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  • provisions of section 28(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
  • clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271,
  • section 271(1) and section 275
  • section 271(1)(c)
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Cited by
Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 28(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
  • clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271,
  • section 271(1) and section 275
  • section 271(1)(c)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Commissioner of Income-tax referred the following question to the court from the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT): “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the proceedings for imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) had been validly commenced within the meaning of section 275 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

Penalty proceedings were initiated against the assessee for alleged concealment of income represented by cash-credit entries in accounts of four creditors for the previous year relevant to assessment year 1963-64. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner examined the creditors, concluded that the assessee’s explanation was false and imposed a penalty of Rs. 28,070.

On appeal to the ITAT, the assessee argued that the penalty proceedings had not been commenced during the assessment proceedings and were therefore invalid. The ITAT accepted that contention and allowed the appeal.

Relevant factual timeline found by the Tribunal: the assessment was completed on November 30, 1963, and the assessment order contained the notation: “Question of penalty for concealment of income under sections 271/274 will also be taken.” A notice under section 271 was issued subsequently on April 25, 1964, and the penalty order followed thereafter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the proceedings for imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) had been validly commenced within the meaning of section 275 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Whether a penalty proceeding under section 271(1)(c) must be commenced (including issuance of notice under section 274(1)) before the assessment proceeding is concluded, or whether it is sufficient that the Income-tax Officer be satisfied in the course of the assessment and record that satisfaction.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The penalty proceedings had not been commenced during the assessment proceedings and were therefore invalid.
  • By reference to section 275, the assessee argued that the penalty proceedings must be commenced before the assessment is concluded — i.e., the implication of section 275 is that commencement must occur during the assessment proceedings.
  • The assessee relied on the decision in Shakti Offset Works v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Bombay High Court), which the assessee interpreted as indicating that the penalty proceeding must be commenced before completion of the assessment proceedings and that satisfaction during assessment itself could constitute commencement.

Commissioner of Income-tax's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Commissioner’s specific submissions in adversarial form; the court's reasoning reflects the Commissioner’s position that satisfaction recorded during the assessment suffices and that section 275 is a limitation provision and does not define the point of commencement of penalty proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax v. S.V. Angidi Chettiar [1962] 44 I.T.R. 739; [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 640 (Supreme Court) That the power to impose penalty depends upon the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer in the course of proceedings under the Act and that such satisfaction must be arrived at before the proceedings are concluded; the condition is satisfaction, not necessarily the issuance of a notice. The court relied on Angidi Chettiar to hold that satisfaction must exist in the course of the assessment proceeding before penalty proceedings are commenced, and that the requirement is satisfaction before conclusion, not the taking of formal steps such as issuing a show-cause notice prior to conclusion.
Durga Timber Works v. Commissioner of Income-tax; Navayuga Traders Gunnies Firm v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1971] 79 I.T.R. 519 (A.P.); Padgilwar Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Poona [1971] 81 I.T.R. 258 (Bom.-Nag) Cases cited as supportive authority for the court's view (as referenced by the court). The court stated that it is "fortified in this view" by these decisions, using them to support the proposition that recording satisfaction during assessment suffices and that the notice under section 274 need not necessarily be issued during the assessment proceeding.
Shakti Offset Works v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [1967] 64 I.T.R. 637 (Bom.) The Bombay High Court observed that initiation of penalty proceedings cannot be postponed until after completion of assessment and indicated that satisfaction during assessment may itself constitute commencement of the penalty proceeding. The court considered this decision but disagreed with any interpretation that would require the issuing of a show-cause notice before completing the assessment; it declined to accept that further action beyond recording satisfaction is mandated before assessment conclusion.
D.M. Manasvi v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1969] 72 I.T.R. 17 (Guj.) The Gujarat High Court held that where the Income-tax Officer reached the satisfaction and recorded a direction in the assessment order that penal action should be started under section 271(1)(c), he must be taken to have commenced the penalty proceeding during the pendency of the assessment proceeding. The court cited this decision as consistent with its conclusion that recording satisfaction/direction in the assessment order is sufficient to show commencement of the penalty proceeding during assessment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions: section 271(1) (power to impose penalty when the Income-tax Officer in the course of proceedings is satisfied that a person has concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars), section 274 (right to be heard and referral to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner where minimum penalty exceeds Rs. 1,000 in clause (c) cases), and section 275 (two-year limitation period measured from the date of completion of the proceedings in the course of which the proceedings for imposition of penalty have been commenced).

The court's step-by-step analysis:

  1. Interpreted section 271(1) to require a prima facie satisfaction by the Income-tax Officer "in the course of" a proceeding under the Act before commencing any proceedings for imposition of penalty.
  2. Accepted the Supreme Court's decision in Angidi Chettiar as establishing that the crucial requirement is satisfaction before the conclusion of the proceedings under the Act; the statute does not require formal written recording of that satisfaction but something must show the officer was satisfied during the assessment proceeding.
  3. Held that recording in the assessment order that "Question of penalty ... will also be taken" constitutes evidence that the Income-tax Officer was satisfied in the course of the assessment and thus satisfies the requirement for commencement of penalty proceedings.
  4. Explained that section 274(1) requires that the assessee be heard before imposition of penalty, and where the minimum penalty exceeds Rs. 1,000 the case must be referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner; but section 274 does not prescribe that the show-cause notice under it must be issued during the assessment proceeding itself.
  5. Analyzed section 275 and concluded it prescribes the limitation period for making a penalty order (two years from completion of the proceedings in the course of which penalty proceedings were commenced) but does not prescribe when the penalty proceeding itself must be held to have commenced; it merely identifies the "former proceeding" for computing limitation.
  6. Considered and distinguished the Bombay High Court decision in Shakti Offset Works to the extent that it may be read to require issuance of notice before completion of assessment; the court refused to accept that proposition.
  7. Relied also upon the Gujarat High Court decision in D.M. Manasvi (and other cited high court decisions) as consistent with the view that recording a direction in the assessment order to start penal action constitutes commencement during the pendency of the assessment.
  8. Concluded that in the present case the penalty proceeding under section 271(1)(c) was validly commenced because the assessment order itself evidenced the officer's satisfaction and direction to take penalty proceedings, and section 275 did not affect the question of when commencement is to be treated as having occurred.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court held that the penalty proceeding under section 271(1)(c) in the present case was validly commenced.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The referred question was answered in the affirmative: recording the officer's satisfaction in the assessment order suffices to show that penalty proceedings were commenced in the course of the assessment proceeding for the purposes of section 271(1)(c).
  • The court held that section 275 is a limitation provision and does not prescribe that the notice under section 274(1) must be issued during the assessment proceeding; therefore section 275 did not alter the conclusion on commencement.
  • As a direct, case-specific outcome, the Commissioner of Income-tax was held entitled to costs. The court assessed costs at Rs. 200 and assessed counsel's fee at Rs. 200.
  • No broader novel precedent was claimed to be created by the opinion; the court's conclusion was reached by applying and reconciling earlier authorities and by answering the referred question accordingly.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P v. Bankey Lal Hira Lal.

    Pathak, J.:— At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the following question has been referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the proceedings for imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) had been validly commenced within the meaning of section 275 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

    2. Proceedings for the imposition of penalty were taken against the assessee for concealment of income represented by cash credit entries in the accounts of four creditors during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1963-64. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner examined the four creditors and upon the material before him held that the explanation submitted by the assessee in respect of the cash credit entries was false. He imposed a penalty of Rs. 28,070. In appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the assessee contended that the penalty proceedings had not been commenced during the course of the assessment proceedings and were, therefore, invalid. The Tribunal accepted the plea and allowed the appeal.

    3. According to the facts found by the Tribunal, the assessment was completed on November 30, 1963. In the order of assessment the Income-tax Officer wrote:

    “Question of penalty for concealment of income under sections 271/274 will also be taken.”

    4. A notice under section 271 was issued on April 25, 1964, and the penalty order was made thereafter.

    5. It is urged before us that the penalty proceeding under section 271(1) must be commenced before the assessment proceeding concludes, that the penalty proceeding commences with the issue of a notice to the assessee to show cause against the imposition of a penalty and that as no proceeding for imposing a penalty was taken under section 271(1) before the assessment order was signed the penalty proceeding was without jurisdiction.

    6. The relevant provisions are:

    “271. (1) If the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in the course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person—………

    (c) has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income,

    he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty,—………..

    (iii) in the cases referred to in clause (c), in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be less than, but which shall not exceed twice, the amount of the income in respect of which the particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished….

    274. (1) No order imposing a penalty under this Chapter shall be made unless the assessee has been heard, or has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271, if in a case falling under clause (c) of that sub-section, the minimum penalty imposable exceeds a sum of rupees one thousand, the Income-tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under this Chapter for the imposition of penalty.

    275. No order imposing a penalty under this chapter shall be passed after the expiration of two years from the date of the completion of the proceedings in the course of which the proceedings for the imposition of penalty have been commenced.”

    7. Now, what section 271(1) requires is that the Income-tax Officer should be satisfied in the course of a proceeding under the Act before him that a person has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. Necessarily, there must be a prima facie satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer before he commences any proceedings for imposing a penalty. Where an assessment proceeding is pending before the Income-tax Officer and he is satisfied in the course of that proceeding that the assessee has been guilty of default the satisfaction must be arrived at before the assessment proceeding is concluded. That view was taken by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. S.V Angidi Chettiar [1962] 44 I.T.R 739, 745; [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R 640 S.C., on the comparable provisions of section 28(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court observed:

    “The power to impose penalty under section 28 depends upon the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer in the course of proceedings under the, Act; it cannot be exercised if he is not satisfied about the existence of conditions specified in clause (a), (b) or (c) before the proceedings are concluded. The proceedings to levy penalty have, however, not to be commenced by the Income-tax Officer before the completion of the assessment proceedings by the Income-tax Officer. Satisfaction before conclusion of the proceedings under the Act, and not the issue of a notice or initiation of any step for imposing penalty, is a condition for the exercise of the jurisdiction.”

    8. While the statute does not require any formal order recording the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer that the assessee has committed the default mentioned in section 271(1), it is sufficient for the validity of the penalty proceeding if there is something to show that the Income-tax Officer was satisfied in the course of the assessment proceeding before the penalty proceeding is commenced. That evidence is forthcoming, as in the present case, if the Income-tax Officer records in the assessment order itself that he is satisfied that it is a case in which a penalty proceeding should be taken. As the Supreme Court has pointed out in Angidi Chettiar, that is the only condition requiring compliance during the course of the assessment proceeding. It is open to the Income-tax Officer to actually commence the penalty proceeding after the assessment has been concluded. If he finds during the course of his investigation that the minimum penalty imposable in a case falling under section 271(1)(c) exceeds Rs. 1,000, he must refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. If he finds otherwise, he can dispose of the case himself. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, in a case referred to him by the Income-tax Officer, has all the powers conferred under the Chapter for the imposition of penalty. Before the Income-tax Officer or the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposes a penalty the assessee must, by reason of section 274(1), be heard in the matter or be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. No penalty can be validly imposed before such opportunity is afforded.

    9. It is contended on behalf of the assessee that if regard be had to section 275 it must be held that the notice under section 274(1) should be issued in the course of the assessment proceeding. Section 275 prescribes the period of limitation for making a penalty order. The period is two years “from the date of completion of the proceedings in the course of which the proceedings for the imposition of penalty have been commenced”. Where there is an assessment proceeding, it is urged by the assessee, the necessary implication is that the penalty proceeding must be commenced before the assessment is concluded. In our opinion, the contention is without force. No such implication can be spelled out from section 275. The section, in its essential content, is a provision prescribing the period of limitation for making a penalty order. It is not a provision prescribing the point of commencement of the penalty proceeding. It is concerned with the order which concludes the penalty proceedings. When it refers to the completion of the proceeding in the course of which the penalty proceeding is commenced, in substance it identifies the former proceeding for the purpose of defining the point of time from which the period of limitation for making the penalty order must be computed.

    10. We are of opinion that the Income-tax Officer need only be satisfied in the course of the assessment proceeding that a proceeding for imposition of penalty should be taken, and it is not necessary that the notice under section 274 should also be issued.

    11. We are fortified in this view by what has been said in Durga Timber Works v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Navayuga Traders Gunnies Firm v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1971] 79 I.T.R 519 A.P. and Padgilwar Brothers v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Poona. [1971] 81 I.T.R 258 Bom.-Nag...

    12. Reliance has been placed by the assessee on Shakti Offset Works v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [1967] 64 I.T.R 637, 655 Bom.., where the Bombay High Court has observed that the initiation of the penalty proceeding cannot be held over until after the completion of the assessment and that section 271(1) and section 275 indicate that the penalty proceeding has to be commenced before the completion of the assessment proceeding. It seems that the learned judges considered that the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment proceeding itself constituted the commencement of the penalty proceeding. They said:

    “Similarly, the opening words of section 271(1) provided for the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner being satisfied in the course of any proceedings under the Act that the assessee has done one or the other of the defaults mentioned in the sub-clauses and on his being satisfied he may direct such person to pay by way of penalty the amounts indicated in the subsequent provision. Thus, the event which gives a cause of action for initiation of proceedings for imposing penalty is not held over until after the completion of assessment proceedings.”

    13. If these observations are capable of being understood to mean that the Income-tax Officer must, besides recording his satisfaction, take further action by the issue of a notice to the assessee before completing the assessment, we are unable, with respect, to agree with the proposition so laid down.

    14. In D.M Manasvi v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1969] 72 I.T.R 17 Guj.. the Gujarat High Court held that inasmuch as the Income-tax Officer had reached the satisfaction contemplated by section 271(1) and recorded a direction in the assessment order that penal action should be started under section 271(1)(c) against the assessee he must be taken to have commenced the penalty proceeding during the pendency of the assessment proceeding.

    15. In our opinion, the penalty proceeding under section 271(1)(c), in the present case, was validly commenced, and inasmuch as section 275 does not deal with the question as to when such, proceeding can be considered to commence, no question arises of applying that provision. The question is answered accordingly.

    16. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel's fee is assessed in the same figure.

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    Comments

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P v. Bankey Lal Hira Lal.
    (Dec 23, 1971)