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Judgment Summary — Mootham, C.J. (Appeal from order of learned Single Judge dated 22 February 1955)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner's property was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Collector made an award on 25 March 1951 under s.11 of the Act. The Collector did not give notice of his award to the petitioner under s.12(2). The petitioner says he became aware of the award only on 13 January 1953. On 24 February 1953 the petitioner filed an application under s.18 before the Collector seeking reference to the Court; the Collector rejected that application the same day as time-barred. It is unclear whether the petitioner was informed immediately of the rejection or only became aware of it at the end of October 1953. On 21 December 1953 the petitioner filed a writ petition under Art.226 seeking (a) certiorari to quash the award proceedings or alternatively (b) a mandamus directing the Deputy Land Acquisition Officer to give the petitioner opportunity to substantiate his application for reference and dispose of it according to law.

The learned single Judge allowed the petition on the basis that the limitation for making an application under s.18 began to run from the date the petitioner became aware of the award; the application of 24 February 1953 was therefore held to have been filed within time. The appellants appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proviso to s.18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act prescribes periods of limitation for all applications under s.18(1), or only for some such applications.
  2. Whether the limitation period for an application under s.18 runs from the date of the Collector's award (i.e., award date) or only from the date of receipt of the Collector's notice under s.12(2) (i.e., from knowledge occasioned by notice), particularly where no notice was issued.
  3. Whether, in the absence of notice under s.12(2), an award is invalid (i.e., whether notice is a condition precedent to the making of a valid award) such that s.18 has no application.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Whether notice be issued by the Collector under s.12(2) or not, the maximum period within which an application must be made under s.18 is six months from the date of the Collector's award.
  • Because the petitioner's application was filed long after six months from the award date, the Collector properly rejected it as beyond time.

Petitioner's (as presented by Sri A.P. Pande) Arguments

  • The concluding words of clause (b) of the proviso to s.18(2), "whichever period shall first expire," show the clause applies only when there is a conflict between the alternative periods (six weeks v. six months); if no notice has been issued under s.12(2) the clause does not apply.
  • Reliance on two sentences in the judgment of Chandravarkar, J. in In re Land Acquisition Act to support the view that notice is an essential ingredient and that the lenient period of notice is essential.
  • Additionally, contention that s.18 has no application because no valid award was made by the Collector as notice of the proposed award to every person interested is a condition precedent to making the award (relying on s.12 and certain decisions).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Land Acquisition Act (Chandravarkar, J.) Interpreted clause (b) of s.18(2) to mean that the lenient period of notice is an essential ingredient and that the clause prescribes one of two periods—either six weeks from receipt of notice or six months from award, "whichever period shall first expire." The present Court respectfully rejected the conclusion drawn by Chandravarkar, J., holding instead that clause (b) means the maximum period is six months from the date of the award and that if notice is received earlier the period is reduced to six weeks from receipt.
Jehangir Bomanji v. C.D. Gaikwad, A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 419 (Bombay High Court) Considered similar facts: application made after petitioners became aware of award but beyond six months from award; the Bombay High Court held such applications were rightly rejected as beyond time. The Court in the present case agreed with that decision and its reasoning and noted the facts were very similar; the Court relied on it to support holding that s.18(2) prescribes a maximum six-month period running from award date.
Macdonald v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 4 I.C. 914 (Punjab Chief Court) Held that it was an essential part of the making of an award that it should be communicated to the interested parties (i.e., communication/notice is integral to making an award). The present Court disagreed with this view as a matter of statutory interpretation: it considered these decisions motivated by avoidance of hardship and held that neglect of the duty to give notice under s.12(2) does not affect the making of the award.
Hari Das Pal v. The Municipal Board, Lucknow, 22 I.C. 652 (Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court) Followed the Macdonald reasoning that an award is not made until announced or communicated to the person interested. The present Court expressed respectful disagreement, treating these earlier authorities as addressing hardship but not as correctly interpreting the statutory scheme: the Court held s.12(2) does not make notice a condition precedent to the making of an award.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and purposive interpretation of s.18(1) and the proviso to s.18(2). Key points of the Court's analysis were:

  1. Textual reading of the proviso: The proviso begins with the words "every such application" and then sets out clause (a) (six weeks where the person was present or represented before the Collector) and clause (b) (in other cases, within six weeks of receipt of notice under s.12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever first expires). The Court held that "in other cases" was intended to mean "in all other cases," i.e., all cases not falling within clause (a), so the proviso applies to all applications under s.18(1).
  2. Interpretation of "whichever period shall first expire": The Court rejected the petitioner's (Sri Pande's) reading and Chandravarkar, J.'s construction that notice is an essential ingredient. Instead the Court read clause (b) to mean that the maximum period is six months from the date of the award, but if the shorter period (six weeks from receipt of notice) applies because notice is received, that shorter period governs. In short: six months from award is the outer limit; receipt of notice can shorten it to six weeks from notice.
  3. Policy considerations and reliance on authority: The Court emphasized legislative intent to avoid undue delay in determining compensation and cited the Bombay High Court decision in Jehangir Bomanji as persuasive authority reaching the same practical result on facts similar to the present case. The Court expressed agreement with that decision.
  4. On whether notice is condition precedent to a valid award: The Court analysed s.12(1)–(2) and the phrase "except as hereinafter provided," concluding that those words refer to later sections providing for reference to Court (e.g., s.18) and not to sub‑section (2). The Court held that s.12(2) imposes a duty on the Collector to give immediate notice, but omission or neglect of that duty does not affect the making of the award which is dealt with by s.11 and is a completed act once made and filed.
  5. Practical consequences and avoidance of unbounded reopening: The Court reasoned that if notice were a condition precedent to the very making of the award, persons unknown to the Collector could indefinitely delay finality (e.g., a person with legal interest who left the State). The Court held that s.18(2) prescribes a period of limitation for all applications and that the maximum period is six months from the date of the Collector's award.
  6. Application to the present facts: Because the petitioner's application was filed many months after the award (and after the six-month outer limit), the Court concluded the application was out of time. The single Judge's reasoning (that limitation runs from actual knowledge of award) was therefore set aside.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal was allowed. The order of the learned single Judge dated 22 February 1955 was set aside, and the appellants were awarded their costs in both courts.

Implications (as stated or clearly deducible from the opinion):

  • The Court held that the proviso to s.18(2) applies to all applications under s.18(1). The maximum period of limitation for making an application under s.18 is six months from the date of the Collector's award; if the Collector's notice under s.12(2) is received earlier, the period may be shortened to six weeks from receipt of that notice (the shorter period governs).
  • The failure of the Collector to give notice under s.12(2) does not render the award invalid or prevent the running of the limitation period under s.18; neglect of the notice duty does not affect the making of the award.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the petitioner's writ petition (which had been allowed by the single Judge on the ground that time began on actual knowledge) was disallowed on appeal; the appellants succeeded and recovered costs.
  • No broader novel precedent beyond the statutory interpretation reached was proclaimed by the Court beyond its application here; the Court explicitly agreed with the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in Jehangir Bomanji on the limitation issue and rejected earlier authorities that had equated communication/notice with the making of the award.

    Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Petitioners v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer And Another .

    Mootham, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated the 22nd February, 1955, granting certain reliefs on a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The relevant facts are not in dispute and can be stated shortly.

    2. Certain property belonging to the petitioner was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; and on the 25th March, 1951, the Collector made an award in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 11 of the Act. No notice of his award was given by the Collector to the petitioner under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12, and the petitioner's case is that he did not come to know that the award had been made and filed until the 13th January, 1953. The petitioner was not prepared to accept the award and on the 24th February, 1953, he filed an application under Sec. 18 of the Act before the Collector that the matter be referred to the Court. This application was rejected by the Collector on the same day as being beyond time. It is not clear whether, as alleged by the appellants, the petitioner was immediately informed that his application had been rejected or whether, as stated by the petitioner, he ascertained this fact only at the end of October, 1953. On the 21st December, 1953, he filed the writ petition out of which this appeal arises. In that petition the relief sought by the petitioner was the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the entire proceedings culminating in the award or, alternatively, the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the first respondent, the Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, Colonisation Scheme, Moradabad, “to give an opportunity to the petitioner to substantiate his application for reference and dispose of the same in accordance with the law.” The learned Judge allowed the petition. He was of opinion that the time within which an application under Sec. 18 had to be made began to run from the date upon which the petitioner became aware that an award had been made. The application made by the petitioner on the 24th February, 1953, was accordingly filed within time, and he directed the second respondent, the State of Uttar Pradesh, to consider that application in accordance with law.

    3. The appellants “contention is that whether a notice be issued by the Collector pursuant to Sec. 12(2) of the Act or not, the maximum period within which an application must be made under Sec. 18 is six months from the date of the Collector's award, and that as the application in the present case was admittedly filed at a very much later date it was properly rejected.

    4. Now Sec. 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by a written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, and sub-sec. (2) enacts that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. Then there is a proviso to this sub-section which reads thus:

    “Provided that every such application shall be made—

    (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

    (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Sec. 12, sub-sec. (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”

    5. The first question which we have to determine, therefore, is whether this proviso provides periods of limitation for all applications made under sub-sec. (1) or whether it applies to some only of such applications. We think the answer to this question must be that the Legislature intended the proviso to apply to all applications. The opening words of the proviso are that “every such application” shall be made, and then follow clauses (a) and (b) stating the periods within which this must be done. Clause (a) makes provision for the case of a person who was present or represented before the Collector at the time when the latter made his award, and in the case of such a person the application must be made within six weeks from the date of the award. Clause (b) is the provision which applies “in other cases” and this phrase in the context in which it is used can mean only, in our opinion, “in all other cases,” that is to say in all cases not falling within the ambit of clause (a).

    6. It has been urged by Sri A.P Pande who appears for the petitioner that the concluding I words of this clause, “whichever period shall firsts expire,” show that the clause only has I application when there is a conflict between I the alternative periods of six weeks and six months and that if no notice has been issued under Sec. 12(2) this clause can have no application; and in support of this submission learned counsel relies upon two sentences in the judgment of Chandravarkar, J. in In re Land Acquisition Act1 where, at page 283, the learned Judge says with reference to clause (b):

    “The clause in question prescribes one of two periods of limitation for a party who has not accepted the Collector's award—either six weeks from the date of the receipt of the Collector's notice, whether immediate or not, or six months from the date of the award; whichever period shall first expire. These last words, which I have italicized, show that the lenient of notice is an essential ingredient, to say, of the two alternative periods …”

    7. We do not, with respect, think that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge can be drawn from the premises. What the clause means, in our opinion, in that in all cases to which clause (a) does not apply the application must be made within six months from the date of the Collector's award, but that if notice is received from the Collector that period is reduced to six weeks from the date of such receipt if that period be the shorter.

    8. Sri Pande's argument means of course that the proviso does not cover all cases. It would not have application where (as in this case) no notice was issued at all or where notice was issued but was not received until after the expiry of the period of six months. The result therefore would be that in respect of such applications no period of limitation has been prescribed and the application can be filed at any time. We think it was the intention of the Legislature that, in the public interest, not merely the physical acquisition of land under the Act but the determination of compensation therefor should be completed without undue delay, and in our opinion Sec. 18(2) provides a period of limitation for all applications, the maximum period being six months from the date of the Collector's award. This question was considered at length by the Bombay High Court in the recent case of Jehangir Bomanji v. C.D Gaikwad A.I.R 1954 Bom. 419. a case which appears not to have been brought to the attention of the learned Judge from whose order this appeal has been filed. The facts in that case were very similar to those in the case now before us. Fifteen months elapsed between the date of the award and the date upon which the petitioners became aware that it had been made, the only difference being that sixteen months after the award had been made, and therefore a month after they had acquired knowledge of it, a notice under Sec. 12(2) of the Act was served upon them. The Court, in a judgment delivered by the learned Chief Justice, was of opinion that an application made by the petitioners as soon as they became aware of the existence of the award was rightly rejected as being beyond time. We agree, with respect, with that decision and are in general agreement with the reason therefor stared by the learned Chief Justice.

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that Sec. 18 has in this case no application as no valid award was made by the Collector. The argument is that notice of the proposed award to every person interested in the land is a condition precedent to the making of the award, and for this proposition learned counsel relies on the provisions of Sec. 12 and on two decisions to which we shall shortly refer. Sec. 12 reads as follows:

    “12. Award of Collector when to be final.—(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

    (2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” Learned counsel contends that the words “except as hereinafter provided,” appearing in sub-sec. (1) refer to the provisions, inter alia, of sub-sec. (2). We do not think this is so, for in our opinion it is clear that the phease we have quoted refers to later sections in the Act providing for a reference to the Court for the determination of the amount of compensation. Sec. 12 is concerned not with the making of the award—that is dealt with in Sec. 11 but with its finality, and had it been the intention of the Legislature that the finality of the award should be dependent on compliance with the provisions of Sub-sec. (2) some such words as “and subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2)” would have been inserted, we think, in sub-sec. (1) after the phrase “except as hereinafter provided.”

    10. The first of the cases upon which Sri Pande relies is the decision of the Punjab Chief Court in Macdonald v. The Secretary of State for India in Council 4 I.C, 914.. In that case the court held that it was an essential part of the making of an award that it should be communicated to the interested parties. This decision was followed in Hari Das Pal v. The Municipal Board, Lucknow 22 I.C, 652. the second case relied upon a decision of the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court. We think however that these decisions are based, if we may say so with great respect, on the desire to avoid the hardship which may undoubtedly arise, if Sec. 18 is properly interpreted. Indeed in the earlier of these cases the Court said:

    “To hold that an award is “made” as soon as it is signed by the Collector would in many cases result in grave hardship, and we, therefore, feel fully justified in holding that an award is not made until it is announced or communicated to the person interested.”

    11. Sec. 12(2) clearly imposes a duty on the Collector; but we are unable to see that neglect of that duty affects the making of the award—an act which has in fact already been done.

    12. We are therefore unable to agree with the view that time under Sec. 18 cannot run until the person interested, (if he was not present or represented before the Collector) has received notice under Sec. 12(2). It is clear that the Collector can under that Sub-section give notice only to such persons as he knows, or ought to have known, to be interested in the land acquired; but it is manifest that there may well be persons with a legal interest in the land of whom the Collector is wholly unaware-persons for example who have left the State and whose whereabouts cannot be traced. What is the position if ten years after the proceedings have been completed an interested person comes along who has not had notice? Is the award invalid and can that person file an application under Sec. 18? We think not. Hardship may undoubtedly arise in exceptional cases, but proceedings Under the Land Acquisition Act are given considerable publicity, and where, as in the case before us, the petitioner filed a claim under Sec. 9 the Legislature may well have taken the view that as any person with a direct interest in the land would keep himself informed of the course of the acquisition proceedings, or at least ascertain from time to time whether any award has been filed in the office of the Collector. In our opinion this appeal must be allowed. The order of the learned Judge is set aside and the appellants are entitled to their costs in both courts.

    13. Appeal allowed.

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    Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Petitioners v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer And Another .
    (Aug 7, 1956)