Gangeshwar Prasad, J.:— The main contention raised in this appeal on behalf of the defendants-appellants is that the benefit of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available in respect of a transfer made in contravention of Sec. 153 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and the plaintiffs-respondents who are transferees under such a transfer got no rights in the land covered by the transfer even upon the subsequent acquisition by the transferors of the rights of a Bhumidhar in the said land, which was held by them only as Sirdars at the time of its transfer. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jama Nasjid Marcara v. K. Deviah A.I.R 1962 S.C 847. which was followed by me in Jagat Narain v. Lal Ji A.I.R 1965 Alld. 504. this contention is plainly untenable. It was urged by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants that a transfer in contravention of Sec. 153 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been declared to be void by Sec. 166 of the said Act and the Supreme Court decision which dealt with a transfer not permitted by Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to a transfer of the former kind. The argument overlooks the fact that transfers of all properties which have been made non-transferable by Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act are void under Sec. 23 of the Contract Act just as all transfers which are void under Sec. 23 of the Contract Act have been prohibited by Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, and it does not, therefore, make any difference that the transfer which was involved in the Supreme Court decision related to a property which was not transferable because of Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. A transfer in contravention of Sec. 153 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be void under Sec. 23 of the Contract Act also, and Sec. 166 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act only embodies in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act itself what would be the legal position even in the absence of the latter provision. Sec. 166 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is, therefore, not in conflict with Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act just as Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act is not in conflict with it. The result clearly is that the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to the benefit of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and the transfers in their favour operated as a transfer of the rights of a Bhumidhar upon the acquisition of the rights of a Bhumidhar by the transferors.
2. The next contention on behalf of the defendants-appellants is that even if Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable the defendants-appellants are protected because they are transferees in good faith for consideration without notice. The transfer in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents is by a registered deed and the lower appellate court has found that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession of the land in suit when the defendants-appellants obtained the subsequent deed in respect of it. Having regard to the definition of ‘notice’, in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act the appellants cannot, therefore, be said to be transferees without notice of the title which, at the time of the transfer in their favour the plaintiffs-respondents had acquired by operation of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.
3. No other point has been urged.
4. The appeal has no force and it is accordingly dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, I.P.C
Appeal dismissed.