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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decree of the learned Civil Judge of Kanpur. The relevant facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • Debi Din owned one biswa of plot No. 840 in Juhi Khurd, Kanpur and by a registered deed dated 29-5-1914 dedicated this area for establishing a gaushala (cow shelter). He appointed Shyam Lal (also called Shamlu Baba), the pujari of Mahabirji's temple, as trustee under that deed.
  • Shyam Lal agreed to construct a gaushala, a well, a cattle trough and four pucca shops "with his own money" and did erect certain constructions. Subsequently Shyam Lal hypothecated the land and constructions to the appellant.
  • Ram Asrey (a member of a joint Hindu family including Bisheshwar Prasad and their sons) obtained a simple money decree against Shyam Lal and in execution caused the property and constructions to be put up for sale in 1933; he purchased the property at that auction and later erected 13 kothris on the site. Shyam Lal died some years later.
  • Within twelve years of the auction sale, one Brahamanamd (the respondent) instituted the suit claiming to be Shyam Lal's chela and the trustee of the gaushala, alleging the property was trust property and could not be sold in execution of a personal decree against Shyam Lal. He sought possession after demolition of the appellant's constructions and Rs. 1,080 as mesne profits (the trial court ultimately awarded Rs. 540).
  • Defendants in the suit included Ram Asrey, his son Satya Narain and the appellant; only the appellant contested. The trial court decreed the suit for possession and recovered Rs. 540 as mesne profits, directing removal of the 13 kothris within six months. The appellant alone appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the constructions made by (or under) Shyam Lal on the trust site formed part of the trust or were his private property.
  2. Whether the respondent's claim for demolition (and for possession) was barred by the doctrine of acquiescence.
  3. Whether the appellant (as auction purchaser) was entitled to compensation for the buildings he erected on the property (invoking principles such as Section 51, Transfer of Property Act).
  4. Whether the respondent had the right or capacity to institute the suit (i.e., his competence or status as trustee).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (Brahamanamd) claimed to be Shyam Lal's chela and the present trustee of the gaushala, asserting that the property was trust property and therefore could not be sold in execution of a personal decree against Shyam Lal.
  • He sought possession, demolition of the constructions erected by the appellant, and mesne profits (originally pleaded at Rs. 1,080; the trial court awarded Rs. 540).

Appellant's Arguments

  • The land had been conveyed to Shyam Lal personally and the trust sought to be created was invalid; the constructions put up by Shyam Lal were his personal property and did not form part of any trust.
  • A valid title had passed to Ram Asrey (auction purchaser) at the 1933 execution sale; the appellant relied on two independent titles: (1) as mortgagee (a simple mortgage, which the appellant conceded had been satisfied and gave no right to possession), and (2) as auction purchaser.
  • Limitation and Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act were pleaded in defence.
  • The appellant argued acquiescence should bar the respondent's claim in respect of the constructions.
  • He contended that, in any event, he was entitled to compensation for the buildings he constructed (invoking the principle of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  • The respondent's status as trustee was denied and it was contended he had no right of suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chaturbhuj v. Chatarjit, 33 All 253 Validity of a gift to an idol not yet in existence; a religious/charitable transfer can be valid even if the religious object does not yet exist. Used to support the proposition that a Hindu religious/charitable trust may be created without the object (idol) pre-existing and without a formal written instrument by the trustee.
Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal, 37 Cal 128 (Full Bench) Earlier Full Bench authority supporting validity of testamentary/charitable dispositions where the religious object was not yet in existence. Cited as foundational support for the rule that a written instrument is not necessary for the creation of a Hindu religious or charitable trust.
Gangi Reddi v. Tammi Reddi, AIR 1927 P.C. 80 (Privy Council) A dedication of family property for religious charity may be validly made without any instrument in writing under Hindu law. Quoted to reinforce that Hindu religious/charitable trusts need not be evidenced by a written instrument and that the Trusts Act formalities do not govern such trusts.
Willmott v. Barber, (1880) 15 Ch D 96 Essentials of the doctrine of acquiescence — requires mistaken belief about rights and awareness of that mistaken belief by the person against whom acquiescence is asserted. Applied to hold that the appellant could not establish the doctrine of acquiescence: essential elements (including knowledge of the other's mistaken belief) were not proved.
Nannu Mai v. Ram Chander, AIR 1931 All 277 (Full Bench) Auction purchaser in execution sale is not entitled to the benefit of Section 51 (Transfer of Property Act) as applied to transferees who improve property in good faith. Relied upon to hold that the appellant, as an auction purchaser in execution of a simple money decree, was not entitled to compensation under Section 51 and could not compel the trust to buy the buildings.
Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti, AIR 1935 P.C. 44 (Privy Council) A de facto trustee can maintain suit for the trust's benefit even if not a de jure trustee. Applied to support the conclusion that the respondent, who had acted as trustee and managed the gaushala for years, could maintain suit as a de facto trustee.
Gopal Dutta v. Babu Ram, AIR 1936 All 653 Persons who are not de jure trustees may nevertheless sue for the benefit of a trust. Cited alongside other authorities to reinforce that the respondent could sue for the trust's benefit despite not being formally appointed by the exact method stated in the deed.
Subramania Gurukkal v. Srinivasa Rao Sahib, AIR 1940 Mad 617 Authority permitting non-de jure trustees to institute suits for the benefit of trusts. Used to support the finding that the respondent's long-continued exercise of trust functions suffices to permit him to maintain the suit.
Sheo Ramji v. Sri Ridhnath Mahadeoji, AIR 1923 All 160 Another authority recognizing the competence of persons acting as trustees (though not de jure) to sue for the trust's benefit. Relied upon as part of the body of authority supporting the respondent's standing to maintain the suit as a trustee in practice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of focused legal determinations, each tied to facts recited in the record:

  1. Title and status of the appellant: the court noted the appellant had two independent bases of title — a simple mortgage (which, on the appellant's own showing, had been satisfied and conferred no right of possession) and an auction purchase in execution of a simple money decree. The mortgage could not support continued possession and any suit on it would be time-barred; therefore the appellant's defence rested on auction purchase title.
  2. Existence and nature of the trust: the court accepted that Debi Din had created a valid trust (wakf) for a gaushala by the registered deed of 29-5-1914. The court examined the terms of the deed (which appointed Shyam Lal as manager/mutwalli and required him to construct and maintain specified works "with his own money") and concluded that Shyam Lal's constructions were erected in pursuance of that agreement and with the intention that they form part of the trust property. The court emphasized that Shyam Lal was expressly forbidden to alienate the property and was charged with maintaining the gaushala.
  3. Formalities and governing law for religious/charitable trusts: the court addressed the appellant's contention that a trust in respect of immovable property required compliance with Section 5 of the Trusts Act (registered document). The court observed that the Trusts Act does not apply to public or private religious/charitable endowments (Section 1) and that the creation of Hindu religious or charitable trusts is governed by Hindu law. The court enumerated the essentials of a valid Hindu religious/charitable trust (object must be valid under Hindu law; founder competent; purpose and property described with sufficient precision; trust not contrary to law) and held that no registered document was necessary under Hindu law for such a trust to arise.
  4. Use of authorities on charitable trusts: the court relied on Chaturbhuj v. Chatarjit and Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal to show that a religious gift or trust may be valid even if the religious object (e.g., an idol) did not previously exist. The Privy Council decision in Gangi Reddi v. Tammi Reddi was cited for the proposition that a dedication of family property for religious charity need not be in writing. These authorities supported the conclusion that Shyam Lal's acceptance and the acts carried out effectuated a valid Hindu religious/charitable trust.
  5. Character of the constructions: having found a valid trust and that the deed's terms required Shyam Lal to erect and maintain the gaushala and related buildings, the court concluded that Shyam Lal intended the constructions to be part of the trust and that any subsequent hypothecation by Shyam Lal was an act in breach of trust and could not retrospectively change the character of the constructions from trust property to his personal property.
  6. Acquiescence: the court rejected the appellant's plea of acquiescence. It noted that the respondent became trustee in 1935 (two years after the 1933 auction) and there was no evidence the constructions were made after 1935; thus acquiescence could not be invoked against the respondent. The court applied the essentials of Willmott v. Barber (which require, among other things, that the person pleading acquiescence have been under a mistaken belief and that the other party be aware of that belief) and found those elements lacking on the facts.
  7. Section 51 (Transfer of Property Act) and compensation for improvements: the court considered whether the equitable principle in Section 51 (allowing a transferee evicted by a person with a better title to recover the value of improvements) could be applied to an auction purchaser. It concluded that a private transfer and an execution sale are fundamentally different: in private transfers the transferor gives implicit assurance of title and estoppel can arise; in execution sales there is no contract, no warranty and the purchaser buys at his own risk (caveat emptor). The court therefore refused to apply Section 51's principle to an auction purchaser, relying on the Full Bench decision in Nannu Mai v. Ram Chander, and held that the appellant was not entitled to compensation or to force the respondent to buy the buildings (though he could remove materials as allowed by the trial court).
  8. Competence to sue: the court examined the deed's provision for succession of the mutwalli (trustee) and the evidence as to the respondent's conduct. Although the deed required election by "four respectable Hindus," the respondent produced a document from Shyam Lal naming him disciple and successor, and the court found that the respondent had been acting as priest and manager of the temple and gaushala for eight or nine years, collecting customary contributions and managing the cows. The court concluded that the Hindu public had tacitly approved his appointment; even if not a de jure trustee, the respondent was a de facto trustee. Relying on Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti and other authorities, the court held a de facto trustee can maintain suit for the benefit of the trust.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: on the combined reasoning — validity of the trust, trust-character of the constructions, failure of the acquiescence and compensation/contentions, and the respondent's competence to sue — the court found the trial court's decree correct and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED. The appellate court upheld the decree of the learned Civil Judge which decreed the respondent's suit for possession and awarded mesne profits (the trial court had awarded Rs. 540) and directed removal of the 13 kothris within the time prescribed by the trial court. The stay orders were vacated and the appellant was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's judgment and decree in favour of the respondent were affirmed. The respondent's claim that the land and constructions were trust property succeeded; the appellant, as auction purchaser, was not entitled to compensation for the buildings he erected and could not compel purchase of those buildings by the respondent. The appellant was permitted (consistent with the trial court's direction) to remove materials as allowed by the trial court.
  • On legal principles: The court reaffirmed that Hindu religious/charitable trusts can arise without a registered instrument by the trustee and that constructions made by a trustee in pursuance of the trust intention form part of the trust property. The court also held that the equitable remedy under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available to an auction purchaser in execution sales.
  • No new binding precedent announced: The decision applies established principles and authorities to the facts; the opinion does not announce a novel legal rule beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

    Lalta Prasad v. Brahmanand And Others

    Brij Mohan Lall, J.:— This is an appeal by one of the defendants against a decree of the learned Civil Judge of Kanpur.

    2. It appears that one Debi Din owned an area of one ‘biswa’ out of plot No. 840 abutting on a public road in Juhi Khurd, Kanpur. By means of a registered deed dated 29-5-1914 he dedicated this area for the purpose of establishing a ‘guashala’. One Shyam Lal alias Shamlu Baba, who was the ‘pujari’ of Mahabirji's temple in Corperganj at Kanpur, was appointed a trustee under this deed. Shyam Lal agreed to construct a ‘gaushala’, a well, a cattle trough & four pucca shops “with his own money”. He did erect certain constructions. Sometimes later he hypothecated the land and the constructions to the appellant. The latter is the natural born son of one Ram Asrey, but has been adopted by his (Ram Asrey's) brother Bisheshwar Prasad. Ram Asrey, Bisheshwar Prasad and their sons form a joint Hindu family. Ram Asrey had a simple money decree against Shyam Lal and in execution thereof he got the disputed land and constructions put up for sale in 1933. He purchased the said property in the auction sale. After the purchase he erected 13 ‘Kothris’ thereon. A few years later Shyam Lal died.

    3. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted by one Brahamanamd (hereafter described as respondent) within 12 years of the auction sale. He claimed to be Shyam Lal's ‘chela’ and the present trustee of the ‘gaushala’. He contended that the property in suit was trust property and as such it could not be sold in execution of a decree obtained against Shyam Lal personally. He prayed for possession of the property in suit after demolition of the constructions erected by the appellant and also sought a decree for Rs. 1,080/- as mesne profits. The defendants to the suit were Ram Asrey, his son, Satya Narain, and the appellant.

    4. The appellant alone contested, the suit. He contended that the land in question was conveyed to Shyam Lal personally, that the trust sought to be created was not valid and that in any case the constructions put up by Shyani Lal were his personal property and did not form part of the trust. It was urged that a valid title had passed to Ram Asrey as auction purchaser. Limitation and Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, were also pleaded in defence. Another plea taken in defence was that in the event of the respondent's suit being decreed he should pay the costs of the constructions put up by the appellant. Lastly, respondent's status as trustee was disputed and it was contended that he had no right of suit.

    5. The learned Civil Judge overruled the defence and decreed the suit for possession of the property in dispute and for recovery of a sum of Rs. 540/- as mesne profits. He directed the appellant and his co-defendants to remove the 13 ‘kothris’ put up by them on the disputed land within a period of six months.

    6. Dissatisfied with this decree the appellant alone has preferred this appeal. Ram Asrey and his son, Satya Narain, have been impleaded as ‘pro forma’ respondents. Four points were urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in his arguments, viz.:

    1. The constructions made by the appellant had not been impressed with the character of a trust and were his private property.

    2. The claim for demolition was barred by the doctrine of acquiescence.

    3. In any event the appellant was entitled to claim compensation for the buildings constructed by him.

    4. The respondent has no right of suit.

    7. It may be pointed out at the outset that the appellant has two independent titles, viz., (1) as mortgagee and (2) as auction purchaser. His mortgage was a simple mortgage and gave him no right of possession. Moreover, this mortgage has, on his own showing, been satisfied. A suit on its basis, if now instituted, would be time-barred. It is, therefore, clear that he has no right to remain in possession on the basis of this mortgage-deed and cannot, therefore, resist the respondent's suit on this ground. If he has any title, it is as an auction purchaser. Being a member of the joint Hindu family with Ram Asrey he can rely on that title, although the purchase was not made in his name. It has to be seen how far can that title furnish a good defence to the respondent's claim.

    8. It has not been denied before us that a valid trust of the site was created by Debi Din. What was contended was that the constructions put up by Shyam Lal did not partake of the nature of the trust. It was argued that if a trustee (and such was admittedly the status of Shyam Lal) puts up constructions on the trust land the constructions would not become part of the trust property. In deciding this question one has to bear in mind the intention of the trustee in erecting those constructions. In order to gather this intention it is necessary to examine the trust deed executed by Debi Din because, obviously, Shyam Lal accepted the terms of this deed and secured the land from Debi Din on terms mentioned in this document. Debi Din expressed himself thus:

    “I have of my own accord and free will without compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else made a perpetual wakf, with respect to, and subject to the terms which have been set up and are given below for the purpose of (construction of) a ‘gaushala’, a well a ‘charhi’ and four pucca shops with his (Shyam Lal's) own money under the mutwalliship of Shyam Lal.”

    9. Thereafter, he goes on to mention the terms and says that Shyam Lal shall be the manager and ‘sarbarakar’ and shall “cause a ‘gaushala’, a well, a ‘charhi’ and four shops to be constructed on the land with respect to which wakf is made at his own cost”. Further on he forbids him to erect any other kind of building. He directs that the rent recovered from the shops shall be used to provide fodder, etc., for the cows. He goes on to add that:

    “Shyam Lal shall at no time have the power and title to make any sale, mortgage or gift, etc., or to transfer the property in any other way. Shyam Lal aforesaid shall always make great efforts for improvement and betterment of ‘gaushala’ and he shall maintain it intact. He shall not do anything contrary to the terms of this wakf, nor shall, he have any power to bring the property made a wakf of to his own use.”

    10. It was on these terms that Shyam Lal agreed, to take the property. He was debarred from alienating it in any manner. He was directed, to keep it intact and to make constant endeavours for its betterment. These terms gave a clear indication that Debi Din and Shyam Lal had both agreed to bring the gaushala into existence and to maintain it. Debi Din made his contribution in the shape of the site. Shyam Lal agreed to provide funds for the construction of a ‘gaushala’ and further agreed to maintain it and to act as its trustee. In the circumstances, we have no doubt in our minds that the constructions were made by Shyam Lal in pursuance of the agreement arrived at between him and Debi Din. We have no doubt that his intention was to make the constructions a part and parcel of the trust property. In the circumstances, the constructions did partake of the nature of trust property. At the time of making the constructions it was not Shyam Lal's intention to treat the said constructions as his personal property. His subsequent conduct in raising money on the security thereof was an act in breach of the trust and it could not retrospectively operate to alter the nature of the constructions from one of the trust property to that of personal property.

    11. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trust deed was executed by Debi Din alone and not by Shyam Lal. It was contended that without a document in writing Shyam Lal could not create a trust of the buildings made by him. Section 5 of the Trusts Act (2 of 1882) lays down the method for creating a trust of immoveable property, but it is provided by Section 1 of the said Act that the Act does not apply to public or private religious or charitable endowments. Therefore, the rule laid down in S. 5 regarding the execution of a registered document in writing does not govern a case like the present. There can be no doubt that the trust for maintaining a ‘gaushala’ is a trust for a charitable purpose. According to strict Hindu notions, it is a religious trust also because maintenance and breeding of cows is an act of religious merit according to Hindu belief. The creation of a trust whether for charitable or religious purpose is governed by rules of Hindu law and not by the provisions of the Trusts Act. The Hindu law does not require a registered deed. The essentials of a valid trust of a charitable or religious nature under Hindu law are that—

    (1) the object or the purpose of the trust must be a valid religious or charitable purpose according to the rules of Hindu law;

    (2) the founder should be capable under Hindu Law of creating a trust in respect of the particular property which is the subject matter of trust;

    (3) the founder should indicate with sufficient precision the purpose of the trust and the property in respect of which it is made and the trust must comply with the requirements of law, as regards the form in which it is to be made; and

    (4) the trust must not be opposed to the provisions of law for the time being in force an infringement of which makes it void or voidable in law (Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, 1952 Ed. p. 52).

    12. If the above requirements exist, a valid trust comes into existence and no document in writing need be executed. It is not necessary that somebody should accept the transfer. Nor is it necessary that the religious or charitable purpose should be in existence from before.

    13. Reference may, in this connection, be made to the case of — ‘Chaturbhuj v. Chatarjit’, 33 All 253 (A). In that case a gift of certain Zamindari property was made to an idol which was not in existence at the time of the gift. Possession was handed over to a certain person as pujari. It was held that the deed of gift was valid and was not vitiated by the fact that the idol had not come into existence till then. This case was based on an earlier Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court (which was a case of a will) viz., — ‘Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal’, 37 Cal 128 (B).

    14. The Privy Council case of — ‘Gangi Reddi v. Tammi Reddi’, AIR 1927 P.C 80 (C) may also usefully be referred to. Their Lordships remarked on page 82 as follows:

    “A dedication of a portion of the family property for the purpose of a religious charity (and the charity which Gangi Reddi purported to endow is of this nature) may, according to Hindu law, be validly made without any instrument in writing, even if it be an appropriation of some landed property.”

    15. Their Lordships were discussing as to what proportion of the joint family property a Karta could dedicate. This question, however, is not before us. We are concerned with only that portion of their Lordships' remark which lays down that a written instrument is not necessary for the creation of a Hindu charitable or religious trust. We are therefore, of the opinion that a valid trust did come into existence notwithstanding the absence of any registered instrument in writing by Shyam Lal.

    16. That the intention of the founder was actually carried into effect is proved beyond a shadow of doubt. (Evidence gone through). It is thus clear that the trust which was the outcome of the joint efforts of Debi Din and Shyam Lal did come into existence and it did function for a long number of years. The constructions in question were, therefore, trust property and could not be sold in execution of a personal decree against Shyam Lal.

    17. After the purchase the appellant or Ram Asrey constructed 13 ‘Kothris’. It is suggested that Shyam Lal saw the constructions but did not object and, therefore, the appellant could invoke the doctrine of acquiescence in this case. It may be pointed out that the respondent was made a trustee in 1935, i.e, two years after the purchase. There is no evidence on the record to prove that the constructions were made after 1935 and it cannot, therefore, be seriously contended that the doctrine of acquiescence will operate against the respondent. The essentials of doctrine of acquiescence were laid down in the case of — ‘Willmott v. Barber’, (1880) 15 Ch D 96 (D), and they require ‘inter alia’ that the person, who wants to plead that doctrine, must have been under a mistaken belief about his rights and the person against whom the doctrine is sought to be invoked should be aware of this mistaken belief. In the present pase, it cannot seriously be contended that the auction purchaser was under a mistaken belief about the nature of the property. Had he taken the trouble to examine the title he would have come to know that Debi Din had created a trust. Moreover, even if it be assumed that there was such a mistaken belief on the part of the auction purchaser, there is no evidence whatsoever to, prove that the respondent was aware of the existence of this mistaken belief in the auction purchaser's mind. Therefore the plea of acquiescence has no place in a case like the present.

    18. It is unnecessary to decide whether or not this doctrine could be invoked against Shyam Lal. The respondent is not claiming through Shyam Lal. On the contrary, he is seeking redress against the unlawful acts of Shyam Lal. Even assuming that the plea could be successfully raised against Shyam Lal it would not ipso facto, operate against the respondent.

    19. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the principle of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, should be applied to this case. This section runs as follows:

    “When the transferee of immoveable property makes any improvement on the property, believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto, and he is subsequently evicted therefrom by any person having a better title, the transferee has a right to require the person causing the eviction either to have the value of the improvement estimated and paid or secured to the transferee, or to sell his interest in the property to the transferee at the then market-value thereof, irrespective of the value of such improvement.

    The amount to be paid to or secured in respect of such improvement shall be the estimated value thereof at the time of the eviction. When under the circumstances aforesaid, the transferee has planted or sown on the property crops which are growing when he is evicted therefrom, he is entitled to such crops and to free ingress and egress to gather and carry them.”

    20. It is conceded that this section does not in terms apply because Section 2 of the Act clearly lays down that the provisions of the Act do not apply to a transfer in execution of a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction. But it is contended that although the section may not in terms apply the principle thereof will apply. With this contention we do not agree. A transfer by act of parties stands on a totally different footing from an execution sale. In a private transfer the transferor expressly or impliedly assures the transferee that he has a valid title to the property. An equity, therefore, arises against him and he is by the application of rule of estoppel precluded from denying his title afterwards. No such considerations arise in the case of an auction sale. It may be repeated at this stage that we are considering the appellant's title as an auction purchaser in a simple money decree. There was no contract between the auction purchaser and the judgment-debtor. The purchase was made neither at the request nor with the consent of the judgment-debtor, but very likely contrary to his wishes. There was no warranty of title by judgment-debtor. The maxim applicable to auction sales is ‘caveat smptor’. The purchaser makes the purchase at his own risk. In the circumstances, it is not possible to apply the principle of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, to auction purchases. In the Full Bench case, — ‘Nannu Mai v. Ram Chander’, AIR 1931 All 277 (E) the auction purchaser was held not entitled to the benefit of S. 51. In that case benefit of S. 70 was given to him because he was a purchaser in execution of a mortgage decree. As already stated more than once, the appellant is not enforcing the rights under the mortgage. He has to take his stand on the auction purchase only. In the circumstances, we hold that the appellant is entitled to no compensation for the buildings erected by him, nor can he compel the respondent to purchase the said buildings. He has been permitted by the learned Civil Judge to remove his materials and that he certainly can do.

    21. Last of all comes the question about the respondent's competence to maintain this suit. In this connection reference is to be made again to the deed of endowment executed by Bebi Din. The relevant passage in this deed rung as follows:

    “Secondly, if God forbid, Shyam Lal aforesaid dies at any time his senior and competent disciple shall become the manager and mutwalli of the property made a wakf of, provided that he follows the ‘Panth’ (Sect) of Shyam Lal, resides in Kanpur proper and is considered by four respectable Hindus to be fit and capable for that purpose.”

    22. It is conceded that the respondent is the only disciple of Shyam Lal, that he belongs to his sect and he resides in Kanpur proper, but it is pointed out that he has not been elected by respectable Hindus to the office of the trustee. The respondent has produced a document executed by Shyam Lal in which he declares that the respondent is his only disciple and in which he appoints him as his successor both to the office of Mutwalli of his trust and as priest of Mahabirji's temple. It is true that the deed of endowment executed by Debi Din conferred no power on Shyam Lal to appoint his successor. The nomination by Shyam Lal does not fey itself help the respondent except that it proves that Shyam Lal, as one of the Hindus, approved of his appointment. But it may be pointed out that ever since the death of Shyam Lal, which took place 8 or 9 years before the hearing of the suit, the respondent has been acting as the priest of the temple of Mahabirji and has been making customary collections from the grain market, where the owner of every cart load of grain has to contribute a cup full of the grain towards the temple. It is in this temple that the cows are being kept after the auction sale held in 1933. He is thus running this ‘gaushala’ and managing the affairs of the temple with the tacit approval of the Hindu public in general who have been making contributions towards the temple and placing the same in his hands. The Hindu public in general has impliedly approved of his appointment. In the circumstances, the requirements of the deed, which lays down the conditions of his appointment, have been complied with.

    23. Even if it be assumed that he is not a ‘de jure’ trustee, he is certainly a ‘de facto’ trustee who has been carrying on the work as such. A ‘de facto’ trustee can maintain suit. This was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in — ‘Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti’, AIR 1935 P.C 44 (F). Reference may also be made to the cases of — ‘Gopal Dutta v. Babu Ram’, AIR 1936 All 653 (G); — ‘Subramania Gurukkal v. Srinivasa Rao Sahib’, AIR 1940 Mad 617 (H) and — ‘Sheo Ramji v. Sri Ridhnath Mahadeoji’, AIR 1923 All 160 (I). In all these cases persons who were not 4 ‘de jure’ trustees were permitted to institute suits not for their own benefit but for the benefit of the trust. On the same principle the respondent who had been performing the duties of a trustee for about 8 or 9 years prior to the institution of the suit could validly institute this suit for the benefit of the trust. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Civil Judge was correct. We find no force in this appeal. It is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay orders are vacated.

    B/R.G.D

    24. Appeal dismissed.

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    Lalta Prasad v. Brahmanand And Others
    (Nov 14, 1952)