N.U Beg, J.:— This is a report by the Chief Inspector of Stamps in respect of a lease deed dated the 15th of September, 1947. By this lease deed an immovable property was let out to the respondents for a period of ninety years on rent. The stipulations relating to rent are contained in paragraph 1 Cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the instrument. According to the terms mentioned in the said lease the rent for the first twenty years i.e from 1947 to 1967, was stipulated to be Rs. 275 per month. The total amount at this rate worked out to Rs. 66,000. A rebate of Rs. 10,000 was, however, allowed if a sum of Rs. 36,000 was paid in advance on the date of the commencement of the lease, and the remaining amount of Rs. 20,000 was paid by two equal instalments of Rs. 10,000 each on the 1st February, 1948, and the 1st May, 1948. The whole amount of Rs. 56,000 thus represented an adjustment towards rent for the entire period beginning from the 15th September, 1947, and ending on the 14th September, 1957. So far as the rent for the second period of 20 years, i.e, 1967 to 1987, is concerned, it was also stipulated to be Rs. 275 per month. With regard to the third period of twenty years, i.e 1987 to 2007, the rent was stipulated to be Rs. 310 per month. For the last remaining period of thirty years, i.e, 2007 to 2037, the rent was stipulated as payable at the rate of Rs. 356-8-0 per month.
2. According to the report of the Chief Inspector of Stamps, the valuation of the Stamp on which the above deed should have been drawn up works out as follows:—
1. On the advance rent of Rs. 36,000 at Rs. 18-12-0 per thousand under Article 35(c)
Rs. 675-0-0
11. On four times the average annual rent, i.e Rs. 3208-3-6 × 4 = Rs. 12,832-14-0 at Rs. 18-12-0 per thousand or part, under Article 35(a)(vi)
Rs. 24342-0
Total
Rs. 918-12-0
3. The document having been executed on stamps of the value of Rs. 282-4-0 only, there was deficiency in stamps to the extent of Rs. 636-8-0. The trial Court should not, therefore, have admitted the document without realising the deficiency of Rs. 636-8-0 with a penalty of Rs. 6,365 under Sec. 35 of the Stamps Act. Acting as Collector under Rule 325 of the U.P Stamp Manual, the Chief Inspector of Stamps, therefore, reported that this Court should make a declaration under Sec. 61 of the Stamp Act that the document is deficiently stamped by Rs. 636-8-0, and the said deficiency with penalty be realised from the party liable for the same.
4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the report of the Chief Inspector of Stamps should be rejected.
5. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of this reference is taken on the ground that the provisions of Sec. 61 of the Indian Stamp Act, II of 1899 are not attracted in the present case. Sec. 61(1) runs as follows:—
“When any Court in the exercise of its civil or revenue jurisdiction or any criminal Court in any proceeding under Chap. XII or Chap. XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, V of 1898, makes any order admitting any instrument in evidence as duly stamped or as not requiring stamp, or upon payment of duty and a penalty under Sec. 35, the Court to which appeals lie from, or reference are made by, such first mentioned Court may, of its own motion or on the application of the Collector, take such order into consideration.”
6. A perusal of the above provision of law clearly indicates that before Sec. 61 can be applied to a case there must be an order of a Court “admitting any instrument in evidence as duly stamped or as not requiring stamp, or upon payment of duty and a penalty under Sec. 35.” These words indicate that the Court should have applied its mind to the question as to whether the stamp duty paid on an instrument is sufficient or not. An order made by a Court admitting an instrument without applying its mind to this aspect of the matter cannot, therefore, be said to be an order contemplated by Sec. 61 of the Indian Stamp Act. The words “makes an order admitting an instrument in evidence” used in Sec. 61 present a marked contrast with the words “admitted in evidence” used in Secs. 35 and 36 of the same Act. The difference in the phraseology of the two modes of expression used in different sections of the same Act is significant. It indicates that the order in the former case was not intended by the legislature to be a merely mechanical order passed in a routine fashion. In this connection it is also instructive to note that the term “order” is defined in Sec. 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code as “the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree.” Further, the last part of Sec. 61(1) of the Stamp Act directs that the higher Count will “take such order into consideration.” To enable the higher Court to properly comply with this direction it should have before it the reasons given by the Court of first instance in support of the said order. Moreover, a fiscal enactment like the Stamp Act is to be strictly interpreted, and, where words in such an enactment are capable of lending themselves to an obvious interpretation which is favourable to the subject, there is every reason to prefer the same. We are, therefore, of opinion that what Sec. 61 contemplates is an express order and not an order by implication. The same view was taken in a decision of the Lahore High Court in Emp. v. Gyan Chand A.I.R 1946 Lah. 265.. There is, therefore, force in the preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the present reference.
7. We have, however, considered the matter on merits also and are of opinion that the stamp duty paid on the instrument is quite enough. The Chief Inspector of Stamps has reported that in the present case Art. 35(c) of the Stamp Act as amended by the U.P Act is the provision of law that is applicable. Art. 35(c) of the Stamp Act lays, down that stamp duty would be payable under that provision of law “where the lease is granted for a fine or premium or for money advanced in addition to rent reserved.” In the present case it cannot be said that the amount of Rs. 56,000 which was to be paid by the lessee was for fine or premium or for money advanced in addition to rent reserved. It was an amount paid in lieu of rent and not in addition to rent. In the present case the stamp duty was paid under Art. 35(a)(vi) of the stamp Act as amended by the U.P Act. Art. 35(a)(vi) applies to a case “where the lease purports to be for a term exceeding thirty years but not exceeding one hundred years.” Column 2 of the said item lays down that the stamp duty payable in such a case would be on a consideration equal to four times the amount or value of the average annual rent reserved. In our opinion the stamp duty was properly paid in the present case under this provision of law. The stamp duty paid on the instrument in question is, therefore, sufficient.
8. For the above reasons we reject the report of the Chief Inspector of Stamps.
Report rejected.