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  • Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Indian Companies Act
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  • Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • Indian Companies Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Messrs. Edward Keventers (S) Private Limited operated a stall at the Nauchandi Fair, Meerut. On 15 April 1962 at about 7 P.M., Sri Ajmal Husain, Food Inspector, purchased 16 Chhataks of sweetened milk from Vidya Bhushan, a salesman at the stall. The sample was divided into three sealed parts in separate containers in accordance with the rules: one given to the salesman, one sent to the Public Analyst and one retained by the Medical Officer of Health.

The Public Analyst tested the sample by reference to the statutory standard for buffalo milk and reported a deficiency in fat content of about 53% and the use of coaltar dye (erythrosine colour index no. 773). The Commercial Manager of the Company (the applicant) and the salesman Vidya Bhushan were tried for an offence under Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. A Magistrate First Class recorded convictions on 30 January 1963 and imposed fines of Rs. 1,000 on the applicant and Rs. 250 on the salesman. The Sessions Judge, on appeal, confirmed the convictions and sentences. The present revision by the applicant challenges that confirmation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant (the Company's Commercial Manager), who was not present at the stall and who was not responsible for the production side of the Company's business, can be held liable under Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for the sale of adulterated milk.
  2. Whether the product sold was toned milk (a dairy product mentioned in Appendix B to the Rules) rather than buffalo milk, and if so, whether the charge of selling adulterated milk was properly established.
  3. What proof is required under Sec. 17(2) of the Act to make an officer of a company (e.g., director, manager, secretary or other officer) criminally liable for an offence committed by the company or its employee — specifically, whether the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to neglect on the part of, such an officer.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant was not present at the stall when the sample was purchased and had no connection with the production side of the Company's business; therefore he could not be held liable under Sec. 16 for conduct committed at the stall.
  • The Company is a separate legal entity registered under the Indian Companies Act; to make the applicant personally liable it must be proved that the offence was committed with his consent or connivance, or was attributable to his neglect—none of which was established on the record.
  • It was contended that the product sold was toned milk (which appears in Appendix B to the Rules) rather than buffalo milk, and therefore the charge of selling adulterated milk had not been established.

Other Parties' Arguments

This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's or other parties' specific legal arguments beyond the matters summarized above and the positions ultimately embraced by the lower courts.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the applicant's submissions and the factual record. It considered the contention that the sample was toned milk and rejected it as insubstantial: had the Company believed the sample to be toned milk (thereby not adulterated in the asserted sense), it was likely the Company would have arranged for analysis of its retained part of the sample by the Public Analyst or the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta, as provided under Sec. 13 of the Act, to protect its business reputation. The absence of such steps reduced the credibility of the toned-milk argument.

The court emphasised the separate legal personality of a company and observed that, in principle, it would have been more appropriate for the Company itself to have been prosecuted as permitted by Sec. 17(1) of the Act. The court then turned to Sec. 17(2), which it quoted:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sec. (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed, with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the Company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly”

From this provision the court concluded that the Legislature requires proof of nexus — consent, connivance or attributable neglect — before an officer of a company can be held personally guilty for an offence committed by the company or its employee. The court found no evidence on the record to demonstrate that the applicant had such a nexus with the offence charged. The applicant had given a statement before the trial court saying he had no connection with the production side of the Company's business, and there was no evidence that, in his capacity as Commercial Manager, he prepared the sweetened milk or organised its sales.

The Sessions Judge's reasoning that the words "any person" in Sec. 16 were wide enough to include the applicant (as a manager or agent) was treated as erroneous by the revisional court. The court explained that, while Sec. 16 may reach persons acting on behalf of another, in the present situation the principal was the Company and the agent physically acting at the stall was the salesman (who had already been punished). Since the Company itself had not been prosecuted, the requisite proof under Sec. 17(2) (consent, connivance or attributable neglect by the applicant) was necessary and absent.

Holding and Implications

Revision allowed.

The court's final disposition was to allow the revision: the conviction and sentence of the applicant (Commercial Manager) under Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act were set aside. The court ordered that any fine paid by the applicant shall be refunded to him.

Implications: The direct effect is the removal of criminal liability and sentence from the applicant and repayment of any fine. The opinion rests on an application of Sec. 17(2) of the Act requiring proof of consent, connivance or attributable neglect before an officer of a company can be held personally liable for offences committed by the company or its employee. The opinion does not state or establish any broader legal precedent beyond the application of those statutory principles to the facts of this case.

    D.K. Jain v. State

    Tripathi, J.:— This revision is directed against an order of the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Meerut, upholding on appeal the applicant's conviction and sentence of Rs. 1,000/-, as fine under Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as recorded by a Magistrate First Class on 30th January, 1963.

    2. Messrs. Edward Keventers(S) Private Limited, Delhi, who deal in dairy products and milk, had established a stall at the Nauchandi Fair in the district of Meerut. On 15th April 1962 at about 7 P.M Sri Ajmal Husain, Food Inspector Meerut purchased 16 Chhataks of sweetened milk from Vidya Bhushan who was working as salesman at the stall on payment of its price. The sample was divided into three parts and sealed then and there in three separate containers, according to the rules, one of which was handed over to Vidya Bhushan. The other was sent to the Public Analyst and the third was retained in the office of the Medical Officer of Health of the city. The Public Analyst tested the sample on the basis of the statutory sandard for buffalo milk and found it to be deficient in fat contents by about 53 per cent. His report indicates that coaltar dye (erythrosine colour index no. 773) had been used for colouring the milk which was not permissible under the law. Subsequently the applicant who is the Commercial Manager of the aforesaid Company and its salesman Vidya Bhushan were tried for an offence under Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 250/- respectively. Their conviction and sentences were confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge. The revision filed by Vidya Bhushan against his conviction and sentence was summarily dismissed and we are not concerned with it.

    3. Learned counsel for the applicant has raised two points in support of this revision. His contention is that as the applicant was not present at the stall when the sample was purchased and as he is not responsible for the production side of the Company's business, he could not be held liable for an offence under Sec. 16 of the Act. Learned counsel contends that Messrs. Edward Keventers (S) Private Limited is a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act and, therefore, to make the applicant liable for the offence alleged to have been committed by it, it must be prove that the offence had been committed with the consent and connivance of the applicant, or is attributable to any neglect on his part, for which there is no evidence on the record.

    4. It has been further argued that it was not the buffalo milk which was sold to the Food Inspector, rather it was toned milk which is a dairy product and which finds mention in Appendix B to the Rules and, therefore, the charge that adulterated milk was being sold at the stall has not been established against the applicant.

    5. The argument that it was the toned milk which was being sold at the stall and not the pure milk was advanced before the lower courts but it did not appeal to him. The argument appears to be without substance because had it been toned milk which was sold to the Food Inspector the Company whose entire business reputation was at stake, in all probability, would have taken steps to get the part of the sample with it analysed as such either by the Public Analyst himself or by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta as envisaged under Sec. 13 of the Act.

    6. A Company is a legal entity distinct from its members. It can hold and dispose of property, it can sue and be sued in its own rights. It would, therefore, have been more appropriate to have prosecuted the Company as well along with the Salesman for the offence as is provided under Sec. 17(1) of the Act.

    7. Sec. 17(2) of the Act reads:—

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sec. (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed, with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the Company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly”

    8. A reading of the aforesaid sub-section makes it obvious that the Legislature has taken care to provide that natural persons made vicariously liable for the offence committed by a Company or anyone of its employees are to be punished only when it is established that they had some nexus with the crime either because of their connivance with it or due to their criminal negligence which had resulted in its commission. To make the applicant liable, therefore, for the offence committed by the Company or its Salesman who was physically present on the scene, it must be proved that the offence was committed with his connivance. There is, however, no such evidence on the record.

    9. In his statement before the trial court, the applicant had stated that he had no connection with the production side of the Company's business. There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant in his capacity as commercial manager of the Company had anything to do with the preparation of sweetened milk or that he was necessarily responsible for organising its sales on behalf of the Company. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the applicant too was liable for punishment under Sec. 16 of the Act because in his opinion the words “any person” used in this section are wide enough to include not only the principal but also the agent, manager or the servant acting on behalf of the former, is based on an erroneous reasoning. It is no doubt true that under the aforesaid section any person acting on behalf of its principal is also liable to punishment. In the instant case, however, it was the Company which was the principal and its agent was the salesman who was found selling the adulterated milk. The Company has not been prosecuted while the agent has already been punished, to make the applicant liable for the offence committed by the Company and its salesman, it was necessary for the prosecution, as has been indicated earlier, within the meaning of Sec. 17(2) of the Act to prove “that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the port of” the applicant.

    10. In the result, this revision is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the applicant are set aside. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to him.

    Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    D.K. Jain v. State
    (Nov 17, 1964)