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  • Article 23, Schedule I-B of the U.P Stamp Act, 1962,
  • Article 5(c) read with Sec. 5 of the Stamp Act
  • Article 23 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act
  • (Sec. 2(10) of the Stamp Act).
  • Sec. 57 of the Stamp Act
  • Sec. 31 of the Stamp Act,
  • Indian Partnership Act,
  • U.P Stamp Act, 1962.2.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • Article 23, Schedule I-B of the U.P Stamp Act, 1962,
  • Article 5(c) read with Sec. 5 of the Stamp Act
  • Article 23 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act
  • (Sec. 2(10) of the Stamp Act).
  • Sec. 57 of the Stamp Act
  • Sec. 31 of the Stamp Act,
  • Indian Partnership Act,
  • U.P Stamp Act, 1962.2.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Stamp Act Reference)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Board of Revenue, acting as the Chief Revenue Controlling Authority, referred five specific questions to the Court under Section 57 of the Stamp Act concerning the proper classification and stamp duty payable on a document executed on 29 October 1967 by Govind Dass Gupta, Manohar Dass Gupta and Gopal Dass Gupta.

Material factual points (as stated in the opinion):

  • The three persons were partners carrying on business as the firm "Ram Manohardas" (also described in the deed with variant forms of the firm name and business locations).
  • Govind Dass Gupta (the first party) executed a deed of retirement on 29 October 1967 by which he retired from the partnership and accepted Rs. 55,000 "in full and final satisfaction of all his dues and claims in the business and capital of the firm and the assets thereof".
  • The deed also provided for an exchange of a godown of Govind with a piece of land of Manohar, and for Govind to transfer his motorcycle and jeep to the firm for an agreed consideration of Rs. 5,000.
  • The instrument was styled as a "deed of retirement" but was initially stamped as a dissolution of partnership with a duty of Rs. 22.50 paid by the executants.
  • On presentation to the Collector, Allahabad, under Section 31 of the Stamp Act, the matter was referred to the Board under Section 56(2). The Board treated the deed as a conveyance chargeable under Article 23 (and treated the transfers/exchange as attracting additional duty) and therefore referred the legal questions to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document is a conveyance for Rs. 55,000 and chargeable with duty under Article 23, Schedule I‑B of the U.P. Stamp Act, 1962, and whether it is liable to additional duty under Article 5(c) read with Section 5 for two distinct agreements regarding sale of a motorcycle and jeep and exchange of property.
  2. Whether the document is a deed of dissolution of partnership and sufficiently stamped under Article 46‑B, Schedule I‑B.
  3. Whether the document is a release of the value of Rs. 35,000 and liable to duty under Article 55, Schedule I‑B.
  4. Whether the document is merely an agreement between the parties and chargeable under Article 5(c), Schedule I‑B.
  5. If not covered by the alternatives above, what stamp duty is payable under the U.P. Stamp Act, 1962.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion records only a limited account of the parties' positions. The following points are those expressly recorded in the text:

Applicant / Executants (as recorded)

  • The document was executed and styled as a deed of retirement; it had been stamped as a deed of dissolution (duty Rs. 22.50) when presented.
  • The executants abandoned the contention that the document was chargeable as an agreement or memorandum under Article 5(c) of Schedule I‑B (the opinion explicitly records that they "have given up the contention" on Article 5(c)).
  • Counsel for the appellant/applicant relied on prior authorities (including decisions referred to in the opinion such as Addanki Narayanappa and certain High Court decisions) to support the contention that the deed should not be treated as a conveyance and in some authorities that such instruments may be treated as a release.

Board of Revenue / Revenue Position (as recorded)

  • The Board's view (as referred to the Court) was that the deed was a conveyance executed by the retiring partner in favour of the continuing partners for consideration of Rs. 55,000 and therefore chargeable under Article 23, Schedule I‑B; and that the agreements relating to the motorcycle, jeep and exchange of immovable property were exchange/transfer deeds liable to additional duty.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhakara Krishnappa — A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1300 (also cited in another report form in the opinion: A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 380) The nature of a partner's rights in partnership property: a partner does not have a transferable interest in specific partnership assets during the subsistence of the firm; entitlement is to share of profits and on dissolution to a share of the monetary value of assets after liabilities are met. The Court relied on this authority as authoritative on the law of partnership rights to conclude that a partner has no transferable interest in specific partnership property while the firm subsists, and thus the retirement payment cannot convert the document into a "conveyance" under Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act.
Ajudhia Prasad Ram Prashad v. Sham Sunder (Full Bench) — (reported in the opinion without full citation) The Full Bench's conclusion that while a partnership exists no partner can point to any part of the assets as belonging to him alone; partners' rights are defined by the Partnership Act scheme and liquidation principles. The Court noted this Full Bench decision as supporting the proposition that partnership property is not the exclusive property of any partner during the continuance of the firm, reinforcing the conclusion that no transferable interest exists in a partner that would make the instrument a conveyance.
Peyare Lal v. Misri — 1940 A.L.J. 592 One of several decisions cited on the character of instruments executed by partners on retirement/dissolution (as referenced by counsel). The Court observed that these decisions do not lay down a principle different from the Supreme Court authority and therefore it was not necessary to refer to them in detail.
Bhola Nath v. Mt. Kaso Devi — (citation referenced) Another decision cited by counsel on related issues of partnership instruments. The Court stated it need not refer to this decision because it does not state a principle contrary to the Supreme Court authority relied upon.
Rani Narain v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. — I.T.R. Vol. 73 p. 423 (citation referenced) One of three decisions cited by counsel addressing related questions. The Court said reference was unnecessary as the Supreme Court decision already authoritatively addressed the relevant law; these cases did not lay down a different principle.
Board of Revenue v. V.M. Murugesa Mudaliar of Gudivalham — A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 641 A Madras Full Bench decision, cited as holding that an instrument of the kind under consideration may be treated as a deed of release (particularly in the context of co‑owners). Appellant's counsel cited this decision to support the view that the instrument could be a release. The Court acknowledged the authority and the principle that a release can enlarge the share of the remaining owners, but proceeded to apply the Stamp Act provisions and partnership law to the instrument before it and ultimately treated the instrument as a release under Article 55.
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Rustorm Nusserwanji Patel — A.I.R. 1968 Mad. 159 A Madras decision dealing with co‑owners (not partnership) where similar instruments were regarded as releases. The Court noted that the 1968 Madras decision dealt with co‑owners rather than partnership firms and therefore its principles are not directly analogous; the opinion nevertheless considered the concept of release under Article 55 in determining the proper classification of the instrument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step‑by‑step analysis focused on the character of the instrument and the legal definition of a "conveyance" under the Stamp Act.

  1. Characterization of the document: The Court accepted the factual recitals that the instrument was a deed of retirement by which Govind (the first party) retired from the firm and received Rs. 55,000 "in full and final satisfaction" of his claims; the deed also recorded transfers/exchanges concerning a godown, a motorcycle and a jeep.
  2. Legal test for "conveyance": The Court noted that, to be a conveyance as defined in Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act, the instrument must transfer property inter vivos. That requires that the executant possesses a transferable interest in the property sought to be transferred.
  3. Nature of a partner's rights: The Court examined the nature of a partner's rights in partnership property and relied primarily on the authoritative Supreme Court decision in Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhakara Krishnappa (and related Full Bench authority) which establishes that:
    • Property brought into or acquired by the firm becomes partnership property;
    • During the subsistence of the firm no partner can deal with a portion of partnership property as his own or assign an interest in a specific item of partnership property;
    • A partner's rights are limited to share of profits during the continuance of the partnership and, on dissolution or retirement, a share in the monetary value of the assets after liabilities are discharged.
    Based on these legal principles, the Court concluded that a retiring partner lacks the requisite transferable interest in specific partnership assets while the partnership subsists, so the payment of Rs. 55,000 to Govind on retirement could not convert the instrument into a conveyance of partnership property within Section 2(10).
  4. Consideration of authorities treating similar instruments as "release": The Court acknowledged High Court decisions (Madras Full Bench matters) that had treated analogous instruments as releases (especially in contexts of co‑ownership). The Court observed that the co‑ownership context differs from partnership, but also observed that Article 55 of Schedule I provides for duty on "Release" defined as an instrument whereby a person renounces a claim upon another person or against specified property.
  5. Factual application to the present deed: The Court concluded that the deed operated as a renouncement by the retiring partner of his claims against the firm and the continuing partners, thereby effecting an enlargement of the continuing partners' interest. Given the partnership law constraints on transferable interests and the statutory definition of "release", the Court classified the instrument as a deed of release rather than as a conveyance or as a deed of dissolution.
  6. Treatment of separate components: The Court accepted the Board's view (and the applicant did not contest) that the agreements relating specifically to the sale/transfer of the motorcycle and jeep and the exchange of the godown for land attracted additional duty (i.e., those discrete agreements were chargeable as transfers/exchanges attracting additional duty under the Stamp Act provisions cited by the Board).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

  • The document is not a conveyance (and therefore is not chargeable under Article 23, Schedule I‑B on that basis).
  • The document is not a deed of dissolution of partnership.
  • The document is a deed of release and is liable to stamp duty of Rs. 50 under Article 55, Schedule I‑B.
  • The document is liable to additional duty in respect of the two distinct agreements concerning the sale/transfer of the motorcycle and the jeep and the exchange of certain immovable properties (this point was not contested by the applicant).
  • No determination was necessary on questions (d) and (e) in view of the decision on (c).

Immediate consequences for the parties

The direct legal effect is that the instrument must be treated and stamped as a release (Article 55 duty Rs. 50). The additional duty consequences for the separate agreements relating to the motor vehicle transfers and the property exchange remain applicable as indicated by the Board and accepted by the applicant.

Broader implications and precedent

The Court grounded its conclusion on the established law concerning the nature of partner's rights as stated by the Supreme Court (Addanki Narayanappa). The opinion notes that the Supreme Court authority is authoritative and that the other cited decisions do not establish a contrary principle. The Court therefore did not purport to lay down a new principle of law; it applied existing authorities to the facts and classified the instrument accordingly.

Questions answered.

    Govind Das v. Board Of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow

    C.S.P Singh, J.:— The Board of Revenue as the Chief Revenue Controlling Authority has referred to the Court under Sec. 57 of the Stamp Act the following questions for answers:—

    “(a) Whether the document under reference is a conveyance for Rs. 55,000/- and is chargeable with a duty of Rs. 2,473/- under Article 23, Schedule I-B of the U.P Stamp Act, 1962, and is also liable to an additional duty of Rs. 4.50 under Article 5(c) read with Sec. 5 of the Stamp Act in respect of the two distinct agreements regarding the sale of Motor cycle and Jeep car and exchange of certain property.

    (b) Whether the document is a deed of dissolution of partnership and is sufficiently stamped with a duty of Rs. 22,50 under Article 46-B, Schedule, I-B, ibid.

    (c) Whether the document is a release of the value of Rs. 35,000/- and is liable to a duty of Rs. 50/- under Article 55, Schedule I-B, ibid.

    (d) Whether the document is merely an agreement between the parties and is chargeable with a duty of Rs. 2.25 under Article 5(c), Schedule I-B, ibid.

    (e) If the document is not covered by any of the alternative aforesaid, what stamp duty is payable in respect thereof under the U.P Stamp Act, 1962.”

    2. The answers to these questions depend upon the nature of the document executed by Govind Dass Gupta, Manohar Dass Gupta and Gopal Dass Gupta on the 29th October, 1967. The facts necessary for the decision of the questions referred may be shortly stated. Manohar Dass Gupta, Gopal Dass Gupta and Govind Dass Gupta were carrying an a partnership business known as Ram Manohardas.” Govind Dass Gupta retired from the partnership and executed a deed of retirement of the 29th October, 1967. Apart from the other clauses of the deed, with which we are not concerned in the present reference. Govind Dass Gupta, the retiring partner was to get an amount of Rs. 55,000/- from the firm in full and final satisfaction of all his dues and claims in the business and capital of the firm and its assets. There was also a stipulation that a godown belonging to Sri Govind Dass Gupta will be exchanged with a piece of land belonging to Manohar Dass Gupta, the continuing partner, and further that Sri Govind Dass Gupta, the retiring partner, will transfer his Motor cycle and Jeep car to the firm for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/-. This document although styled as a deed of retirement was stamped as a dissolution of partnership and a duty of Rs. 22.50 was paid by the executants. On the document being presented before the Collector, Allahabad, for adjudication under Sec. 31 of the Stamp Act, the matter was referred to the Board for orders under Sec. 56(2) of the Act. The Board took the view that the deed in question was a conveyance executed by the retiring partner in favour of the two remaining partners for a consideration of Rs. 55,000/- and not merely a deed of retirement of relinquishment and as such was chargeable as a conveyance under Article 23 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act and further that the agreements relating to the transfer of the Jeep and Motor Cycle and exchange of godown of the retiring partner Govind Dass with the land of the remaining partner Manohar Dass Gupta were chargeable an exchange transfer deeds and were liable to additional duty. At the instance of the executants, the Board has referred the questions noted above to this Court.

    3. Learned counsel for the applicant has not contested the view of the Board in respect of the agreements relating to the sale of the Motor cycle and the Jeep car and the exchange of the immovable properties between the retiring partner Govind Dass Gupta and the remaining partner Manohar Dass Gupta and such, in the present reference, it is not necessary to enter into the second part of the first question which relates to the two agreement realting to the sale of the movable properties and the exchange of immovable properties. In order to decide the controversy it will be useful to reproduce some elauses of the deed of the 29th October, 1967.

    4. THIS DEED OF RETIREMENT MADE THIS 29th DAY OF OCT., 1967 BETWEEN SRI GOVIND DASS GUPTA SON OF LATE RAM DASS Gupta resident of Tagore Town Allahabad, hereinafter called the FIRST PARTY; Sri Manohar Dass Gupta son of Late Ram Dass Gupta resident of railway Market, Kharagpur, District Midnapur, West Bengal, hereinafter called the SECOND PARTY and Sri Gopal Dass Gupta son of Late Ram Dass Gupta resident of Muthiganj, Allahabad, hereinafter called the THIRD PARTY.

    5. WHEREAS the parties to this deed are partners of the firm named and styled as Ram Dass Manohar Dass and whereas the said partnership is carrying on his business of Oil Millers and have got their Oil mill at Naini and Kharagpur and also their Offices at Calcutta and Jabalpur and whereas the business at Allahabad is carried on in the name and style of MANOHAR OIL MILL AND ENGINEERING WORKS AND MANOHAR OIL AND FLOUR MILL, MANOHAR OIL MILL and whereas the head office of the business is situated at Kharagpur is known as Manohar Oil and Flour Mill and whereas the FIRST PARTY has decided to retire from the said business and from the ‘firm Ram Dass Manohar Dass and whereas the Second and THIRD parties have agreed to the retirement of the First party from the said partnership and whereas the FIRST PARTY has offered to accept a sum of Rs. 55,0001/- (Rupess Fifty five thousand) in full satisfaction of all his claim, right, title or interest in the business and assets of the said firm………”

    “NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH:

    (1). That the first party has from this day retired from the firm of Ram Dass Manohar Dass and thereafter all the assets of the said firm including the moveable assets, immoveable assets, book debts, trade marks, name and goodwill shall hereafter belong to and be owned by the second and the third parties who are herein jointly described as the continuing partners and the first party shall hereafter has no right, title or interest whatsoever left in any of the assets of the firm aforesaid and the first party has no claim, right, title or interest left against the firm or against the continuing partners for and in connection with the business of the firm after the date of retirement and similarly the firm and the second and the thrid parties have no claims wratsoever of any kind against the first party for and in connection with the business of the firm upto the date of retirement, save except as herein agreed between the parties.”

    (2). That the first party shall receive a sum of Rs. 55,000/- (Rupees Fifty five thousand) from the firm in full and final satisfaction of all his dues and claims in the business and capital of the firm and the assets thereof and on the payment of the said amount the first party shall have all his claims and interest in the firm duly satisfied. The first party shall transfer to the firm his motor cycle No. U.P.C 3703 and Jeep Car No. U.P.C 9580 and the turn hall pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand) as the price thereof before the first party retires from the firm.”

    6. From the recitals in the deed it is clear that the deed is one of retirement by which Govind Dass Gupta went out of the firm and received an amount of Rs. 55,000/- from the firm in full and final satisfaction of all his dues and claims in the business and capital of the firm and the assets thereof. The result of the retirement of Govind Dass Gupta from the firm was an enlargement of the share of the remaining partners. The question, however, is as to whether the deed of retirement can on account of the payment of Rs. 55,0001/- from the firm to the retiring partner be termed as a conveyance as defined in Sec. 2(10) of the Act so as to attract duty under Art. 23 of Schedule I-B or is a deed of release (as has been contended by learned counsel for the applicant). The executants have given up the contention that the document is chargeable as an agreement or a memorandum of an agreement under Article 5(c) of Schedule I-B. Before the deed in question can be classified as a conveyance it must be an instrument by which property, moveable or immoveable, is transferred inter vivos (Sec. 2(10) of the Stamp Act). This implies that the executant of the deed must have a transferable interest in the property which is sought to be transferred. It would thus be necessary to see what is the exact nature of the right of a partner in the partnership property. The rights which a partner enjoys in respect of partnership property has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhakara Krishnappa A.I.R 1966 S.C 1300.. On page 1303 of the report their Lordships observed as follows:—

    “From a perusal of these provisions it would be a abundantly clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing to the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership. During the subsistence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to any one. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in Cl. (a) and sub-Cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of Cl. (b) of Sec. 48.”

    7. And then again on page 1304 their Lordships have laid down that:—

    “It seeme to us that looking to the scheme of the Indian Act no other view can reasonably be taken. The whole concept of partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose to bring in as capital money or even property including immovable property. Once that is done whatever is brought in would cease to be the exclusive property of the person who brought it in. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the partners would have interest in proportion to their share in the joint venture of the business of partnership. The person who brought it in would, therefore, not be able to claim or exercise any exclusive right over any property which he has brought in, much less over any other partnership property. He would not be able to exercise his right even to the extent of his share in the business of the partnership. As already stated his right during the subsistence of the partnership is to get his share of profits from time to time as may be agreed upon amoug the partners and after the dissolution of the partnership or with his retirement from partnership of the value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement after a deduction of liabilities and prior charges. It is true that even during the subsistence of the partneship a partner may assign his share to another. In that case what the assignee would get would be only that which is permitted by Sec. 29(1), that is to say, the right to receive the share of profits of the assignor and accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners.”

    8. Further on page 1306 their Lordships observed as follows:—

    “We may also refer to the decision of a Full Bench in Ajudhia Prasad Ram Prashad v. Sham Sunder,2 in which Cornelius, J. has discussed most of the decisions we have earlier referred to, in addition to several others and reached the conclusion that while a partnership is in existence, no partner can point to any part of the assets of the partnership as belonging to him alone. After examining the relevant provisions of the Act, the learned Judge observed:—

    “These sections require that the debts and liabilities should first be met out of the firm property and thereafter the assets should be applied in rateable payment to each partner of what is due to him firstly on occount of advances as distinguished from capital and, secondly on account of capital, the residue, if any, being divided rateably among all the partners. It is obvious that the Act contemplates complete liquidation of the assets of the partnership counts between partners upon dissolution of the firm and it will, therefore, be correct to say that, for the purposes of the Indian Partnership Act, and irrespective of any mutual agreement between the partners, the share of oath partner is, in the words of Lindley: “his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been all realised and converted into money, and All the partner ship debts and liabilities have been paid and discharged.”

    9. This indeed is the view which has commended itself to us.”

    10. It would thus appear that no partner can, during subsistence of the partnership, claim any portion of the property as his own. His only right is to obtain such profits, if any, that falls to his share. The property of the partnership is the trading asset of the partnership. It is only on dissolution that the partner gets a right to share in the residue that remains after meeting the liabilities provided for under Sec. 48 of the Act. If, as has been seen, a partner does not have any transferable interest in the moveable and immoveable properties of the firm it is difficult to understand how a deed of retirement would be a conveyance as defined in Sec. 2(10) of the Act. The amount of Rs. 55,000/- which was paid to the retiring partner in the present case was in lieu of “all his claim, right, title and interest in the business and the asset of the firm” and as has been seen, till such time that the partnership subsists the business and property of the firm belong to the firm and not to any partner individually. In this context, counsel for the appellant has referred us to the case of Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishtappa A.I.R 1959 A.P 380. and to three decisions of this Court in the cases of Peyare Lal v. Misri 1940 A.L.J 592., Bhola Nath v. Mt. Kaso Devi and Rani Narain v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P I.T.R Vol. 73 P. 423.. It is not necessary to refer to these decisions as the law on the nature of the rights of a partner qua partnership property has been authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to earlier and these cases do not lay down a principle different from what has been enunciated by the Supreme Court. The position on a consideration of these authorities, is that the deed in dispute cannot be a conveyance as defined under Sec. 2(10) of the Act.

    11. Counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to two decisions of the Madras High Court in Board of Revenue v. V.M Murugesa Mudaliar of Gudivalham A.I.R 1955 Mad. 641. and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Rustorm Nusserwanji Patel A.I.R 1968 Mad. 159. wherein the view has been taken that such a deed would be a deed of release. In 1955 Madras (Supra) Rajamannar, C.J who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench has observed on page 642 of the report as hereunder:—

    “In such a case there need be no conveyance as such by one of the co-owner in favour of the other co-owners. Each co-owner in theory is entitled to enjoy the entire property in part and in whole. It is not therefore necessary for the one of the co-owners to convey his interest to the other co-owner. It is sufficient if he releases his interest. The result of such release would be the enlargement of the share of the other co-owner. There can be no release by one person in favour of another, who is not already entitled to the property as a co-owner.”

    12. The case of 1968 Madras (Supra) dealt with the case of co-owners and not of a partnership firm but the principles laid down in that case are also opposite to the case of the present kind. Article 55 of Schedule I provides for duty leviable on “Release, that is to say, any instrument (not being; a release as is provided for by Sec. 23-A) whereby a person renounces a claim upon another person or against any specified property.” Such renouncement need not necessarily be by one co-owner in favour of another co-owner or the other co-owners. A person having a claim may also effect a release by renouncing his claim which may not be founded on co-ownership or may have arisen otherwise. In our opinion the deed in question is a deed of release and is leviable to stamp duty as such.

    13. Our answers to the questions referred for our decision are as hereunder:

    Q.(a) The document in question is not a conveyance. It is not chargeable to duty under Article 23. It is liable to an additional duty in respect of the two distinct agreements regarding the sale of Motor Cycle and Jeep Car and exchange of certain properties.

    Q.(b) The document is not a deed of dissolution,

    Q.(c) It is a deed of release and liable to duty of Rs. 50/- under Article 55 Schedule I-B.

    Q.(d) and (e) No decision is necessary in view of the decision of question (c).

    Questions answered.

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    Comments

    Govind Das v. Board Of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow
    (Apr 28, 1971)