Mootham, J.:— This is a plaintiff's application in revision.
2. The plaintiff, who is an occupancy tenant, filed a suit against the defendants, the opposite-parties in this Court, upon the allegation that they had wrongfully entered upon his land, and upon this ground he sued for recovery of possession and for damages. He also alleged—and it is not disputed—that he had been wrongfully dispossessed by the defendants on two previous occasions and that on each of these occasions he had to recover possession through the court. The present suit was, therefore, the third which he had to institute against these defendants, and accordingly he also asked for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession. This suit he filed in the civil court. A preliminary issue was framed as to whether the civil court or the revenue court had jurisdiction and was answered in favour of the latter, and that finding was upheld by the learned District Judge on appeal. A preliminary objection was taken in this Court that no revision lies. It is true, and it has repeatedly been laid down, that a court has jurisdiction to decide a case wrongly as well as rightly, but as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury 76 I.A 131.
Although error in a decision of a subordinate court does not by itself involve that the subordinate court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under Sub-section (c) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises under Sub-section (a) or Sub-section (b) and Sub-section (c) can be ignored.
3. There can be no doubt that the court in this case had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit should have been filed before it or in a revenue court, and it had jurisdiction to decide that question erroneously. It has decided that the suit ought to have been filed in a revenue court, and it was then bound, as it has in fact done, to direct that the plaint be returned. But if in so directing the court's decision on the question of jurisdiction was wrong then it has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law. I am, therefore, of opinion that the preliminary objection fails.
4. It was then contended that the suit was not one which came within the ambit of Section 180 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, as it was a suit by a tenant against a trespasser. In D.N Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider A.I.R 1946 All. 379. a Full Bench of this Court said—
We do not think that Section 180 applies at all to cases in which the defendant has never given the plaintiff reason to think that he is setting up a claim to be the proprietor of the land, and conversely that a suit in a civil court does not lie when the defendant has given reason to think that he is claiming interest as a tenant.
5. The Court further pointed out that the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of affairs which existed at the time of the institution of the suit, and that the plaintiff should as far as possible ascertain on what ground the defendant claimed to occupy the land before he hled his plaint. In Baur v. Deo Kali 1950 A.L.J 861. it was held that for the plaintiff merely to allege in his plaint that the defendants were trespassers was not of itself enough to give the civil court jurisdiction. In the case before me I am informed that in each of the two earlier suits the defendants set up a plea of tenancy, and that is the defence which is raised in this case. In the absence of anything to suggest the contrary the circumstances indicate that the plaintiff must have known that was the ground on which the defendant claimed possession of the land; and I observe that in the trial court it was not in dispute that had the suit been limited to one for possession and damages it ought to have been filed in the revenue court. I am of opinion that this objection also fails.
6. The substantial question is whether the addition of a prayer for an injunction, in circumstances such as obtain in this case, is sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court.
7. Section 242 of the U.P Tenancy Act provides that (subject to a proviso with which we are not now concerned) all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Act shall be heard and determined by a revenue court and that no court other than a revenue court shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in the Act, take cognizance of any such suit of application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. It is clear, therefore, that if in a suit for possession and damages a prayer for injunction be added which is based on the same cause of action the jurisdiction of the revenue court will not be ousted, and it was so held in Ananti v. Chhannu I.L.R 52 All. 501 F.B..
8. But that is not the position in the present case in which it appears to me that the claims for possession and damages on the one hand, and for an injunction on the other, are based on different causes of action, the cause of action in the former case being the last dispossession of the plaintiff and in the latter being the two earlier acts as well as the last act of dispossession. The injunction asked for by the plaintiff cannot be granted by a revenue court, but I do not see in Section 242 any bar to that relief (if the circumstances are found to justify it) being granted by a civil court. It will be observed that the words used in Section 242 are “cause of action” and not “cause of action or part of a cause of action”. Cause of action means the bundle of facts which is material to be proved to establish the plaintiff's claim. Considered, as I think it must be considered, as one collection of facts the cause of action upon which the claim for an injunction is in this case based is one, in my view, in respect of which no relief can be obtained by means of a suit in a revenue court, and the plaintiff is not, therefore, debarred from seeking that relief in a civil court.
9. The position then is that the plaint in this case discloses two distinct causes of action, the relief based upon one being within the jurisdiction of the revenue court and on the other within the jurisdiction of the civil court. This is of course subject to this qualification, that although it is not an uncommon practice for a plaintiff to sue for possession and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with his possession the injunction cannot be granted until after an order that possession be restored to the plaintiff has been made.
10. In Ram Rup Goshain v. Ram Dhari Bhagat I.L.R 47 All. 770. the view was expressed by a Bench of this Court that in a case where some of the reliefs claimed in a suit were reliefs which the court in which the plaint had been filed was competent to grant while others were beyond its jurisdiction the proper procedure was for the court either to call upon the plaintiff to amend his plaint by striking out the reliefs which the court had no jurisdiction to grant or wait until judgment was delivered and dismiss the claims relating to such reliefs. This case was followed by Braund, J. in Laltu v. Maha Laxmi Bai F.A No. 203 of 1940, a case in which the plaintiff had filed a suit in a civil court which gave rise to issues in respect of some of which the civil court had jurisdiction and in respect of others exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the revenue court. The learned Judge there pointed out in addition to the alternatives to which referrence has been made in Ram Rup Goshain's case I.L.R 47 All. 770. a further alternative would be to apply Order 6, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and for the court to dismiss at once chat part of the suit in respect of which it had no jurisdiction as tending to prejudice, embarrass or to delay a fair trial of the suit.
11. The civil court could not in the present case give the plaintiff any relief, for it had no jurisdiction with regard to the claims for possession and damages, and the claim for an injunction was premature. As, however, it had jurisdiction so far as the second claim was concerned it ought, in my judgment, to have dismissed the suit and left it to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit for possession and damages in the revenue court. Instead, however, of doing this it returned the plaint for presentation in the revenue court, and that order has been upheld by the lower appellate court. Substantial justice has accordingly been done, and in the circumstances I do not propose to interfere in revision. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs.
12. Application dismissed.