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  • Sec. 3(1)(a) of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
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  • Sec. 3(1)(a) of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    Roshan v. Purshottam Lal

    Dhavan, J.:— This is a tenant's second appeal from the decree of the Ist Additional Civil Judge Agra confirming the decree for his ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent from him. The appellants were joint tenants of the accommodation in dispute and fell into arrears of rent. The landlord served a notice which has become familiar in this State as a combined notice of demand under Sec. 3(1)(a) of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act and termination of tenancy under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice itself was addressed to both the tenants (the appellants before me) but the envelope was addressed to one of them. He refused to accept it and it was returned by the post-office to the landlord who then filed the present suit for ejectment and recovery of rent.

    2. The defendants resisted the suit and denied that they had made any default in payment of rent. They also pleaded that the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid.

    3. The courts below disbelieved the defendants story that they had paid rent and rejected the plea that the notice was invalid. They have come to this Court in second appeal.

    4. Only one argument was advanced in support of this appeal—namely, that the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid as the envelope was addressed to one of the joint tenants. It was conceded that the notice it sell was addressed to both. The address on the envelope is no part of the notice but only a direction to the post-office to deliver the letter to a particular person. I am doubtful whether the post-office would accept a registered letter addressed simultaneously to two different persons as this may create trouble for them if the two addresses become rival claimants for the letter. But even if the post-office do accept an envelope for delivery, the address on it is only a direction to them. The real notice is inside the envelope. I would therefore hold that a notice calling upon two joint tenants to quit but sent to the address of one of them is in law a notice addressed to both.

    5. Mr. Seth argued that the principle enunciated above may apply where such a notice is accepted by one of the joint tenants, but not where it is refused by him. He argued that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Kanji Manji v. Trustees Of The Port Of Bombay A.I.R 1963 S.C 468. does not apply where the tenant to whom it is addressed does not accept it. Learned counsel further argued that knowledge of the notice by one tenant may be imputed to another but ignorance cannot. Where a person refuses to accept notice he remains ignorant of the contents of the notice and therefore the other tenants remain equally ignorant. He relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Vaman Vithalkalkarni v. Kanderao Rama Rao Sholapurkar A.I.R 1935 Bom. 247., in which it was observed that a registered letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought back unopen is not well served because “one cannot assume that because an addressee declines to address a particular sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents.” Beaumont, C.J, observed in support of this view that “many people in this country make a practice of always refusing registered letters, a practice based, I presume, on their experience that such document usually contain something unpleasant.” With great respect the view of the Bombay High Court does not take into account the manner of delivery of a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which is authorised by the section itself. It provides, “Every notice in this section must be in writing signed on or on behalf of the person giving it and may be sent by post to parties who are intended to be by it or be declared or delivered personally to such party or to one of his family or servant at his residence or if such tender or delivery is not practicably affixed at a conspicuous part of the property.” It is therefore obvious that the requirement with regard to service of notice is fulfilled if it is sent by post to the person concerned and it was tendered or delivered personally to him. Sec. 106 does not say that the notice is not complete unless tenant accepts it, but merely that it should be tendered or delivered. Thus the section provides for a case where the tenant refused the notice when it is tendered. The law has prescribed a mode of terminating the tenancy and if the landlord follows it, there is nothing more to be done. In this case the accommodation had two joint tenants and the notice to quit was served on one of them. If a notice is served on one of several joint tenants it is equivalent to a notice on all. Learned counsel's argument appears to be that the landlord must obtain a refusal on all the joint tenants individually before he can claim that the notice was served on all of them. I do not think the law requires the landlord to go chasing after each and every joint tenant merely for the purpose of obtaining individual refusals. If tender of notice on one is sufficient notice on all, it is immaterial whether it is accepted or refused, for the requirements of Sec. 106 are complied with. If joint tenants are permitted to take shelter behind the refusal of one of them to accept it, it would be impossible for the landlord to serve a valid notice terminating a joint tenancy, because one of the tenants would keep refusing the notice while the others keep out of its way.

    6. No other point was urged.

    7. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Roshan v. Purshottam Lal
    (Apr 13, 1964)