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Court Opinion Summary (Sapru, J.) — Uttar Pradesh Government Application for Transfer

Factual and Procedural Background

The Uttar Pradesh Government applied to this Court to transfer a criminal case (charges under Ss. 395, 397 and 412, Penal Code) pending before the learned Sessions Judge of Banda to another Court of equal status. The application was described by the Court as unusual because it is rare for the State to seek transfer of a case from the Court of one Sessions Judge to another.

The contested hearing concerned a dacoity matter in which 15 accused were implicated; on 29 November 1949 only two formal witnesses were examined: Badri (a recovery witness) and Shri N.K. Roy, a Judicial Magistrate who had conducted identification proceedings. An affidavit filed on behalf of the prosecution (sworn by the station officer of Naraini police station) made various allegations of bias, improper conduct and procedural irregularities by the Sessions Judge during those examinations. The Court reviewed the allegations and the explanations provided by the learned Sessions Judge and decided the transfer application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and allegations presented, a reasonably trained mind representing the State could entertain a reasonable apprehension that the accused would not receive a fair and impartial trial before the learned Sessions Judge.
  2. Whether the specific allegations of judicial misconduct and procedural irregularity made in the prosecution's affidavit (including alleged expressions of opinion, improper recording of evidence, humiliating or prejudicial treatment of witnesses, and allowing outside comment in court) justify transferring the case from one Sessions Judge to another.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution / State (as represented in the affidavit)

  • The prosecution's affidavit (sworn by the station officer) alleged multiple grievances against the learned Sessions Judge arising from the hearing on 29 November 1949.
  • Specific allegations included: repeated remarks that "there was nothing in the case"; remarks that a second identification parade had no legal value; asking defence counsel whether they had seen a second identification parade (implying the Judge had formed an opinion); allowing defence counsel to dictate the witness's statement; subjecting Shri N.K. Roy (the Magistrate witness) to ridicule, including sending him to the verandah to inspect an accused's complexion; requiring the witness to measure marks on an accused's face and hold the accused's nose; making sarcastic allusions to identification proceedings and indicating they were farcical; and that the record was correctly written only after repeated protests by the Magistrate witness.
  • The affidavit was sworn by the station officer of Naraini police station and asserted personal knowledge of many paragraphs (paras 1–6 and 18 and others).

Learned Sessions Judge (Responses / Explanations)

  • The learned Sessions Judge categorically denied several of the alleged statements, including that he said "there was nothing in the case" and that he expressed a final opinion about the identification evidence.
  • He explained that he observed what appeared to be two identification parades in respect of some accused (first parade with no identification; second parade later where identification occurred). He said he asked counsel to find authorities on the point and proposed discussing the matter at length at argument, which the Court found to be a proper approach.
  • He denied that he allowed defence counsel to dictate the Magistrate's statement and provided explanations (including about cuttings in the English and Hindi records) which the Court found reasonable.
  • He explained asking the Magistrate to go to the verandah to see an accused's complexion was motivated by ensuring accurate description (the room was dark); the Court accepted this explanation as not showing prejudice.
  • He admitted permitting the witness to measure the marks on an accused's face with pins, explaining this was necessitated by the witness's conduct and the defence's contention about precautions in identification parades; the Court accepted this explanation and did not view it as intended to humiliate the witness.
  • He denied making sarcastic allusions or indicating that identification proceedings were farcical; the Court found no reason to disbelieve him on this point.
  • He acknowledged that senior local Bar members present had expressed surprise at the Magistrate witness's attitude; the Judge recorded this in his explanation, which the Court found surprising and improper for a Judge to permit or encourage.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by observing that applications by the State to transfer cases between Sessions Judges are rare and require careful scrutiny because Sessions Judges hold a high position in the judicial hierarchy and are entrusted with wide powers. The Court emphasized that when the State seeks a transfer it must be reasonable to assume that the department in charge would take care to ensure substance in the allegations.

The Court proceeded to examine the prosecution's allegations "seriatim" (one by one) and evaluated each against the learned Sessions Judge's denials and explanations:

  • Where the Sessions Judge denied making a remark and there was no counter-affidavit from the State to challenge him (for example, the alleged remark that "there was nothing in the case"), the Court accepted the Judge's version as correct.
  • On the issue of the alleged denigration of the second identification parade, the Judge explained factual circumstances (two parades and counsel's objections) and the Court found nothing improper in asking counsel to locate authorities and deferring final opinion to argument.
  • Allegations that the defence counsel was allowed to dictate a witness's statement were met by categorical denials and explanations from the Judge; the Court found those explanations reasonable and thus gave the allegations no force.
  • The Court accepted the Judge's explanations for asking the Magistrate to step into the verandah to see an accused's complexion (to enable accurate identification description in a dark room) and for permitting measurement of marks with pins (to resolve disputes about the size of marks and precautions in the identification parade). The Court did not view these acts as humiliating or evidence of bias.
  • Regarding the presence and comments of senior members of the local Bar (President Makuod Lal and Secretary Bhupendra Nigam) who "expressed their surprise at the attitude of the Magistrate witness," the Court strongly criticized the Judge for permitting outside counsel or persons to make observations about witnesses in Court and stressed that a Judge must not consult or invite opinions from others in arriving at a decision. The Court regarded this conduct as improper, though it noted the State had not raised this as a grievance.
  • The Court also criticized the State's practice of swearing the prosecution affidavit through a Police Officer, describing this as a procedure likely to affect the prestige and independence of the judiciary and stating that such an affidavit should have been sworn by someone other than a Police Officer.

Balancing the admitted lapse (allowing bar members' remarks) against the totality of the evidence and explanations, the Court concluded that the irregularity, though regrettable, did not create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the State that it would not receive a fair and impartial trial before the learned Sessions Judge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for transfer filed on behalf of the State is rejected. The Court expressly refused to transfer the Ss. 395/397/412 Penal Code case from the learned Sessions Judge of Banda to another Court of equal status.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The criminal trial remains before the learned Sessions Judge of Banda; no transfer is ordered.
  • The Court signalled two important procedural and institutional positions expressed in the judgment: (a) it is generally averse to entertaining applications for transfer of cases by the State from the Courts of one Sessions Judge to another; and (b) affidavits in support of transfer applications should not be sworn by Police Officers, as that practice is objectionable for reasons of judicial prestige and independence.
  • The Court also admonished judicial practice: it is improper for a Judge to permit or encourage counsel or uninvolved persons (e.g., senior local Bar representatives) to make public observations in Court about witnesses, and a Judge should not consult or allow outside influence in reaching decisions. The Court, however, found the particular lapse insufficient to justify transfer in this instance.
  • No new legal precedent was established in the sense of altering substantive transfer law; rather, the Court applied established standards for assessing reasonable apprehension of bias and declined to order transfer on the facts before it.
D.R.R

Disposition: Application rejected.

    State v. Ram Sia And Others Opposite Party.

    Sapru, J.:— This application on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Government is of a rather unusual nature. The prayer embodied in this application is that this Court may be pleased to transfer Ss. 395/397/412, Penal Code case pending in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge of Banda to some other Court of equal status. We have described the application as unusual because it is very rarely, if indeed ever, that applications for transfer of cases from the Court of one Sessions Judge to another are made on behalf of the State to this Court. Sessions Judges occupy a position of distinct importance in our judicial hierarchy. It is after years of service that a judicial Officer reaches the position of a Sessions Judge. The Criminal Procedure Code vests Sessions Judges with vast powers. They can pass a sentence of death, subject to confirmation by this Court. Very rightly both this Court and the State repose complete confidence in their ability, integrity and character, A transfer application on behalf of the State? stands on a somewhat different footing from that of a private complainant or an accused person. Before a transfer application is presented on behalf of the State, it is not unreasonable to assume that care is taken on the part of the department responsible for law and order, that there is substance in the allegations on which the transfer application is based. What may disturb the equanimity of mind of an ordinary villager is not likely to disturb the trained mind of men who have to deal with State matters. The State is represented in all trials by experienced counsel in all the districts in this province and it strikes us that they bring to bear upon their work an intelligent mind. The question, therefore, which we have to ask in this case is whether a trained mind could reasonably entertain an apprehension that the party it is representing is not likely to have a fair trial before the learned Sessions Judge. With these observations of a general character, we propose to deal with the specific allegations seriatim which have been made against the learned Sessions Judge in this case.

    2. It appears that a dacoity case in which 15 accused persons were involved was fixed for hearing in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge on 29th November 1949. On that date only two formal witnesses, i.e, one Badri and another Shri N.K Roy, Judicial Magistrate, first class, were examined. Badri was a recovery, witness and so far as Shri N.K Boy was concerned, he was the Magistrate who had conducted the identification proceedings. The first grievance against the learned Sessions Judge is that, during the course of the recording of the statements of these witnesses, the remark was made by him more than once that there was nothing in the case. In his explanation the learned Sessions Judge has categorically denied that he ever made that remark. The affidavit has been filed in this case by the station officer police station Naraini who had investigated the-case. We do not know how the station Officer came to be present in Court. According to the affidavit, the contents of Paras, 1 to 6 and 18 are true to his personal knowledge. There is no counter affidavit on behalf of the State to challenge the version of the learned Sessions Judge and, in these circumstances, we are bound to accept the version that the learned Sessions Judge has given as correct. The second grievance against the learned Sessions Judge is that during the statement of Shri N.K Roy, Judicial Magistrate, first class, the learned Sessions Judge made the observation that the second identification has got no legal value and was useless. It is urged that by this remark he expressed a definite opinion about the identification evidence upon which the prosecution was relying. The learned Sessions Judge denies having made any such observation. His explanation is that during the course of the examination of the Magistrate who had conducted the identification proceedings it appeared to him in the case before him that the identification proceedings of some of the accused by the same witnesses were held twice. He further states in his explanation that in the first parade no accused could be identified and in the second parade which was held after some time by another Magistrate the same witnesses identified the accused persons. Naturally it was pointed out by one of the counsel for the accused that any identification in the circumstances would be of little or no value. The learned Sessions Judge asked the counsel who was appearing in the case to hunt out authorities on the point and observed that the point would be discussed at length at the time of argument. We see nothing wrong in the line that the learned Sessions Judge adopted. It would certainly have been improper for the learned Sessions Judge to have expressed any definite or final opinion on the identification proceedings, but we do not find on the facts before us that he, in fact, did so.

    3. The third grievance against the learned Sessions Judge is that he asked the defence counsel whether they had ever seen or heard of a second identification parade of the same accused in the same case. The allegation in the affidavit is that the question was put in a one which unmistakably indicated that the learned Sessions Judge had already made up his mind that the second identification proceedings were null and void and illegal. The learned Sessions Judge denies that he ever made any such observation. We accept the version of the learned Sessions Judge as correct.

    4. The fourth grievance against the learned Sessions Judge is that the attitude of the learned Sessions Judge during the examination of Shri N.K Roy was not correct and proper. It is alleged that the deposition of this witness was not recorded in the manner in which it should have been recorded and that the defence counsel was, in fact, allowed to dictate the statement in his own words. It is also alleged that there was objection to this procedure on the part of the witness but no heed was paid to the objection. It is further alleged that thereafter the dictation of the learned defence counsel was penned through and the Actual statement of the witness taken down. This is a very serious allegation to make against any Court and, if true, would constitute a good ground for transfer. The learned Sessions Judge has categorically denied that the statement of the Magistrate was not recorded in the manner deposed to by him. He has also denied in no unmistakable language that the defence counsel was allowed to dictate the statement in his own words. He has given an explanation of the two cuttings in the English memorandum and one in the Hindi record which we find reasonable. The result is that this allegation against the learned Sessions Judge has no force.

    5. We come now to the fifth grievance which, is to be found in para. 7(ii) of the affidavit. The allegation is that the learned Sessions Judge was intent on being obnoxious to Shri N.K Roy. He submitted him to ridicule in open Court. It is alleged that when Shri Boy stated that the complexion of one of the accused was gahra gandumi, the learned Sessions Judge compelled the witness to go out of the Court room in the verandah to examine the complexion of the-accused and thereafter to give his statement. The version of the learned Sessions Judge is that the-witness was asked to go out of the court room in the verandah to see the complexion of a particular accused at that accused in his opinion had a remarkably fair complexion for a villager. The point that the defence was making out was that it was possible, because of his complexion for the accused to be Bingled out in the identification parade unless precautions were taken to mix up persons of similar complexions in the parade. It was urged by the defence that no such precautions had been taken by the learned Magistrate who was in the witness box. In these-circumstances, it became necessary for the learned Sessions Judge to draw the attention of the Magistrate witness to the complexion of the accused. Apparently, the room in which the Magistrate was being examined was a dark one. In order to give the witness an opportunity of giving a correct description of the accused the learned Sessions Judge asked him to go out of the Court room in the verandah and see his face in clear light there. It may be that the learned Sessions Judge would have been better advised to take down the statement of Shri Boy as it was without asking him to go out of the courtroom in the verandah, but we are unable to see in this act of the learned Sessions Judge any prejudice or bias or animosity against the learned Magistrate or the prosecution.

    6. The sixth grievance against the learned Sessions Judge is that he compelled the Magistrate witness to measure with pins the distances and the size of the marks on the face of the accused and that he made him, despite his protests, hold the nose of the accused and measured the distance of the marks from the nose. The learned Sessions Judge states in his explanation that it is a fact that the witness was allowed to measure with pins the size of the marks on the face of the accused, that this he explains was necessitated by the conduct of the witness. According to the learned Sessions Judge, Badri accused had two marks on his face. In the identification memorandum prepared by the witness there was no note about these marks. The allegation of the defence was that no precautions had been taken in respect of these marks. When the attention of the witness was drawn to these marks by defence counsel, the witness tried to explain them away by saying that the marks were insignificant. Thereafter the learned Sessions Judge was requested by the defence counsel to note the size of the marks as the witness was not prepared to agree to the size proposed by the defence. In these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that there was no alternative before him but to ask the witness to measure the marks with pins and give their exact dimensions. We have no hesitation in accepting the version of the learned Sessions Judge as correct. We are certain that by doing all this it was not the intention of the learned Sessions Judge to humiliate the Magistrate witness.

    7. The seventh grievance made against the learned Sessions Judge is that he made sarcastic allusions and references to the identification parade held by learned Magistrate and that he made it quite obvious by the nature of his questions and the manner in which they were put that he had already decided that the identification proceedings were of a farcical character. The learned Sessions Judge categorically denies that at any time during the examination of the Magistrate he made any sarcastic allusions or references to the identification parade or expressed any opinion about the value of the identification parade. We see no reason to disbelieve the learned Sessions Judge on this point.

    8. In Para. 11 of the affidavit the allegation is made that it was only after repeated protests by the Magistrate that the record was correctly written. The learned Sessions Judge denies that there is any foundation for this allegation. We have noticed his explanation in regard to the manner in which the record was prepared in considering the allegations made against him in Para. 7(i) of the affidavit filed on behalf of the prosecution.

    9. We have dealt in detail with the various allegations which have been made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the prosecution. We are bound to say that we do not think it right that the State, when it seeks transfer of a case from the Court of one Sessions Judge to that of another Sessions Judge, should utilise the services of a Police Officer for purposes of swearing affidavits. Such a procedure is calculated to affect the prestige as also the independence of the judiciary. The affidavit in this case should have been sworn to by some one who was not a Police Officer.

    10. We come now to a portion of the explanation of the learned Sessions Judge which to say very frankly, has surprised us. In the concluding part of his explanation the learned Sessions Judge says:

    “In the end it may be pointed out that some seniormost members of the local Bar, including the President, Shree Makuod Lal, and the Secretary Shri Bhupendra Nigam were present in Court at the time of hearing and had watched the proceedings. They all expressed their surprise at the attitude of the Magistrate witness.”

    11. For any counsel who is not directly interested in the case as counsel for one of the parties to make any observation, favourable or unfavourable, against a witness in Court is in our opinion a highly improper Act. It is the Court and Court alone which is in control of the proceedings of the Court. It is not right for a Judge to encourage counsel to make any observations in his Court about witnesses who happened to be appearing before him. The decision that a Judge has to give is a personal decision and in coming to a conclusion in regard to a case it is not open to him to consult, in any shape or form, any person whatsoever. We think that it was not proper for the learned Sessions Judge to have allowed the president and the secretary of the Local Bar to make any remarks about the nature of the evidence or the character or the attitude of the Magistrate witness. We regret that this aspect of the matter never occurred to the learned Sessions Judge. This, however, is not one of the matters of which a grievance has been made by the State. We have given anxious thought to the question whether, having regard to the fact that the learned Sessions Judge did not observe a proper etiquette in regard to this matter, we should transfer the case to soma other Sessions Judge. We have come to the conclusion that regrettable as this lapse— perhaps through inadvertence—on the part of the learned Sessions Judge is, it is not of such a character as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the State which has advisers of a suffisently high intellectual calibre that it will not have a fair and impartial justice before the learned Sessions Judge. We are not on this ground, therefore, to transfer this case.

    12. Before we part with the case, we should like to make it clear that this Court is, generally speaking, averse to entertaining applications for transfer of cases by the State from the Courts of one Sessions Judge to another. We have in the opening part of or judgment given at some length the reasons why we think that this practice should be discouraged. For the reasons give above, this transfer application on behalf of the State is rejected.

    D.R.R

    13. Application rejected.

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    Comments

    State v. Ram Sia And Others Opposite Party.
    (Jul 3, 1950)