Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Sp. A. No. 527 of 1960

Advocates

V.K.S Chaudhary and K.N. Tripathi
S.N. Kabar
Yashoda Nandan and Gyan Prakash

Judges

M.C Desai, C.J
S.N Dwivedi, J.

Acts

Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court, and Sub-section (2) of Section 104
SECTION 17 PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
Section 9 of the Presidancy Small Cause Courts Act
provisions of the Code. Rule 10 of Order XLI
Rule 90 of Order XXI Civil Procedure Code.
provision contrary to Clause 10 or Rule 5,
Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules
SECTION 122 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
Civil Courts. Section 128
Rule 90 of Order XXI,
Rule 8 of Order XLV

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Chaman Lal Gupta (the respondent) instituted Suit No. 27 of 1949 for recovery of about Rs. 11,000 against the appellant (his brother, Daya Chand Jain) and Shambhu Lal and Sons (their joint family business). During the suit, various immovable properties were attached. The suit succeeded and a decree for approximately Rs. 11,646 was passed on August 13, 1956. On April 4, 1957, Chaman Lal Gupta applied for execution of his decree by sale of the attached properties.

Mainawati (a sister of the appellant) and Payal Chand Jain also held money decrees and initiated execution proceedings against the same properties. The properties were first sold in execution of Mainawati's decree; Chaman Lal objected to that sale and it was set aside on May 24, 1958. Separately, on November 21, 1957, the properties were sold in execution proceedings initiated by Chaman Lal Gupta. The appellant moved an application under Rule 90 of Order XXI, Civil Procedure Code, seeking to set aside that sale. The execution Court dismissed the application, holding (a) that the appellant had no interest in the properties and (b) that no substantial prejudice had been caused to him by alleged irregularities in the auction.

The appellant appealed to the High Court. A learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal on a preliminary ground: the appellant had failed to deposit security as required by Clause (b) of the proviso to Rule 90. The appellant then preferred a special appeal under Rule 5, Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court (a rule said to replicate Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and made under Article 225 of the Constitution). The High Court proceeded to consider whether the preliminary objection was sustainable and on the merits whether the sale should be set aside.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court could entertain the special appeal under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII despite the provisions of the Code that might appear to limit such jurisdiction (i.e., whether the special jurisdiction is frozen by any conflicting provision).
Whether Clause (b) of the proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI (requiring deposit or security before an application to set aside a sale is entertained) applies to applications filed after its enactment even when execution proceedings were initiated before enactment (i.e., whether Clause (b) is retrospective or prospective).
Whether a procedural rule such as Clause (b) was within the rule-making power conferred on the Court by Section 122 read with Section 128 of the Code (i.e., vires of Clause (b)).
Whether the appellant had locus standi (a subsisting interest) to move under Rule 90 to set aside the auction sale.
Whether the auction-sale should be set aside on the grounds alleged (material irregularity, fraud or illegalities), particularly whether the appellant proved he suffered substantial injury as required by the proviso to Rule 90.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant argued that he had acquired a vested right to apply to set aside the sale according to Rule 90 as it stood on April 4, 1957 (the date of the execution application), so Clause (b) (added on June 1, 1957) should not apply to his application.
The appellant contended that Clause (b) could not be enforced unless and until the Court itself had fixed the amount of deposit or security; implying the Court should have fixed the amount or given him an opportunity at the appellate stage.
He urged that it was unnecessary to establish substantial injury because the sale was vitiated by illegalities (not mere irregularities), and illegalities would render the sale null and void without proof of substantial injury.
The appellant also contended that the learned Single Judge should have given him a chance to comply with Clause (b) before dismissing the appeal on that ground.

Respondent / Execution Court's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

The execution Court held that the appellant had no subsisting interest in the disputed properties and thus lacked locus standi to attack the sale.
The execution Court also held that the appellant had not suffered any substantial injury from the alleged irregularity or fraud in the sale process, and therefore the sale should not be set aside.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Muhammad Naimullah Khan v. Ihsanullah Khan, ILR 14 All 226	Case cited on points of procedure under the earlier Civil Procedure Code (1882).	The Court observed this was decided under CPC 1882 (which lacked a provision analogous to Section 4 of the present Code) and said that decision is not good law now.
Piarelal v. Madanlal, ILR 39 All 191 : (AIR 1917 All 325)	Authority under the present Code on a related issue.	The Court noted the Judges in that case were not referred to Section 4; it was not followed later (see Ram Sarup) and is said to be implicitly overruled by Supreme Court authority (Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co.).
Ram Sarup v. Mt. Kaniz Ummehani, AIR 1937 All 165	Later decision illustrating non-following of Piarelal.	Mentioned as a subsequent decision that did not follow Piarelal, supporting the Court's view that Piarelal is not good law.
Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., 1962 All LJ 1 at p. 7 : (AIR 1962 SC 256 at p. 262)	Supreme Court authority considered to have impliedly overruled prior inconsistent holdings.	Relied on to show that earlier decisions (e.g., Piarelal) are impliedly overruled and cannot support the appellant's contention.
Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 987 : (AIR 1953 SC 221)	Authorities on rule changes and vested rights; discussed in context of whether a procedural change creates a vested right.	The Court treated this and a similar case (State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.) as distinguishable from the present facts; used to reject the appellant's claim of a vested procedural right.
State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 980	Authority on vested rights and change of procedure.	Distinguished on the facts; did not support appellant's claim of a vested right in the procedure.
Parmeshwar Kurmi v. Bakhtawar Pandey, AIR 1933 All 20	Holds that a right to obtain review of judgment is a vested right.	The Court observed this authority is of no assistance to the appellant in his procedural-rights argument.
O.N.R.M.M. Chettyar Firm v. Central Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1937 Rang 419 (FB)	Case addressing deposit requirements and vires of rules requiring deposits.	Distinguished: that rule required deposit along with the application and fixed the amount invariable; Clause (b) in the present case is discretionary and adaptive, so the earlier decision does not govern.
United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum, 1941 All LJR 170 : (AIR 1941 FC 16)	Interpretation of the phrase "relating to" in rule-making power under Section 128.	Quoted for the proposition that "relating to" has a wide meaning and authorises rules incidental or ancillary to procedure; used to support the vires of Clause (b).
Madurai Pillai v. T. Muthu Chetty, ILR 38 Mad 823 : (AIR 1914 Mad 287) (FB)	Case on deposit of security for costs under a statute with narrower enabling language.	Distinguished: that rule was enacted under a differently worded statutory power (Section 9 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act), so it does not assist the appellant here.
Brij Behari Lal v. Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar, ILR 18 Pat 327 : (AIR 1939 Pat 248) (FB)	Decisions supporting that anticipatory security for costs can be part of procedural regulation.	Placed as supportive authority for the proposition that anticipatory warranty/security for costs is within procedure.
Upendra Nath Basu v. Pandaya Gulab Sarkar, ILR 19 Pat 531 : (AIR 1940 Pat 264) (FB)	Similar Patna decisions cited to support procedural reach of security-for-costs rules.	Referenced as supportive authorities for recognizing anticipatory security for costs as procedural in nature.
Seeta Ramanjaneyulu v. Ramayya, ILR (1941) Mad 203 : (AIR 1941 Mad 28) (FB)	Madras decisions of similar tendency on security/deposit for costs and rule-making power.	Also cited as supportive authority that such procedural devices are permissible under rule-making powers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several connected steps, each grounded on facts and legal principle as stated in the opinion:

Preliminary jurisdictional point: The Court rejected the preliminary objection that its power to entertain the special appeal was frozen by any provision of the Code. It held that the power to entertain a special appeal is a special jurisdiction conferred by the Letters Patent (and now by Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court made under Article 225), and that Sub-section (2) of Section 104 cannot be treated as a specific contrary provision that would oust that special jurisdiction. Accordingly the Court overruled the preliminary objection and proceeded to decide the appeal on merits.
Temporal operation of Clause (b): Clause (b) of the proviso to Rule 90 (requiring deposit or security not exceeding 12.5% of the sum realised by the sale or such other security as the Court may fix) was inserted on June 1, 1957. The Court held it to be prima facie prospective and not retrospective. Because the appellant's application under Rule 90 was moved on December 20, 1957 (after the clause was added) and the auction sale had taken place on November 21, 1957 (also after insertion), Clause (b) governs all applications moved after its enactment even if execution proceedings had been initiated earlier. The Court emphasized that procedural changes do not create vested rights in the sense contended by the appellant; the right to challenge a sale only accrues after the sale has occurred and is thus not a vested right existing before the sale.
No duty on Court to fix deposit ex officio: The Court rejected the argument that Clause (b) cannot be enforced until the Court itself has fixed the amount of deposit or security. It reasoned that the Court has no obligation to act without invitation; it cannot exercise discretion unless the applicant furnishes necessary facts and prays for fixation of the amount. The appellant had not asked the Court to fix the quantum or supply the facts needed.
Meaning and operation of the word "entertain": The Court analyzed the word "entertain" (dictionary meaning: to deal with; to admit to consideration). It concluded that in Clause (b) "entertain" means to admit to consideration; accordingly, while the Court should not refuse to accept an application merely because it lacks deposit or security, it cannot judicially consider such an application until Clause (b) is complied with. Ordinarily the Court would give the applicant an opportunity to comply; if the applicant still fails to comply the application should be rejected.
Viability of Clause (b) under rule-making power: The Court examined Sections 122 and 128 (rule-making power to regulate procedure of Civil Courts). It concluded that Clause (b) relates to procedure (payment of costs to a winning party is a matter of procedure) and is reasonably connected to procedure. The Court supported this conclusion by reference to analogous provisions that require anticipatory security (Rule 10 Order XLI, Rule 8 Order XLV as to Supreme Court appeals, Section 17 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, election law requirements). On that basis the Court found Clause (b) to be within the rule-making power of the Court and not inconsistent with the Code.
Distinction from precedents relied on by appellant: The Court distinguished the O.N.R.M.M. Chettyar Firm decision (Rangoon) on three grounds: that case did not appear to consider the expanded meaning of "relating to" in Section 128; the earlier rule required deposit with the application and fixed the amount invariable, whereas Clause (b) allows discretion and does not compel deposit with the application; and the prior Court's focus on the "onerous" character of the rule was not a relevant test in the present context. Similarly, Madurai Pillai was distinguished on statutory scope grounds.
Appellate opportunity to comply: The Court held that a learned Single Judge of the High Court had no duty to allow compliance at the appellate stage where the applicant had failed to comply in the execution Court; the application could not be entertained at all in the execution Court for want of deposit/security, and it was too late to expect an opportunity to comply for the first time on appeal.
Locus standi and substantial injury: The execution Court had dismissed the appellant's Rule 90 application on the ground he had no locus and had not suffered substantial injury. The High Court found the locus objection unsatisfactory: in particular, Chaman Lal, despite a prior auction-sale in favour of Mainawati, had put the disputed properties to auction on the apparently implicit assumption that the appellant was their owner; since Mainawati's sale was later set aside, the appellant had a maintainable interest. However, even assuming some irregularity in publication or conduct of sale, Rule 90 requires proof that the applicant sustained substantial injury. The appellant had not proven substantial injury: sale proceeds aggregated Rs. 22,300 while estimated value in the sale proclamation was shown as Rs. 20,000; in the Mainawati sale proceeds were about Rs. 22,000. The Court concluded the appellant failed to show substantial injury and that the alleged infirmities did not amount to illegalities rendering the sale null and void.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court held that the appellant's application to set aside the auction sale failed: Clause (b) of the proviso to Rule 90 is applicable to applications moved after its enactment and is within the rule-making power of the Court; although the appellant could maintain an application, he failed to prove substantial injury and the alleged defects did not constitute illegalities that would render the sale void.

Implications:

Clause (b) (requiring deposit or security, or furnishing of security as the Court may fix) was held to be a valid procedural requirement enacted under the Court's rule-making power (Sections 122 and 128) and is applicable to applications moved after its insertion.
An applicant cannot claim a vested procedural right to be governed by an earlier version of the rule merely because execution proceedings were initiated before the rule's enactment; the right to challenge a sale accrues only after the sale and hence procedural requirements enacted before the challenge are applicable.
The Court is not obliged to fix the amount of deposit/security of its own accord; the applicant must invite the Court and provide facts to enable the Court to exercise its discretion.
If a Rule 90 applicant fails to comply with Clause (b) in the execution Court, it is too late to seek an opportunity to comply for the first time at the appellate stage.
On the facts, because no substantial injury was shown and the alleged infirmities were not illegalities rendering the sale void, the auction sale was not set aside. The direct effect is that the appellant's challenge to the sale failed.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added.

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Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta And Another .

1. Chaman Lal Gupta the respondent, instituted suit No. 27 of 1949 for recovery of about Rs. 11,000/- from the appellant, his brother Daya Chand Jain, and Shambhu Lal and Sons, their joint family business, During the pendency of the suit Chaman Lal Gupta got an order of attachment before judgment of bungalow no. 1 B.P. Jain Road, of quarters No. 1 to 12 and 13 to 24, British Infantry Bazar, of No. 116, Cowshed, Royal Artillery Bazar and of No. 46, Royal Artillery Bazar. The suit was decreed for Rs. 11,646/-approximately on August 13, .1956. On April 4, 1957 Chaman Lal Gupta applied for execution of his decree by sale of the aforesaid attached proper- ties. It appears that Mainawati, a sister of the appellant and Payal Chand Jain, also held a money decree against them. In execution of her decrees she also applied for sale of the aforesaid properties, Thus at one and the same time two decree-holdeds, Chaman Lal Gupta and Mainawati, were proceeding against the aforesaid properties. It appears that the said properties were sold first in execution of Mainawati's decree, Chaman Lal filed an objection in her execution case. His objection was allowed and the sale was get aside on may 24, 1958. But before that on November 21, 1957, those properties were also sold in the execution proceedings started by Chaman Lal Gupta himself. The appellant moved an application for setting aside the sale in the execution case started by Chaman Lal Gupta under Rule 90 of Order XXI Civil Procedure Code. The application was dismissed by the execution Court. It held that the appellant had no interest in the properties in dispute and that no substantial prejudice had been caused to him by irregularities in the auction sale The appellant then filed an appeal in this Court against the order of the execution Court dismissing his application. The leaded single Judge dismissed it on a preliminary ground that the appellant's objection could not be entertained for his failure to deposit security as required by Clause (b) of the proviso to Rule 90. This special appeal against the order of the learned single Judge has been preferred under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court. This rule is a replica of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and is made under Article 225 of the Constitution.

contrary nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special law in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force, The power of the High Court to entertain a special appeal is a special jurisdiction or power conferred on it by its Letters Patent earlier and now by Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court, and Sub-section (2) of Section 104 cannot be said to be a specific provision contrary to Clause 10 or Rule 5, It cannot therefore freeze that special jurisdiction or power.

3. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Naimullah Khan, v. Ihsanullah Khan, ILR 14 All 226 and Piarelal v. Madanlal, ILR 39 All 191 : (AIR 1917 All 325 (2)). The first case was decided under the Civil Procedure Code 1882, which did not contain any provision analogous to section 4 of the present code. That decision is not good law now. The second case was decided under the present Code, but the learned Judges were not referred to Section 4. It was snot followed by the Court subsequently (Ram Sarup v. Mt. Kaniz Ummehani, AIR 1937 All 165) and is now impliedly Overruled by the Supreme Court (Union Of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. . 1962 :All LJ 1 at p. 7 : (AIR 1962 SC 256 at p. 262)).

4. We therefore overrule the preliminary objection and proceed to decide the appeal on merits.

5. Rule 90 of Order XXI, as amended by this Court, reads:-

"90. (1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it Provided that no application to set aside a sale shall be entertained -

(a) upon any ground which could have been taken by the applicant on or before the date on which the sale Proclamation was drawn up; and

(b) unless the applicant deposits such amount not exceeding twelve and half per cent, of the sum realised by the sale or furnishes such security as, the Court may, in its discretion, fix except when the Court for reasons to be recorded dispenses with the requirements of this clause;

Provided further that no sale shall be set aside On the ground of irregularity or fraud unless upon the facts proved the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud.

(2) Where such application is rejected the Court may award such costs to the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser or both as it may deem fit and such costs shall be the first charge upon the security referred to in Clause (b) of the proviso, if any."

6. Clause (b) of the proviso was added on June 1, 1957, and it is ex facie not retrospective Chaman Lal Gupta applied for the execution of his decree on April, 4, 1957; the attached properties were sold on November 21, 1957; and the appellant moved his application under Rule 90 on December 20, 1957. It is argued that the appellant acquired a vested right to make an application according to Rule 90 as it stood on the date of the execution application, that is, on April 4, 1957 and that Clause (b) would not accordingly apply to his application. Now, Rule 90 provides a remedy to the judgment-debtor for setting aside sale for certain defects, and Clause (b) of the proviso prescribes the condition for availing that remedy, It enacts a rule of procedure. It would, therefore, ordinarily govern all applications moved after its enactment in execution proceedings whether initiated before or after its enactment. There is no vested right in mere procedure. Nor did the right to impeach the auction sale accrue to the appellant on the date of the filing of the execution application. It accrued only after the auction sale. Prior to that event the appellant could not even apprehend or anticipate that it would become necessary to challenge the auction-sale on grounds of fraud or material irregularity. Then it all rested in future; so there could not be a vested right. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India). Ltd v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 987: (AIR 1953 SC 221) and State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 980 are distinguishable: for it is well-settled that the right to appeal is a vested right, parmeshwar Kurmi v. Bakhtawar Pandey, AIR 1933 All 20 holds that a right to obtain review of judgment is a vested right and is of no assistance to us.

7. The argument that there is no breach of Clause (b) unless and until the Court of its own accord has fixed the amount of deposit Or of security does not look attractive. No duty is cast on the Court to act without invitation. Indeed it cannot exercise' discretion unless the applicant furnishes necessary facts and prays for fixation of the amount of deposit or of security. Admittedly, nothing of the kind was done by the appellant.

8. The dictionary meaning of the word 'entertain' is to deal with; to admit to consideration. In its application to Clause (a) the word bears the meaning of admitting to consideration. That clause enjoins the Court from considering the application on any ground which could have been taken on or before the drawing up of the sale proclamation. In its application to Clause (b) the word should bear the same sense. Accordingly, while the court cannot refuse to take an application which is not backed by deposit or security, it cannot judicially consider it. It is expected that the Court would ordinarily give an opportunity to the applicant to comply with Clause (b), and would reject the application if clause (b) were still not complied with.

9. Section 122 Civil Procedure Code enables this Court to make rules regulating the procedure of Civil Courts. Section 128 provides that Such rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions in the Code and may provide for any matters 'relating to the procedure' of Civil Courts. It is not urged that Clause (b) is inconsistent with any provision in the Code. The crucial point is whether the provision for a deposit or security for costs of the adversary party in the event of his success is a matter 'relating to the procedure' of Civil Courts. The key words are 'relating to' and 'procedure'. The expression 'relating to' has got wide meaning. It will authorise the making of a rule which is incidental or ancillary to the regulation of 'procedure'. United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum, 1941 All LJR 170 : (AIR 1941 FC 16). The word 'procedure' is not capable of a precise definition, and broadly it means the mode in which courts proceed in a case.

10. The subject-matter of Clause (b) is the provision for deposit of security for defraying the costs of the adversary party. Payment of costs to the winning party is a matter of procedure. The subject-matter of Clause (b) is thus reasonably connected with a matter of procedure. And in so far as it requires an anticipatory warranty, it would be ancillary to a matter of procedure. That it is so is shown by certain provisions of the Code. Rule 10 of Order XLI empowers the appellate Court to demand from the appellant security for costs of the respondent even before the admission of his appeal Similarly, under Rule 8 of Order XLV an appeal to Supreme Court is admitted by the High Court only if the appellant has furnished security as required by Rule 7. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is of a similar nature. In election law also election petitions and appeals should be backed by security for costs of the adversary party. All these instances show that an anticipatory warranty for costs of the adversary party is now recognised as a part of procedure; We are, therefore, unable to hold that Clause (b) is in excess, of the rule-making power of this Court.

11. Reliance is placed on O.N.R.M.M. Chettyar Firm v. Central Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1937 Rang 419 (FB). That decision is distinguishable. Firstly, it does not appear that learned Judges were referred to the enlarging implication of the expression 'relating to' in Section 128. Secondly, the rule in that case was entirely different from the rule before us in two respects: (1) deposit was required to be made along with the application and (2) the amount of the deposit was fixed and invariable. Clause (b) does not oblige an applicant to make a deposit along with his application. Nor does it make the amount of deposit invariable. It gives discretion to the Court to fix a lesser amount than twelve and half per cent. of the sum realised by the sale; the Court may even mitigate the vigour of the rule by requiring security instead of deposit; and in proper cases it may for reasons to be recorded relax the rule altogether. Thirdly, learned Judges seem to be somewhat oppressed if we may say so, by the 'onereus' character of the rule. With respect, it seems to us that though that element is sometimes considered in testing the vires of a bye-law, it is not a relevent consideration in the event of a challenge to the vires of a rule.

12. Madurai Pillai v T. Muthu Chetty, ILR 38 Mad 823 : (AIR 1914 Mad 287) (FB), also does not assist the appellant, for the rule for deposit of security for costs is more akin to the provision in the earlier case than, to Clause (b) and was enacted under Section 9 of the Presidancy Small Cause Courts Act which is not as widely phrased as section 128 of the code.

13. Our view, on the other hand, gets some support from Brij Behari Lal v. Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar, ILR 18 Pat 327 : (AIR 1939 Pat 248) (FB); Upendra Nath Basu v. Pandaya Gulab Sarkar, ILR 19 Pat 531 : (AIR 1940 Pat 264) (FB) and Seeta Ramanjaneyulu v Ramayya, ILR (1941) Mad 203 : (AIR 1941 Mad 28) (FB).

14. It is urged that learned single Judge's order is erroneous for he should have given the appellant a chance to comply with Clause (b) be-fore dismissing the appeal. In our view no such duty is east on the appellate Court aS the appellant had failed to make a deposit or furnish security in the execution Court, his application could not be entertaired at all. We think that it is too late to except an opportunity of complying with Clause (b) at the appellate stage.

15. The execution, Court dismissed the appellant's application on the grounds that be had no locus standi and that he had not suffered any substantial injury by the alleged fraud or material irregularity. In spite of their previous auction-sale in favour of Mainawati Chainanlal put the disputed properties to auction-sale obviously on the assumption that the appellant was their owner. We therefore fail to understand how he can object to the application on the ground that the appellant has no subsisting interest in the properties. It may be recalled that the sale in favour of Mainawati was later set aside on May 24, 1958, We are of the view that the appellant could maintain the application.

16. Assuming that there might have been some irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale the auction-sale cannot be set aside without proof of substantial injury to the appellant. There is no evidence to prove substantial injury. The sale fetched an aggregate sum of Rs. 22,300/-; the estimated value of the sold properties was show as Rs. 20,000/- in the sale" proclamation. Presumably in the case of Mainawati, also the, properties were auction-sold at about Rs. 22,000/-. Thus the appellant has failed to prove that he has sustained any substantial injury. It is urged that it is not necessary to establish substantial injury as the sale was vitiated by illegalities and not mere irregularities. But none of the infirmities pointed out to us are in our opinion illegalities in the sense that an illegality renders an act null and void.

Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta And Another .

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent / Execution Court's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta And Another .

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