Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • stayed.9. Section 12 of the Code of 1882
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • stayed.9. Section 12 of the Code of 1882
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant initiated suit No. 69 of 1957 alleging ownership of a Mercedes-Benz truck transferred to the defendants under a hire-purchase agreement with payment in 12 installments of Rs. 1,900 each. Only five installments were paid, leading to default, after which the plaintiff repossessed the truck by mutual agreement on 10th April 1957. The plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership and possession and recovery of unpaid installments.

The defendants filed suit No. 48 of 1958 claiming they had purchased the truck from the applicant, asserting ownership and wrongful removal of the truck by the applicant. They sought a declaration of ownership, damages for removal, and Rs. 17,250 as damages.

The second suit was contested on the basis that the truck was given under a hire-purchase agreement and repossession was lawful due to default. The applicant applied under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for a stay of the second suit, arguing that the matter in issue was directly and substantially the same as in the first suit.

The Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra, held that although the main issue was the nature of the transaction (hire-purchase vs sale), additional issues such as damages arose in the second suit, so the earlier decision would not operate as res judicata, and the second suit was not liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC. The applicant filed this revision against that order dated 9th May 1959.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second suit (No. 48 of 1958) was liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC because the matter directly and substantially in issue was also in the previously instituted suit (No. 69 of 1957).
  2. What is the scope and application of Section 10 of the CPC in relation to identity of issues and subject-matter between two suits?
  3. Whether the existence of additional claims (such as damages) in the second suit affects the applicability of Section 10.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The matter relating to the nature of the transaction concerning the truck was directly and substantially in issue in both suits.
  • Therefore, the second suit was liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC to avoid parallel proceedings.
  • Relied upon AIR 1953 Bom 117 (Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas) to argue that Section 10 requires substantial identity, not complete identity, of issues and subject-matter.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • Referred to AIR 1958 All 207 (L. Nem Kumar Agarwal v. Nem Kumar) stating that Section 10 requires identity of matters directly and substantially in issue.
  • Argued that the presence of additional issues such as damages and different subject-matter in the second suit precludes the application of Section 10.
  • Contended that the second suit was not liable to be stayed as the issues were not identical in substance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas, AIR 1953 Bom 117 Section 10 requires substantial identity of matter in issue, not complete identity; prevents parallel suits. Used to support the principle that the field of controversy must be substantially the same to invoke Section 10.
Jamini Nath Mallick v. Midnapur Zemandari Co., AIR 1923 Cal 716 Even after omission of "for the same relief" in Section 10, a suit cannot be stayed if subject-matter differs. Referenced to illustrate that different subject-matter in suits precludes stay under Section 10.
Balkishen v. Kishan Lal, ILR 11 All 148 Under the older Section 12, stay required same relief and identical matter in issue. Discussed in context of historical interpretation of Section 10's predecessor.
L. Nem Kumar Agarwal v. Nem Kumar, AIR 1958 All 207 Section 10 requires identity of matters directly and substantially in issue for stay to apply. Relied upon by opposite parties to argue against stay of the second suit.
Bepin Behary v. Jogendra Chandra, AIR 1917 Cal 248 Requirement of same subject-matter for application of stay under Section 10. Referenced to support the view that different subject-matter avoids stay.
Kesho Prasad Singh v. Shiva Saran Lal, AIR 1919 Pat 491 Same as above regarding subject-matter and stay under Section 10. Used to illustrate judicial approach to Section 10's scope.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the scope of Section 10 of the CPC, emphasizing its purpose to prevent concurrent jurisdiction from trying parallel suits involving the same matter in issue, which could lead to conflicting decisions. The court acknowledged two conflicting views on Section 10: one requiring complete identity of subject-matter to invoke the section, and the other requiring only that the matter directly and substantially in issue be the same.

Relying on the precedent in Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas, the court accepted that Section 10 requires substantial, not complete, identity of subject-matter and issues. However, the court also noted that the matter in issue must be of substance so that a decision in one suit materially affects the other.

The court examined the facts that the central issue in both suits was whether the truck was transferred under a hire-purchase agreement or sold outright and whether the repossession was lawful. It found these issues directly and substantially in issue in both suits. Additional claims such as damages in the second suit did not negate the applicability of Section 10.

The court held that the lower court erred in refusing to stay the second suit under Section 10, as the mandatory provisions of the section required staying the suit pending the decision of the first suit. The order refusing the stay was held to be illegal or a material irregularity in jurisdictional exercise, justifying revision.

Holding and Implications

The revision is allowed, the order dated 9th May 1959 is set aside, and the second suit (No. 48 of 1958) is stayed until the decision of suit No. 69 of 1957.

The direct effect of this decision is that the second suit cannot proceed concurrently with the first suit on the same substantial matter in issue, thus preventing conflicting judgments and conserving judicial resources. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. The court did not set any new precedent beyond clarifying the mandatory nature of Section 10 in such circumstances.

    Ram Narain v. Ram Swarup

    1. This is an application in revision against an order dated the 9th May, 1959 of the learned Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra.

    2. The applicant brought suit No. 69 of 1957 in the court of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra, on the allegations that he was the owner of a Meroedez-Benz truck which he transferred to the defendants under a hire-purchase agreement which provided for the payment of the price in 12 instalments of Rs. 1,900/- each. Only five installments were paid. In default the plaintiff was entitled to take back the truck, and by mutual agreement the truck was taken back by the plaintiff on the 10th April, 1957. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was the owner and in rightful possession of the truck and for the recovery of the unpaid instalments. The defendants to the above suit (the opposite parties) brought suit No. 48 of 1958 in the same court on the allegations that they had purchased the truck from the defendant i.e, the applicant) and had become owners thereof and it was wrongfully removed by the defendant from their possession on the 10th April, 1957. The opposite parties claimed a declaration that they were the owners of the truck and damages for alleged removal of types etc. and further claimed Rs. 17,250/- as damages suffered by them.

    3. This suit was contested, inter alia, on the grounds that the truck was given to the plaintiff under a hire-purchase agreement and as there was default in the payment of instalments the truck was taken over by him by mutual agreement.

    4. The plaintiff of the earlier suit (the present applicant) made an application under Section 10 of the CPC for stay of the second suit on the ground that the matter in issue in suit No. 48 of 1958 was directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit No. 69 of 1957.

    5. The learned Second Additional Civil Judge held that the matter directly and substantially in issue in both the suits was whether the truck was given under a hire-purchase agreement or there was a sale, and as there were other questions regarding damages etc. arising in suit No. 48 of 1958, the decision in the earlier suit could not operate as res judicata and therefore the second suit was not liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC.

    6. It is urged in revision that the matter relating to the nature of the transaction under which the truck was taken by the plaintiff of suit No. 48 of 1958 being directly and substantially in issue in both the suits the second suit was liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC.

    7. Section 10 of the CPC says that no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. The object of the section is obviously to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. As observed in Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas, AIR 1953 Bom 117 the principle underlying Sec. 10 seems to be that the policy of the legislature is opposed to two courts with parallel jurisdiction proceeding simultaneously with two suits when there is a possibility of the two courts coming to different conclusions and thereby resulting in conflict of decisions.

    8. There is however a conflict regarding the exact scope of Sec. 10-One view is that S. 10 will apply only if there is a complete identity of the subject-matter in the two suits, so that decision in one suit will operate as res judicata in the other. The other view is that complete identity of the subject-matter is not necessary to attract the application of Sec. 10 and if a matter directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit is also directly and substantially in issue in a later suit then under Sec. 10 the later suit shall be stayed.

    9. Section 12 of the Code of 1882 contained the words “for the same relief” after the words “previously instituted suit”. It was therefore held that it was necessary for the application of the section not only that the matter in issue in the second suit should also be directly and substantially in issue in the first suit but that the second suit must be for the same relief as that claimed in the first suit: see Balkishen v. Kishan Lal, ILR 11 All 148 and Ramalinga v. Raghunatha, ILR 20 Mad 418. In spite of the omission from Sec. 10 of the words “for the same relief” it was held that a suit cannot be stayed although the main issue in both the suits is the same if the subject-matter of the second suit is different from that of the first suit: see Jamini Nath Mallick v. Midnapur Zemandari Co., 27 Cal WN 772 : (AIR 1923 Cal 716); Bepin Behary v. Jogendra Chandra, 36 Ind Cas 641 : (AIR 1917 Cal 248) and Kesho Prasad Singh v. Shiva Saran Lal, 51 Ind Cas 36 : (AIR 1919 Pat 491).

    10. Reliance on behalf of the applicant is placed upon AIR 1953 Bom 117 (supra) in which it was held that Sec. 10 does not contemplate identity of issues between the two suits nor does it require that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly the same or identical. What the section requires is that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same and proper effect must be given to the language used by the legislature in Sec. 10 that the identity required is a substantial identity. There must be an identity of the subject-matter. The field of controversy between the parties in the two suits must also be the same, but the identity contemplated and the field of controversy contemplated should not be identical and the same in every particular, but the identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same.

    11. The opposite parties, on the other land, have referred to L. Nem Kumar Agarwal v. Nem Kumar, 1957 All LJ 734 : (AIR 1958 All 207) where it was laid down that Section 10 of the CPC requires that a suit must be stayed if the matter directly and substantially in issue in it is also directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit which is pending, the criterion for testing whether the subsequent suit be stayed or not is whether there is an identity of the matters directly and substantially in issue in the two suits. If there is, the subsequent suit must be stayed, and if there is not, it will not be stayed. To appreciate the real import of the decision a brief reference to the facts is necessary.

    12. In 1948 a suit was brought for possession of a car on the allegation that the plaintiff was the owner of the car having purchased it in. Delhi with his own money and that he had lent it for a certain period to the opposite party and the opposite party had not returned it. The suit was contested on the grounds that the opposite party himself was the owner of the car, having purchased it in Delhi with his own money, but in the name of the plaintiff and that he (the opposite party) was the Owner of the shop known as Sasta Kisan Loha Store and the plaintiff worked in the shop as manager.

    13. The issues that were framed by the trial court were (1) whether the applicant was the owner of the car and (2) whether the opposite party had purchased it bename in the name of the applicants and whether the applicant had lent it to the opposite party. No dispute arose about the interest of the plaintiff in the shop and whether interest might have been claimed in the shop was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the suit brought by him because he did not claim title to the or on account of his interest in the shop, and therefore, no issue was framed about his interest in the shop. The suit was dismissed on the finding that the car belonged not to the plaintiff but to the shop, Sasta Kisan Loha Store.

    14. In appeal the District Judge framed an issue as to who was the owner of the shop and to whom the car belonged, and referred it to the trial court for 3 finding, directing that the trial court should not record fresh evidence so long as Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1951 was decided. This appeal arose out of another suit No. 22 of 1948 that was instituted after suit No. 21 of 1948 for rendition of accounts of the shop. In this appeal an application was made by the plaintiff of the earlier suit for its stay under Section 10 of the CPC on the ground that the matter directly and substantially in issue was also a matter directly and substantially in issue in the previous appeal No. 91 of 1949. The application was rejected. The contention that the second suit should be stayed if the decision in the earlier suit operated as res judicata was not accepted. Referring to this argument it was remarked;

    “To say that section 10 will apply if the decision in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit, does not at all advance the solution of the problem because it will still have to be decided whether the matter in issue in the subsequent suit was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit. Whether the decision in the previous suit will operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit cannot be derided without deciding whether they matters in issue in the two suits are directly and substantially the same.”

    Applying the test whether there was identity of matters directly and substantially in issue in the two suits the conclusion arrived at was that the matters that arose directly and substantially in the two suits were not identical and Section 10 of the CPC did not apply. In the earlier suit the question was simply of the ownership of the car and the question of the plaintiff's interest in the shop did not arise at all. The subject matter of the second suit was the shop and the interest of the plaintiff of the first suit in it and that suit had nothing to do with the ear or the personal property of the plaintiff of the earlier suit. The decision must therefore be confined to the particular facts of the case, and it is no authority for the proposition that to ??? the provisions of Section 10 of the CPC there must be a complete identity of the subject-matter in the two suits.

    15. In the instant case the matter directly and substantially in issue in the two suits was whether the truck was given to the opposite parties under a hire and purchase agreement or there was a sale out and out, and whether the applicant (the plaintiff of the earlier suit) had got back the truck by mutual agreement. If these two issues were decide in favour of the applicant then the second suit when largely fail.

    16. Any matter common to the two suits I will not attract the provisions of Section 10 of the CPC, the matter must be of substance so that its decision in one suit shall affect materially the decision of the other suits. In view of the mandatory provisions of Section 10 of the CPC the second suit was liable to be stayed.

    17. The Court below in refusing to stay the second suit under the mandatory provisions of Section 10 of the CPC acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and therefore the revision is maintainable. It was held in (AIR 1953 Bom 117) (supra), that an order under section 10 is not an order dealing with procedure; it is an order dealing with the jurisdiction of the Court because under section 10 whatever order is passed affects the jurisdiction of the Court.

    18. The revision is allowed and the order dated the 9th May, 1959 is set aside. The second suit shall remain stayed till the decision of suit No. 69 of 1957. Ill the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.

    IE/P.B

    19. Revision allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ram Narain v. Ram Swarup
    (Mar 27, 1961)