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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
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Case Number
Advocates
  • Gyan Prakash
  • Standing Counsel
Judges
  • C.S.P Singh, J.
Acts
  • Sec. 8 of the U.P Rent Control and Eviction Act.
  • Sec. 16 or 17 of the new Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Gyan Prakash
  • Standing Counsel
Judges
  • C.S.P Singh, J.
Acts
  • Sec. 8 of the U.P Rent Control and Eviction Act.
  • Sec. 16 or 17 of the new Act,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion by C.S.P. Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the owner of premises No. 98, K.P. Rakker Road, Allahabad. The ground floor contains two shops; one of them was in the possession of respondent No. 3, Purshottam Das (also referred to as the allottee / Agarwal). On 1 April 1972 Purshottam Das applied for regularization of his tenancy over the disputed shop, claiming he had been in possession as a tenant for thirteen years under the name "Agarwal Paper Stores" and that the monthly rent had been progressively increased up to Rs. 150. He alleged the landlord was seeking to enhance the rent to Rs. 200 and that no rent receipts were issued. The Chief Inspector inspected and reported that the tenant was in possession; the allottee filed an affidavit before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 20 April 1972.

The Rent Control and Eviction Officer issued an allotment order in favour of Purshottam Das on 24 April 1972. The petitioner filed an objection to that order on 15 May 1972; the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissed the objection on 7 August 1972. The petitioner appealed to the Additional District Judge, which appeal was dismissed by order dated 21 February 1973. The present writ petition was filed challenging both the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's order and the Additional District Judge's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal against the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's order dismissing the petitioner's application to set aside the allotment order was maintainable after the enforcement of the "new Act" (i.e., the effect of Sec. 43 of the new Act treating pending proceedings under Sec. 7 of the old Act as proceedings under Sec. 16 or 17 of the new Act, and the availability of appeal under Sec. 18 of the new Act).
  2. Whether respondent No. 3 (Purshottam Das) was a tenant (entitled to allotment) or merely a licensee/licencee, having regard to the evidence led (including the dissolution deed, income-tax returns, and correspondence such as the letter dated 11 November 1971).
  3. Whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate authorities (i.e., scope of judicial review under Article 226 as contrasted with appellate review).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The allottee's allotment order was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and concealment of material facts; specifically, there had been a partnership involving the allottee's wife and minor son with the landlord, which the petitioner claimed established the allottee was not a tenant entitled to allotment.
  • A dissolution deed (dated 17 February 1952) and related partnership material showed that the allottee should not have been recognized as tenant or allottee; the allottee had agreed to vacate but failed to do so.
  • The Additional District Judge's view that the appeal was not maintainable (because the allotment order and connected proceedings were under the old Act) was incorrect — implying the petitioner contended the appeal should have been treated differently under the new Act.
  • Counsel also contended that the appellate authority erred in law by not treating the dissolution deed as evidence, asserting that the special rules of evidence under the Rent Control and Eviction Act should not have prevented its consideration.

Respondent No. 3's (Allottee/Tenant's) Arguments

  • Purshottam Das denied the existence of any partnership and averred that he had been a tenant of the disputed shop from the outset, initially paying lower rent which was subsequently raised (accounts and rent amounts were set out), with amounts shown in his income-tax returns.
  • The allottee asserted the landlord had sought enhancement to Rs. 200 by letter dated 11 November 1971; thereafter he applied for allotment and the landlord accepted rent post-allotment at Rs. 150 per month.
  • The allottee denied that possession was based on a licence or any misrepresentation to obtain the allotment order.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two principal strands: (A) statutory-interpretation and procedural maintainability; and (B) assessment of factual findings and scope of interference under Article 226.

A. Maintainability — statutory interpretation

The judge examined the character of the proceedings and the effect of the transitional provision in the "new Act" (Sec. 43). He noted that the allotment order in favour of Purshottam Das was made under Sec. 7 of the old Act and that the petitioner's application to set aside that allotment order was a proceeding inherently connected to the allotment proceedings under the old Act. The court read the term "proceedings" in Sec. 43 of the new Act broadly — to include not only final orders but also applications and miscellaneous proceedings connected with those orders. Applying that reading, the court concluded such an application should be treated as a proceeding under Sec. 16 (or 17, as may be applicable) of the new Act. Since the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissed the application after the new Act had come into force, an appeal lay under Sec. 18 of the new Act. Consequently, the Additional District Judge's view that the appeal was not maintainable was incorrect; the appeal was competent.

B. Merits and factual assessment

On the merits the court accepted the factual findings of the subordinate authorities. The Additional District Judge had examined the documentary and testimonial material and found no reliable evidence of the alleged partnership: no partnership deed had been produced; the dissolution deed was only a purported copy and no explanation had been given for the absence of the original, so the copy could not be relied upon. The appellate authority also considered two notices (dated 2 March 1951 and 14 March 1956) issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer — one under Sec. 7-A and another under Sec. 8 of the old Act — and treated the fact that notices were issued to Purshottam Das as indicative that he was in occupation of the premises at those times.

Further, the appellate court relied on corroborative material: income-tax returns filed by Purshottam Das which showed rent being paid for the premises, and the landlord's letter of 11 November 1971 demanding enhancement of rent from Rs. 150 to Rs. 200. The appellate court concluded that the allottee's occupation was consistent with tenancy rather than licence, and that the objections filed earlier by Purshottam Das (for example, to avoid prosecution or eviction) were not sufficient to overturn the inference of tenancy when viewed against the totality of other evidence.

C. Scope of judicial review under Article 226

The court addressed the petitioner's submission that the High Court should re-appraise the factual conclusions as if it were an appellate forum under Article 226. The court emphasized the well-settled principle that jurisdiction under Article 226 is not appellate in nature: the High Court can interfere only where the decision is based on irrelevant considerations or where there is no material to support the conclusion reached. Applying that standard, the court held that the subordinate authorities' conclusions were supported by material and were not based on irrelevant factors; hence there was no ground for interference under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court held that (a) the Additional District Judge's conclusion that the appeal was not maintainable was incorrect because the application to set aside the allotment order constituted a proceeding under Sec. 16 (or 17) of the new Act and an appeal lay under Sec. 18 of the new Act; and (b) on merits there was no ground for interference under Article 226 because the factual conclusions reached by the subordinate authorities were supported by material and not vitiated in law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The allotment in favour of Purshottam Das (respondent No. 3) stands; the petition filed by the landlord is dismissed and the subordinate authorities' factual findings — that Purshottam Das was a tenant paying rent — are sustained.
  • Procedural implication noted by the court: An application to set aside an allotment order made under Sec. 7 of the old Act should be treated as a connected proceeding under Sec. 16 or 17 of the new Act by virtue of Sec. 43, and appeals against orders disposing of such applications after the new Act came into force lie under Sec. 18 of the new Act (the court so held in this opinion).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not state that it is laying down any new binding precedent beyond its determination in this case. The decision primarily affirms the factual findings of the subordinate authorities and clarifies the transitional application of the new Act to connected proceedings; no broader precedent beyond the case's outcome is explicitly asserted in the text.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Show full summary ...

    Rameshwar Prasad Agarwal v. Ist Addl. District Judge

    C.S.P Singh, J.:— The petitioner is owner of premises No. 98, K.P Rakker Road, Allahabad. In the ground floor portion of this accommodation, there are two shops. One shop is in the possession of Purshottam Das respondent No. 3. On the 1st April, 1972 Purshottam Das moved an application for regularization of his tenancy over the disputed shop, alleging that he had been in possession of it as a tenant for the last thirteen years under the name and style of “Agarwal Paper Stores” and paying a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- per month. The monthly rent, according to respondent No. 3, was initially Rs. 80/- per month which was increased to Rs. 100/- per month, and then to Rs. 120/- per month thereafter and to Rs. 150/- per month. The landlord was now asking him to enhance the rent to Rs. 200/- per month. As no rent receipt was being issued by the landlord, a prayer was made that his possession be regularized by issuing an allotment order in his favour. The Chief Inspector inspected the premises and found the tenant in possession, and made a report to the Rent Control and Evict on Officer. The respondent No. 3 in support of his allegation filed an affidavit before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 20-4-1972.

    2. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an allotment order in favour of the respondent No. 3 on 24-4-1972. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an object on against the aforesaid order on 15-5-1972, and prayed that the allotment be cancelled. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after hearing the parties, dismissed the objection on 7-8-1972. The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order to the Additional District Judge. This appeal has been dismissed by order dated 21-2-1973. The present petition has been filed against this order as well as the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.

    3. Before coming to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to set out the case of the parties and the findings recorded by the subordinate authorities. The petitioner alleged in his application for cancellation of the allotment order that the petitioner and the allottee were close relations, and the allottee's wife and his minor son started a partnership business in the premises. The partnership was dissolved on the 17 February, 1952. It was agreed that the allottee would vacate the premises within a month, or in default will pay compensation and penalty. It was averred that the allottee had failed to vacate the premises and obtained an allotment order by fraud, misrepresentation and concealment of material facts. The allottee in his affidavit denied the partnership, and alleged that he was tenant of the disputed accommodation, to begin with, on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- per month, and was paying the rent regularly which had been shown in his income-tax return. This amount was enhanced to Rs. 100/-. In April, 1964, the allottee had agreed to enhancement of rent to Rs. 120/- per month. This amount was also shown in the income-tax return. On request for further enhancement of rent to Rs. 150/-, the allottee agreed to pay Rs. 150/- from 1-6-1968 onwards, and this rent was also shown in the income-tax. On the 11th November, 1971, the landlord sent a letter demanding rent at Rs. 200/- per month, which was not acceptable to the allottee, and he thereafter applied for allotment. The landlord, had accepted rent subsequent to the allotment order, at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. The case of the petitioner landlord that the allottee was a licencee was specifically denied, as also the allegations that the allotment order had been obtained on misrepresentation of facts and by practising fraud. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that there was no evidence on record to show that there was any partnership, except the dissolution deed which had no evidentiary value without the partnership deed. He also found that the letter dated 11th November, 1971 established that the landlord was receiving rent of the premises. In view of these findings, he dismissed the application of the petitioner landlord. An appeal was thereafter filed by the petitioner landlord. One of the points that arose for decision was as regards the maintainability of the appeal. The Additional District Judge held that in as much as the application for setting aside the allotment order and the allotment order itself had been passed under the old Act, the order was not appealable. He, however, also went into the merits of the case. He held that no partnership deed in proof of the existence of partnership business had been filed, and that the dissolution deed which had been filed was only a purported copy of the original, and no reason had been given for not filing the original dissolution deed. In the absence of the original dissolution deed, he upheld the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that no reliance could be placed upon the copy of the dissolution deed for proof of the fact that there had been any partnership. He next referred to two notices dated 2-3-1951 and 14-3-1956 given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to Purshottam Das, the allottee. The first notice was under Sec. 7-A of the old rent Act, and directed the allottee to show cause as to why eviction proceedings should not be taken. In reply to this, the allottee had taken up the stand that Rameshwar Prasad Agarwal the landlord was him-elf doing business in the premises with Sri Kant, the son of the allottee. The notice was vacated on 10-9-1951. The second notice was issued under Sec. 8 of the old Act, and discharged on the 24th April, 1956. In view of these notices, he held that it was the allottee who was in occupation of the premises, for has it been otherwise, no notice could have been issued to him. As regards the contention of the petitioner based on the objection filed by Purshottam Das that a partnership business was being carried on in the premises by the landlord along with the wife of the allottee and Sri Kant the son, he held that the objection did not establish that both the wife and the son of the allottee were partners. He accepted an argument of the respondent allottee that the objection had been filed to avoid prosecution, and eviction from the premises, as the allottee at that time was in occupation of the premises without a valid allotment order. He also relied on the Income-tax returns filed by Purshottam Das, the allottee, wherein he had shown the rent being paid by him for the premises. Reliance was also placed by him on the letter of the 11th November, 1971 sent by the petitioner to Purshottam Das Agarwal for enhancement of rent from Rs. 150/- to Rs. 200/- per month.

    4. On a consideration of the above evidence, he came to the conclusion that Purshottam Das Agarwal; the allottee had been in occupation of the premises as a tenant, and had been paying rent regularly. He, as such held that his possession was not on the basis of any partnership. On these findings, the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed.

    5. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the view of the lower appellate court that the appeal was not maintainable is incorrect. There appears to be force in this contention. The order of allotment in favour of Purshottam Das Agarwal was under Sec. 7 of the old Act. The application for setting it aside was in respect of the allotment order. Under Sec. 43 of the new Act, all proceedings under Sec. 7 of the old Act, which were pending, are to be treated as proceedings under Sec. 16 or 17 of the new Act, as the case may be. An application for setting aside an allotment order is nothing but a proceeding under Sec. 7 of the old Act as it is inherently connected with the allotment order and allotment proceedings. The use of the words' proceedings' in Sec. 43 of the new Act, are significant, and denote not only specific orders passed under section of the old Act but also applications and other miscellaeous proceedings connected with the final orders passed thereunder. This being so, the application for setting aside the allotment order would be one which would fall within Sec. 16 of the new Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissed the application for setting aside the allotment order after the enforcement of the new Act, and, as such an appeal, against this order lay under Sec. 18 of the new Act. The appeal, as such, was competent.

    6. On merits, however, the petitioner does not have any case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution, as the conclusions arrived at by the Additional District Judge are conclusions of fact and are not vitiated in law.

    7. Counsel for the petitioner urged that the finding that the respondents were tenants of the accommodation is based upon an unwarranted assumptions and on a mis-conception of the law. It has been urged in the first place that in as much as the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to the proceedings under the Rent Control and Evict on Act, the appellate authority committed an error in not considering the dissolution deed filed by the petitioner. In the first place even if it were erroneous on the part of the appellate authority not to have taken the dissolution deed into account as has been noticed in the earlier part of the judgment, the finding that the respondent was a tenant of the premises and was not a licensee, is not based solely on this consideration. The appellate authority has relied, on a large number of other circumstances or holding that the petitioner had let out the premises to the respondent. It was then urged that the fact that respondent was a licensee of, the premises was established by the admission made by the petitioner himself in his objection filed on having received notice under Sec. 8 of the U.P Rent Control and Eviction Act. The appellate authority has on a consideration if the evidence on record come to the conclusion that the objection filed by the respondent tenant were made in order to avoid eviction from the premises. This conclusion is not an impossible or an improbable conclusion to reach, on the case set up by the tenant-respondent, and as such this too does not vitiate the finding of the appellate authority.

    8. Counsel then tried to assail the appellate order as if the jurisdiction that this Court exercises under Article 226 of the Constitution is an appellate jurisdiction. It is settled that courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution do not act as courts of appeal, and can interfere only in case the decision is based either on irrelevant consideration, or there is no material for the conclusion reached. In the present case, the orders passed do not suffer from such infirmities.

    9. The petition fails and is dismissed.

    10. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rameshwar Prasad Agarwal v. Ist Addl. District Judge
    (Jul 25, 1975)