Katju, J.:— The two questions which have been referred to us for our opinion are as follows:—

(1) Whether the State Government acts as a quasi-judicial authority when deciding a case relating to the grant of permission under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for filing a suit in the civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation?

(2) Whether the State Government is bound to give reasons for its orders under Sec. 7-F of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in proceedings arising out of an application under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file a suit in a civil court for the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation?

2. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments of my brothers Khare and Mathur and I am inclined to agree with my brother Khare. The majority view of our Full Bench in Haji Manzoor Ahmad v. State of U.P 1968 A.L.J 809. in which it was held that proceedings under Sec. 7-F of U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are quasi-judicial in character, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand 1965 A.L.J 353.. The Supreme Court further re-affirmed the aforesaid view in Vasudeo Chaube v. Vaidya Nand Kishore 1968 A.L.J 1021.. My answer to the first question, therefore, is in the affirmative. The answer to the second question is not free from difficulty. The Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union Of India & Others A.I.R 1967 S.C 1607. overruled its earlier decision in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R 1966 S.C 671.. On an appeal under Article 156 of the Constitution of India from an order of the Central Government it was held that the Central Government should have passed a speaking order. The same view was expressed in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in (i) Prag Das Umar Vaishya v. Union of India 1967 M.P.W.R 448., (ii) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Seth Narsinghdas Jankidas Mehta Civil Appeal No. 681 of 1966 decided on 29th April, 1969., (iii) Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union Of India† Civil Appeal No. 2252 of 1966 decided on 28th October, 1969. and (iv) State of Gujrat v. Patel Raghav Natha 1969 2 SCC 187. The following observations were made by Subba Rao, J. in his minority judgment in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India.

“There is no essential distinction between a Court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively un-influenced by considerations of policy or expediency, but, an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand point of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their orders.”

3. It may be desirable that a Tribunal while passing its order in a case referred to it in revision, as it was in the cases before us, should give its reasons for the decision arrived at by it. Such an order passed by a Tribunal may be questioned before the Supreme Court on appeal under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution or it may be challenged before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and it may be proper that the Supreme Court or the High Court should have the benefit of examining the reasons on the basis of which the Tribunal had arrived at its decision. But there appears to be no provision under Sec. 7-F of the Act which can compel, as a matter of law, the State Government to record its reasons while passing an order under Sec. 7-F of the Act. It may be desirable for the State Government to record its reasons while giving its decision in proceedings under Sec. 7-F of the Act. But as long as there is no specific provision directing the State Government to make a speaking order while giving its decision under Sec. 7-F of the Act, an order passed by it on an application in revision cannot be struck down merely on the ground that it has not given any reason for its decision. The observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases were made with particular reference to the provisions of the enactments under which the orders in question before the Supreme Court were passed and they can only be considered as directory in nature so far as they relate to an order passed, by the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act. My brother Khare has considered the decisions of the Supreme Court which followed Bhagat Raja's case and I fully agree with his reasons that the decisions in the aforesaid cases have to be read in the context of the provisions of the particular enactments with which those cases were concerned.

4. One decision of the Supreme Court which could be said to be directly on the point as it relates to the Act is Mohammad Ismail v. Nanhey Lal 1969 A.W.R 281.. It was observed therein

“Neither the District Magistrate nor the Commissioner nor the State Government is obliged to disclose any reason which may influence such authorities in coming to their decision.”

5. If the State Government is not obliged to disclose any reason while coming to its decision it naturally follows that an order passed by it under Sec. 7-F of the Act cannot be struck down merely on the ground that no reasons have been stated in the order of the State Government. Again in Som Datt v. Union of Indian A.I.R 1969 S.C 414., it was observed by the Supreme Court:—

“…….. Apart from any requirements imposed by the statute or statutory, rules expressly or by necessary implication we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Datta that there is any general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision.

6. In English law there is no general rule apart from the statutory requirement that the statutory tribunal should give reasons for its decision in every case. In Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal 1952 1 K.B 338. it was decided for the first time by the Court of Appeal that if there was a “speaking order” a writ of certiorari could be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court or a statutory tribunal on the ground of error on the face of record……………………………. It was observed that if the tribunal did state its reasons and those reasons were wrong in law a writ of a certiorari might be granted by the High Court for quashing the decision…………………………..

7. But the decision in this case led to an anomalous result, for it meant that the opportunity for certiorari depended on whether or not the statutory tribunal chose to give reasons for its decision, in other words, to make a “speaking order”. No all tribunals, by any means, were prepared to do so, and a superior Court had no power to compel them to give reasons except when the statute required it. This incongruity was remedied by the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 (S. 12) (6 and 7 Elizabeth 2C. 66), which provides that on request a subordinate authority must supply to a party genuinely interested the reasons for its decision. Sec. 12 of the Act states that when a tribunal mentioned in the First Schedule of the Act gives a decision it must give a written or oral statement of the reasons for the decision, if required to do so on or before the giving of notification of the decision. The statement may be refused or the specification of reasons restricted on grounds of national security, and the tribunal may refuse to give the statement to a person not principally concerned with the decision if it thinks that to give it would be against the interests of any person primarily concerned. Tribunals may also be exempted erupted by the Lord Chancellor from the Duty to give reasons, but the council on Tribunals must be consulted on any proposal to do so……”

8. As mentioned above, there is nothing in Sec. 7-F of the Act which can compel the State Government to give its reasons while passing its order. On the other hand, the exercise of the power of the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act appeals to be discretionary and it can “make such orders as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice.”

9. The scope of the revisional powers of the State of Maharashtra as provided for under Sec. 154 of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (No. XXIV of 1961) was considered in E.A Co-operative Housing Society v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R 1966 S.C 1449.. Sec. 154 of the aforesaid Act is as follows:—

“154. Power of State Government and Registrar to call for proceedings of subordinate officer and to pass orders thereon.

10. The State Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them, except those referred to in sub-Sec. (9) of Sec. 149 for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. If in any case, it appears to the State Government or the Registrar, that any decision or order proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may after giving persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard pass such order thereon as it or him may seem first”.

11. The Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“There is no doubt that Sec. 154 is potential but not compulsive. Power is reposed in Government to intervene to do justice when occasion demands it and of the occasion for its exercise, Government is made the sole Judge.

“There remains the question whether a party has a right to move Government. The Tribune Trust case is distinguishable and cannot help the submission that Government cannot be moved at all. The words of the two enactments are not materially equal. The Income-Tax Act used the words suo motu' which do not figure here. It is, of course, true that the words “on an application of a party” which occur Sec. 150 of the Act and in similar enactments in other Acts, are also not to be found. But that does not mean that a party is prohibited from moving Government. As Government is not compelled to take action, unless it thinks fit, the party who moves Government cannot claim that he has a right of appeal or revision. On the other hand, Government should welcome such applications because they draw the attention of Government to cases in some of which Government may be interested to intervene. In many statutes, as for example the two major procedural Codes, such language has not only not inhabited the making of applications to the High Court, but has been considered to give a right to obtain intervention, although the mere making of the application has not clothed a party with any rights beyond bringing a matter to the notice of the Court. After this is done, it is for the Court to consider whether to act or not. The extreme position does not obtain here because there is no right to interference in the same way as in a judicial proceeding. Government may act or may not act; the choice is of Government. There is no right to relief as in an appeal or revision under the two Codes.”

12. The power given to the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act is not much different than the power given under Sec. 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. By the same process of reasoning it would follow that the State Government is not compelled to take action when an application in revision is presented to it under Sec. 7-F of the Act. Further if it passes an order it cannot be compelled to record its reasons for coming to its decision.

13. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati A.I.R 1969 S.C 329 at 338.:

“Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rules either expressly or by necessary implication we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Phadke that there is any general principle that a statutory tribunal should always give its judgment in writing and should always give reasons thereof immediately with the pronouncement of the judgment.

14. My answer to the second question, therefore, is in the negative.

15. G.C Mathur, J.:— The following two questions have been referred to this Bench for opinion:—

(1) Whether the State Government acts as a quasi-judicial authority when deciding a case relating to the allotment of an accommodation?

(2) Whether the State Government is bound to give reasons for its order in a case for the allotment of an accommodation?

16. What is popularly called an “allotment order” is really an order to let an accommodation to a particular person and is made under Sec. 7(2) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Sub-Sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 7, which are relevant to the questions referred, are in these words:—

“7(1)(a) — Every landlord shall within 7 days after an accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant vacating it or otherwise ceasing to occupy it or by termination of a tenancy or by release from requisition or in any other manner whatsoever, give notice of the vacancy in writing to the District Magistrate.

(b) — Every tenant occupying accommodation shall, within 7 days of vacation of such accommodation, or ceasing to occupy it, give notice thereof in writing to the District Magistrate.

(c) — The notice given under Clause (a) or (b) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.

(2) The District Magistrate may, by general or special order, require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant.”

17. The general order contemplated in sub-Sec. (2) is an order by the District Magistrate forbidding all landlords from letting out any accommodation to any person without his permission and the special order is one by which the District Magistrate directs a particular landlord to let out a particular accommodation to a particular person. An order under Sec. 7(2) is not revisable by the Commissioner but only by the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act. Sec. 7-F provides:

“7-F. The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in Sec. 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under Sec. 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under Sec. 7-A and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice.”

18. Before considering whether the State-Government is required to act quasi-judicially in deciding a case under Sec. 7-F arising out of an order under Sec. 7(2), it is necessary to determine whether the District Magistrate is required to act quasi-judicially in making an order under Sec. 7(2). The decisions of the Supreme Courts have laid down the following three tests for determining whether a statutory authority is required to act in a quasi-judicial manner or not:—

(i) That if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a Iis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act;

(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act, provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially; and

(iii) that if the nature of the duties and functions to be exercised by the authority is such that they cannot but be exercised in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner, the authority must act in a quasi-judicial manner.

19. If any one of these tests is satisfied, it must be held that the authority must act quasi-judicially. So far as the first test is concerned, it has been frankly conceded by Sri V.P Misra appearing for the appellant that, in allotment proceedings, there is no lis between the parties. Even apart from this concession, it is apparent that, in such proceedings, no claim in respect of any right is made by any party which is disputed by any other party. None of the persons, who apply for allotment, has any right in or to the accommodation or to its allotment; there is really no dispute inter se the various applicants for allotment. The first test is, therefore, not satisfied in cases of allotment.

20. For the applicability of the second test, we have to see whether the Act or the rules framed thereunder, expressly or by necessary intendent, provide that the District Magistrate should act judicially. The Act itself lays down no procedure for the exercise of the power under Sec. 7(2) by the District Magistrate and gives no indication whatever that he is required to act quasi-judicially. The rules also do not lay down any procedure for the exercise of cants for allotment. Sri Misra placed reliance on the provisions of Sec. 7-G of the Act for showing that the Act required the district Magistrate to act judicially. Sec. 7-G runs as follows:—

“7-G(1) — For purposes of any inquiry under this Act, the District Magistrate may—

(a) enter, inspect or authorise any officer subordinate to him to enter and inspect any accommodation at any time between sunrise and sunset; or

(b) by written order require any person to produce for his inspection such rent receipts, books or other documents relevant to the enquiry at such time and at such place specified in the order.

Provided that no premises shall be entered under Clause (a) without the consent of the occupier, unless at least 24 hours' previous notice in writing has been given.

(2) The District Magistrate shall, in so far as such powers are necessary for carrying out the different provisions of this Act, have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents in so far as may be in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

21. Sec. 7-G does not really prescribe any procedure for the exercise of the power under Sec. 7(2) but merely confers power in the District Magistrate to enter and inspect any accommodotion and to require any person to produce documents. Such powers are also conferred on purely administrative bodies which are not required to act quasi-judicially. The conferment of the power under Sec. 7-G gives no indication that the District Magistrate, in exercising power under Sec. 7(2), must act quasi-judicially. There is thus no indication either in the Act or in the rules that the District Magistrate is required to act quasi-judicially. The second test is also not satisfied.

22. So far as the applicability of the third test is concerned, it was contended by learned counsel that, even in allotment proceedings, the District Magistrate may be called upon to determine two jurisdictional questions, i.e, (i) whether the Act is applicable to the accommodation; and (ii) whether there is any vacancy or not and that these two questions cannot but be determined objectively and, therefore, the District Magistrate must act quasi-judicially. Reliance is placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Property Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur 1964 A.L.J 752.. This case does support the contention to some extent but, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, this contention cannot be accepted. In Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani A.I.R 1950 S.C 222., it was held that the argument that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, the decision is quasi-judicial is not sound. It was observed that the argument overlooked the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and, in most cases, affects the rights of some one or the other. Because an executively authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step in the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. In Radheyshyam Khare v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R 1959 S.C 107., the Supreme Court reiterated its view that the mere fact that an administrative or executive authority is required by the statute to determine some questions of fact does not necessarily require the authority to act quasi-judicially. Therefore, the mere fact that the District Magistrate may, in certain cases, have to determine the question whether the act was applicable to the accommodation and whether the accommodation was vacant is no indication that the Legislature required the District Magistrate to act quasi-judicially. The nature of the power exercised by the District Magistrate under Sec. 7(2) is also not such that it cannot but be exercised in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner. In fact, the District Magistrate is not called upon to determine any rights of any parties. Allotment proceedings are akin to proceedings for the grant of permits for the supply of a controlled commodity. It cannot be said to have any serious consequences because out of several applicants the accommodation can be allotted only to one of them and the consequences, serious or otherwise, are inevitable for the remaining applicants. The proceedings cannot be compared with proceedings for disciplinary action, or with proceedings taken against examinees who are alleged to have resorted to unfair means. The third test is also not satisfied in the case of allotment proceedings. Since neither of the three tests is satisfied, it must be held that the District Magistrate, in exercising his power under Sec 7(2) of the Act, is not required to act quasi-judicially. The same view has been taken earlier by this Court in Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur 1955 A.L.J 252., Suraj Narain v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur 1958 A.L.J 283. and Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur 1964 A.L.J 710..

23. The next question, which arises for consideration, is whether the State Government is required to act quasi-judicially in exercising its power of revision under Sec. 7-F in respect of orders of allotment. It is contended that the revisional or appellate power has to be exercised judicially even when it is exercised in respect of a purely administrative order unless the statute conferring the revisional or appellate power indicates to the contrary. The contention appears to be well founded. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume II, Third Ediction, it is stated at page 56:

“Thus, if in order to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, if at some stage of the proceedings leading upto the decision there was something in the nature of a lis before it, then in the course of such consideration and at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judicially.”

24. Lord Haldane observed in Local Government Board v. Arlidge 1915 A.C 120..

“My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties he opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice.”

25. A question arose before the Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division A.I.R 1958 S.C 398., whether the Commissioner exercising appellate power under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act was required to act the power or for the giving of any hearing or opportunity to any of the appliquasi-judicially. Holding that it was required to act quasi-judicially, the Supreme Court said:

“Where there is a right vested in an authority created by statute, be it quasi-judicial or administrative, to hear appeals and revisions, it becomes its duty to hear judicially, that is to say, in an objective manner, impartially and after giving reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned in the dispute to place their respective cases before it.”

26. In Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India A.I.R 1960 S.C 606. a question arose before the Supreme Court whether, in considering a review application under Rule 53 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, against an order of the State Government Granting a mining lease, the Central Government was required to act judicially or not. Holding that it was, the Supreme Court observed:—

“Now when a lease is granted by the State Government, it is quite possible that there may be no application for review by those whose applications have been refused. In such a case the order of the State Government would be final it would not, therefore, be, in our opinion, right to say that no right of any kind is created in favour of a person to whom the lease is granted by the State Government…….. At any rate, when the statutory rule grants a right to any party aggrieved to make a review application to the Central Government, it certainly follows that the person in whose favour the order is made has also a right to represent his case before the authority to whom the review application is made. It is in the circumstances apparent that as soon as Rule 52 gives a right to an aggrieved party to apply for review, a lis is created between him and the party in whose favour the grant has been made. Unless, therefore, there is anything in the statute to the contrary, it will be the duty of the authority to act judicially and its decision would be a quasi-judicial act.”

27. In P.L Lakhanpal v. Union of India A.I.R 1967 S.C 1507., the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether the Central Government was required to exercise its power to review a detention order judicially. Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules empowered the Central Government and the State Government to detain any person in certain circumstances and Rule 30-A(9) required that every detention order made by the Central Government or the State Government shall be reviewed at intervals of not more than six months by the Government who made the order and, upon such review, that Government shall decide whether the order should be continued or cancelled. The Supreme Court held that, though the power under Rule 30(1)(b), which was to be exercised upon the subjective opinion of the Government, was purely administrative, the power of review had to be exercised judicially. It said:—

“It is equally obvious that the manner, in which the question of continuation of detention joined upon by Rule 30-A(9) has to be determined is by applying the objective standard as against the subjective opinion or the belief of the detaining authority, i.e, by weighing evidence brought before or collected by such authority relevant to the purposes under Rule 30(1)(b) and Rule 30-A(9) and then coming to a decision whether the order of detention needs continuation or not. How can such an authority come to its decision honestly and properly unless it is certain that the materials before it are true and dependable. How is that certainty to be derived unless the person concerned is given an opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence either by explanation or through other materials which he can place before the authority.”

28. In the State of Assam v. Hari Singh Civil Appeal No. 1066 of 1966 decided on July 16, 1969., the question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court, was whether the Conservator of Forests dealing with an appeal by one party against the order of the Divisional Forest officer accepting the tender of another party for the purchase of forest produce was required, to act judicially. The Supreme Court held:

“The Conservator of Forests is invested with power to hear an appeal against an order which is administrative in character, but, in the absence of my clear indication to the contrary, he is, when hearing the appeal, under a duty to act judicially.”

29. Then referring to its previous decisions in the Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India it abserved:—

“It is, therefore, clear that the duty of an authority invested with power to decide a question to act judicially need not arise from express enactment; it may result from necessary implication of the statute.

30. In the present case, the Divisional Forest officer had accepted the tender of the first respondent. If the first respondent carried out the conditions, he was entitled to call upon the Divisional Forest officer to settle the forest produce in his favour. The order was according to the conditions of sale, subject to appeal and on that account liable to be set aside by the Conservator of Forests. But, when deciding an appeal against the order of the Divisional Forest officer, the Conservator of Forests had to act fairly and in a manner consistent with the rules of natural justice, that is, to consider the respective claims after giving an opportunity to the persons directly interested in the result of the appeal, to make their representations and to consider them objectively. Investment of power to entertain an appeal with authority to pass an order to the prejudice of one of the claimants prima facie implies a duty to act judicially, and there is nothing in the Act which negatives that implication.”

31. Recent decisions show that gradually the concept of quasi-judicial power is being widened and the functions, which were formerly considered to be purely administrative, are now considered to be quasi-judicial. In A.K Kraipak v. Union of India 1969 2 SCC 262, the Supreme Court made the following observations:—

“The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the frameword of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution, the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures, which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power, are merely those which facilitate, if not ensure, a just and fair decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.”

32. Keeping these principles in mind, let us now examine the nature of the functions exercised by the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act. The examination reveals four, things, viz.

(i) that the power under Sec. 7-F is a supervisory or appellate power to cancel, modify or affirm an order of allotment made in favour of a party;

(ii) that, as a result of the order of allotment, the allottee acquires a right to became a tenant of the accommodation and this right is disputed or challenged by another party before the State Government by an application under Sec. 7-F;

(iii) that the dispute is a private dispute between two parties which the State Government has to adjudicate upon; and

(iv) that the matter has to be decided on merits and objectively and not on grounds of policy or expediency.

33. It thus appears that there is some sort of a lis before the State Government in deciding which it has to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that, in deciding a case under Sec 7-F relating to the allotment of an accommodation, the State Government has to act judicially. I would accordingly answer the first question in the affirmative.

34. The second question referred is whether the State Government is bound to give reasons for its order in a case relating to allotment of an accommodation. In answers to questions referred to this Bench in Writ Petition No. 3755 of 1967 (Reported in 1970 A.L.J 1177), I have expressed the opinion that the State Government, passing an order under Sec. 7-F in a case arising out of proceedings for the grant of permission under Sec. 3 of the act to file a suit for eviction of a tenant, is bound to give reasons for its order. Since I am of the opinion that the State Government is required to act quasi-judicially in deciding a case under Sec. 7-F relating to the allotment of an accommodation, it is bound, for the reasons already expressed in my answers to the reference in the writ petition, to give reasons for its order. I would accordingly answer the second question referred also in the affirmative.

35. H.N Seth, J.— I agree.

36. M.H Hussain, J.— I agree.

37. Per S.N Katju and S.D Khare, JJ.:— The following two questions have been referred to this Bench for opinion:—

(1) Whether the State Government acts as a quasi-judicial authority when deciding a case relating to the allotment of an accommodation?

(2) Whether the State Government is bound to give reasons for its order in a case for the allotment of accommodation?

38. We have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared by brother G.C Mathur, J., and with great respect we agree that for reasons given by him the First question should be answered in the affirmative. For reasons already given by us in Civil Misc. Writ No. 3755 of 1967 and special Appeal Nos. 429 of 1967 our opinion is that the second question should be answered in the negative.

39. By The Court — In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench are:

(1) the State Government acts as a quasi-judicial authority when deciding case under Sec 7-F of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act relating to the allotment of an accommodation; and

(2) the State Government is bound to give reasons for its order under Sec. 7-F of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in a case for the allotment of an accommodation.

40. (Note:— The copy of dissenting judgment pronounced by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.D Khare has not been supplied by the High Court. So it has not been published. It will be published when the copy will be available).

41. Questions answered.