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  • provisions of Rule 13 of Chapter III of the Fundamental Rules
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Rule 13 of Chapter III of the Fundamental Rules
  • Rule 12 of Chapter III of the U.P Fundamental Rules
  • clause (a) of this rule or in clause (13) of rule 9
  • provisions of clause (a) of rule 14.7.
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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Sahai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a permanent employee (Ahalmad Appeals) in the Collectorate at Orai and was temporarily selected and appointed as Panchayat Inspector, Orai on 10 June 1949. After his appointment he joined B.A. classes with permission. On 2 December 1953 the Joint Director of the Panchayat Raj Department served a chargesheet alleging seven charges (which the petitioner says were particulars of a single charge) that he drew false travelling allowances on dates when he was supposedly present in college; the dates alleged included 29-8-1951, 29-11-1951, 30-11-1951, 7-3-1952, 24-3-1952, 29-3-1952 and 11-2-1953. The petitioner submitted an explanation on 26-12-1953 denying the charges and alleging proxy or mistaken marking of attendance. The petitioner contends no inquiry was held, and by order dated 19-5-1954 respondent No. 2 removed him from the post of Panchayat Inspector without opportunity to show cause.

The petitioner appealed to the State (respondent No. 1). Meanwhile he rejoined his post in the Collectorate. The State Government set aside the removal order as ultra vires and modified it into an order of reversion to his substantive post in the Collectorate by an order dated 17 September 1955 (text of the appellate order is quoted in the opinion). The petitioner sought a certified copy of the appellate order in 1956 and ultimately obtained one; he then filed the present writ petition on 3 October 1956 challenging that order as amounting to reduction in rank and asserting loss of pay (Panchayat Inspector pay Rs.144 vs Collectorate pay Rs.110) and that Panchayat Inspector was an executive post whereas his Collectorate post was ministerial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government's modification of the removal order into an order of reversion (retransfer to the petitioner's substantive post) amounted to a reduction in rank or a punitive measure requiring protection under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India.
  2. Whether the petitioner had a right or lien to the post of Panchayat Inspector (i.e., whether he had a substantive entitlement to remain in the post) such that his reversion would operate as a penalty.
  3. Whether the order of reversion visited the petitioner with "evil consequences" (forfeiture of pay or allowance, loss of seniority in substantive rank, or stoppage/postponement of future promotion prospects) such that it should be characterised as punitive.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserts he was removed by respondent No. 2 without an enquiry and without being given opportunity to show cause.
  • He contends the State Government's reversion effectively reduced his rank: as Panchayat Inspector his pay was Rs.144/- per month whereas on reversion to the Collectorate he drew Rs.110/- per month.
  • He also contends the post of Panchayat Inspector is an executive post while his Collectorate post is ministerial — implying loss of status.

Respondents' Arguments (as set out in counter-affidavit)

  • The respondents assert the petitioner's appointment as Panchayat Inspector was temporary; his substantive appointment was as Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate (a permanent post) and he retained a lien on that Collectorate post while officiating as Panchayat Inspector.
  • The counter-affidavit relies on the Fundamental Rules (Rules 11, 12, 13, 15 and related clauses) to show: a government servant cannot hold liens on two substantive posts; a temporary/officiating appointment does not create a right to the transferred post; and retransfer to the substantive post is permissible under the rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 A.L.J. 372 S.C. Principles for determining when a reduction in rank amounts to punishment: (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or rank; (2) whether the order visited the servant with penal/equivocal consequences (forfeiture of pay, loss of seniority in substantive rank, stoppage/postponement of future promotion). Also reference to the protection under the rules and Art. 311 as relevant. The court applied the two tests from P.L. Dhingra and found: (a) the petitioner had no right to the officiating post of Panchayat Inspector (it was a temporary appointment and he retained lien on his substantive Collectorate post), and (b) none of the specified "evil consequences" visited the petitioner (no forfeiture of pay/allowance, no loss of seniority in his substantive rank, and no stoppage or postponement of future promotion prospects in his substantive grade). Therefore reversion did not amount to reduction in rank/punishment under the Dhingra tests.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step manner, relying on the factual record, the respondents' admitted assertions in the counter-affidavit, the Fundamental Rules cited, and the test formulated in P.L. Dhingra:

  1. Characterisation of the appointment: The court accepted the counter-affidavit (not controverted in rejoinder or the original affidavit) that the petitioner's substantive appointment was as Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate (a permanent substantive post) and that his work as Panchayat Inspector was temporary/officiating. The petitioner therefore held a lien on his Collectorate post but not on the Panchayat Inspector post.
  2. Application of Fundamental Rules: The court cited relevant Fundamental Rules:
    • Rule 12 — a government servant cannot hold substantive appointments to two permanent posts at the same time and cannot be substantively appointed to two permanent posts.
    • Rule 13 — a government servant holding substantively a permanent post retains a lien on that post while holding a temporary post or officiating in another post (unless lien suspended or transferred under specified rules).
    • Rule 11 — the whole time of a government servant is at the disposal of the Government and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority without claim for additional remuneration.
    • Rule 15 — a government servant may be transferred from one post to another and retransferred to his original post without having acquired a substantive right to the post to which he was temporarily transferred; substantive transfer to a lower-paid post is restricted except in specified situations.
    The court used these rules to conclude that the petitioner had no substantive right or lien to the Panchayat Inspector post and therefore could not claim an entitlement to remain on that post against a lawful retransfer to his substantive post.
  3. Application of the Dhingra Tests: The court recited the two-part test from P.L. Dhingra (whether the servant had a right to the particular rank; and whether the reduction visited the servant with penal consequences such as forfeiture of pay, loss of seniority in substantive rank, or stoppage/postponement of promotion). The court found:
    • The petitioner did not satisfy the first test: he had no right to the post or rank of Panchayat Inspector because his appointment there was temporary and he retained his substantive post and lien in the Collectorate.
    • The petitioner did not satisfy the second test: the order of reversion did not foreclose pay (no forfeiture), did not affect seniority in his substantive rank (Ahalmad Appeals), and did not stop or postpone his chances of promotion in his substantive grade/service. The court interpreted "stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion" as referring to prospects in the substantive post/grade/service, not prospects in some other department to which he had no right to be transferred.
  4. Consequential reasoning: Because neither the substantive-right test nor the penal-consequences test was satisfied, the court concluded that the State Government's modification of the removal order into an order of reversion did not amount to punishment or an unlawful reduction in rank under the principles in P.L. Dhingra. The court also observed that the original removal order had been set aside by the Government and converted into reversion, so it was not understandable how the set-aside removal could still prejudice the petitioner.
  5. Relief and costs: Having so concluded, the court found the petition without force and dismissed it; there was no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court held that the State Government's order modifying the earlier removal into an order of reversion did not amount to a reduction in rank or to punishment under the tests laid down in P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner's challenge to the reversion was rejected and the reversion (retransfer to his substantive post of Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate) stands upheld.
  • The court found that the petitioner had retained his lien and substantive rank in the Collectorate and had no substantive right to the officiating Panchayat Inspector post; further, no penal consequences (forfeiture of pay, loss of substantive seniority, or stoppage/postponement of promotion in his substantive grade) flowed from the reversion as presented in the petition.
  • No costs were awarded (the opinion states "there is no order as to costs").
  • No broader novel legal principle or new precedent was announced by the court beyond applying established tests from the cited Supreme Court authority and the Fundamental Rules to the facts before it.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

    Shambhoo Ji Srivastava v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another Opp. Parties.

    Sahai, J.:— The petitioner was a permanent employee in the Collectorate at Orai. A selection took place for appointment to the post of Panchayat Inspector. The petitioner was selected for that post and was appointed as the panchayat Inspector, Orai on 10th June, 1949. His case is that after his appointment as Panchayat Inspector he was anxious to improve his educational qualifications and therefore obtained permission of the District Magistrate of Orai for joining B.A Classes in D.V College at Orai. On 2-12-1953 the Joint Director of Panchayat Raj Department, U.P Lucknow served upon the petitioner a chargesheet containing seven charges and asked him to explain why he should not be properly punished. The Petitioner's case is that in substance there was only one charge and the so called other six charges were only the particulars of this charge, the charge being that the petitioner had drawn false traveling allowances on dates when he was actually present in the College. The dates in question were 29-8-1951, 29-11-1951, 30-11-1951, 7-3-1952, 24-3-1952, 29-3-1952 and 11-2-1953. The petitioner submitted an explanation through the District Magistrate Jalaun on 26-12-1953 wherein he denied the charges and submitted that he was shown to be present in the College on proxy or mistaken marking of attendance. The petitioner's case is that no enquiry was held against him and after considering his explanation the respondent No. 2 by his order dated 19-5-54 removed him from the post of Panchayat Inspector. According to the petitioner no opportunity was given to him for showing cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the respondent No. 1, the State of Uttar Pradesh. In the meantime he joined his post in the Collectorate at Orai. The State Government set aside the order removing the petitioner from the post of Panchayat Inspector but ordered that he should be reverted to his permanent post in the Collectorate. The order of the State Government is in the following terms:—

    “With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter no. 5.Sha/773/55: 811/49, dated September 17, 1955, I am directed to say that since Sri Shambhoo Ji Srivastava was permanent employee of the Jalaun Collectorate and he held a lien on his permanent post in the Collectorate while he worked against a temporary post of Panchayat Inspector, the order of removal passed against him by you was ultra vires. The Governor is therefore, pleased to order that the order of removal passed against him should be modified into that of reversion.”

    2. On 10-5-56 the petitioner sent an application to respondent no. 2 requesting him to furnish him a certified copy of the appellate order of the Government. On 15-6-1956 the petitioner was informed by the Additional Assistant Director, Panchayat, Raj, Lucknow that he should apply to the Government for a certified copy which the petitioner did on 21-6-1956. On 24-7-1956 the Officer-in-charge Collectorate Orai handed over a copy of the appellate order of the Government to the petitioner. Thereafter the present writ petition was filed on 3rd October, 1956. The petitioner's complaint is that the order of the State Government amounts to the petitioner's reduction in rank. He has made an averment that his pay as a Panchayat Inspector was Rs. 144/- per month whereas on reversion to the Collectorate he is drawing Rs. 110/- per month only. There is a further averment that the post of the Panchayat Inspector is an executive post while the post of the clerk in the Collectorate is only a ministerial post. Whether or not the petitioner has been reduced in rank would depend upon the fact whether the petitioner had a right to continue on the post of the Panchayat Inspector. The Supreme Court in the case of P.L Dhingra v. Union of India 1958 A.L.J 372 S.C. while expressing opinion as to what would amount to a reduction in rank observed as follows:—

    “A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment, but the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowance or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indiate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has “been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? if the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Art. 311 which give ??? to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.”

    3. In the present case the petitioner was only temporarily appointed to the post of a Panchayat Inspector. (See paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit). Paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit also shows that his appointment as Appeal Ahalmad in the Collectorate of Orai was a permanent appointment and was in a substantive capacity. He held a lien on his post in the Collectorate and had therefore no lien on the post of Panchayat Inspector (see paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit) A government servant cannot acquire lien on two posts. Rule 12 of Chapter III of the U.P Fundamental Rules given on page 15 of the Financial Handbook, Volume II, 1941, 42 Edition, runs as follows:—

    12.(a) Two or more government servants cannot be appointed

    “Substantively to the same permanent post at the same time.

    (b) A government servant cannot be appointed substantively except as a temporary measure to two or more permanent posts at the same time.

    (c) A government servant cannot be appointed substantively to a post on which another Government servant holds a lien.”

    4. Rule 12(b) clearly shows that the petitioner could not be substantively appointed both on his original post in the Collectorate as also on the post of Panchayat Inspector. The allegations made in the counter affidavit that his substantive appointment was that of Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate and not that of Panchayat Inspector and that he held a lien on his post in the Collectorate have not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit, not is there any allegation contrary to those allegations in the original affidavit filed by the petitioner. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner held substantive appointment as a Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate Orai and he held a lien on that post. It must also be held that he held no lien on the post of Panchayat Inspector which post he occupied only temporarily. In this connection the provisions of Rule 13 of Chapter III of the Fundamental Rules printed on page 15 of the ??? Hand book Volume II 1941–1942 Edition are relevant. That rule runs as follows:

    (13) Unless his lien is suspended under Rule 14 or transferred under Rule 14-B a government servant holding substantively a permanent post retains a lien on that post:

    (a) while performing the duties of that post;

    (b) while on foreign service, or holding a temporary post, or officiating in another post;

    (c) during joining time on transfer to another post; unless he is transferred substantively to a post on lower pay, in which case his lien is transferred to the new post from the date on which he is relieved of his duties in the old post;

    (d) while on leave; and

    (e) while under suspension.

    5. Therefore even though the petitioner continued to work as Panchayat Inspector his lien on his original post of Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate continued to exist. The mere fact that the petitioner was working on the post of the Panchayat Inspector would not confer any right on him to insist on being retained on that post, his appointment to that post being in a temporary capacity and he having acquired no lien on that post. Rule 11 of the rules mentioned above runs as follows:—

    “11. Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided, the whole time of a government servant is at the disposal of the Government and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority without claim for additional remuneration whether the services required of him are such as would ordinarily be remunerated from the revenues of the Province or from a local fund or from the revenues “of an Indian State”.

    6. This would show that the petitioner could claim no right to himself with regard to the post of Panchayat Inspector. Rule 15 of the same rules is also relevant. It runs as follows:—

    “15. (a) A government servant may be transferred from one post to another, provided that, except

    (1) on account of inefficiency or mis-behaviour, or

    (2) on his written request. A government servant shall not be transferred substantively to, or, except in a case covered by rule 49 appointed to officiate in, a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended under rule 14.

    (B) Nothing contained in clause (a) of this rule or in clause (13) of rule 9 shall operate to prevent the retransfer of a government servant to the post on which he would hold a lien, had it not been suspended in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of rule 14.”

    7. This rule shows that a government servant can be transferred from one post to another and can be retransferred to his original post without his having acquired any right to the post to which he was transferred. He cannot make a complaint of being retransferred to his original post. That being so, to my mind, the petitioner does not fulfil the first test laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of P.L Dhingra v. The Union of India, i.e whether “the servant had a right to the post or the rank.” To my mind the petitioner had no right to the post or the rank of the Panchayat Inspector.

    8. In my opinion even the second test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of P.L Dhingra v. The Union of India has not been fulfilled in the present case, the test being “whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to.” Those evil consequences are the forfeiture of his pay or allowance or the loss of seniority in the substantive rank or stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion. In my opinion none of these evil consequences have visited the petitioner. There is no forfeiture of his pay or allowance; nor his seniority in his substantive rank of Ahalmad appeals in the Collectorate has been affected. The chances of his future promotion have not been postponed or stopped. In the grade in which he is he would be entitled to go to the maximum. The order of reversion cannot operate to his not getting the maximum in the grade in which he is in the Collectorate. To my mind the words “stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion” as used by their Lordships of the Supreme Court mean the stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion in the grade and in the service in which he is in a substantive capacity. It does not mean the stoppage or postponement of his future employment in any other department on transfer because he has got no right to claim a transfer in another department or to occupy a post in another service. Unless it is shown that the petitioner's prospects in his own service and in his own grade are blasted or retarded the petitioner cannot succeed in complaining that his future promotion has been postponed or stopped. It would be significant to note that the Supreme Court has clearly stated that seniority in “substantive rank” must be affected before a person can complain of having been reduced in rank. The petitioner's substantive rank is not that of Panchayat Inspector, but that of Ahalmad Appeals in the Collectorate. The words “stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion must also relate to his substantive post or to his present cadre or grade or present service. The mere fact that the petitioner was taken on transfer in another department and having been found unfit there was reverted to his substantive post in his original department cannot, to my mind, lead to the inference that the petitioner has been reduced in rank. That being so the petitioner has not fulfilled even the second test as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of P.L Dhingra v. The Union of India.

    9. Mr. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the result of the orders passed against the petitioner by respondents nos. 1 and 2 is that he is not given a post in any other department when he applies for it, as every body takes it that he has been removed from service because of the original order of removal passed by respondent No. 2 it is clear that the order passed by respondent No. 2 removing the petitioner from service was set aside and substituted by a fresh order of reversion and retransferring the petitioner to his original post in the Collectorate. It is therefore not comprehensible that the order or removal which has actually been set aside can still operate to the prejudice of the petitioner. The petition has no force and is dismissed but there is no order as to costs.

    10. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Shambhoo Ji Srivastava v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another Opp. Parties.
    (Mar 25, 1958)