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Judgment Summary — Dhavan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Sessions Judge at Mainpuri convicted Ram Singh and Gopal of the murder of Kunwar Krishna Kapoor and sentenced both to death. The prosecution's brief case was that Mr. Kapoor, senior engineer at Hind Lamp Works (Private) Limited, was killed in his bed during the night between the 7th and 8th (dates in the record vary) after he had brought his monthly salary home. Mrs. Sudarshan Devi Kapoor (the widow) was the principal eyewitness: she testified that she was awakened by a groan, saw Gopal pulling a knife from her husband’s chest and Ram Singh attempting to stab her husband, and that she physically seized Ram Singh. A struggle ensued; Gopal escaped initially but was later captured along with a knife and blood-stained clothes which were recovered after a statement made by Gopal to the Investigating Inspector. Ram Singh was overpowered on the scene and detained. Other key prosecution witnesses included B.R. Kriplani, Ajab Singh and Rati Bhan, all of whom supported Mrs. Kapoor's account. Both accused denied the charges, claimed alibis (each said he was asleep in his room), and produced no defence evidence. The Trial Court convicted both under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced both to death. The Sessions Judge considered and rejected a plea for lesser sentence for Ram Singh on account of youth (alleged age 17), describing the murder as “exceedingly brutal and dastardly” and Ram Singh's conduct as a betrayal of trust. Both accused appealed and the Sessions Judge's confirmation reference of the death sentences was before the court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence established the guilt of Gopal and Ram Singh for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
  2. Whether discrepancies (notably between the F.I.R. and Mrs. Kapoor’s trial testimony) or other aspects of the prosecution case created sufficient doubt to overturn the convictions.
  3. Whether Ram Singh’s alleged youth (about 17 years) and related considerations amount to extenuating circumstances that justify reducing the death sentence to life imprisonment.
  4. Whether the death sentence imposed on Gopal and Ram Singh should be confirmed by the Appellate Court and the reference by the Sessions Judge be affirmed.

Arguments of the Parties

Ram Singh (Appellant) — Arguments presented by Mr. S.N. Mulla

  • Primary objective was to seek reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment on grounds of youth and immaturity (Ram Singh alleged to be 17 years old).
  • Suggested that Ram Singh might have been influenced or led by Gopal and therefore less culpable; youth implies immaturity and susceptibility to influence.
  • Proposed an alternative factual picture: the assailants may have been primarily committing robbery (searching for the keys of the Godrej safe) and that Ram Singh may not initially have stabbed anyone.
  • Relied in part on procedural change (amendment of Section 367 Cr.P.C.) to argue that courts now have wider latitude in awarding lesser punishments and need not state reasons when not imposing death.

Gopal (Appellant) — Arguments presented by Mr. S.N. Chatterji

  • Pressed that there was a discrepancy between the F.I.R. (which mentioned struggle by both Mr. and Mrs. Kapoor with the murderers) and the trial testimony of Mrs. Kapoor (which did not describe the husband struggling), and that this discrepancy undermined the prosecution case.
  • Maintained an alibi: that Gopal was asleep in his room at the time of the murder and did not leave it even after hearing Mrs. Kapoor’s cries; denied making statements to the Investigating Inspector and denied any recovery of dagger or clothes in his presence.
  • Suggested possibility of mistaken identity — that the second assailant might have been an unknown associate of Ram Singh rather than Gopal.
  • Argued that aspects of the prosecution evidence created doubt as to his guilt.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Bhagwan Din, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 89 Held that youth alone is not a sufficient reason for withholding the death penalty; youth may be a circumstance but is not decisive. Used as key authority to support the proposition that youth by itself does not exempt a murderer from capital punishment when the crime is deliberate and there are no extenuating circumstances.
Sheo Dina v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 All. 939 Refusal to reduce death sentence for a young man (22) where murder was deliberate and heinous. Relied on as part of consistent authority that deliberate, planned murders by young persons do not automatically attract the lesser sentence.
Moti Ram Bhoja Ram v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 998 Rejected claim for exemption from death penalty on grounds of youth where murder was deliberately planned and carried out. Cited to reinforce the proposition that planning and deliberation negate youth as an extenuating circumstance.
Sadiq v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 104 Observed that youth and hot-headedness are unsound reasons for mitigation where evidence of premeditation exists. Used to show that youthful impulsiveness is not adequate to displace capital punishment where premeditation is established.
Allahbaksh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 956 Youth (about 19) was disregarded where the crime was heinous, planned, cruel and treacherous. Applied as authority that youth alone is not an adequate ground for mitigation in cases of careful planning and cruelty.
Jangli v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1934 Oudh 19 Even comparatively young persons (20 and 22) may receive capital sentence if murder is deliberate and cruel. Cited to support the view that age is not determinative absent extenuating circumstances.
Tiri v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1931 Ran. 171 (Rangoon High Court) Held that youth alone is not an extenuating circumstance sufficient to avoid the death penalty; youth must be considered with other facts. Quoted as part of the body of authority stating the principle that youth must be weighed with other circumstances and will not suffice where murder is cold-blooded and premeditated.
State of U.P. v. Hari Kishan (Supreme Court) Supreme Court reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment citing (1) youth and (2) a long lapse of time since conviction by the High Court; the judgment approved the trial court's imposition of death. Examined to show that reductions in the Supreme Court may be influenced by circumstances other than youth (in that case, passage of time) and that the Court did not lay down youth as an automatic ground for mitigation.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 364 Observed that for murder the death sentence should ordinarily be imposed, but the Court has discretion to impose lesser punishment for reasons a judicial mind could accept. Used to emphasise that sentencing is discretionary but must be judicially exercised on acceptable grounds.
Ghunai v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1934 All. 132 Division Bench remitted death sentence of a 15–16 year old boy to transportation for life on the ground of immaturity given the peculiar facts. Distinguished on facts: court noted Ghunai involved very young accused and a finding of immaturity; the present case was factually different and did not support a general rule that youth alone warrants mitigation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court performed a multi-part analysis, constrained to the facts and law as presented in the record:

  1. Evaluation of evidentiary sufficiency and credibility:
    • Accepted Mrs. Sudarshan Devi Kapoor’s vivid, detailed testimony describing the assault, her seizure of Ram Singh and the fleeing of Gopal. Her testimony was corroborated by B.R. Kriplani and Ajab Singh and remained unshaken on cross-examination.
    • Found the recovery of the knife and blood-stained clothes at the place pointed out by Gopal (after his arrest and a statement to the Investigating Inspector) to corroborate the eyewitness testimony.
    • Rejected the appellants’ alibi evidence: both had no supporting testimony and offered no explanation for why three independent witnesses would falsely implicate them.
  2. Treatment of the asserted discrepancy between the F.I.R. and Mrs. Kapoor’s trial testimony:
    • The Court noted that the F.I.R. was made immediately after the gruesome incident and was prepared by Mr. Kriplani according to Mrs. Kapoor’s instructions. The F.I.R.'s reference to a struggle involving both husband and wife was not replicated in the trial testimony as to the husband’s struggle.
    • The Court explained that the difference did not discredit Mrs. Kapoor’s trial evidence: she had been injured, shocked, and grieving; the F.I.R. was signed under stress and prepared by another person. The trial testimony still recorded her hearing a groan from her husband, which could explain the F.I.R.’s reference to a struggle.
    • The accused did not probe this discrepancy in cross-examination to the Court’s satisfaction, reducing its significance.
  3. Analysis of Gopal’s case:
    • After considering counsel’s points, the Court found the three eyewitnesses’ evidence unshaken and Gopal’s alibi and denials unpersuasive.
    • Concluded that if Gopal were innocent he would likely have rushed to help; his claim that he remained indoors made his guilt more probable.
    • Considered and rejected the suggestion of mistaken identity in light of consistent, corroborated eyewitness accounts and recoveries led by Gopal’s statement.
    • Determined that no extenuating circumstances existed in Gopal’s case and that death sentence was the only appropriate punishment.
  4. Analysis of Ram Singh’s plea of youth and mitigation:
    • The Court examined statutory language (Section 302 IPC) and noted that the Penal Code does not create classes exempt from death on the basis of age alone; it observed related Code provisions (Secs. 82, 83, 84, 85) that show express exceptions are provided where intended by the legislature.
    • Held that Section 302 leaves sentencing to judicial discretion but that youth alone is not an automatic ground for mitigation; youth may give rise to certain presumptions (immaturity, susceptibility to influence) which, if borne out by evidence, could justify lesser punishment.
    • Considered prior case law (cited precedents) consistently supporting the rule that youth alone is not sufficient; some cases reduced sentences where immaturity or peculiar facts were shown (e.g., Ghunai), but those were fact-specific and did not establish a general rule.
    • Addressed counsel’s reliance on the amendment to Section 367 Cr.P.C. (removal of the requirement to state reasons for not imposing death) and held the amendment procedural only — it does not alter substantive sentencing principles under the Penal Code.
    • Examined the facts specific to Ram Singh: his position as a domestic servant in the Kapoo r household, evidence of pre-meditation (knife stolen earlier), the timing of the assault after the employer received pay, the sequence of attacks, Ram Singh’s active role (ready with a knife to finish the murder, dragged Mrs. Kapoor into the verandah, inflicted injury on Mrs. Kapoor), and the betrayal of trust inherent in a servant conspiring to kill his employer.
    • Found no evidence that Ram Singh was merely misled or less culpable; rather, the evidence indicated active participation and planning such that no extenuating circumstance arose from his age.
  5. Disposition reasoning:
    • Concluded that the convictions were fully established and that the trial court’s verdict was correct.
    • Concluded there were no extenuating circumstances warranting mitigation of either appellant’s death sentence; accordingly, death sentences were to be confirmed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Both appeals are dismissed and the death sentences of Ram Singh and Gopal are confirmed. The Sessions Judge's reference for confirmation of the death sentences is affirmed, and the sentences shall be executed in accordance with law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The convictions and capital sentences imposed by the Trial Court on both Ram Singh and Gopal were upheld and are to be carried out in accordance with law.
  • Legal principle affirmed: The Court reaffirmed the prevailing judicial principle (supported by cited authorities) that youth, by itself, is not an automatic ground for substituting life imprisonment for the death penalty; youth can inform presumptions of immaturity or susceptibility to influence, but absent evidence of such extenuation and where the murder is cold-blooded, planned, or particularly brutal, the death penalty may be appropriate.
  • No new legal rule was formulated; the decision applies established statutory interpretation and precedent to the facts of this case and confirms the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing.

This summary is confined to the facts, arguments, analysis and conclusions explicitly stated in the provided opinion. No information has been inferred beyond the opinion's text.

    Ram Singh v. State

    Dhavan, J.:— Ram Singh and Gopal have been sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge, Mainpuri for the murder of Mr. Kunwar Krishna Kapoor. The case of the prosecution against them very briefly was this. At the time of his murder Mr. Kunwar Krishna Kapoor was employed as senior engineer in Hind Lamp Works (Private) Limited Shikohabad and was drawing a salary of Rs. 900/- and odd per mensem. He was married and had two children a son about 8 and a daughter about 4 years of age. Ram Singh was employed as a domestic servant by Mr. and Mrs. Kapoor. Gopal was in the domestic service of a gentleman by the name of Dr. Bhattacharya who was also employed by the same company which had provided residential quarters for its senior officers. The bungalow of Mr. and Mrs. Kapoor adjoined that of Dr. Bhattacharya both facing south and being almost similar in size, construction and design. In the colony there also lived Mr. B.R Kriplani who was also a senior engineer of the Company with a salary of Rs. 1250/- per mensem. The prosecution case is that on 5th October 1959 Mr. Kapoor drew his monthly salary of Rs. 900/- and odd which he brought home. Two days later during the night between 7th and 8th October 1959 at or about 1 a.m Ram Singh and Gopal entered the bed room of the Kapoors' and committed the murder. The family were sleeping indoors on a composite bed enclosed by a single mosquito net. The bed was placed east to west, the head towards the east and feet towards the west. Mrs. Kapoor lay on the southern edge of the bed, Mr. Kapoor in the middle and their little girl on the northern edge. The wooden shutters of the door of the bed room were opened but the wire gauze shutters were closed and bolted from inside. An electric bulb of high power was switched on in the verandah in front of the bed-room door and another radiated its light from a bracket fixed to the outer wall of the verandah. At or about 1 a.m Mrs. Kapoor was disturbed and awakened by what she subsequently described as a groaning noise coming from her husband. She saw Gopal who was standing by the head of the bed, in the act of pulling out a knife from her husband's chest. At that very moment she also saw Ram Singh, who was standing by the southern edge of the bed where she lay, attempting to stab her husband with a knife. Mrs. Kapoor threw herself on her husband and thereby succeeded in taking Ram Singh's knife blow on the left side of her back. She, however, managed to grip Ram Singh accused and never let him go. At the same time she screamed for help. She kept a firm hold all the time on Ram Singh whose knife fell from his hand. Ram Singh, however, made a desperate effort to free himself and dragged Mrs. Kapoor through the door of the bed-room into the verandah. During this struggle the other assailant Gopal gave her a blow with his knife which injured her left arm. He managed to run out and escaped but Ram Singh was held by Mrs. Kapoor in her grip. Meanwhile, her cries had aroused others. Those who reached quickly on the scene were Mr. B.R Kriplani, the senior engineer mentioned above, Ajab Singh, the head Durban of the Hind Lamp Colony, and Rati Bhan a night watchman who was present nearby. They were just in time to see Gopal running away with a knife in his hand. They, however, got hold of and overpowered Ram Singh who had not been able to shake off Mrs. Kapoor. They shut him up in a room and proceeded to search for Gopal. Within a few minutes Ajab Singh and Rati Bhan secured Gopal who had retired to the servants room in the house of Dr. Bhattacharya. Mr. Kriplani then wrote out in English a report for the police which was taken to the police station Shikohabad by the Supervisor of the Lamp factory. The Sub-Inspector reached the spot at or about 2-30 a.m and made out the usual recovery list in the presence of the witnesses and prepared an inquest report. He also made a sketch of the locality or site plan as it is usually called. Mr. Kapoor's dead body was sent for post mortem. It appears that Gopal accused made a statement to the Investigating Inspector which led to the recovery of the knife which he had thrown in the back garden of Mr. Kapoors' house before escaping and also some blood-stained clothes which Gopal was wearing at the time of the assault.

    2. Both Ram Singh and Gopal were charged with the murder of Mr. Kapoor and with attempt to murder under Sec. 307/34, I.P.C The principal witness for the prosecution was Smt. Sudarshan Devi Kapoor the widow of the murdered man. She gave a detailed and graphic description of the assault and of her unsuccessful effort to save the life of her husband. She also described how she was able to catch hold of Ram Singh and prevented him from running away like Gopal. The other important witnesses were Mr. B.R Kriplani, the senior engineer and Ajab Singh both of whom had run to the house of Kapoor on hearing Mrs. Kapoors' loud cries for help. The evidence of these three witnesses was unshaken in cross-examination. In fact, there was hardly any cross-examination worth the name. Both Ram Singh and Gopal denied the charge and stated that they did not commit the crime and did not know how Mr. Kapoor was killed and his wife injured. Ram Singh stated that he was sleeping in his room at or about 1-30 a.m when he was arrested by the Investigating Officer. Gopal stated that he too was sleeping in his own room in Dr. Bhattacharya's house when he was awakened by the shouts of Mrs. Kapoor. He also alleged that though, on hearing Mrs. Kapoors' cries his employer went to Mr. Kapoors' bungalow, he (Gopal) did not leave his room. He denied having made any statement to the Investigating Inspector that he had hidden any dagger and denied that there was any recovery of these articles in his presence. When asked why Mrs. Kapoor, Mr. Kriplani and Ajab Singh had given evidence against them, both Ram Singh and Gopal could not give any explanation. They produced no evidence in defence or in support of their alibi. The learned Sessions Judge convicted both of them of murder under Sec. 302/34, I.P.C and sentenced both to death. He considered the prayer on behalf of Ram Singh for lesser penalty of life imprisonment on the ground of youth. He is alleged to be of 17 years of age-but rejected it because of “the exceedingly brutal and dastardly nature of the murder and having regard to the fact that the accused, in associating himself with the murder of his own master, has grievously betrayed the Sacred trust between master and servant.” He, therefore, took the view that Ram “Singh also deserved death as punishment for his crime.

    3. Both accused have appealed against their conviction and sentence, and there is the usual reference for confirmation of the death sentence by the learned Sessions Judge. Ram Singh is represented in this appeal by Mr. S.N Mulla. Learned counsel at the outset stated before the Court that it would be difficult for him to assail the evidence against his client and that he would confine himself to a plea for the reduction of the sentence. Gopal is represented by Mr. S.N Chatterji who tried to show that there are aspects of the prosecution evidence which tend to make the case against his client appear doubtful. We shall, therefore, consider the case of Gopal first.

    4. Mr. Chatterji's first argument is based on what according to him is a discrepancy between the F.I.R and the evidence of Mrs. Kapoor. This report was written out by Mr. Kriplani immediately after the murder and begins with the following statement:

    “I, Mrs. Sudarshan Kapoor, was sleeping with my husband. To night at 1 a.m Ram Singh, my servant, and Gopal servant of Dr. Bhattacharya, who is my neighbour, both these servants entered in my bed-room and fatally stabbed my husband on the bed. Myself and my husband struggled with both these murderers and I also received one wound on my back. My husband could not speak and survive on receiving the chest wound. I made hue and cry and chased Ram Singh and arrested him in the verandah.”

    5. Learned counsel asked the Court to compare this statement with the evidence of Mrs. Kapoor on this point which runs thus:

    “……….at about 1 a.m, as I and my husband were sleeping on the same bed in our bed-room………… I was suddenly awakened on hearing mild groaning noise of my husband and I noticed, just then, that Ram Singh accused was standing towards, south of our bed almost touching our bed, and Gopal accused, who was standing towards east of our bed, was drawing out his knife from the chest of my husband.”

    6. Learned counsel pointed out that whereas in the F.I.R Mrs. Kapoor had mentioned that both herself and her husband had struggled with the murderers; there was no mention of this struggle by the husband in her testimony before the trial court. This discrepancy according to him tends to discredit the entire case for the prosecution and makes the conviction of the appellants unsafe. We do not agree. The F.I.R was signed by Mrs. Kapoor immediately after the gruesome murder of her husband. She too had been slabbed and beaten and pushed about by the assailants. Any woman under these circumstances would be overwhelmed with grief and shock and her mental condition would not be normal. Moreover, the report was written out by Mr. Kriplani and signed by Mrs. Kapoor, though according to her instructions. In these circumstances, if there is any mention of a struggle between the assailants and Mr. and Mrs. Kapoor, it does not follow that her subsequent testimony before the sessions court is discredited. Moreover, Mrs. Kapoor did state before the trial court that she heard a groan from her husband. Probably the struggle referred to in the F.I.R is based upon the cry which escaped from her husband when he was attacked. The accused who were defended by counsel, did not ask Mrs. Kapoor in cross-examination to explain the reference to her husband's struggle in the F.I.R We are, therefore, not inclined to attach much importance to the mention of this struggle, particularly in view of the fact that there was a struggle between her and the assailants. The mention of her husband's struggle may have been due to her inability immediately after this horrible tragedy which nearby killed her and left her the widowed mother of two orphan's, to focus her mind on the details of the struggle.

    7. Learned counsel for Gopal had to concede in the end that the evidence of the three witnesses, Mrs. Kapoor, Mr. Kriplani and Ajab Singh remains unshaken. He also had to concede that there was no explanation why all the three of them should accuse falsely Gopal and Ram Singh of the crime which they did not commit. Gopal's own statement that he was in his room at the time of the murder and that even after Mrs. Kapoors' cries for help reached him, he preferred to remain indoors clinches his guilt for, if he were really innocent, he would have rushed to Mrs. Kapoors' help like all the other who heard her shrieks for help. Learned counsel made a half hearted attempt to suggest that Gopal was the victim of a mistake in identity and that the second assailant was some unknown associate of Ram Singh. In our opinion there can be no question of a mistake in view of the evidence of the three witnesses. Mrs. Kapoors' description of the assault is graphic and her testimony rings true. Learned counsel had to concede that the evidence of the investigating inspector cannot be assailed. That being so, the recovery of the knife and the bloodstained clothes from the place pointed out by Gopal after his arrest fully corroborates the evidence of Mrs. Kapoor and the other witnesses. We are of the opinion that the case against both the accused is fully established and they were rightly convicted.

    8. As regards sentence, there is no question of any extenuating circumstance in favour of Gopal nor was any argument addressed to us that he is entitled to exemption from the extreme penalty. In our opinion, death sentence is the only possible punishment in his case.

    9. As regards Ram Singh. Mr. S.N Mulla vehemently argued on his behalf that he may be given the lesser sentence of life imprisonment on account of his age and other circumstances. Learned counsel argued that age itself is proof of Ram Singh's immaturity and that it is likely that he had fallen under the influence of Gopal. Mr. Mulla also contended that upto a particular stage during the assault Ram Singh did not stab any one. He suggested the possibility that both accused were only interested in committing robbery and were searching for the keys of the Godrej safe which was kept in Mrs. Kapoor's bed-room. During their search they might have disturbed Mr. Kapoor's sleep and on a challenge by him Gopal stabbed him. This might have aroused Mrs. Kapoor which in turn led to the intervention of Ram Singh. This in brief is the picture of the assault which learned counsel tried to place before us.

    10. Mr. Mulla also contended that youth by itself can be a sufficient reason for not imposing a sentence of death after a conviction for murder. He relied, inter alia, on a recent amendment of Sec. 367 Cr. P.C which deleted the clause requiring the Court to state its reasons whenever it decides not to impose the sentence of death imposed by law. He suggested that the removal of this condition shows that the Court now has a wider latitude in the matter of awarding or not awarding the death penalty and it may impose the lesser punishment on the ground of age even if it could not do so before the amendment of the section. We do not think that the amendment of Sec. 367 Cr. P.C affects the law regulating punishment under the Penal Code. This amendment related to procedure, and now Courts are no longer required to elaborate the reasons for not awarding the death penalty; but they cannot depart from sound judicial considerations in preferring the lesser punishment. A court may record no reason for not passing the death sentence, but if it awards life imprisonment for a cold-blooded and revolting murder the absence of reasons will not save its preference from being unjudicial. We have heard learned counsel at some length on this point because the fact that Ram Singh is young in years has given us, we confess, many anxious moments.

    11. It is certainly true that many a murderer escaped the death penalty partly because of his age. But youth by itself has never been at least we have not come across a single case where it was held to be a sufficient reason for imposing the lesser sentence. It is therefore necessary to understand the principle which have induced the High Courts in India not to impose the death sentence on youthful murderers.

    12. The Penal Code has not created any special categories or classes of persons who can claim exemption from death sentence as a matter of right. Neither youth nor sex nor any other peculiarity is mentioned by Sec. 302 as entitling any person to claim exemption from capital punishment after his conviction for murder. It merely says, “whoever commits murder shall be sentenced to death or transportation for life and shall also be liable to fine.” The word ‘whoever’ forbids any classification of murderers into categories on the basis of youth or sex or any other ground for the purpose of deciding the question of appropriate sentence after conviction.

    13. If the legislature had intended that the sentence of death is not meant for persons of young age, the Code would have contained a section or proviso exempting specified classes of persons from the death penalty, just as other provisions clothe certain categories of persons with complete, partial, or conditional immunity from punishment from all crimes. Secs. 82 and 84 respectively exempt children under seven years and persons of unsound mind from the criminal law and Sec. 85 confers a similar but conditional exemption on persons in a state of intoxication. Under Sec. 83 every youthful person below the age of 12 who have not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct is immune from punishment. But beyond the age of 12, all persons are equally liable for punishment for any crime.

    14. Ch. III of the Code which prescribes categories of punishments ranging from death to fine is equally impartial. There is no section in this Chapter enjoining that persons of a very young age shall be exempt from the punishment of death. This is significant. If youth or tender age alone was intended to be a ground for exemption from the death penalty, one would have expected a provision exempting absolutely or subject to conditions, persons between ages of, say, 12 and 15 from capital punishment. But there is no such provision. It follows that every person subject to the Code is liable to every category of punishment, that no class of murderers is exempt from the death penalty, and that a sentence of death may be passed on a young person if justice so requires it.

    15. Sec. 302 provides two categories of punishment. It does not specify which must be imposed in what cases. It has left to the judicial discretion of the Court to award the appropriate penalty in a case of murder. In suitable cases it may award the lesser punishment of life imprisonment, but what is a suitable case is within the Court's discretion which must of course be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily or on irrelevant considerations. The conduct of the murderer, the nature of the temptation to which he yielded, the manner in which the crime was committed are some of the considerations which will weigh with the Court. But it is clear that the Code provides no exemption for young persons on the ground that they are young. Youth may lead to certain presumptions in favour of the murderer which, if not displaced by evidence, may induce the Court not to impose a death sentence. But youth alone does not entitle him to claim the lesser punishment, if the murder is brutal and cold-blooded and there are no extenuating circumstances. In such a case the law requires that the sentence should be death.

    16. It is for the legislature to change the principles governing the imposition of the death penalty by amending the Code and providing exemption from the death penalty in the case of very young persons between the ages of 7 and a specified minimum age. It may be that a change in the law is due in the matter of inflicting the punishment of death on very young persons, particularly when capital punishment itself is troubling the conscience of large sections of humanity and has disappeared from the Criminal Codes of several civilised states. But any change in the sociophilosophic foundations of capital punishment is a matter for society and the legislature, not the judiciary. But under the present Code youth in itself will not save a murderer from the death penalty if there is nothing else in his favour.

    17. Age has been taken into account by the Indian Courts really on the principle that persons of young age are ordinarily immature, or unable to understand the full implications of their crime or easily misled by others, or subject to violent emotional disturbances which induce them to leap without looking into the pit of crime. Such weaknesses of character leading to temptation are not confined to young persons and may affect others too. Young blood is ordinarily more susceptible than old. But the point to note is that, not youth, but the presumptions arising from it are the real reasons whenever a young person is not awarded the sentence of death for murder.

    18. But if the evidence reveals that the criminal, though young in age, fully understood what he was doing and the murder was cold-blooded, deliberate and planned, and there are no extenuating circumstances, his age alone will not save the murderer from the sentence of death. He will then be given the extreme punishment as a normal case.

    19. The principle enunciated above appears to have served as a guide to the High Courts in India both in cases where they exempted a murderer from a capital sentence on the ground of age, and when they refused to do so. In Emperor v. Bhagwan Din A.I.R 1931 Oudh 89., Raza and Pullan, JJ. held that there is no law which justifies a court in not passing a sentence of death on any persons merely because he is young. This case is of some importance, for the Court enhanced a sentence of life imprisonment into one of death on an application by the State. The Sessions Judge had refrained from awarding the sentence of death on three reasons: (1) the accused was a young lad of about 18; (2) he might still reform; and (3) the murder was committed without premeditation. The first two grounds were rejected as irrelevant by the then Chief Court which observed; “Youth may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in offences where the accused person is not fully able to understand the nature of his act, or has been influenced by older persons. But this is a case in which a youth has deliberately murdered a small boy for motives of greed, and there is no suggestion that he was prompted to the crime by any motive except his own base nature.” After examining the evidence the court came to the conclusion that it was a case of brutal murder and held that there were no extenuating circumstances and that the accused had rendered himself liable to the full penalty prescribed by the law. In Sheo Dina v. Emperor A.I.R 1933 All. 939. Bennett and Bajpai, JJ. refused to reduce the sentence of death passed on a young man of 22 years of age because they came to the conclusion that he had acted with deliberation and had followed his victim his mother-in-law with art axe in hand. In Moti Ram Bhoja Ram v. Emperor A.I.R 1933 Lah. 998. Bhide and, Cure, JJ. rejected the accused's claim for exemption from the death penalty on the ground of youth because they felt the murder had been deliberately planned and carried out and there were no extenuating circumstances. The accused, who had been having illicit relations with a married woman, was sentenced to death for murdering her husband. In Sadiq v. Emperor A.I.R 1943 Lah. 104. Tek Chand and Sale, JJ. observed that youth and hot-headedness were unsound reasons for awarding the lesser punishment for murder but they refrained from issuing a notice of enhancement because the Crown had not applied for enhancement and the evidence of premeditation was not clear. In Allahbaksh v. Emperor A.I.R 1933 Lah. 956. the Court ignored the fact that the accused was “a raw youth aged only about 19” because it held that his crime appeared to be a heinous one and the murder was carefully planned and carried out in a cruel and treacherous manner” and observed that youth alone could not be considered an adequate ground for mitigation of punishment in that case. In Jangli v. Emperor A.I.R 1934 Oudh 19. Srivastava and Allsop, JJ. held that though the accused were comparatively young men, one being 20 and the other 22 years of age, the capital sentence was proper as the murder was deliberate and cruel and there were no extenuating circumstances. In Tiri v. Emperor A.I.R 1931 Ran. 171. the Rangoon High Court rejected a prayer for the reduction of the death sentence passed on a boy under 18 years he had given his age as 16 and after a review of the case law enunciated what they considered to be the “correct principle” that youth alone is not an extenuating circumstance which would justify the imposition of the lesser penalty for murder but should be considered with the other facts of the case. They took the view that in a case of cold-blooded and premeditated murder, they would not be justified in inflicting the lesser penalty solely on the ground of the youth of the appellant.

    20. There appears to be no reported, authority in support of the contention that a young murderer can claim exemption from the death sentence on the ground of his age alone. This reason is negatived by the language of Sec. 302 itself which says that whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and suggests that the choice between the extreme and the lesser penalty is not to be made on classification of murderers into categories on the basis of youth, sex and so on.

    21. We shall now examine some of the decisions in which the youth of the murderer was considered a good reason for not inflicting a sentence of death—commencing of course with the Supreme Court. In State of U.P v. Hari Kishan Bakshi,8 the Court after observing that the accused had committed the crime of the murder of two defenceless women which they described as atrocious,” reduced the sentence of death of life imprisonment for two reasons; (1) the youth of the accused at the time of the murder and (2) the fact that over four years had elapsed since the respondent was acquitted by the High Court. It would be difficult to assert with certainty which weighed most with their Lordships, the youth of the murderer or the lapse of time. We venture to suggest that it was the second reason and that the Supreme Court felt that it would not be proper to hang a man four years after he had been declared a free man by the High Court. But their Lordships fully approved of the death sentence passed on Bakshi by the trial court for they observed, “the additional Judge had rightly imposed the sentence of death on him.” The reduction of the sentence by the Supreme Court was, we venture to suggest, really prompted by subsequent events and in particular by a feeling that it would be inhuman to send a man back to the gallows four years after the High Court had granted him the right to live. They were really expressing their distaste for the idea, tolerated in America, of executing a man after keeping him in the condemned cell, for tense and expectant, for several years during which, as Lord Justice Birkitt recently said of Caryl Chessman, “he must have died a thousand deaths.” But the Supreme Court approved of the death sentence passed on Bakshi by the trial court, which makes it impossible to interpret their judgment as enunciating the principle that the youth of the murderer by itself calls for the lesser punishment. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R 1953 S.C 364. the Supreme Court observed that for murder the death sentence should ordinarily be imposed, but the Court has the discretion to impose the lesser punishment for reasons which a judicial mind could accept.

    22. In Ghunai v. Emperor A.I.R 1934 All. 132. a boy of 15 or 16 years of age committed a murder which the Division Bench in appeal described as “brutal and horrible”. They, however observed that “however horrible the crime, a boy of his age should not be hanged, that at the age of 15 and 16 when a boy had just come to the age of puberty he may do many things which he would never dream of doing when he was older and that the sentence of death should be remitted to transportation for life.” In that case the murderer, a boy whose age was described as under 15 by the Civil Surgeon, had murdered a boy of 8 years of age by chopping off his hands for the sake of some ornaments which the boy was wearing. The learned Judge observed his appearance and came to the conclusion that he would not have done this horrible deed if he had been older. This does not appear to have been a case where the assailant had planned to kill. He wanted to obtain the ornaments of the smaller boy and chopped off his hands in callous and brutal disregard of the likely effect of this amputation on his victim. There was no other injury on the body of the boy. The learned Judges remitted the death sentence on the ground that the crime was due to the immaturity of the accused. The facts of that case were peculiar and quite different and distinguishable from those in the case before us. The accused Ram Singh was not 15 but 17 years of age and it is not possible to draw the inference of inmaturity in view of the manner in which the murder was planned. Moreover with respect to the learned Judges, if they intended to lay down any broad principle that youth in itself is a suficient reason for not imposing the capital punishment, the principle is against the overwhelming weight of judicial authority and is not borne out by the scheme of the Penal Code.

    23. These cases were hot cited at the bar but we examined them ourselves during the Rearing and, in our opinion, there is overwhelming authority for the principle that youth in itself is not a ground for imposing the lighter sentence.

    24. In our opinion, Ram Singh can claim the lesser penalty only if it can be shown that there are extenuating circumstances which entitle him to claim exemption from the death sentence. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the circumstances in which this murder was committed. Ram Singh was the domestic servant of Mr. and Mrs. Kapoor. He started on an initial salary of Rs. 15/- per month which was subsequently increased to Rs. 24/- plus free board and clothing. He was obviously well-treated and had no cause for harbouring any ill-feeling nor does he say that he had any towards his master and mistress. In spite of this he entered into a conspiracy to murder his employer which was carried out in a callous, cold-blooded manner and according to plan. The first step was to provide themselves with daggers or knives. Ram Singh stole a knife which Mr. and Mrs. Kapoor had brought while holidaying in Kashmir in June 1959. Mrs. Kapoor has deposed that the knife disappeared one month before the murder, which indicates that the plans for the murder had matured before the date on which it was committed. The assassins then waited till Mr. Kapoor brought home his pay for the month of May 1959. This he did on 5th June and they struck on the night of the 7th. They chose the small hours of the morning when sleep lulls all living beings and they knew that their intended victims were likely to be in deep slumber. The order in which they picked their victims was shrewd. First they proceeded to liquidate the only male member in the house the head of the family who alone could offer powerful resistance to them. He was killed in his sleep. What they would have done next if Mrs. Kapur had not been awakened by her husband's death-groan is not difficult to guess. Their object appears to have been robbery which could have been carried out undisturbed only if the other adult person was also disposed of. That they were in a mood to stick at nothing is shown by Ram Singhs' conduct after the other murderer had plunged his knife into Mr. Kapur's chest. Ram Singh raised his hand to deliver a second knife thrust presumably to make sure of the victims death. But Mrs. Kapur, in a rare act of courage, sacrifice, and devotion which will inspite many hearts, threw herself on her husband and by making her own body his shield took the knife thrust on herself. Her shrieks must have made the assassins realise that help was on the way and the game was up. Then Gopal, in an attempt to destroy the only eye-witness of their murder, aimed his knife at Mrs. Kapur but succeeded only in stabbing her in the up per arm. What probably saved her was the assassins' desire to escape before help, which was on its way, arrived. These were the circumstances in which Ram Singh and his associate committed this murder. We have given every possible consideration to the fact that Ram Singh is alleged to be of 17 years of age, but we are unable to find any extenuating circumstance in this crime. We have given due weight to Mr. Mulla's eloquent plea that Ram Singh does not deserve the death sentence as he may have done the deed under the influence of Gopal. But we are unable to agree that he was misled or influenced by his associate in crime. There is not a scrap of evidence to suggest this, on the contrary, there are indications that without his active help the murder could not have been committed. As the domestic servant of Mr. and Mrs. Kapur he was in a position to move about the house and know their habits. He must have revealed to the other assassin the position of the bed-room and of the Godrej safe in it, and even the usual positions of their victims in bed. While Gopal was plunging his knife into his victims chest, Ram Singh was ready with his own weapon to finish the murder. His knife thrust was not on any signal or call for help from Gopal, he was standing poised to complete the job of killing. Unlike Gopal, he was bound to his employers by ties of duty and confidence which even in this age of dissolving loyalties have some meaning for decent people. Mr. Kapur had raised his wages and he must have been treated well, for he had stayed with them for three years. In the annals of crime it would be difficult to find many cases to match the conduct of this person in treachery and infamy. He was an active accomplice in this crime and there is nothing to distinguish his case from that of Gopal except his age.

    25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was right in his view that Ram Singh deserved the punishment of death.

    26. For these reasons we confirm the death sentences and dismiss both the appeals. The reference by the learned Sessions Judge is confirmed. The sentence of death shall be executed in accordance with law.

    27. Appeal dismissed.

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    Ram Singh v. State
    (May 17, 1960)