend the time granted by the courts below or give a fresh opportunity to comply.

Respondents' (Defendants/Petitioners') Arguments

  • Rule 5 of Order XV did not apply because the tenancy had not been validly determined and there was a dispute about whether any rent was due; therefore the condition precedent for invoking Rule 5 was absent.
  • The defendants also argued that if Rule 5 were held applicable, they should be granted 15 days' time to make the requisite deposit (i.e., an application for extension of time and security was made).
  • In the High Court petition, the defendants sought relief that, if they made the deposits by a date fixed by the Single Judge, the trial court should not strike off their defence; the Single Judge issued directions consistent with that form of relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carried out a textual and procedural analysis of Order XV, Rule 5 and of the scope of Article 226 jurisdiction. The key points of the court's reasoning are:

  1. Interpretation and Stage of Application of Rule 5:
    • Rule 5 applies to suits by a lessor for eviction of a lessee after determination of the lease and for recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation.
    • Order XV deals with disposal of the suit at the first hearing; that stage is reached after the defendant has filed his written statement, parties may have been examined under Order X to clarify points, documents produced, admissions and denials recorded, and necessary issues framed under Order XIV. In short, Rule 5 comes into play after issues are framed and before the parties lead evidence on those issues.
    • Because Rule 5 is engaged at that procedural stage, the court at that point is not required to decide disputed questions of fact (e.g., whether the lease was validly terminated or whether any rent is due) — such findings require evidence and testimony to be led later in the trial.
  2. Nature of the Deposit Obligation under Rule 5:
    • The defendant must deposit the entire amount of rent or compensation for use and occupation that he admits to be due at or before the first hearing (or the first hearing after the rule's commencement, for suits instituted earlier).
    • The defendant must then continue to deposit regularly the monthly amount at the rate he admits throughout the suit.
    • If no amount is admitted to be due by the defendant, he is not required to make any deposit under Rule 5.
    • The court cannot, under Rule 5, compel the defendant to deposit amounts the defendant disputes; the rule applies only to amounts admitted by the defendant.
    • Consequences for non-compliance are discretionary: the court may refuse to entertain any defence or strike off the defence for default, but only after considering any representation by the defendant and unless it allows further time on security being furnished.
  3. Application to the Present Case:
    • In the present case there was no dispute about the rate of rent (Rs. 150), and some amount was admitted to be due (the defendants had pleaded that the plaintiff refused tender and then the rent was remitted by money order).
    • Consequently the nature of the suit and the procedural stage satisfied the conditions for invoking Rule 5; the learned Munsif was therefore correct in holding Rule 5 attracted.
    • The learned Munsif, after considering circumstances, permissibly granted time (fifteen days) for deposit—Rule 5 allows the court discretion to grant further time on security where justified.
  4. Competence and Limits of Article 226 in the Circumstances:
    • The court accepted the appellant's contention that the writ petition was, in principle, not a competent substitute for remedies under the Code. The extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 is not intended to correct ordinary errors of law or fact made by subordinate courts during the progress of a suit; such errors are remediable by appeal, revision or review under the Code.
    • When statutory procedures provide a remedy and the proceedings have reached finality within that scheme (for example, after disposal by a court from which no further statutory revision lies), Article 226 should not ordinarily be invoked merely to correct an error; interference is reserved for exceptional cases of grave injustice.
    • In this case the order of the Additional District Judge finally disposed of the matter in dispute and Section 115 or other further revision to this Court was not available; therefore Article 226 was not an appropriate substitute.
    • Even assuming Article 226 were competent, the Single Judge exceeded jurisdiction by effectively granting further time to the petitioners to make the deposit. Under Article 226 the Single Judge could quash or affirm the impugned orders but could not lawfully exercise the power to extend time or grant a fresh opportunity solely by way of writ relief in order to permit compliance.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court allowed the appeal. The court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.

DISPOSITION: The appeal is allowed; the Single Judge's order is set aside; the writ petition is dismissed; the appellant is awarded costs of the appeal and of the writ petition.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The High Court's direction that effectively extended time for deposit and protected the defendants' defence is vacated; the earlier orders of the trial court and the Additional District Judge (which had applied Rule 5 and granted a time-limited opportunity for deposit) remain the operative determinations for the matter as described in this opinion.
  • Scope of Rule 5 clarified by the court: Rule 5 applies at the first-hearing stage after issues are framed and requires deposit only of amounts admitted by the defendant; courts have discretion to grant further time on furnishing security, and are not required to strike off defences mechanically for defaults.
  • The opinion underscores that Article 226 is not a routine alternative to statutory remedies under the Code; it should not be used simply to obtain an extension of time or a fresh opportunity to comply with orders of subordinate courts.
  • No broader precedent-creating pronouncement beyond the reasoning set out above is identified in the opinion; the decision resolves the dispute between the parties and clarifies the application of Rule 5 in the procedural posture described.

    Ladly Prasad v. Ram Shah Billa And Others

    K.N Seth, J.:— The appellant Ladly Prasad filed a suit in the court of the Munsif, Ghaziabad, for eviction of the defendants from the premises in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation alleging that the defendants were tenants at a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- and their tenancy had been terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was contested by the defendants, inter alia, on the grounds that the notice terminating the tenancy was illegal and the tenancy had not been terminated in law and no rent was due. Necessary issues were framed in the suit.

    2. During the pendency of the suit rule 5 was added to Order XV of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 (U.P Act No. 37 of 1972).

    3. The plaintiff made an application praying that the defence be struck off and an ex parte decree be passed against the defendants as they had failed to deposit the arrears of rent and damages as required under Order XV, Rule 5, C.P.C The application was contested on the ground that Rule 5 was not attracted as the case had not been validly determined and no arrears of rent were due. It was further pleaded that in case Rule 5 was held applicable, 15 days' time be granted for making the requisite deposit.

    4. The learned Munsif held that Order XV, Rule 5, C.P.C was attracted to the case. Fifteen days' time was allowed to deposit the entire dues. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the revision filed by the defendants and upheld the order of the trial court. The defendants filed a petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge, without entering into the merits of the controversy, issued a direction to the effect that in case the petitioners pay the entire amount of rent which according to them was due upto February 28, 1975, within one month or before the first day of hearing that may be fixed in the case by the trial court, the trial court will not strike off the defence. The defendants have also been directed to continue to deposit every month the amount as required by Rule 5. The legality of the order of the learned Single Judge has been assailed in this appeal by the plaintiff. It was contended that the decision of the courts below that Rule 5 was attracted to the case was legally sound and that the petition under Article 226 was not maintainable and the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to grant time to the petitioners to make the requisite deposit. Rule 5 added to Order XV of the Code of Civil Procedure by Act No. 37 of 1972 provides:—

    “(5) Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent, etc., in any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent, or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the court may unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike-off his defence.

    (2) The provisions of this rule are in addition to and not in derogation of anything contained in Rule 10 of Order XXXIX.”

    5. The earlier part of the rule describes the nature of the suit as one between a lessor and a lessee instituted after the determination of the lease for the eviction of the lessee and for recovery from him of rent or of compensation. The latter part of the rule provides for deposit by the lessee of the entire amount of rent or compensation for use and occupation admitted by him to be due at the first hearing of the suit. The rule empowers the court to refuse to entertain any defence or strike off the defence in case the lessee commits any default in making the requisite deposit unless the court, after considering any representation made by the defendant, allows him further time to make the requisite deposits on security being furnished for the amount. If the suit is of the nature mentioned in the rule, the provisions relating to deposit and the consequences on failure to do so are attracted.

    6. We find no merit in the contention of the respondents that Rule 5 is not attracted unless the court first decides the questions whether the tenancy has been validly terminated and any amount of rent is due from the defendants. Order XV relates to disposal of suit at the first hearing. This stage is arrived after the defendant has filed his written statement, the parties have been examined under Order X, if considered necessary, to clarify the points in controversy, documents on which parties rely have been produced and admission and denial obtained; and necessary issues framed as provided under Order XIV. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. This is the stage when Rule 5 of Order XV comes into play. This is anterior to the stage when the parties examine their witnesses. At the stage of Rule 5 of Order XV the court is not required to record finding on disputed questions of fact which can be done only after the parties have led evidence in support of their conflicting claims.

    7. In the suit in question there is no dispute about the rate of rent. It was pleaded in the written statement that the plaintiff illegally refused to accept the rent tendered personally and then remitted by a money order. The nature of the suit and the stage at which Rule 5 comes into play appear to be fully satisfied when the court was invited to exercise the power conferred by that rule.

    8. Under Rule 5 the defendant is required to deposit the entire amount of rent or damages for use and occupation which is admitted by him to be due. If the whole or a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant in his written statement or during the examination under Order X, the law requires that he shall deposit the amount admitted to be due and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit continue to deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him. If, however, the defendant does not admit that any amount is due to the plaintiff as rent or damages for use and occupation, he need not make any deposit. At this stage the court is not required to decide the questions whether any amount is really due and whether the lease has been validly terminated. The court cannot under this rule order or compel the defendant to deposit the amount claimed by the plaintiff and on the failure of the defendant to make the deposit as claimed by the plaintiff refuse to entertain any defence or strike off his defence. It is only when the defendant commits default in depositing the amount admitted by him to be due or or in continuing to deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation due at the rate admitted by him that the court would be competent to refuse to entertain any defence or to strike off his defence. In case the court after considering the representation made by the defendant comes to the conclusion that the circumstances justify grant of further time on security being furnished for the amount, the court will be competent to do so. It is not obligatory on the court to refuse to entertain any defence or to strike off the defence in a case default is committed by the defendant in making the requisite deposits. In the present case the learned Munsif rightly came to the conclusion that looking to the nature of the case rule 5 was attracted but on being satisfied that circumstances justified it, granted time to the defendants to make the deposit.

    9. The contention that the writ petition was not competent and should not have been entertained appears to be sound. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the court under the Constitution is not meant to correct error of law or fact committed by the subordinate courts during the proceedings of a suit. For that purpose adequate machinery has been provided by the Code by way of appeal, revision or review. When the appropriate remedy under the Code has been utilized the controversy must come to an end. If the Code provides no further remedy to an aggrieved party, finality must attach to the order deciding the controversy one way or the other. Even if the order could be demonstrated to be erroneous is should normally be not interfered with. It is only in exceptional cases of grave injustice that the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under the Constitution can be invoked. In the present case the order of the learned Additional District Judge finally disposed of the matter in dispute as the Code does not provide for a further revision to this Court. Article 226 is not meant to be invoked as a substitute for Section 115 of the Code.

    10. Assuming that the petition was competent the learned Single Judge while disposing of the petition had no jurisdiction to grant further time to the petitioners to make the deposit. He could either quash the impugned orders or affirm them. Article 226 could not be pressed into service solely for the purpose of extending the time granted by the courts below or for granting a fresh opportunity to the petitioners to comply with the order of the courts below.

    11. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal as well as the writ petition.

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    Ladly Prasad v. Ram Shah Billa And Others
    (Sep 26, 1975)