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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Vishnu Sahai
  • A.N. Sinha and Standing Counsel
Judges
  • Satish Chandra
  • N.D Ojha, JJ.
Acts
  • Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act
  • Secs. 4(1) or 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Even if Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions of Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act,
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act or Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act,
  • Sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act.8. Sec. 55 of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 96(1) of the Parishad Act). Under Sec. 97 of the Parishad Act
  • provisions of the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act
  • provisions of Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 4(1) or Sec. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • severable.14. Sec. 40 of the Town Improvement Act
  • Parishad.7. Sec. 56 of the Town Improvement Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Sec. 6(1) of he Land Acquisition Act. Clause (2)
  • Sec. 36 of the U.P Town Improvement Act, 1919
  • Secs. 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act
  • Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • provision of the Town Improvement Act
  • Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act.15.
  • Sec. 66 of the Land Acquisition Act.9.
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act
  • Sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • U.P Town Improvement Act, 1919
  • Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 97(3) of the Parishad Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Town Improvement Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Vishnu Sahai
  • A.N. Sinha and Standing Counsel
Judges
  • Satish Chandra
  • N.D Ojha, JJ.
Acts
  • Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act
  • Secs. 4(1) or 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Even if Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions of Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act,
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act or Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act,
  • Sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act.8. Sec. 55 of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 96(1) of the Parishad Act). Under Sec. 97 of the Parishad Act
  • provisions of the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act
  • provisions of Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 4(1) or Sec. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • severable.14. Sec. 40 of the Town Improvement Act
  • Parishad.7. Sec. 56 of the Town Improvement Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Sec. 6(1) of he Land Acquisition Act. Clause (2)
  • Sec. 36 of the U.P Town Improvement Act, 1919
  • Secs. 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act
  • Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • provision of the Town Improvement Act
  • Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act.15.
  • Sec. 66 of the Land Acquisition Act.9.
  • Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act
  • Sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • U.P Town Improvement Act, 1919
  • Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act
  • Sec. 97(3) of the Parishad Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Town Improvement Act
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Satish Chandra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from a common judgment dismissing three writ petitions in which appellants challenged acquisition of land under improvement schemes originally framed by the Meerut Improvement Trust and subsequently continued by the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (the "Parishad").

An improvement scheme titled "Scheme No. 3—Housing Accommodation and Street Scheme lying between Meerut Garhmukteshwar and Meerut Hapur Roads" was framed by the Meerut Improvement Trust. A notice under Sec. 36 of the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 was published in the State Gazette on 7 January 1967. The scheme covered land in four villages outside Meerut municipal limits. Ninety-nine persons filed forty-five objections; the Chairman of the Improvement Trust visited the area and heard oral representations. The appellants contended they had no knowledge of those proceedings and therefore could not file objections or make representations.

By a Notification dated 7 December 1967 the State Government extended the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, No. 1 of 1966 to the areas formerly under the Improvement Trust. As a result the Town Improvement Act ceased to apply to that area (vide Sec. 96(1) of the Parishad Act), and under Sec. 97 improvement schemes pending before the Improvement Trust were transferred to the Parishad. The Parishad dealt with Scheme No. 3, disposed of objections, and referred the scheme to the State Government for sanction. The State Government sanctioned the scheme and published the sanction in the Gazette on 23 November 1968 under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act.

Pursuant to Sec. 55(1) of the Parishad Act, the Parishad initiated acquisition proceedings for land required to execute the scheme; a notice under Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 18 November 1966. At that stage the appellants instituted writ petitions challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings on several grounds. Their writ petitions were dismissed, and these appeals followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Notifications (under the Town Improvement Act and under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act) were required to comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (including adequate identification of the land) and whether failure to do so rendered the Notifications void.
  2. Whether Section 38 of the Town Improvement Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution by discriminating against owners of land situated outside municipal limits, and if so whether that provision was non-severable such that the Act as a whole would be invalid.
  3. Whether an incomplete scheme framed by the Improvement Trust could be validly transferred to and continued by the Parishad (i.e., whether transfer of a pending but incomplete scheme was permissible under Sec. 97 of the Parishad Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Notifications issued under Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act were equated by the Schedules of those Acts to notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act; therefore those Notifications had to comply with the procedural requirements of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (including adequate identification of the land covered). The Notification under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act allegedly did not adequately identify the land and was therefore void.
  • Section 38 of the Town Improvement Act creates an invidious discrimination because it requires service of individual notices on owners whose names appear in municipal assessment lists (i.e., owners within municipal limits) but does not require service on owners outside municipal limits; this violates Article 14. Section 38 is non-severable and thus the Town Improvement Act as a whole (or at least the relevant parts) should be declared void.
  • An incomplete scheme framed by the Improvement Trust could not be transferred to the Parishad; therefore the Parishad lacked jurisdiction to continue or complete such a scheme.

No detailed account of respondents' or State's affirmative arguments is contained in the provided opinion beyond the procedural actions described (e.g., transfer, consideration of objections, sanction and publication).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each of the appellants' principal points in turn.

1. On the contention that Notifications under the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act had to satisfy Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act: the court examined the relevant provisions of the Schedules to both Acts which state that the Notifications issued under those Acts "shall ... substitute for and have the same effect as" publication under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The court described this as a legislative fiction: the Notifications under Sec. 36 (Town Improvement Act) and Sec. 32(1) (Parishad Act), if valid under their own statutory requirements, are by operation of law to be deemed Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

The court concluded from that statutory fiction that it is unnecessary for the Improvement Trust or the Parishad to make a separate publication under Sections 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, the validity of the Notifications under the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act cannot be tested by importing the procedural requirements of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act into those Notifications. Even if Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act required particular particulars of land, that requirement could not be imported where the provisions of Sec. 36 or Sec. 32(1) make no such condition. The court noted it was not disputed that the Notifications complied with the provisions of Sec. 36 and Sec. 32(1). On this basis the court held the first point to have no substance.

2. On the Article 14 challenge to Section 38 of the Town Improvement Act: the court observed the statutory scheme. Section 36 requires publication of notice of the improvement scheme and a statement of the period for objections; Section 38 requires service of notices on persons appearing in municipal assessment lists (i.e., owners within municipal limits). The appellants argued this discriminated against owners outside municipal limits. The court stated that it was unnecessary to express any final opinion on whether Sec. 38 is discriminatory; however, even if it were discriminatory, Sec. 38 is clearly severable from the remainder of the statute. The court explained that Sec. 40 requires consideration of objections and then the State Government's sanction notified under Sec. 42; the service requirement in Sec. 38 is an additional procedural step and not an essential element without which the legislative scheme would fail. Because Sec. 38 is severable, invalidity of Sec. 38 would not vitiate the Notification under Sec. 36 or subsequent proceedings, and subsequent proceedings under the Parishad Act could not be affected by invalidity of Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act.

3. On whether an incomplete scheme could be transferred: the court examined Sec. 97(3) of the Parishad Act, which provides that every scheme and all proceedings relating thereto under the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 shall stand transferred to the Board (Parishad), which shall proceed further with the scheme or execution thereof from the stage at which it was transferred in accordance with corresponding provisions of the Parishad Act. The provisos allow the Board to recall any step already taken under the earlier Act and take that step afresh under the Parishad Act. The court read these provisions as leaving no room for doubt that a scheme framed by the Improvement Trust but not completed also stands transferred to the Parishad, and that the Parishad has jurisdiction to continue it. Accordingly, the third point was without merit.

Having rejected all points urged in support of the appeals, the court dismissed the appeals.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Direct Effect

The direct practical consequence for the parties is that the writ petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings and related Notifications were dismissed, and the Parishad's proceedings to acquire land for Scheme No. 3 were upheld as not invalid on the grounds advanced in these appeals.

Broader Implications

The opinion reasons that where a statute's Schedule deems a Notification under a special statute to "substitute for and have the same effect as" a Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, the special-statute Notification need only meet the requirements of the special statute and is not to be tested by importing additional procedural requirements of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The court also affirms severability of a potentially discriminatory procedural provision (Sec. 38) where the legislative scheme can still operate without that provision, and it recognizes the Parishad's statutory power to continue schemes pending at transfer under Sec. 97(3).

The opinion does not state that it establishes a new binding precedent beyond the reasoning applied to the facts and statutes in this case, nor does it elaborate additional broader legal doctrines beyond those reflected in its analysis above.

Appeals dismissed.
Show full summary ...

    Riaz Uddin And Others v. State Of U.P And Others

    Satish Chandra, J.:— These three special appeals raise common questions. They are directed against a common judgment dismissing three writ petitions. In the writ petitions, the appellants had challenged the acquisition of land in execution of improvement schemes framed by the Meerut Improvement Trust and continued by the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad.

    2. An improvement scheme called “Scheme No. 3—Housing Accommodation and Street Scheme lying between Meerut Garhmukteshwar and Meerut Hapur Roads” was framed by the Meerut Improvement Trust. Notice of this scheme as required by Sec. 36 of the U.P Town Improvement Act, 1919 was published in the State Gazette of 7th January, 1967. The area comprised in the scheme included land in four villages, all situate outside the municipal limits of Meerut. The notice invited objections. Ninety-nine persons filed forty five objections. The Chairman of the Improvement Trust visited the area involved in the scheme and heard oral representations from various groups of landholders in the area. The appellants' case is that they had no knowledge of these proceedings and they could not either file objections or make representations to the Chairman at the time of his visit.

    3. By a Notification of 7-12-1967 the State Government extended the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, No. 1 of 1966 (which we shall call the Parishad Act) to the areas which were till then under the jurisdiction of the Improvement Trust, Meerut. As a result of this Notification, the Town Improvement Act stood repealed in respect to its application to this area (vide Sec. 96(1) of the Parishad Act). Under Sec. 97 of the Parishad Act the improvement schemes pending before the Improvement Trust, stood transferred to the U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, (hereinafter ??? the Parishad) constituted under the ??? shad Act. The Parishad was to ??? further with the schemes or their ??? from the stage at which it stood transfer to it.

    4. The Parishad took up the ??? Accommodation and Street ??? No. 3; it disposed of the objections, ??? as required by Sec. 31(1), referred scheme to the State Government for sanction. The State Government sanction the Scheme and the sanction was publicity in the Gazette of 23rd November, 1968, accordance with Sec. 32(1) of the Parish Act.

    5. In pursuance to Sec. 55(1) of ??? Parishad Act the Parishad comment proceedings for the acquisition of ??? required for the execution of this ??? Notice under Sec. 9 of the Land ??? Act was published on 18th November, 1966. At this stage the appellant instituted writ petitions. They challenging the validity of the acquisition proceeding on several grounds which, however, fail and the writ petitions were dismissed the judgment under appeal.

    6. Learned counsel for the appellants pressed before us three points:—

    (1) The Notification of the ??? did not comply with the requirements Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land ??? Act.

    (2) Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution; it being non-severable, the prosions of the Town Improvement Act as whole were void.

    (3) An incomplete scheme framed the Improvement Trust could not ??? be transferred to the Parishad.

    7. Sec. 56 of the Town Improvement Act provides that the Improvement Trust may acquire land required for ??? on any of the purposes of the A under the provisions of the Land ??? Act, 1894 as modified under Sec. and by the Schedule to that Act. Clause 2 of the Schedule provides that the ??? publication of a notice of an improvement heme under Sec. 36 of the Act shall be ??? for and have the same effect ??? publication of a Notification under Sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

    8. Sec. 55 of the Parishad Act similar ??? provides that any land required for the purposes of this Act may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh and as modified by lie Schedule to the Act. Clause 2(2) of lie Schedule, inter alia, provides that a notification under Sec. 32(1) of the Act shall be substituted for and have the same Sect as a declaration by the State Government under Sec. 66 of the Land Acquisition Act.

    9. For the appellants it was urged that the provisions of the Schedules of both the Acts equated the Notifications issued under Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act with the Notification under Sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, and the Notification under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act with the Notification under Sec. ??? of the Land Acquisition Act. There-ore, the Notifications must comply with he provisions of Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. One requirement of Sec. ??? of the Land Acquisition Act is that the and covered by the Notification should be adequately identified in the Notification. This was not done by the Notification issued under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act. For this reason this Notification was void.

    10. The relevant provisions of the schedules to both the Acts say that the Notifications issued under those Acts “shall ??? substitute for and have the same effect” is publication of the Notification under Secs. 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Notifications issued under the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act operate as substitutes for Notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In addition, the Notifications under those Acts have the same affect as the publication of a Notification under Sec. 4(1) and as a declaration under Sec. 6(1) of he Land Acquisition Act. Clause (2) of the Schedules create a fiction whereby the Notifications under the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act are to be deemed to be and having the same effect as Notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

    11. In our opinion, the fiction created by the Schedules precludes the making or the publication of a Notification under Section 4(1) or Sec. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Notifications issued under the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act are themselves deemed to be and having the same effect as Notifications under the Land Acquisition Act. If the Notifications under Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act comply with the requirements of those provisions, and as such are valid Notifications under those Acts, they by operation of law have effect and operate as Notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of this fiction, the Improvement Trust or the Parishad is exempted from making or publishing a Notification under Secs. 4 and ??? of the Land Acquisition Act. No Notification is required to be issued under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Hence the Notification issued under Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and under Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act need not be strictly in accordance with the provisions of Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Those Notifications are not required to fulfil the requirements of Secs. 4 and 6. If they are valid Notifications under the provisions of the Town Improvement Act and the Parishad Act they exclude the necessity of issuing a Notification under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Those Notifications cannot be struck down because they do not fulfil the requirements of Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Their validity cannot be tested on the analogy of the requirements of Secs. 4(1) or 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Even if Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act required that the Notifications should give particulars of land to be acquired, that requirement cannot be imported into the Notifications issued under Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act or Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act, because those provisions make no such condition. It was not disputed that the Notifications complied with the provisions of Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act and Sec. 32(1) of the Parishad Act, The First point urged in support of these appeals has, in our opinion, no substance.

    12. The second point raised for the appellants was that Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Sec. 36 of the Town Improvement Act requires the Improvement Trust to cause a notice of the improvement scheme containing the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of its sub-sec. (1) to be published weekly for three consecutive weeks in the official Gazette and a local newspaper or newspapers, with a statement of the period within which objections will be received. Sec. 38 of the Act requires service of notices on every individual whose name appears in the municipal assessment list as being liable to pay any tax assesed on the building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme. On its language Sec. 38 provides for service of individual notices on all owners of buildings or land situated within municipal limits. Even though land situated outside municipal limits may be acquired in execution of an improvement scheme, Sec. 38 or any other provision of the Town Improvement Act does not oblige the Improvement Trust to serve individual notices on owners of land situated outside the municipal limits. From the point of view of a quisition proceedings the owners of land outside the municipal limits constitute the same group along with the owners of land within the municipal limits. The submission was that Sec. 38 makes an invidious discrimination adverse to the owners of land situated outside the municipal limits and for this reason it violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

    13. In our opinion, it is not necessary to express any opinion on this point. Even if Sec. 38 is assumed to be discriminatory, it is clearly severable.

    14. Sec. 40 of the Town Improvement Act requires the Trust to consideration the objections filed under Sec. 36 as well as under Sec. 38 to any improvement scheme and thereafter either to abandonment the scheme or apply to the State Government for its sanction. If the State Government sanctions the scheme the sanctions is notified under Sec. 42 of the Act. For the scheme devised by the Town Improvement Trust the service of notice under Sec. 38 is a requirement in addition to the basic factors which are the publication ??? a notice under Sec. 36, consideration of the objections under Sec. 40 and then sanctions of the State Government. The Schems of the Act does not indicate that the Legislature would not have enacted this scheme without Sec. 38. Sec. 38 being severable the Notification under Sec. 36 could not be struck down. In the present case, that subsequent proceedings were conducted under the Parishad Act. They could not be affected by the invalidity of Sec. 38 of the Town Improvement Act.

    15. We did not hear learned Counsel elaborating the third point. There is no merit in it. Sec. 97(3) of the Parishad Act provides that every scheme and all proceedings relating thereto under the U.P Town Improvement Act, 1919 shall stand transferred to the Board, which shall proceed further with the scheme or execution thereof from the stage at which it was transferred to it, in accordance with the corresponding provisions of this Act. Its provisos state that the Board may, if it thinks fit, recall any step or proceeding already gone through under the said Act and take that step or proceeding afresh under the corresponding provisions of this Act. It will be seen that the transfer of a scheme takes place at the stage at which it is pending on the appointed day; and the Board, (which we have called Parishad) is to continue with the scheme or the execution thereof from that stage ???. The Board can recall any step or proceeding already gone through by the Improvement Trust. These provisions eave no room for doubt that a scheme ??? by the Improvement Trust but not completed, also stands transferred to the Parishad; and it has jurisdiction to continue it.

    16. The various points urged in support of the appeals having failed, they are dismissed with costs.

    Appeals dismissed.

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    Comments

    Riaz Uddin And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
    (Oct 27, 1972)