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  • sub-section (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916,
  • provisions of section 40(3) and (4) of the U.P Municipalities Act of 1916
  • (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916,
  • section 40(3) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act,
  • sub-section (3) of section 40, U.P Municipalities Act
  • section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of sub-section (4)
  • sub-section (4) of section 40
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916,
  • provisions of section 40(3) and (4) of the U.P Municipalities Act of 1916
  • (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916,
  • section 40(3) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act,
  • sub-section (3) of section 40, U.P Municipalities Act
  • section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of sub-section (4)
  • sub-section (4) of section 40
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three applications were heard together. The three applicants were members of the Municipal Board of Kasganj (district Etah). On or about 25 March 1949 each was served with a notice under sub-section (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, requiring an explanation of certain acts alleged to constitute a flagrant abuse of position as a board member. Each submitted an explanation. By an order dated 24 November 1949 the Governor concluded that their continuance as members was detrimental to the public interest and ordered their immediate removal.

The applicants made representations to the Government; those representations were rejected on 14 December 1950. On 24 February 1951 the applicants filed writ applications in this Court seeking, in substance, the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the 24 November 1949 removal order. The affidavits accompanying the applications varied in length; one contained many particulars, the others relied largely on that affidavit.

The statutory provision relied on by the State and considered by the Court was section 40(3) and (4) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916: subsection (3) empowers the Provincial Government to remove a member who in its opinion has flagrantly abused his position rendering continued membership detrimental to public interest; subsection (4) provides that when the Provincial Government proposes to take such action an opportunity of explanation must be given and reasons for action must be placed on record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Provincial Government had jurisdiction to remove the applicants in view of the statutory requirement that an opportunity of explanation be given before removal (i.e., whether there was compliance with section 40(4)).
  2. Whether the removal order was unreasonable, arbitrary or otherwise subject to quashing by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether this Court may, under Article 226, entertain writ applications challenging an administrative or quasi-judicial order made before the Constitution came into force (i.e., whether Article 226 has retrospective effect in the circumstances).
  4. Whether the applicants had an alternative adequate remedy (civil suit) such that this Court should decline to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The Provincial Government lacked jurisdiction because the applicants were not afforded an adequate "opportunity of explanation" as required by section 40(4) (challenge to procedural compliance).
  • The charges were so vague that the applicants did not know the nature of the allegations and therefore could not give a proper explanation.
  • The order was unreasonable and arbitrary and should be quashed by writ of certiorari.
  • They sought relief under Article 226 (certiorari) to quash the 24 November 1949 order.

State's Arguments

  • There was an available remedy by way of suit against the Government; where such an alternative remedy exists the Court will normally require its exhaustion and decline to issue certiorari.
  • The order challenged was an administrative order and, in any event, the provisions of subsection (4) were complied with.
  • The Court has no power under Article 226 to quash an order made prior to the date on which the Constitution came into force (i.e., Article 226 should not be given retrospective effect to impair pre-existing acts).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Asiatic Engineering Company v. Achhru Ram (Full Bench) Article 226 confers discretionary power; issue of writs is a judicial discretion to be exercised according to judicial principles. The Court relied on this to emphasize that writ relief is discretionary and that ordinarily applicants should first resort to ordinary remedies (e.g., suit).
The King v. Stafford Justices, ex parte Stafford Corporation (Court of Appeal) Certiorari is discretionary; even in clear excess of jurisdiction cases the court's discretion remains relevant. Used to support the proposition that certiorari is not obligatory and the Court must examine circumstances and petitioner conduct when deciding whether to exercise discretion.
Farquharson v. Morgan Distinction between patent and latent want of jurisdiction; writ more readily granted where want of jurisdiction is patent. Cited to show that where defects are latent and depend on evidence, the matter is more suitable for fuller inquiry (i.e., a suit) than summary writ relief.
King v. North, ex parte Oakey (Atkin, L.J.) Writs based on breach of fundamental principles of justice may be treated differently; general caution about discretion. Cited to explain contours of discretionary relief and exceptions where breach is of a fundamental principle of justice.
In re Ramjidas Nahaliram; T. Sundra Rao Naidu v. Commissioner, Corporation of Madras; Khurshed Mody v. Rent Controller, Bombay General rule that courts normally require recourse to ordinary remedies before issuing discretionary writs. Invoked to support the conclusion that the applicants should pursue civil suit since adequate alternative remedies existed.
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (9th Ed.) and Colonial authorities (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving) Principle that statutes are not to be given retrospective effect so as to impair existing rights unless clearly intended; procedural provisions may have retrospective effect but substantive rights are protected. Quoted to frame the Court's hesitation to rest decision on whether Article 226 applied retrospectively and to indicate the general caution about retrospective operation of statutes affecting rights.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi (Privy Council) Reiterates principle that procedural provisions may be retrospective, but provisions affecting existing rights should not be applied retrospectively absent clear intent. Quoted in support of the general interpretative approach to retrospective application (the Court said the retrospective question need not be decided here).
Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (Atkin, L.J.) Bodies with legal authority to determine questions affecting rights are subject to judicial control if they act in excess of legal authority. Used to support the proposition that governmental decisions affecting rights may be subject to writ jurisdiction where duty to act judicially exists.
Rex v. London County Council; Nakhuda Ali v. M.F. Des Jayaratne Acceptance of Atkin, L.J.'s formulation on judicial control over bodies determining rights. Referred to as confirmatory authorities for the same principle that quasi-judicial acts are amenable to judicial review.
Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly (Lord Hewart, C.J.) For a body to be subject to judicial control, it must not only have legal authority to determine rights but also have the duty to act judicially. Cited to clarify the test distinguishing administrative from quasi-judicial acts (the duty to act judicially is decisive).
Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas (Das, J.) Definition of 'judicial act' as one done upon consideration of facts and circumstances affecting rights (not limited to courts). Quoted to reinforce the view that Government's decision-making process in removal could be judicial in character.
U.P. Government, Lucknow v. Radhey Lal Phrase "in its opinion" in section 40(3) makes Provincial Government the sole judge of whether abuse occurred; civil court will not interfere if Government acted bona fide and within limits. Applied to explain the scope of civil remedy and to show that civil courts retain jurisdiction where Government action is capricious, arbitrary or mala fide.
Indian Sugar Mills Association v. The Secretary to Government, U.P. (Full Bench) Article 226 was not intended to provide an alternative to ordinary remedies; writ powers should be sparingly used and only where no adequate remedy exists or rights are seriously infringed. Relied on to justify refusal to issue writ because applicants had an alternative remedy and delayed unreasonably in seeking relief.
Dharnidhar Sharma v. Thakur Prasad Delay caused by statutory prerequisites for suits against Government (e.g., section 80 notice) is not by itself a sufficient reason to invoke Article 226. Cited to reject the applicants' contention that formal requirements for suing Government made civil remedy inadequate because of delay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Two separate judgments (Mootham, J. and Sapru, J.) were delivered and each approached the issues with similar foundational points: Article 226 is discretionary; compliance with the statutory requirement of an opportunity to explain is a condition precedent; and the availability of an alternative remedy (civil suit) weighs heavily against issuance of writs.

Mootham, J. — Key analytical steps

  • Emphasised that Article 226 is discretionary (citing Asiatic Engineering Co.) and that the Court should require applicants to resort to ordinary remedies in appropriate cases.
  • Observed that each applicant had been asked for an explanation and that each submitted one; none asserted at that time that they did not understand the charges.
  • Recognised that the charges lacked the desirable precision but treated that defect as latent (dependent on evidence) rather than patent; therefore more suitable for determination in a suit where fuller evidence could be led.
  • Noted that applicants delayed thirteen months before filing writs and that a by-election had already occurred (or would have practical consequences), but stated that the relevant balance of convenience is measured from the time applicants first had the choice of remedies.
  • Concluded that on these facts the applicants failed to make out a case for certiorari; the appropriate remedy was a suit; accordingly refused to issue the writ and dismissed the application (with no order as to costs because principles on writs were not yet well understood).

Sapru, J. — Key analytical steps

  • Summarised the factual matrix (applicants removed under s.40(3), representations rejected, suit filed later) and identified the main contention as non-compliance with the opportunity-to-explain requirement of s.40(3) and (4).
  • Considered, but ultimately found unnecessary to decide, whether Article 226 has retrospective effect to reach orders made before Constitution came into force.
  • Engaged in a detailed discussion distinguishing administrative acts from quasi-judicial acts, adopting definitions and authorities (Atkin, Das J., Lord Hewart) and concluded that the Government's decision to remove a member under s.40(3) involved a duty to act judicially and was therefore quasi-judicial in nature.
  • Reviewed the factual sequence: charges were framed (specific charges against the three applicants were recited), ten days were given to submit explanations, and no contemporaneous objection was taken that charges were unintelligible; Government recorded reasons and rejected subsequent representations.
  • Held that because an alternative remedy (civil suit) was available, the applicants' delay in approaching this Court and failure to raise objections at the earliest opportunity weighed strongly against invoking Article 226. Referred to precedent that Article 226 should be sparingly used and not provide an alternative route to ordinary remedies.
  • Concluded that the writs should be refused and that the applicants were free to pursue civil remedies; ordered dismissal and that parties bear their own costs (no costs awarded).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The applications for writs (in substance certiorari to quash the 24 November 1949 order of removal) were dismissed. The Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant the relief sought.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The removal order of 24 November 1949 was not quashed by this Court in these proceedings; the applicants were directed to pursue available alternative remedies, namely a civil suit, to challenge the order's validity on facts and law.
  • Procedural emphasis: The Court reinforced that Article 226 is discretionary and that where an adequate alternative remedy (such as a civil suit) exists, the writ jurisdiction will ordinarily not be exercised—particularly where the applicants delayed in seeking relief or failed to raise objections at the earliest opportunity.
  • On costs: The judges declined to make an order for costs in favor of either side; the parties were directed to bear their own costs (no costs awarded).
  • Precedential note: The Court did not purport to lay down any novel rule shifting established law; rather it applied and reiterated existing principles concerning the discretionary nature of writs, the administrative/quasi-judicial distinction, retrospective operation of constitutional remedies (which it did not decide), and the propriety of requiring recourse to ordinary remedies. The opinion therefore does not present itself as establishing a new precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts before the Court.

Application dismissed.

    Mohammad Bux v. Government Of The State Of Uttar Pradesh

    Mootham, J.:— These three applications can conveniently be dealt with in one order. The three applicants were members of the Municipal Board of Kasganj in the district of Etah. On or about the 25th March, 1949, each of them was served with a notice-requiring him, under sub-section (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, to furnish an explanation of certain acts specified in the notice which it was alleged constituted a flagrant abuse of his position as a member of the Board. Each of them submitted an explanation, but by an order, dated the 24th November, 1949, they were informed that the Governor had come to the conclusion that their continuance as members of the Municipal Board was detrimental to the public interest and that he had ordered their removal forthwith from membership of the Kasganj Municipal Board. The applicants made representations to the Government against the order, of removal, but their representations were rejected on the 14th December, 1950, and on the 24th February, 1951, they filed the present applications in which, in the lax way in which such applications are sometimes presented to this Court, the applicants ask for “a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or prohibition or mandamus or any order” that the order of removal may be set aside. Learned counsel has however stated that the relief which the applicants in fact seek is the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari and the quashing of the order of the 24th November, 1949. The application of Mohammad Baksh is accompanied by an affidavit of considerable length which contains a good deal of irrelevant matter. Each of the other two applications is accompanied by a very short affidavit in which the applicant states that he relies upon the facts set forth in the affidavit of Mohammad Baksh. This is an unsatisfactory practice as it is likely to result in one or more of the deponents deposing to matters not within his or their personal knowledge; the better course is for a joint affidavit to be filed.

    Sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 40 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, are in the following terms:

    “(3) The Provincial Government may remove from the board a member who in its opinion has so flagrantly abused in any manner his position as a member of the board as to render his continuance as a member detrimental to the public interest:

    (4) Provided that when either the Provincial Government or the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be, proposes to take action under the foregoing provisos of this section, an opportunity of explanation shall be given to the member concerned, and when such action, is taken, the reasons therefor shall be placed on record.”

    It is the applicants' case that the provincial Government had no jurisdiction to make the order of which they complain because they were not afforded an adequate “opportunity of explanation” which is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of removal; it is also their case that the order in question is an unreasonable and arbitrary order. They concede that they have a remedy by way of suit against the Government, and indeed, if the allegations be correct this is not in doubt and counsel for the State contends that in these circumstances the Court will not issue a writ in the nature of certiorari. He has further argued that the order which is now challenged is an administrative order, that the provisions of sub-section (4) were complied with, and that the Court has no power under Article 226 to quash an order made prior to the date upon which the Constitution came into force.

    In the recent case of The Asiatic Engineering Company Achhru Ram(1) it was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court that

    “there can be no doubt that Article 226 of the Constitution makes the issue of directions, orders or writs discretionary and it cannot be argued that any party has a right to any form of order as a matter of course. The discretion is a judicial discretion to be exercised according to judicial principles.”

    That view appears to be substantially the same as that now taken in England where, in The King v. Stafford Justices, ex parte Stafford Corporation(2), the Court of Appeal held that the issue of a writ of certiorari, save where it goes as of course, is discretionary, even in those cases in which there being a clear excess of jurisdiction an aggrieved person is said to be entitled to the writ ex debito justitiae, that is those cases in which, as was said in Farquharson v. Morgan(3), the want of jurisdiction was patent and not latent and dependent on the evidence, or, in the words of Atkin, L.J, in King v. North ex parte Oakey(4), is based upon the breach of a fundamental principle of justice. In every case the court is entitled to enquire into the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the petitioner—that is why the relief is a discretionary one—but as the Master of the Rolls pointed out in the first mentioned case, “in all discretionary remedies it is well known and settled that in certain circumstances…. the Court, although nominally it has a discretion, if it is to act according to the ordinary principles upon which judicial discretion is exercised, must exercise that discretion in a particular way.” Subject to that consideration I am of the opinion that in exercising its discretion the Court must have regard to the general rule that the Court will normally require the applicant to have recourse to his ordinary remedies: In re Ramjidas Nahaliram, T. Sundra Rao Naidu v. Commissioner, Corporation of Madras, Khurshed Mody v. Rent Controller, Bombay.

    The applicants contend that they were given no adequate opportunity of explanation because the charges they were called upon to answer were so vague that they did not know the nature of the: allegations made against them. They were however asked for an explanation; each of them submitted an explanation and in none of those explanations was it contended or even suggested that the charges were not understood. I am anxious not to express an opinion as to whether the charges were stated in terms sufficiently clear to enable the applicants to comprehend fully the case they had to meet; that they were not stated with that precision which is desirable is clear, but the applicants were municipal counsellors and it may be the case (I do not of course say that it is) that as the charges related to alleged malpractices by the applicants as counsellors the loose wording of the charges was not in fact a handicap to them in preparing their explanations. In other words the alleged defect is latent and depends on evidence; and the question whether there has been a contravention of sub-section (4) of section 40 is one which can, in my judgment, be more satisfactorily and more appropriately determined in a suit than on the scanty materials before us.

    The applicants have allowed thirteen months to elapse before filing these applications. They say that if they are compelled to resort to a suit the vacancies on the Municipal Board will be filled by a bye-election before the suit can be determined. I understand however that bye-election has already been held, and in my opinion it is not the balance of convenience at the present time which has to be considered, but the balance of convenience in cases which the matter is material at the time the applicants first had the choice of pursuing alternative remedies. If as a result of a suit filed by the applicants the order for their removal is declared null and void they will be deemed to have continued in office as municipal counsellors, 2nd there will in consequence have been no vacancies to be filled by a bye-election.

    Taking all the circumstances into consideraiton I am of opinion that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for the issue of a writ of certiorari, that the appropriate remedy for them is by way of suit, and that this Court should, therefore, refuse to issue a writ. The application must accordingly be dismissed, but as the principles on which writs of certiorari are issued are not as yet well understood we make no order as to costs.

    Sapru, J.:— These are three separate applications by three different applicants who were Municipal Commissioners and who seek to have the order of their removal from the office of the Municipal Commissioner by the Government of Uttar Pradesh set aside by this Court. The applicants have come under Article 226 of the Constitution and their prayer is that a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or prohibition or mandamus or all or any of them may be issued or such other order or directions may be passed by this Court as it may deem fit so that the order of their removal from the office of the Municipal Commissioner by the Government of Uttar Pradesh may be set aside. There is a prayer that for the purpose of doing justice in this case this Court may be pleased to send for the record relating to the removal of the applicants.

    It will be convenient to deal with the three cases in one judgment. The applicants are Shri Mohammad Bux, Shri Gauri Shanker and Shri Babu Lal Chole. They were elected members of the Municipal Board of Hathras but were removed by an order, dated the 24th of November, 1949 under section 40(3) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, kasganj, on the ground that they had so flagrantly abused their position as members of the Board as to render their continuance as members detrimental to the public interest. Each of the applicants appears to have presented two applications to the Government for reconsideration but they were turned down on the 14th of December, 1950. The applicants have left unspecified in their application the particular writ or order they seek from this Court but in the course of argument it was made clear to us that what they were asking us to do was, in effect, to invoke us to exercise our powers of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. The main ground on which they seek the intervention of this Court under Article 226 is that the provisions of section 40(3) and (4) of the U.P Municipalities Act of 1916 have not been complied with inasmuch as no opportunity such as is contemplated by that section was given to them for offering any explanation before their removal.

    It will be seen that the order which is sought to be impugned was passed before the coming into force of the Constitution on 26th January, 1950. The question, in these circumstances, naturally arises whether Article 226 of the Constitution is retrospective in its effect and, if so, in what sense. This is a difficult, question on which we allowed full argument to be addressed to us but, after giving my careful consideration to all the aspects of the case, I have come to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to base our decision on our view in regard to it as, in the view, we are taking, the question does not arise. I may, however, point out that the position in English law is, as pointed out by Maxwell in his “Interpretation of Statutes”, 9th Edition, page 221, that “no statute shall be constructed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. “No rule of construction”, observes Sir Maxwell, “is more firmly established than this: that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only….

    A statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary,”

    I may be further permitted to quote the following observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company, Limited v. The Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi.

    “The principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving where in is, in effect, laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.”

    Mr. Beg's argument is that notwithstanding the fact that the order was passed before the Constitution had come into force and become final, the order of Government has not ceased to be operative for the reason that one effect of it is that under section 41(B) the applicants who have been removed under sub-section 3 of section 40 of the Act are not eligible for further election or nomination for a period of three years from the date of the removal. He has further contended that the effect of giving retrospective operation to Article 226 will be neither to impair any existing right or obligation nor to touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute. I consider it unnecessary to notice this and other arguments as, in the view that we are taking, the questions raised do not arise. Suffice it to say that without, expressing any final opinion on the points raised I do not feel impressed with the line of argument referred to above.

    I may also briefly indicate that I am not prepared to accept the argument of the learned Standing Counsel that the order of removal, which is being sought to be impugned in this case, is an administrative order which it could not have been competent for us to consider even had there been no question of its having been passed before the Constitution came into force. The distinction between what may be called an administrative and quasi-judicial acts by an administrative authority is a subtle one and has been the subject-matter of much case law. It would be correct to say that in a sense there is no administrative or executive Act which has no judicial element in it. Even in arriving at an administrative decision the executive Government has to weigh the pros and cons of the issues involved and it is by this process that it arrives at some conclusion. Now there is no doubt that both judicial and quasi-judicial functions pre-suppose the existence of a dispute between the parties and that it is this feature which distinguishes them from an administrative function. The distinction between an administrative and judicial or guasi-judicial Act, therefore, turns upon the question whether the duty of the authority was to act judicially or not. On this point I may be permitted to quote the observations of Das, J. The Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas. They run as follows:

    “In this connection the term judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for purposes of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting rights, and if there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, make estimates to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequences would be judicial acts.”

    I would also refer to the observations of Atkin, L.J, as he then was, in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners. They run as follows:

    “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine question affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.”

    The above observations of Lord Atkin have become classical and were accepted as correctly laying down the law in Rex v. London County Council and by many other learned Judges in subsequent cases including the Supreme Court and the latest decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Nakhuda Ali v. M.F Des Jayaratne. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that the real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is as observed by Atkin, L.J's definition, namely, the duty to act judicially. The law has been well put by Lord Hewart, C.J, in Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly that—

    “In order that a body may satisfy the required test it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects; there must be super added to that characteristic the further characteristic that the body has the duty to act judicially.”

    Now it strikes me that in this particular case there can be no doubt that though the decision of the Government as to whether a member has or has not acted in such a manner as to render him unfit to be a member of the Board is subjective, the process by which it arrives at the decision involves a judicial act for, in arriving at it, Government must not take into consideration any factor which is not a judicial factor. In other words, it is, on an honest application of its mind to the pros and cons of the case, against the municipal commissioner concerned that it must arrive at its decision. It is obvious that in declaring a person unfit to be a municipal commissioner, Government is passing an order which would deprive him not only of an office to which he has been elected by the electorate but also automatically disqualify him under section 40(2) for a period of four years from seeking election to the office. This is a serious thing to do. Obviously, therefore, in exercising it the Government must be deemed to have acted judicially.

    I should like to remark that one of the requirements of an order under section 40(3) is that it should be recorded in writing. I do not understand it to lay down that it must be communicated to the applicants. I indicated to the learned Standing Counsel that I wanted to know whether any such order had or had not been recorded. I understand that reasons were put on the record. The requirement above referred to merely goes to strengthen the view that the act was a quasi-judicial, and not administrative one.

    It is obvious that it was only after an opportunity had been given to the member concerned to explain that action could be taken against him. Clearly by an opportunity to explain a reasonable opportunity is intended. Where, for example, the charges framed are so vague or indefinite as to make it impossible for the applicant to tender his explanation, it cannot be said that a reasonable opportunity has been given. The further requirement that reasons must be recorded makes it clear that though not necessarily communicated to the person concerned the act was considered to be of a quasi-judicial nature. One of the principal complaints against the members appears to be that they somehow misused their position as members in the matter of the allotment of electrical power. It would appear that by a Government Notification, dated the 25th July, 1947, the Chairman of the Municipal Board was allowed to allot electrical power to members of the public to the extent of a total of 30 kilowats. It was contended by the applicants that applications were made by a member or members to the Chairman for the allotment of electrical powers and that these applications were disposed of in strict order of priority. Among the applicants for electrical power there were three members of the Board, Shrj Babulal Chola, Chaudhary Mohammad Bux and Shri Ram Prakash. They were also allotted electrical powers on payment of the usual charges. There were some complaints against the allotment and thereafter the U.P Government decided to depute one Shri H.L Kashyap, Electrical Inspector, to go and enquire into the grievances. This officer reported that there was no ground for any complaint or grievance. On his report, the matter appears to have been dropped by the U.P Government in 1947. Thereafter, the matter was revived and charges were framed against the members concerned and they were required to answer them. The charges against each of the members were as follows:

    Shri Mohammad Bux—That he misappropriated for his own use 10 horse power out of the quota or 40 horse power of electric power which was granted to the Kasganj Municipal Board for public use.

    Shri Gauri Shankar—That in 1946 he purchased a nazul plot of land near the railway station in Kasganj for Rs. 265 only in the name of his cousin, Shri Piarelal. The plot, was worth more than Rs. 10,000 and it is clear that he made the purchase with the help of some of Board's staff and thus caused a heavy loss to the Board.

    That he again tried to purchase a piece of land near the female dispensary in the name of his friends and relatives thus abusing his position as a member. Had not the present Executive Officer intervened in the proposed sale, the Board would again have been put to loss.

    That he misappropriated some of the 40 horse power electric energy given to the Board for public use though outwardly it was done in the name of his father-in-law.

    Shri Babulal Chola:— That he along with Shri Girja Shanker tried to purchase a piece of land near the female dispensary in the name of his friends and relations at a low price thus abusing his position as a member.

    That he misappropriated to himself 10 horse power out of the 40 horse power quota of electric energy granted to the Board for public use.

    Ten days time from the date of the receipt of orders were given to each of the applicants to submit their explanations to Government through the Commissioner who was directed by the order to make his comments and recommendations thereon as early as possible.

    No objection was raised by the applicants or any of them to the effect that the charges framed against them were not intelligible and inquired elucidation and clarification. The applicants seem to have proceeded upon the assumption that what they were called upon to answer was what had already been explained by them in the enquiry previously held against them by Shri H.L Kashyap. Their answers were presumably not found satisfactory by the Government for I find that on the 24th of November, 1949 intimation was sent to them that the Governor had arrived at the conclusion that their continuance as members of the Municipal Board was detrimental to the public interest, and that they could not consequently be allowed to remain as members of the Board. Upon its receipt, the applicants made representations against the Government's order of removal, but Government did not consider that there was any case for reconsideration and rejected them on the 14th of December, 1950. On the 24th of February, 1951, that is to say, some two months and ten days after their representation had been rejected, the applicants filed the present application, the precise nature of which has not been indicated clearly in the affidavit.

    Now on these facts it is clear to me that the applicants had an alternative remedy, i.e they could go to a civil court and challenge the order passed against them on the ground that it was arbitrary, capricious, wanton and that the action in removing them was not bona fide. In the case of U.P Government, Lucknow v. Radhey Lal it was remarked by Bind Basni Prasad, J., that—

    “Where the statute provides that the sole judge of a certain fact will be a certain authority, no suit can lie to question the decision of such authority in respect of such matter.”

    It was further laid down that—

    “The phrase ‘in its opinion’ which occurs in sub-section (3) of section 40, U.P Municipalities Act has the effect of making the Provincial Government the sole judge of the fact whether a member has flagrantly abused his position so as to render his continuance in the Board detrimental to public interest. Where the Provincial Government has properly exercised the powers conferred upon it by the Act and the action taken by it in removing a member from a Board is bona fide and not capricious, wanton and arbitrary, the civil court will not allow it to be challenged.”

    As I read this case which arose out of a suit instituted for a declaration that the applicant had been illegally removed and that he was, therefore, not subject to the disability of non-eligibility for election in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 40 of the said Act, the position is that though the Governor in Council is the sole judge of the question whether the acts by the Commissioners concerned justified their removal or not, the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be ousted, if the applicant was able to show that the authority vested with the power to remove him had exercised its discretion in a capricious wanton and arbitrary manner and in an unreasonable way. I may be permitted to refer to the observations of Malik, J. (Now Malik, C.J) in the case mentioned above. I quote them below:—

    “It is not alleged by the plaintiff that the Provincial Government had not followed the procedure laid by the statute or had not acted strictly within the limits of its authority, nor is there any charge of malice or want of good faith. The Provincial Government having acted in accordance with “the procedure laid down and having in good faith considered that the plaintiff had so flagrantly abused his position as a member of the Board as to render its continuance as such detrimental to the public interest, the civil courts cannot substitute their own opinion for the opinion of the Provincial Government.”

    In other words, Malik, J., would have been prepared to interfere with the order of Government had the applicant either shown—

    (a) that the Provincial Government had failed to observe the procedure laid clown by the statute, or

    (b) had not acted within the limits of its authority, or

    (c) had acted with malice or want of good faith.

    Having regard to the law, as laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that, on the grounds alleged by the applicants, the alternative remedy of a civil suit was not available. This being so, the question naturally arises whether we should allow the applicants the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is Urged that the remedy of a civil suit is not an expeditious one, that the matter is, from the point of view of the applicants, urgent, that there is a penalty attached to the removal inasmuch as under section 40(3) a member removed under sub-section (3) under the Act is not eligible for a period of three years from the date of his removal and that this court should, in view of the above circumstances, exercise its powers under Article 226. It is further alleged that no suit under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be filed against the Government, unless two months' notice thereof is given and this involves delay. It has been held by a Bench of this court that this is an immaterial circumstance, vide the case of Dharnidhar Sharma v. Thakur Prasad.

    As regards the other considerations to which attention has been invited by the learned counsel, the answer, is that had the matter from the point of the applicants' view been really urgent, they would have come to this Court much earlier, i.e immediately after this Court became vested with the power of issuing writs under the Constitution on the 26th of January, 1950. It is to be noticed that the writ application was not filed until the 24th of February, 1951. During the interval that elapsed between the date on which the order was passed and application to this Court, was made, it was possible for the applicants to go to the civil courts and seek a relief. The fact that this procedure of a civil suit is a somewhat dilatory one, on account of congestion of work in the civil suit, is no ground to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. I may be permitted in this connection to refer to the observations of the Full Bench in the case of the Indian Sugar Mills Association v. The Secretary to Government, U.P.

    “We feel that the time has come when we may point out that Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to provide an alternative method of redress to the normal process of a decision in an action brought in the usual courts established by law. The powers under this Article should be sparingly used and only in those clear cases where the rights of a person have been seriously infringed, and he has no other adequate remedy available to him.”

    These observations were made in a case in which the writ asked for was in the nature of a mandamus and were limited to the facts of that case.

    I should also like to refer to the observations of the Full Bench of which I was a member in Asiatic Engineering Company v. Achhru Ram.

    “Though the historical background of these various orders in the nature of writs have to be borne in mind in considering whether a writ should or should not issue, there can be no doubt that Article 226 of the Constitution makes the issue of directions, orders or writs discretionary and it cannot be urged that any party has a right to any form of order as a matter of course. The discretion is a judicial discretion to be exercised according to judicial principles.”

    In this case the writ principally asked for was a certiorari or prohibition. The question in these circumstances, is whether we should exercise our discretion in issuing writs in favour of applicants who did not raise any objection at the time when the charges were forwarded to them by the U.P State Government, that there was any ambiguity about the charges and that they were framed in such a manner as not to enable them to know the exact nature of the case against them and who went on, even after the order had been passed, making representations to Government without protesting against the vague, ambiguous or defective nature of the charges and did not choose to come to this Court until after the lapse of a year of, the passing of the final order by Government. Important as the right to vote is, speaking from the point of view of a citizen living under a democratic system of Government, this Court will not assist a party who fails to come to it at the earliest possible opportunity. All this, of course, presupposes that there is a power under Article 226 to issue writs or direction of orders affecting the rights of parties in respect of matters which were disposed of finally before the Constitution came into force. On that point I consider it unnecessary, however, to express any final opinion, as properly speaking, in the view that I am taking, it does not arise in this case.

    For the reasons given above, I would refuse the writ but it is open to the applicants, if they so desire, to prosecute any remedy that they, may have in the civil courts and it will be for the civil court to go into the question of fact which was raised in the supplementary affidavits which were sought to be filed by the learned counsel for the applicants.

    After giving the matter my anxious consideration I have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case, no costs should be awarded. In all the circumstances of this case, the proper order to pass will be to make the parties bear their own coats. This application should be accordingly dismissed but no order should be made as to costs.

    Application dismissed.

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    Mohammad Bux v. Government Of The State Of Uttar Pradesh
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