Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, of the Code.
  • 2, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • different.12. Order 2, Rule 2,
  • Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C
  • Order 2, Rule 2,
  • Order 2, Rule
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, of the Code.
  • 2, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • different.12. Order 2, Rule 2,
  • Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C
  • Order 2, Rule 2,
  • Order 2, Rule
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Agarwala, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a defendants' appeal arising from a suit for possession and recovery of damages. The litigation concerns a 2½ biswa zamindari share in Patti Sheo Baran Singh and related Sir land that originally belonged to Sheo Baran Singh. On 23 November 1921 he executed a deed of gift allocating his zamindari share and Sir land among branches of his family in unequal shares.

Relevant events in chronological order (as stated in the opinion):

  • 23.11.1921 — Sheo Baran Singh made a deed of gift dividing his zamindari share among family branches (specific shares given to various family members are set out in the opinion).
  • 2.7.1924 — Nabbo Singh and his sons sold 8 biswansis out of the 15 biswansis they had received under the gift to Jokhi Ram and Munna Lal (the appellants in earlier litigation).
  • 1925 — The purchasers (appellants) brought a suit for profits against the family co-sharers; Lakhan Singh and Sardar Singh and others were impleaded as minors represented by guardians. That suit was decreed on 4.12.1925; execution followed and the remaining zamindari share in judgment-debtors' hands was sold at auction and purchased by the appellants on 22.1.1929.
  • The auction sale left a balance due to decree-holders of about Rs. 400; the Sir land held by the judgment-debtors became exproprietary tenancy as a result of the sale.
  • 20.4.1931 — To satisfy the balance, multiple family members (including Budha Singh and Tikam Singh, and guardians on behalf of others) executed a deed of relinquishment of exproprietary rights in five plots measuring 8 bighas and 5 biswas in favour of the decree-holders (appellants). The appellants thus acquired possession over the entire 2½ biswa zamindari share and actual cultivatory possession of the five plots. Some branches of the family submitted to these proceedings; others did not.
  • 1938 — Certain members (Lakhan Singh & Sardar Singh; Hukam & Hakim Singh) brought suit No. 26 of 1938 against the appellants seeking possession of their 2/3rds share of the 2½ biswa subject-matter of the 1921 gift. They contended the property was ancestral, the gift invalid, the 1925 profits decree not binding because minors were improperly/neglectfully represented by guardians, and hence the execution sale was invalid. That suit was decreed in their favour.
  • 1942 — The present suit (the subject of this appeal) was instituted by the same plaintiffs for recovery of possession over the 2/3rds share of the land covered by the 20.4.1931 deed of relinquishment.
  • Procedural history of the 1942 suit: trial court decreed the suit; the lower appellate court reversed and dismissed it; a Single Judge of this Court allowed an appeal and decreed the plaintiffs' suit. The defendants brought the present special appeal from that Single Judge's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 1942 suit instituted by Lakhan Singh, Sardar Singh, Hakim Singh and Hukam Singh was barred by Order 2, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the cause of action and relief sought were the same as in the earlier suit (Suit No. 26 of 1938) and therefore should have been included in that earlier suit.
  2. Whether the deed of relinquishment dated 20 April 1931 constituted the same cause of action as the execution sale arising from the decree for profits (i.e., whether the two transactions were substantially the same for the purposes of Order 2, Rule 2).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The principal defence was that the plaintiffs' present suit was barred by Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. because the cause of action was the same as that in Suit No. 26 of 1938 and the relief sought (possession over the area) should have been included in the prior suit.
  • Implicitly, the appellants relied on identity of the foundation of the claim: the allegations that the property was ancestral, the 1921 gift invalid, the 1925 decree not binding due to negligent guardianship, and the alleged invalidity of the execution sale.

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs pointed out that although many foundational allegations were identical between the two suits, the present suit additionally relied on the deed of relinquishment dated 20 April 1931 and alleged that because the decree for profits was not binding, there was no real consideration for that deed and therefore it was not binding on them to the extent claimed. The 1931 deed and its consequences were not pleaded in Suit No. 26 of 1938.
  • It was conceded by the parties that the plaintiffs in principle could have included the present claim in the earlier suit, but plaintiffs contended the cause of action in the present suit was founded on a distinct transaction (the 1931 deed of relinquishment) and hence Order 2, Rule 2 did not bar the later suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Read v. Brown (1889 L.R. 22 Q.B.D. 128) / Cook v. Gill (Law Rep. 8 C.P. 107) Accepted definition of "cause of action" as "every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court." The Court relied on this definition to frame the inquiry into whether the facts necessary to establish each suit were identical; it used the definition to emphasize that cause of action comprises necessary facts, not every piece of evidence.
Sm. Chand Koer v. Partab Singh (15 I.A. 156) Cause of action has no relation to the defence and refers to the grounds set out in the plaint; focuses on the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to reach a conclusion. The Court cited this to underline that cause of action is determined by the plaintiff's pleaded grounds, not by possible defences or the relief's form.
Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund (1873 12 Beng. L.R. 304) The term "cause of action" is to be construed with reference to substance rather than form. Used to support the proposition that substance governs the identity of causes of action rather than mere formal similarities.
Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranee (2 I.A. 283) Same substantive point: emphasis on substance over form in determining cause of action. Referenced as part of the established approach that substance controls the assessment of whether causes are identical.
Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali (1948 A.L.J.R. 574) Summarised tests for O.2 R.2: (1) whether new claim is founded on a distinct cause of action; (2) cause of action means every fact necessary to be proved; (3) different evidence implies different causes; (4) causes may be same if in substance identical; (5) cause of action unrelated to defence or relief prayed for. The Court adopted these propositions as the correct legal test for determining whether the present suit was barred under Order 2, Rule 2, and applied them to the facts (noting that infringement as well as title facts form part of cause of action).
Rajah of Pittapur v. Sri Rajah Venkata Mahapathi Surya (12 I.A. 116) Illustrated that claims arising from different transactions (here immoveable vs moveable property claims) may constitute distinct causes of action. The Court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that a claim founded on a deed of relinquishment (distinct transaction) could be a separate cause of action from a claim arising out of an execution sale.
Har Sarup v. Anand Sarup (A.I.R. 1942 All. 410) Held that whether subsequent suit is founded upon same cause of action is a question of fact; separate infringements by separate acts may create separate causes of action and need not be combined. The Court cited this authority to reinforce that separate acts infringing separate rights give rise to separate causes of action and that Order 2, Rule 2 does not require combining such separate causes in one suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

(Step-by-step synthesis of the court's legal analysis, restricted to what is stated in the opinion.)

  1. The Court framed the pivotal factual question as whether the cause of action in the earlier suit (Suit No. 26 of 1938) was the same as that in the present 1942 suit or whether the two were distinct for the purposes of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C.
  2. The Court reviewed authoritative definitions and principles concerning "cause of action," citing Read v. Brown (and Cook v. Gill) to adopt the definition that it comprises every fact which the plaintiff must prove if traversed to obtain judgment.
  3. The Court reiterated authorities (including Sm. Chand Koer, Soorjomonee Dayee, Krishna Behari Roy) that the concept relates to the substance of the plaint and the grounds upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at its conclusion, not to the defendant's possible defences or merely the form of relief.
  4. Drawing on Mohammad Khalil Khan, the Court set out the relevant tests: (a) ask whether the new claim is founded upon a cause of action distinct from the former; (b) cause of action includes every fact necessary to be proved; (c) different evidence implies different causes; (d) causes identical only if in substance identical; (e) cause of action is unrelated to defence or relief.
  5. The Court emphasized that cause of action includes both the facts establishing the plaintiff's right (e.g., title) and the facts constituting the infringement of that right (the date and nature of the infringement). The date of accrual — the date of infringement — is therefore an element of the cause of action.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court identified the deed of relinquishment dated 20 April 1931 as the transaction that gave rise to the cause of action for the present suit. The Court held that this deed of relinquishment was an entirely different transaction from the execution sale which had been the subject-matter of the earlier suit.
  7. The Court acknowledged that while the consideration for the 1931 deed related to the balance due under the earlier decree, consideration is not the same thing as the transaction itself; the relinquishment was a voluntary and separate act distinct from the execution sale.
  8. Because the infringements of the plaintiffs' rights arose from two separate transactions covering different kinds of rights in property (execution sale vs. deed of relinquishment), the Court concluded that the causes of action were not substantially the same, even though some facts establishing title were common to both suits.
  9. The Court reinforced this conclusion by reference to Rajah of Pittapur and Har Sarup, which support the principle that separate acts infringing separate rights can give rise to separate causes of action and need not be combined in a single suit under O.2 R.2.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the present suit was not barred by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal was dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The defendants' appeal failed; the Court found no force in the appeal and dismissed it with costs (i.e., the earlier Single Judge's judgment allowing the plaintiffs' suit stands as against this appeal).
  • No broader legal innovation or novel precedent is stated in the opinion; the Court applied and reiterated existing principles and authorities governing the meaning of "cause of action" and the scope of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C., concluding that separate transactions (execution sale vs. deed of relinquishment) produced separate causes of action.

    Jokhi Ram v. Sardar Singh

    Agarwala, J.:— This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for possession over certain property and recovery of damages. The only question in the appeal is whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred by Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C The following pedigree will be useful in understanding the facts of the case:

    2. Sheo Baran Singh was the owner of 2½ biswa share in Patti Sheo Baran Singh. Appertaining to this share he had some Sir land. On 23rd November, 1921 he made a gift of his zamindari share and the Sir land to the three branches of his sons but in unequal shares. To Lakhan Singh and Sardar Singh plaintiffs 1 and 2 and their mother Srimati Chameli he gave 15 biswansis share; to Budha Singh and Tikam Singh, defendants 5 and 6 and Nabbo Singh deceased their father he gave 15 biswansis share, and to Shrimati Larehti, wife of Lochan Singh and mother of Hakim Singh and Hukam Singh, plaintiffs 3 and 4, he gave one Biswa share. On the 2nd July, 1924, Nabbo Singh and his sons, Budha Singh and Tikam Singh sold 8 Biswansis zamindari share out of the 15 biswansis which they obtained under the aforesaid deed of gift to the appellants Jokhi Ram and Munna Lal.

    3. In 1925 the appellants who had thus become co-sharers in Patti Sheo Baran Singh brought a suit for profits against the members of the family of Sheo Baran Singh, who were co-sharers in the Patti. Lakhan Singh and Sardar Singh, plaintiffs 1 and 2, Hakim Singh and Hukam Singh, plaintiffs 3 and 4, were impleaded as minors represented by their respective guardians. The suit was decreed on the 4th December, 1925. Execution proceedings were taken out and the entire zamindari share remaining in the hands of the judgment-debtors was sold in auction and purchased by the appellants on 22.1.1929

    4. The auction sale did not satisfy the decree in full and there was a balance of about Rs. 400 still due to the decree-holders, the appellants. As a result of the sale, the Sir land in possession of the judgment-debtors became their exproprietary tenancy holding.

    5. In order to satisfy the balance of the decree, on 20th April, 1931 Budha Singh and Tikam Singh, sons of Nabbo Singh, and Lochan Singh for himself and as guardian of his sons Hakim Singh and Hukam Singh, plaintiffs 3 and 4, and Srimati Chameli for herself and as guardian of Lakhan Singh and Sardar Singh, plaintiffs 1 and 2 executed a deed of relinquishment of their exproprietary rights in five plots measuring 8 bighas and 5 biswas in favour of the decree-holders appellants. In this way the appellants acquired possession over the entire 2½ biswa zamindari share and also actual cultivatory possession over plots measuring 8 bighas and 5 biswas. The branch of Nabbo Singh submitted to all these proceedings but the branches of the other two sons of Sheo Baran Singh did not.

    6. In 1938, Lakhan Singh and Sardar Singh, sons of Kedar Singh and Hukam Singh and Hakim Singh, sons of Lochan Singh brought a suit, suit No. 26, of 1938, against the appellants for possession over their ⅔rds share out of 2½ biswas zamindari share which was the subject-matter of the gift of 23rd November, 1921 on the grounds that the property was ancestral, that Sheo Baran Singh had no right to make a gift of it to different persons as he purported to do by means of the deed of gift dated 23rd November, 1921, that in the suit for profits brought by the appellants in the year, 1925, the plaintiffs were not properly represented and the guardians were negligent in defending the suit and for these reasons the decree in that suit was not binding upon them, that the sale in execution therefore was consequently of no legal validity and that they were entitled to obtain possession over their share of the property. That suit was decreed. It was held that the property was joint, that Sheo Baran Singh was not entitled to make a gift of it, that the guardians appointed in the suit of 1925 were negligent and that the decree and sale in the execution proceedings of that decree were not binding on the plaintiffs.

    7. Later on in the year 1942 the suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted by Lakhan Singh, Sardar Singh, Hakim Singh and Hukam Singh for recovery of possession over ⅔rds share of the land covered by the deed of relinquishment of 20th April, 1931.

    8. The main defence with which we are concerned was that the suit was barred by order 2, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the cause of action for the suit was the same as for suit No. 26 of 1938 and the relief for possession over the area sought for in the present suit should have been included in the previous one.

    9. The trial Court rejected the defence and decreed the suit. The lower appellate court on appeal set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. There was an appeal to this Court which came up before a learned Single Judge who allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, holding that it was not barred by Order 2, Rule 2. Against this judgment the present special appeal has been brought by the defendants.

    10. The recitals in the plaints of the two suits so far as they related to the foundation of the plaintiff's claim were exactly the same, namely, that the property was ancestral that Sheo Baran Singh had no right to make a gift of it to different persons, that the decree passed in the appellant's suit for profits in which the plaintiffs were arrayed as minor defendants under their guardians were not binding upon them as their guardians were negligent in defending the suit and that the sale in execution of the decree was consequently void and not binding on them. The only additional facts narrated in the present suit which were not narrated in the previous one were that as the decree for profits obtained by the appellants was not binding against the appellants, there was no real consideration for the deed of relinquishment, and that as such it was not binding on the plaintiffs to the extent of that share 20th of April, 1931, the date of the deed of relinquishment, was mentioned as one of the dates of the accrual of the cause of action in the present suit and this date was not mentioned in the previous suit No. 26 of 1938.

    11. It is conceded that the plaintiffs could have included in the previous suit the claim made in the present suit if they were so disposed. On these facts the question is whether the cause of action for the previous suit is the same as the cause of action for the present suit or the two causes of action are different.

    12. Order 2, Rule 2, lays down that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a particular cause of action and that if he omits to sue in respect of any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the same. The object of the rule is clearly to avoid splitting up of claims and to prevent multiplicity of suits. The phrase cause of action has not been defined in any enactment, but the meaning of it has been Judicially considered in various decisions. In Read v. Brown 1889 L.R 22 Q.B.D 128., Lord Esher, accepted the definition given in Cook v. Gill Law Rep. 8 C.P 107. that it meant:—

    “every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece on evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.”

    13. In Sm. Chand Koer v. Partab Singh 15 I.A 156., Lord Watson delivering the judgment of the Board observed as follows:—

    “Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set out in the plaint as the cause of action, or in other words to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”

    14. In Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund 1873 12 Beng. L.R 304 at 315., it was observed that “the term” cause of action “is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to the form of action.” To the same effect are the observations in Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranee 2 I.A 283 at 285.. In Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali 1948 A.L.J.R 574 at 583., Sir, Madhavan Nair, after a review of the relevant cases, summarised the law as follows:—

    (1) The correct test in cases falling under Order 2, Rule 2, is “whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit.

    (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the Judgment.

    (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of action are also different.

    (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical.

    (5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”

    15. If the ‘cause of action’ means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the court, it must obviously include not only the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to establish the right which he seeks to establish, but also its infringement because without the infringement of the right it can hardly be said that the cause of action has arisen for the suit. In every suit the plaintiff has to mention the date when the cause of action arose for the suit. The date is the date of the infringement of the right of which the plaintiff complains. The right (including the facts constituting its foundation) and its infringement must, therefore, both constitute the cause of action for a suit. In Mohammad Khalil Khan's case (Ubi supra), the Judicial Committee clearly accepted this view. An observation of their Lordships at the bottom of page 583, of the report in the Allahabad Law Journal to the effect that:—

    “The plaintiff's cause of action to recover the properties consists of those facts which would entitle them to establish their title to the properties.”,

    should not be understood as laying down the proposition that the facts necessary to establish the title or the right of the plaintiff alone were sufficient to constitute the cause of action for the suit, and that the facts relating to its infringement were immaterial; because later on their Lordships do consider the infringement of the title or the right in the two suits which were under consideration before their Lordships and they approve of the observation of the High Court to the effect that the infringements in the two suits in substance arose out of the same transaction or formed part of the same transaction. Thus it is clear that in order that the cause of action for two suits may be the same, it is necessary that not only the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to establish his title to the property claimed in the two suits be the same but also that the attack on the title or the infringement of the plaintiff's right at the hands of the defendant must have arisen, in substance out of the same transaction.

    16. In the present case the transaction which gave rise to the cause of action for the present suit was the deed of relinquishment executed on the 20th April, 1931. This was entirely a different transaction from the execution sale which took place in the execution proceedings of the ‘appellants’ decree for profits. It is true that the consideration for the deed of relinquishment was the balance of the amount due under that decree, but the consideration for a transaction is not the same thing as the transaction itself. The deed of relinquishment was a voluntary act quite separate from the execution sale which was the subject-matter of the previous suit. Though the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to establish his title to the property were the same in both the cases, the infringements of the plaintiff's right having been occasioned as a result of two separate transactions covering different kinds of rights in property, it cannot be said that the cause of action was substantially the same in both the cases.

    17. This view finds support from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Rajah of Pittapur v. Sri Rajah Venkata Mahapathi Surya 12 I.A 116.. In that case the plaintiff sued to recover immoveable property in consequence of having been improperly turned out of possession and afterwards sued to recover from the same defendant moveable property in consequence of its wrongful detention. The plaintiffs' title to the said estate as well as to the half share of the personality arose under a will of one Bharayamma. It was held by their Lordships that:—

    “The claim in respect of the personality was not a claim arising out of the cause of action which existed in consequence of the defendants having improperly turned the plaintiffs out of possession of the zamindari property. It was a distinct cause of action altogether and did not arise at all out of the other.”

    18. In Har Sarup v. Anand Sarup A.I.R 1942 All. 410., a Bench of this Court held that:—

    “The question whether a subsequent suit is founded upon the same cause of action on which a previous suit was based is essentially one of fact and must be determined upon the facts of each case. The right of an owner to maintain his possession over a particular item of property is quite distinct and apart from his right to recover possession of another item of property from which he has been ousted by a trespasser. Where there is an infringement of two separate rights by two separate acts of trespass which cannot be said to have formed part of the same transaction committed by the same trespasser there must be two separate causes of action, and a suit in respect of the one will not be barred by a prior suit in respect of the other by O. 2, R. 2, because O. 2, R. 2, does not make it incumbent upon the plaintiff to combine separate cause of action in the same suit. All that it lays down is that the plaintiff must include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action.”

    19. With respect, we agree with these observations.

    20. We, therefore, hold that the present suit was not barred by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, of the Code. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.

    21. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Jokhi Ram v. Sardar Singh
    (Jul 22, 1955)