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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • India Companies Act (VII of 1913) by the amending Act (LII of 1951).
  • section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-section (3) of section 153(c)
  • SECTION 91 EVIDENCE ACT
  • sections 153(c) and 153(d)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • India Companies Act (VII of 1913) by the amending Act (LII of 1951).
  • section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-section (3) of section 153(c)
  • SECTION 91 EVIDENCE ACT
  • sections 153(c) and 153(d)
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Brij Mohan Lal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under sections 153(c) and 153(d) recently inserted in the India Companies Act (VII of 1913) by the amending Act (LII of 1951). The petitioners are two shareholders in the Amrit Banaspati Company, Limited, Ghaziabad (hereafter "the company"). They alleged various acts of mismanagement against the company, its Directors and Managing Agents, and sought relief under the newly inserted provisions. A preliminary objection was taken by the opposite parties that the petition did not comply with the statutory requirements of sub-section (3) of section 153(c). The court considered the preliminary objection and dismissed the petition on that ground.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners complied with the requirement of sub-section (3) of section 153(c) of the India Companies Act regarding obtaining "consent in writing" of the requisite number of members before making the application.
  2. Whether the sheets bearing the signatures of 117 shareholders (filed with the petition) constitute valid "consent in writing" within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section 153(c).
  3. Whether consents given by shareholders after the presentation of the petition (the subsequent sets of 30 and 22 shareholders) satisfy the statutory requirement that consent must be obtained prior to presentation of the application.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended that they had obtained the written consent of more than one hundred shareholders, relying primarily on sheets filed with the petition bearing the signatures and addresses of 117 shareholders.
  • They later produced additional written consents: one set of 30 shareholders and, on the date of hearing, another set of 22 shareholders.
  • They supplemented the initial 117 signatures by filing an affidavit of Jagannath, who stated that he, Lala Banwari Lal and "other persons" went round obtaining consent from shareholders (the names of the "other persons" were not disclosed).

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 153(c) had not been complied with.
  • They asserted that the signatures on the sheets filed with the petition did not amount to the statutory "consent in writing" because the documents themselves did not show that the signatories had applied their minds or intended to consent to the application.
  • They also contended that consents produced after the petition was filed could not satisfy the requirement that consent be obtained prior to presentation of the application.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based on the material in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of "consent in writing": The court held that the expression "consent in writing" implies that the writing itself should indicate that the signatories understood the matter and gave their consent to the action proposed. A document bearing a signature must, by its content, demonstrate the consent; a bare signature on a document that gives no indication of purpose does not suffice.
  2. Application of documentary-evidence principle: By analogy to section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which requires the written consent of the Advocate-General for proceedings under that section), the court observed that producing a blank paper bearing a signature, supplemented only by an affidavit that the signature was given as consent, would not comply with the statutory requirement that the consent be in writing. At best, such evidence would permit a presumption but would not transform the signature into "consent in writing."
  3. Reference to section 91 of the Evidence Act: The court quoted section 91 of the Evidence Act, noting that where the law requires a matter to be reduced to writing, proof must be by the document itself (or admissible secondary evidence). Because sub-section (3) requires written consent, the document itself must demonstrate the consent; secondary evidence (affidavit or oral sworn statement) cannot be used to supply the missing content of the document.
  4. Application to the facts: The 117 signatures filed with the petition lacked any endorsement or notation indicating that the signatories were expressing consent to the petition; accordingly, supplemented by the affidavit of Jagannath, they did not amount to the "consent in writing" required by sub-section (3).
  5. Temporal requirement for consent: The court emphasized that obtaining the requisite consent is a condition precedent to presenting the application—consent must have been obtained prior to presentation. The two subsequent sets of shareholders (30 and 22) expressly indicated that they were approving an application that had already been filed; therefore their consents were given after presentation and are not valid under sub-section (3).
  6. Conclusion from analysis: Because the petitioners could not demonstrate valid written consent of the requisite number of members prior to presentation, the petition failed on that preliminary ground and was not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Petition dismissed.

Consequences and costs awarded:

  • Opposite parties 1 and 2 are awarded costs of Rs. 500 each.
  • Such of the remaining opposite parties as engaged separate counsel are awarded costs of Rs. 200 each.

No broader legal implications or new precedent-setting doctrine are discussed in the opinion; the decision turns on statutory interpretation of the documentary requirement of "consent in writing" and the requirement that such consent be obtained prior to presentation of the application.

    Makhan Lal Jain And Another (Petitioners) v. The Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. And Others (Opposite Parties).

    Brij Mohan Lal, J.:— This is an application under sections 153(c) and 153(d) recently inserted in the India Companies Act (VII of 1913) by the amending Act (LII of 1951). The petitioners are two shareholders in the Amrit Banaspati Company, Limited, Ghaziabad, hereafter described, for brevity's sake, as the company. They have made various allegations of mismanagement and foul play against the company, its Directors and Managing Agents. But it is unnecessary to go into those allegations at this stage because a preliminary objection has been taken by the learned counsel for the opposite parties and the petition fails, in my opinion, on that preliminary ground alone.

    It is contended, on behalf of the opposite parties that the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 153(c) have not been complied with. The relevant portion of this sub-section reads as follows:

    “(3) No application under sub-section (1) shall be made by any member, unless—

    (a) in the case of a company having a share capital, the member complaining—

    (i) has obtained the consent in writing of not less than one hundred in number of the members of the company or not less than one-tenth in number of the members, whichever is less, or

    (ii) holds not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company upon which all calls and other sums due have been paid; and

    It is conceded by the petitioners that they do not hold one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company and therefore they do not fall under clause (ii). They maintain that their case falls under the first part of clause (i) inasmuch as they allege to have obtained the consent in writing of more than hundred shareholders. They do not rely on the second part of clause (i).

    What the petitioners did was to attach with the petition several sheets of papers which bear the signatures (together with addresses) of as many as 117 share-holders. It is to be remembered that these persons are not signatories to the petition and they are not supposed to have joined the petition as petitioners. It is the petitioners' case that they have given their consent only.

    Sometime afterwards the petitioners produced the consent in writing of 30 other shareholders. On the date of hearing consent of 22 other shareholders was produced. In the cases of second and third sets of shareholders an endorsement was made at the top of each sheet to the effect that the shareholders were expressing their approval of the application filed by the petitioners in this Court. But no such endorsement is to be found in the case of 117 shareholders whose signatures were filed along with the petition. They do not write anything at the top of the sheet on which their signatures are to be found. Looking at the sheets themselves, one cannot ascertain why the signatures were affixed. The petitioners felt that there was this lacuna and to fill it up they filed an affidavit of one Jagannath who is himself a shareholder and who describes himself as the Mukhtar-i-Khas of Gobardhan Das Poddar, one of the petitioners. He has sworn in this affidavit that he in company with one Lala Banwari Lal and “other persons” (whose names have not been disclosed), went round to various shareholders and obtained their consent to move an application in this Court. The question that arises is whether, supplemented by this affidavit, the sheets containing the signatures of 117 shareholders, contain the “consent in writing” of the said shareholders.

    The expression “consent in writing” obviously implies that the writing itself should indicate that the persons who have affixed their signatures have applied their minds to the question before them and have given their consent to certain action being taken. If a petitioner obtains another shareholder's signature on a blank piece of paper and wishes to supplement it by an affidavit or an oral sworn statement of himself or his agent, the signature on the blank paper does not become content in writing. By way of analogy, reference may be made to section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires the consent in writing of the Advocate-General for a suit instituted under that section. If certain persons institute a suit under section 92 and produce a blank piece of paper bearing the Advocate-General's signature, supplemented by their own affidavit to the effect that the Advocate-General had affixed his signature in token of his consent, they cannot be said to have complied with the requirements of section 92. At the most, one may presume that consent was given. But the signature cannot amount to “consent in writing”, because the document on which the signature is to be found does not, by itself, indicate why the signature was affixed.

    In this connection, reference may also be made to section 91 of the Evidence Act. The relevant portion of that section may be quoted as follows:

    “…in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof…of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.”

    In the present case, the law requires that the consent should be in writing, i.e in the form of a document. Therefore, the document itself should prove that the consent has been given. No evidence, either by way of affidavit or of oral sworn statement in court, can be given to prove that such consent was given. I am consequently of the opinion that in obtaining the signatures of 117 shareholders on blank sheets the petitioners did not secure the consent in writing of the said shareholders.

    If the signatures of these 117 shareholders are to be excluded from consideration, the consent of the remaining two sets of shareholders, totalling 52 in all, will not be of help to the petitioners. Even if their consent be presumed to be valid, the number fall's short of hundred. But it, may be pointed out that their consent also does not comply with the requirements of the said sub-section (3). The contents of that sub-section have been quoted above, but a portion thereof will bear repetition. The material words are:

    “No application under sub-section (1) shall be made by any member unless… the member complaining has obtained the consent in writing.”

    The obtaining of the consent is a condition precedent to the making of the petition. In other words, consent, must have been obtained prior to the presentation of the application. The two sets of shareholders, who subsequently gave their consent, have clearly indicated in the document embodying their consent that the petition had already been filed and that they were expressing their approval thereof. Their subsequent consent is not a valid consent under sub-section (3).

    I am, therefore, of the opinion that the requirements of law re the obtaining of consent in writing have not been complied, with and consequently this petition is not maintainable. It should fail on the preliminary ground.

    The opposite parties are entitled to their costs. Opposite parties 1 and 2 shall receive a sum of Rs. 500 each as costs and such of the remaining opposite parties as have engaged separate counsel shall get a sum of Rs. 200 each as costs.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Makhan Lal Jain And ... v. The Amrit Banaspati ...
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