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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • B.K. Dhao
Judges
  • Hon'ble Mr. Mirza Nasir Ullah Beg
Acts
  • Section 230 of the Tenancy Act, 1926,
  • Section 63 of the U.P Tenancy Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • B.K. Dhao
Judges
  • Hon'ble Mr. Mirza Nasir Ullah Beg
Acts
  • Section 230 of the Tenancy Act, 1926,
  • Section 63 of the U.P Tenancy Act.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Beg, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (together with his two brothers) alleged absolute ownership and full possession of certain plots. Defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were said to be threatening forcible dispossession and were alleged to be claiming title through Defendant No. 8, who purported to be mutwalli under a certain waqf. The plaintiff further asserted that he had obtained a prior decree declaring that the said waqf was not valid. On those allegations the plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against all defendants.

Defendants Nos. 1 to 7, in their written statement, pleaded that they were tenants of the disputed plots through Defendant No. 8 (who was described as lambardar and owner) and claimed to have obtained a decree from the Revenue Court. They also contested the civil Court's jurisdiction. The Munsif, Barabanki framed a preliminary issue on jurisdiction and decided it in favour of the defendants, returning the plaint for presentation to the proper (revenue) Court. The plaintiff appealed; the District Judge reversed the trial Court's order, held the suit to be within civil jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the Munsif for trial. The defendants filed the present appeal against that order of remand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is cognizable by the Civil Court or by the Revenue Court (i.e., the question of jurisdiction).
  2. Whether, at a preliminary stage, the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined by accepting the allegations in the plaint as correct.
  3. Whether the fact that a prayer for injunction has been made (and is the principal relief) takes the case out of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court where the subject-matter might otherwise fall within revenue jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendants') Arguments

  • The sole point argued: the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court and therefore the trial Court's order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court was correct.
  • The defendants relied on provisions and authorities under the U.P. Tenancy Act (including an express reference to Section 63 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and a later reference to Section 230 of the Tenancy Act, 1926) to argue that the matter fell within revenue jurisdiction when tenancy rights were involved.
  • The appellants cited multiple cases to support the contention that the revenue Court had jurisdiction or that the inclusion of a prayer for injunction would not oust revenue jurisdiction where the essence of the suit was within revenue jurisdiction.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position — as accepted and articulated by the Court

  • At the preliminary stage the Court must accept the allegations of the plaint as correct for the purpose of deciding jurisdiction.
  • The plaint alleges the plaintiff's ownership, possession, cultivation as a khudkasht holder and threats of forcible dispossession; it does not allege that defendants were claiming title as tenants or that any tenancy claim had substance.
  • Because the main and sole relief claimed is permanent injunction (not a declaration that the land constitutes Sir or khudkasht or a suit for possession falling squarely under revenue jurisdiction), the suit is appropriately within the cognizance of the Civil Court based on the plaint allegations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nageshar Ram v. Bansbahadur Singh, A.I.R. 1950 All. 532 Where a suit for possession is against a trespasser and the plaintiff knows the defendant claims to be a tenant, jurisdiction lies in the revenue Court (not the Civil Court). The Court held this case inapplicable: the present suit is not for possession and the plaint does not show the plaintiff was aware of any tenancy claim by defendants.
Mst. Ananti v. Chhannu (Full Bench) If a suit for possession and mesne profits substantially falls under Section 99 and is cognizable by a revenue Court, a mere addition of a perpetual injunction will not oust revenue jurisdiction; initial jurisdiction is determined by the plaint. The Court found it inapplicable because, in the present case, injunction is the sole and main relief (not a mere addition). The Full Bench's statement that jurisdiction is initially determined by the plaint supports the plaintiff.
Shyam Lal v. Hira Nath Under Section 230 of the Tenancy Act, if adequate relief could be granted by the revenue Court, then the essence of the suit being cognizable by the revenue Court means addition of an injunction does not remove revenue jurisdiction. The Court held it inapplicable here since the prayer for injunction is not a mere addition but the principal relief; thus the principle did not take the present case out of civil jurisdiction.
D.N. Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider, 1946 A.L.J. 369 (Full Bench) Jurisdiction depends upon the state of affairs before institution of the suit, not on post-institution defences; a plaintiff cannot confer jurisdiction by false allegations; civil and revenue jurisdiction depend on the plaint's allegations if established true. The Court considered it inapplicable because in that Full Bench matter the question was decided after full trial and the plaintiff's allegations had been found false; here the plaintiff had not been given an opportunity to establish his allegations due to the preliminary issue.
Mst. Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh Where the plaintiff comes alleging the defendants obtained a rent decree in revenue Court and are asserting tenancy (and the plaintiff alleges such proceedings are fraudulent), the civil Court may be asked for declaratory relief; the facts may indicate the plaintiff was aware of a tenancy claim. The Court found the precedent inapplicable because, in that case, the plaintiff was fully aware defendants were setting up title as tenants and sought declaratory relief; contrastively, the present plaint seeks injunction and does not allege a substantive tenancy claim.
Rati Ram v. Shri Krishna (Single Judge, Allahabad High Court) Where a defendant's claim to tenancy rests on a third party's title and that third party has no legal title, the defendant's claim may be treated as insubstantial and the defendants may be treated as trespassers; civil Court can have jurisdiction in such circumstances. The Court found this case closely analogous and supportive of the plaintiff's position. It observed the present facts are even stronger because the plaint here does not even state defendants claim tenancy; rather it indicates they are trespassers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, constrained to the allegations of the plaint because the question of jurisdiction was raised as a preliminary issue:

  1. At the preliminary stage jurisdiction must be determined by the allegations in the plaint, which the Court is obliged to accept as correct for this limited purpose. The Court contrasted this stage with a full trial, where findings on the truth of allegations would determine jurisdiction.
  2. Reading the plaint's allegations as correct, the plaintiff claimed ownership, full possession, cultivation as a khudkasht holder and that defendants threatened forcible dispossession. The plaint further alleged defendants claimed title through a third party (Defendant No. 8) who himself had been judicially denied title (a decree declared the waqf invalid).
  3. Given those allegations, the Court concluded the proper remedy, based on the plaint, was a suit for permanent injunction; the plaint nowhere alleged that the defendants were asserting tenancy rights with substance.
  4. The Court examined the authorities relied upon by the defendants and distinguished them on their facts: many authorities applied where the suit was essentially for possession or mesne profits or where the plaintiff was aware of a tenancy claim. Several Full Bench decisions emphasize that jurisdiction turns on the plaint and on findings at trial; those decisions do not assist the appellant on these facts because here the plaintiff had not yet been allowed to prove the allegations and the relief sought is primarily injunctive.
  5. The Court gave particular weight to Rati Ram v. Shri Krishna, a single-judge decision aligning with the view that where a defendant's tenancy claim depends on a third party who has no title, the defendants may be treated as trespassers and a Civil Court can entertain the suit. The present facts were held to be at least as strong as those in that case.
  6. On that basis the Court concluded the District Judge (lower appellate Court) correctly reversed the trial Court's order and remanded the suit for trial in the Civil Court (Munsif), and the appeal by the defendants failed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The judgment of the lower appellate Court (the District Judge) reversing the trial Court and remanding the suit to the Munsif for trial was correct and is upheld.

Direct consequences and immediate implications:

  • The matter remains within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as held by the District Judge and the suit is to proceed before the Munsif for trial on its merits in accordance with the plaint's allegations.
  • No order as to costs was made because no one appeared for the respondents.
  • The stay application that had been fixed with the appeal was declared infructuous and dismissed.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or broad precedent beyond applying and distinguishing prior authorities on the jurisdictional issue; its effect is the vindication of the lower appellate Court's remand and the confirmation that under the facts pleaded the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.

Show full summary ...

    Ishwar Din v. Ch. Mohd. Ishaq

    Beg, J.:— This is a defendants' appeal against an order of remand by the lower appellate Court in a suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff. The suit was brought by the plaintiff on the allegation that he, along with his two brothers, was the absolute owner of the plots in dispute. According to the allegations in the plaint the plaintiff was in full possession of the said plots but defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were threatening to take forcible possession of the same. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were claiming their title through defendant No. 8, who was putting himself up as mutwalli under a certain was and against whom the plaintiff had got a decree deciding the question in favour of the plaintiff and declaring that the said waqf was not valid. The plaint accordingly claimed a relief of permanent injunction against all the defendants.

    2. The written statement of the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 alleged that the defendants were tenants of the plots in dispute through defendant No. 8 who was the lambardar and owner of the land in question and against whom the defendants had also obtained a decree from the Revenue Court. The defendant's also took the plea that the suit was not within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The suit was filed in the Court of the Munsif, Barabanki, who framed a preliminary issue on the question of jurisdiction. The trial Court decided the issue in favour of the defendants and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The plaintiff filed an appeal against the said order. The learned District Judge reversed the order of the trial Court, held the suit to be within the jurisdiction of the civil Court and remanded it for trial by the Munsif. Dissatisfied with the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge, the defendants have filed this appeal against it.

    3. The sole point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit was not cognizable by the civil Court and the order of the trial Court returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court was a correct one. It may be mentioned at the very outset that this question is being agitated as a preliminary issue. In determining the question of jurisdiction at the initial stage the Court is confined to the allegations in the plaint and has to accept them as correct. The position would be different after the suit has gone through all the stages of trial and the Court has given a finding as to whether those allegations are correct or otherwise. At the preliminary stage the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined by the allegations contained in the plaint itself. At the conclusion of the trial the jurisdiction of the Court would be determined by the findings arrived at by the trial Court. If the allegations in the plaint taken to be correct, then it is evident that the plaint as it stands could not have been filed in the revenue Court. The plaintiff has clearly asserted that he was in possession of the plots in dispute, that he was the owner of the same, that he was cultivating them as Khudkasht holder, that the defendants were setting up title through a person who was not a trespasser and that the defendants had threatened to take forcible possession of the land. On these allegations the only course open to the plaintiff was to file a suit for permanent injunction which he has done in the present case. The plaint nowhere alleges that the defendants were claiming title as tenants or that there was any substance behind any claim of tenancy. The learned Counsel for the defendants has invited my attention to Section 63 of the U.P Tenancy Act. The said section would apply only if the suit is for a declaration that the property in dispute constitutes the Sir or khudkasht land of the plaintiff. The present suit is not one for a declaration at all. It is a suit for injunction. He has cited a large number of cases in support of his argument, none of which seems to me to be applicable to the facts of the present case.

    4. In Nageshar Ram v. Bansbahadur Singh A.I.R 1950 All. 532. it was laid down that where in a suit for post session of plots against a trespasser, the plaintiff knows that the defendant is claiming to be in possession not as a proprietor but as a tenant, the suit lies in a revenue Court and not in a Civil Court. The present suit is not for possession of plots and there is no averment in the plaint showing that the plaintiff was aware of the defendants' claim as tenants.

    5. The next case relied on by the learned counsel is Mst. Ananti v. Chhannu,2. It is a Full Bench case which lays down that if a suit for possession and mesne profits substantially falls under Section 99 and is cognizable by a revenue Court, the mere fact that a relief for perpetual injunction has been added will not take the case out of the jurisdiction of the revenue Court. In the present case the relief for injunction is not a mere addition to other reliefs claimed but is the sole and the main relief claimed and accordingly the law laid down in this case will be inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The Bull Bench also held that the jurisdiction of the Court is to be initially determined by the allegations made in the plaint and the allegations made in the written statement cannot oust the jurisdiction unless and until the allegations have been gone into, tried judicially and found to be true and the plaintiff's allegations found to be false. This part of the judgment is in support of the plaintiff's case that his plaint cannot the thrown out initially on the ground that the allegations contained are untrue.

    6. The next case to which my attention has been invited by the learned counsel is Shyam Lal v. Hira Nath.3 It laid down that under Section 230 of the Tenancy Act, 1926, if adequate relief could be granted by the revenue Court, it would be immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court is not identical with that which the revenue Court could have granted. Thus if a suit be in its essence cognizable by a revenue Court, the addition or a prayer for injunction will not take the case out of the cognizance of that Court. In the present case, as I have said above, the prayer for injunction is not a mere addition but is the main relief asked for in the case and is the proper relief that should be asked for, if the allegations contained in the plaint are accepted to be correct.

    7. The next case referred to by the learned counsel is another Full Bench case in D.N Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider 1946 A.L.J 369 which lays down that jurisdiction of a Court does not depend upon the defence which is set up after the suit is instituted but upon the state of affairs which existed before the institution of the suit. A plaintiff, however, cannot give either the Civil Court or the revenue Court jurisdiction by making false allegations in his plaint. The jurisdiction of civil and revenue Courts cannot be concurrent but depends on the allegations made in the plaint provided that those allegations are established to be true. In the present case the plaintiff has never been allowed an opportunity of establishing his allegations to be true, as the issue has been raised as a preliminary issue. In the Full Bench case referred to the question was argued after the evidence had been gone into and the plaintiff's allegations had been found to be false. Under these circumstances this case has no bearing on the question at issue in this case.

    8. The last case cited in support of the appellant's argument is Mst. Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh.5 In this case the plaintiff came to Court with the allegation that the defendants had obtained a rent decree in revenue Court. It was also alleged that there were ejectment proceedings in the revenue Court. The plaintiff came to the civil Court with the allegations that all proceedings which were taken in the revenue Court were fraudulent and were resorted to for the purposes of establishing the title of the defendants as tenants and for damaging her own rights. It is evident that in this case the plaintiff came to Court with the allegations that the defendants were setting up title as tenants. The plaint alleged that the defendants had obtained a decree from the revenue Court on the basis of that title. The plaintiff was, therefore, fully aware of the title set up by the defendants. Moreover, the only relief claimed by the plaintiff was one of the declaration. In the present case the only relief claimed by the plaintiff is one of injunction. The facts of this case, therefore, have no application to the present case.

    9. The only case, the facts of which are closely analogous to the facts of the present case, is reported in Rati Ram v. Shri Krishna.6 The view taken therein clearly supports the case of the plaintiff. This is a single Judge decision of the Allahabad High Court, which lays down that where a defendant's claim to a tenancy is based on the title of a third party and that third-party either by a decree of a competent Court already existing or by common consent has himself not a shadow of title, the defendant cannot be credited with any appreciable position as chat of a tenant legally so-called. In a suit for possession over certain agricultural plots, the plaint Stated that the defendants were claiming a cultivatory right through a person who himself had no title in the plots inasmuch as the deed of trust on which that person was relying had itself no legal foundation. The plaint did say that the defendants were claiming to be tenants of the plots in suit, but added that in the circumstances the defendants' claim had only an airy foundation. It was held that the plaintiff definitely treated the defendants no better than mere trespassers and the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants were claiming as tenants, in the circumstances of the case, did not amount to an averment which would oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The facts of the present case are stronger in so far as the plaintiff has not even stated that the defendants are claiming to be tenants. On the other hand, the allegations in the plaint clearly indicate that the defendants are no more than rank trespassers.

    10. In view of the law discussed by me above I have come to the conclusion that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is correct and cannot be disturbed in appeal. This appeal is hereby dismissed. As no one appears on behalf of the respondents, I pass no order as to costs. The stay application, fixed along with this appeal, has become infructuous and is dismissed.

    11. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ishwar Din v. Ch. Mohd. Ishaq
    (Jan 17, 1952)